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Local Government 
and Public Service Reform Initiative
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI), as one of the programs 
of the Open Society Institute (OSI), is an international development and grant-giving 
organization dedicated to the support of good governance in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS). LGI seeks to fulﬁll its 
mission through the initiation of research and support of development and operational 
activities in the ﬁelds of decentralization, public policy formation, and the reform of 
public administration.
With projects running in countries covering the region between the Czech Republic 
and Mongolia, LGI seeks to achieve its objectives through:
 • development of sustainable regional networks of institutions and professionals 
engaged in policy analysis, reform-oriented training, and advocacy;
 • support and dissemination of in-depth comparative and regionally applicable 
policy studies tackling local government issues;
 • support of country-speciﬁc projects and delivery of technical assistance to the 
implementation agencies;
 • assistance to Soros foundations with the development of local government, 
public administration, and/or public policy programs in their countries of the 
region;
 • publication of books, studies, and discussion papers dealing with the issues of 
decentralization, public administration, good governance, public policy, and 
lessons learned from the process of transition in these areas;
 • development of curricula and organization of training programs dealing with 
speciﬁc local government issues;
 • support of policy centers and think tanks in the region.
Apart from its own projects, LGI works closely with a number of other international 
organizations (Council of Europe, Department for International Development, USAID, 
UNDP, and the World Bank) and co-funds larger regional initiatives aimed at the 
support of reforms on the subnational level. Local Government Information Network 
(LOGIN) and Fiscal Decentralization Initiative (FDI) are two main examples of this 
cooperation.

vContents
 Acknowledgments ................................................................... vii
 List of Contributors ...........................................................................ix
 List of Tables and Figures ......................................................... xi
 1. Introduction ....................................................................... 1
  Gábor Soós
  
 2. Country Report—Bulgaria ............................................... 25
  Report on the State of Local Democracy in Bulgaria
  Milena Minkova  ■  Milena Stefanova
  Rumyana Kolarova  ■  Dimitar Dimitrov
 3. Country Report—Estonia .............................................. 163
  Indicators of Local Democracy in Estonia
  Georg Sootla  ■  Anu Toots  ■  Rein Ruutsoo
 4. Country Report—Slovakia ............................................. 351
  The State of Democracy in Slovakia
  Ján Sopóci  ■  Anna Hrabovská  ■  Ján Bunčák
 5. Conclusion: Comparing Local Democracy ..................... 473
  in Central and Eastern Europe
  Paweł Swianiewicz
 
 Index of Terms ...................................................................... 513

vii
Acknowledgments
The editor would like to thank Violetta Zentai for her moral support and en-
couragement, Tom Bass for his well-organized management of the publication, and 
Kim Fraser for the hard work she put in on the copy-editing of the book.

ix
List of Contributors
Ján Bunčák is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology, Comenius 
University and Research Fellow, Institute of Sociology of the Slovak Academy 
of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia.
Dimitar Dimitrov is a lecturer on political participation and election studies at the 
University of Soﬁa and the New Bulgarian University, Bulgaria.
Anna Hrabovska is an assistant professor at the Department of Sociology, Comenius 
University, Bratislava, Slovakia.
Rumyana Kolarova is a lecturer in political science at the University of Soﬁa and the 
American University in Bulgaria.
Milena Minkova is a consultant on local government and public administration in 
Bulgaria.
Rein Ruutsoo is professor of general political science at the University of Tartu.
Ján Sopóci is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology, Comenius Uni-
versity, Bratislava, Slovakia.
Georg Sootla is a professor of public policy in the Department of Government, Tallinn 
University of Educational Sciences, Tallinn, Estonia.
Gábor Soós is research project manager at the Tocqueville Research Center, Budapest, 
Hungary.
Milena Stefanova is an associate professor of local government, Department of Public 
Administration, University of Soﬁa, Bulgaria.
Paweł Swianiewicz is a professor in the Centre for European Regional and Local Studies, 
Warsaw University, Poland.
Anu Toots is an associate professor in public policy, Tallinn University of Educational 
Sciences, Tallinn, Estonia.

xi
List of Tables and Figures
TABLES
C H A P T E R  2  ■ B U L G A R I A
Table 2.1:  Key Economic Indicators ..................................................... 29
Table 2.2:  Number of Municipalities in Bulgaria ................................. 29
Table 2.3:  Type and Number of Territorial Units (1949–2003) ............ 31
Table 2.4:  Breakdown of Municipalities by Population Size ................. 32
Table 2.5:  Representativeness of the Sample by Gender ....................... 36
Table 2.6:  Representativeness of the Sample by Age ............................. 37
Table 2.7:  Identiﬁed Problems in the Interaction of 
  Central and Local Government ........................................... 40
Table 2.8:   Municipal Budget Deﬁcits (1997–2001) ........................... 426
Table 2.9:   Cross-diﬀerences among Municipalities ............................... 42
Table 2.10:  Structure of Revenues in Municipal Budgets [%] ................. 43
Table 2.11:  Structure of Own Revenues in Municipal Budgets [%] ........ 44
Table 2.12:  Structure of Own Revenues in Municipal Budgets 
  (2002–2003) ....................................................................... 45
Table 2.13  Revenues in Local Budgets of Bulgarian 
  Municipalities [%] ............................................................... 45
Table 2.14:  Local Expenditures by Type [%] .......................................... 45
Table 2.15:  Current Municipal Expenditures [%] .................................. 46
Table 2.16:  Structure of Local Expenditures by Policy Area [%] ............. 47
Table 2.17:  Scale of Diﬀerences across Municipalities ............................ 47
Table 2.18:  Major Bulgarian Political Parties: Statutes of Local Branches ... 51
Table 2.19:  Partiality of Local Administration (7-Point Scale) ................ 57
Table 2.20:  Index of Respect for the Law [%] ........................................ 58
xii
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Table 2.21:  Respect for Legal Regulations by Type of Municipality 
  (7-Point Scale) ..................................................................... 58
Table 2.22:  Requests for Access to Public Information Submitted to the 
  Municipal Administration (January–December, 2002) ........ 61
Table 2.23:  Sources of Municipal E-government [%] ............................. 62
Table 2.24:  Staﬀ Member to Inform Journalists ..................................... 63
Table 2.25:  Frequency of Contact with Journalists ................................. 63
Table 2.26:  Public Deliberations on the Local Budget ............................ 64
Table 2.27:  Municipal Councilors: Nature of Employment .................... 66
Table 2.28:  Bribery Cases among Public Oﬃcials (1997–2001) ............. 69
Table 2.29:  Public Procurement Regulations in Municipalities ............... 70
Table 2.30:  Inﬂuence of Local Business on Local Government Policies 
  (7-Point Scale) ..................................................................... 70
Table 2.31: Inﬂuence of Business on Local Councilors’ Opinions 
  (7-Point Scale) ..................................................................... 71
Table 2.32:  Corruption Pressure by Occupational Group [%] ................ 74
Table 2.33:  Spread of Corruption by Occupational Group 
  (2000–2003) [%] ................................................................ 75
Table 2.34:  Perceived Inﬂuence on Municipal Decisions 
  (7-Point Scale) ..................................................................... 77
Table 2.35: Number of Full-time Civil Servant Positions ....................... 81
Table 2.36:  Total Number of Employees in Local Administration .......... 81
Table 2.37:  Number of Years in Present Position as 
  Chief Administrative Oﬃcier .............................................. 82
Table 2.38:  Length of Residence in Municipality ................................... 83
Table 2.39:  Chief Administrative Oﬃcers’ Priorities at Work ................. 84
Table 2.40:  Councilors’ Assessment of Local Administration’s 
  Competence and Partiality .................................................. 84
Table 2.41: Number of Assembly Sessions in Municipalities (2003) ....... 85
Table 2.42:  Indicators for Decisional Performance ................................. 86
Table 2.43:  Most Frequent Reason for Delay in Council Decisions ........ 87
xiii
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  A N D  F I G U R E S
Table 2.44:  Planning and Programming in Local Policy by Sector .......... 87
Table 2.45: Municipal Planning Capacity [%] ....................................... 88
Table 2.46:  Cost Reviews by Sphere [%] ................................................ 89
Table 2.47:  Assessment of Outputs from Privatization and 
  Contracting Out (7-Point Scale) .......................................... 90
Table 2.48:   Number of Electoral Parties in Parliamentary and 
  Local Elections (1991–2001) ............................................... 91
Table 2.49:  Positions Contested in Local Elections (1995–1999) ........... 93
Table 2.50:  Registration of Lists and Candidates 
  in Local Elections (1999) ..................................................... 95
Table 2.51:  Citizen Participation in Election Campaigns ....................... 95
Table 2.52:  Party Seats in Municipal Councils 
  by Type of Municipality (1995) ........................................... 97
Table 2.53:  Party Seats in Municipal Councils 
  by Type of Municipality (1995) [%] .................................... 97
Table 2.54:  Party Seats in Municipal Councils 
  by Type of Municipality (1999) ........................................... 98
Table 2.55:  Party Seats in Municipal Councils 
  by Type of Municipality (1999) [%] .................................... 99
Table 2.56:  Election Results for Municipal Mayors by Party (1999) ..... 100
Table 2.57:  Election Results for Municipal Mayors by Party 
  (1999) [%] ........................................................................ 101
Table 2.58:  General Election Results by Political Party 
  (1990–2001) [%] .............................................................. 102
Table 2.59:  Total Number of Voters in Millions and 
  Percentage Turnout in Elections (1991–2001) ................... 103
Table 2.60:  Turnouts in 1999 Local Elections Compared to 
  1997 Parliamentary Elections  ........................................... 104
Table 2.61:  Party Membership of Representatives 
  by Type of Nomination ..................................................... 110
Table 2.62:  Party Nomination of Representatives 
  by Size of Municipality ...................................................... 110
xiv
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Table 2.63:  Party Membership of Representatives 
  by Size of Municipality ...................................................... 110
Table 2.64:  Mayor and Councilor Nominations by Party ..................... 111
Table 2.65:  Councilors’ and Mayors’ Endorsements by Type ................ 111
Table 2.66:  Level of Education of Local Representatives ...................... 117
Table 2.67:  Income Levels of Councilors and Mayors (7-Point Scale) ..... 118
Table 2.68:  Democratic Values and Attitudes 
  of Local Representatives [%] .............................................. 121
Table 2.69:  Consideration Given by Local Representatives 
  to Selected Groups (7-Point Scale) ..................................... 123
Table 2.70:  Local Representatives’ Ranking of Information Sources 
  as a Reﬂection of Citizens’ Views ....................................... 124    
Table 2.71:  Inﬂuence of Diﬀerent People 
  on Local Representatives’ Opinion (7-Point Scale) ............. 124
Table 2.72:  Inﬂuence of Selected People and Bodies 
  on the Decisions of Local Government (7-Point Scale) ...... 127
Table 2.73:  Number of Civil Society Organizations in Municipalities ... 128
Table 2.74:  Forms of Public Discussion of the Local Budget ................ 129
Table 2.75:  Number of Public Hearings and Forums 
  by Size of Municipality (2002) .......................................... 130
Table 2.76:  Number of Media Covering Local Aﬀairs 
  by Size of Municipality ...................................................... 132
Table 2.77:  Type of Media Covering Local Municipal Aﬀairs ............... 133
Table 2.78:  Political Topics in the Local Media [%] ............................. 136
Table 2.79:  Number of Civil Society Organizations 
  in Municipalities by Type [%] ........................................... 140
Table 2.80:  Percentage of Municipalities Where Actions against 
  Local Government Decisions Occur .................................. 148
C H A P T E R  3  ■ E S T O N I A
Table 3.1: Regional Gross Domestic Product at Current Prices (2000) ... 166
Table 3.2: Number and Percentage of Municipalities by Population ... 171
xv
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  A N D  F I G U R E S
Table 3.3: Size of the Local Administration as a Proportion of the 
  Population in Local Communities [%] .............................. 171
Table 3.4: Distribution of Sent and Received Survey Samples 
  by Region .......................................................................... 175
Table 3.5: Local Oﬃcials’ Assessment of Intensity of Problems 
  in Intergovernmental Relations (7-Point Scale) .................. 179
Table 3.6: Community Problems Reported 
  by Survey Respondents [%] ............................................... 184
Table 3.7: Assessment of the Intensity of Problems 
  in Intergovernmental Relations by Local Oﬃcials 
  (7-Point Scale) ................................................................... 186
Table 3.8: Evaluation of Changes in the Distribution of Investments 
  via the National Investment Program (4-Point Scale)  ........ 189
Table 3.9: Management of Cases at Administrative Courts 
  in Estonia (2002) .............................................................. 196
Table 3.10: Information Requests to Local Authorities in Estonia 
  by Size of Community [%] ................................................ 199
Table 3.11: Information Presented on the Websites of Estonian  
  Local Governments by Size of Community [%] ................ 202
Table 3.12: Frequency of Contact with Journalists Dependent 
  on the Formalization of Staﬀ Assignment to Public 
  Relations Tasks in Local Government [%] ......................... 204
Table 3.13: Frequency of Public Hearings and Forums Organized 
  by Local Governments Dependent on the Formalization 
  of Staﬀ Assignment to Public Relations Tasks [%] ............. 205
Table 3.14: Frequency of Review of Costs and Eﬃciency 
  of Administration by Councils [%] .................................... 209
Table 3.15: Assessment of Local Government Susceptibility to Business 
  Inﬂuence by Size of Community (7-Point Scale) ............... 212
Table 3.16: The Inﬂuence on Local Democracy of the Election 
  of Leaders of Civic Organizations as Councilors [%] ......... 212
Table 3.17: The Proportion of Local Governments Where Council 
  Used Controls beyond the Normatively Regulated Forms 
  of Accountability [%] ........................................................ 216
xvi
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Table 3.18: The Impact of Size and Type of Local Government 
  (Parish, Town) on Institutional Balance (7-Point Scale) ..... 220
Table 3.19: The Role of Cooperation between the Assembly and the 
  Mayor Dependent on the Size of the Community [%] ...... 220
Table 3.20: Age Structure of the Population and Reproduction of the
  Workforce According to Size of Local Community [%] ..... 222
Table 3.21: Income Groups by Geographic Region (1998) [%] ........... 223
Table 3.22: Own Revenues as a Proportion of Total Revenues 
  of Local Governments by Size [%] ..................................... 224
Table 3.23: Proportion of Personal Income Taxes in Total Revenues 
  of Local Communities by Size [%] .................................... 225
Table 3.24: The Role of Investments in Local Government 
  Expenditures in the General Accounts 
  of Local Government Budgets [%] .................................... 227
Table 3.25: Sources of Investments of Diﬀerent Sized 
  Local Communities (2000) ............................................... 228
Table 3.26: Characteristics of Top Investors (2000–2002) .................... 228
Table 3.27: The Role and Impact of the Local Civil Service 
  as Assessed by Councilors (7-Point Scale) .......................... 230
Table 3.28: Most Frequent Reasons for the Delay of Decisions 
  at Local Councils [%] ........................................................ 237
Table 3.29: Voting Behavior of Council by Size 
  of Local Community (10-Point Scale) ............................... 239
Table 3.30: Availability of Diﬀerent Types of Strategy 
  in Local Communities by Size [%] .................................... 241
Table 3.31: Investments Made According to Development Plan 
  by Size of Community [%] ................................................ 242
Table 3.32: Expected and Real Budget Costs 
  by Size of Community [%] ................................................ 243
Table 3.33: The Inﬂuence of Investing According to a Development 
  Plan on the Financial Discipline of Projects [%] ................ 244
Table 3.34: The Extent of Privatization and Contracting 
  out of Services at the Local Level [%] ................................ 247
xvii
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  A N D  F I G U R E S
Table 3.35: Assessment of the Outcomes of Privatization and Contracting 
  out by Size of Local Community, (7-Point Scale) ............... 248
Table 3.36: Local Referenda on the Amalgamation of Municipalities 
  (1996–2002) [%] .............................................................. 250
Table 3.37: Resident-Councilor Ratio According 
  to the Local Government Council Election Act ................. 252
Table 3.38: Trends in the Form of Competition in Local Elections 
  (1993–2002) ..................................................................... 255
Table 3.39: Level of Competition in the 2002 Local Elections 
  According to Region .......................................................... 257
Table 3.40: Predictors of Turnout Rate in Local Elections (2002) ........ 258
Table 3.41: Division of Mandates across the Regions 
  in the Local Elections (2002) ............................................. 261
Table 3.42: The Division of Mandates across the Region 
  in the Local Elections (2002) ............................................. 262
Table 3.43: The Division of Votes and Mandates between  
  Electoral Lists in the Local Elections (2002) [%]  .............. 263
Table 3.44: The Basic Characteristics of Estonian Political Parties ........ 264
Table 3.45: Party Membership of Local Representatives 
  and Mayors [%] ................................................................. 265
Table 3.46: “What Kind of Organization Nominated You 
  in the Last Election Campaign?” (Number of Cases) ......... 266
Table 3.47: Passive and Active Presence of Political Parties 
  at the Local Level [%] ........................................................ 268
Table 3.48: Organizations That Played the Most Important Role 
  in Unconventional Actions [%] ......................................... 269
Table 3.49: Inﬂuence of Faction and Political Leaders on the  
  Formation of Councilors’ Personal Opinions Dependent 
  on Nominating Body (7-Point Scale) ................................. 271
Table 3.50: Characteristics of Local Council Factions 
  across Political Parties ........................................................ 272
Table 3.51: Formalization of Interparty Relations in Local Councils .... 273
Table 3.52: Gender Representation by Region (2002) [%] ................... 275
xviii
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Table 3.53: Education of Representatives and the Electorate [%] ......... 276
Table 3.54: Communication Skills of Local Representatives [%] .......... 277
Table 3.55: Political Positions Most Often Held 
  by Local Representatives [%] ............................................. 278
Table 3.56: The Main Forms of Engagement of Local Representatives 
  in Civic Organizations [%] ................................................ 279
Table 3.57: Statements Receiving the Most Support 
  by Local Councilors (7-Point Scale) ................................... 281
Table 3.58: Local Councilors’ Support of New Public Management 
  Ideas by Size of Local Government (7-Point Scale) ............ 281
Table 3.59: Local Councilors’ Support for Political Parties 
  (7-Point Scale) ................................................................... 283
Table 3.60: Share of Respondents Who “Completely” and
  “Rather” Trust Listed Institutions [%] ............................... 284
Table 3.61: Trust toward Political Institutions by Size of Municipality 
  (7-Point Scale) ................................................................... 284
Table 3.62: Social Groups Considered by Local Representatives 
  in Decision-making (7-Point Scale) ................................... 286
Table 3.63: Actors Having Main Inﬂuence 
  on the Decision-making of Councilors (7-Point Scale) ...... 287
Table 3.64: Importance of Feedback Channels of Local Representatives 
  by Size of Local Community (7-Point Scale) ..................... 288
Table 3.65: Local Councilors’ Attitudes towards the Participation 
  of External Actors (7-Point Scale) ...................................... 289
Table 3.66: The Impact of External Constituents 
  on Local Government Decisions and the Decision-making 
  Process (7-Point Scale) ....................................................... 290
Table 3.67: Local Residents’ Satisfaction with Public Service Delivery 
  by Department .................................................................. 293
Table 3.68: Local Residents’ Satisfaction with the Extent of Services 
  Provided by Local Government [%] .................................. 293
Table 3.69: Assessment of Quality of Work of Authorities 
  by Frequency of Residents’ Contact [%] ............................ 394
xix
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  A N D  F I G U R E S
Table 3.70: Share of Local, Regional, and National Print Media 
  in Media Consumption [%] .............................................. 301
Table 3.71: Coverage of the Activities of Local Government 
  in the Print Media [%]  ..................................................... 302
Table 3.72: Evaluation of Coverage of Local Issues 
  in the Print Media by Size of Municipality [%] ................. 302
Table 3.73: Coverage of Local Government Activities 
  in the Electronic Media by Size of Municipality [%] .......... 304
Table 3.74: Evaluation of the Coverage of Local Issues 
  by the Electronic Media [%] .............................................. 304
Table 3.75: Nonproﬁt Associations Registered in the Business Register 
  by County and Number of Residents per Association 
  (1994–2001) ..................................................................... 310
Table 3.76: Distribution of Associations in Diﬀerent Fields of Activity .... 312
Table 3.77: Division of Municipalities according 
  to the Density of Associations [%]  .................................... 315
Table 3.78: Ranked Funding Sources of Civil Society Organizations 
  by Type of Settlement ........................................................ 318
Table 3.79: Local Councilors’ Views on Trust, Cooperation, 
  and Conﬂict [%]  .............................................................. 321
Table 3.80: Citizens’ Beliefs about Their Capacity to Inﬂuence 
  Political Issues [%] ............................................................. 331
Table 3.81: Local Oﬃcials’ Level of Attachment 
  to Diﬀerent Identities [%] ................................................. 334
Table 3.82: Local Leaders’ Identiﬁcation with Diﬀerent Levels 
  of Community [%] ........................................................... 336
Table 3.83: Citizens’ Trust in and Perception of Ability to Inﬂuence 
  Institutions [%] ................................................................. 338
C H A P T E R  4  ■ S L O V A K I A
Table 4.1: Communities in Slovakia Ranked by Number of Residents ... 358
Table 4.2: State and Municipal Budget Expenditures 
  [Billions of Slovak crowns] ................................................ 375
xx
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Table 4.3: Trends in Indebtedness of Local Self-governments
  [Billions of Slovak crowns] ................................................ 376
Table 4.4: Most Frequent Reason for Postponement of Decisions 
  by Local Representatives [%] ............................................. 395
Table 4.5: Programs of Local Policy and Municipal Development 
  in Slovakia ......................................................................... 396
Table 4.6: Number of Local Representatives in Communities ............ 398
Table 4.7: The Role of Political Parties in Local Elections (2002) ....... 402
Table 4.8: Voter Turnout in Parliamentary and Local Elections [%] ... 403
Table 4.9: Presence of Political Party Branch Oﬃces 
  by Size of Municipality [%] ............................................... 406
Table 4.10: Local Party Branches in Municipalities [%] ....................... 406
Table 4.11: Local Boards Containing Parties or Coalitions 
  (Factions) [%] ................................................................... 409
Table 4.12: Level of Education of Representatives 
  and the General Population [%] ........................................ 412
Table 4.13: Democratic Values and Attitudes of Representatives [%] ... 417
Table 4.14: Party Sympathy of Local Representatives 
  According to Party Membership ........................................ 421
Table 4.15: Trust of Local Representatives and General Population 
  in Institutions .................................................................... 423
Table 4.16: Special Consideration of Representatives 
  to Selected Groups of People ............................................. 424
Table 4.17: Special Consideration to Selected Groups According to
  Demographic Data and Party Membership (7-Point Scale) ... 425
Table 4.18: Opinion Usually Followed by Representatives 
  in Conﬂict Situation by Age, Party Membership, 
  and Desire to be Reelected  ................................................ 428
Table 4.19: Inﬂuence of Diﬀerent People on Local Representatives’ 
  Opinion (7-Point Scale) .................................................... 429
Table 4.20: Importance for Councilors of Information Sources 
  about the Views of Citizens (7-Point Scale) ....................... 430
xxi
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  A N D  F I G U R E S
Table 4.21: Inﬂuence of Selected Persons and Bodies 
  on the Decisions of Local Government (7-Point Scale) ...... 433
Table 4.22: Intensity of NGOs’ Involvement 
  in the Decision-making Process by Region ........................ 434
Table 4.23: Local Government Programs and Action Plans (2003) [%] .... 436
Table 4.24: Challenges Facing Community Leaders/Mayors 
  (7-Point Scale) ................................................................... 437
Table 4.25: Presence of Media Covering Local Aﬀairs 
  by Size of Municipality [%] ............................................... 439
Table 4.26: Coverage of Local Aﬀairs in Municipalities 
  by Type of Media ............................................................... 440
Table 4.27: Audience of Newspapers and Radio or Television Stations 
  in Municipalities of Diﬀerent Sizes [%] ............................. 441
Table 4.28: Political Topics Presented in the Local Media [%] .............. 443
Table 4.29: Largest Civil Society Organizations (2000) ........................ 447
Table 4.30: Types and Intensity of Civil Society Organizations 
  in the Munipalities [%] ..................................................... 447
Table 4.31: Average Number of Active Civil Society Organizations 
  in the Regions ................................................................... 448
Table 4.32: The Usefulness of NGOs According to Slovak Citizens ..... 449
Table 4.33: Civil Society Organizations and Local Government ........... 451
Table 4.34: Citizens’ Views of the Eﬀectiveness of 
  Local Self-government and the Former Communist 
  Local Administration ......................................................... 457
Table A4.1: The Structure of the Municipal Budget in Slovakia 
  (2000) ............................................................................... 470
Table A4.2: Income of Local Budgets ................................................... 470
Table A4.3: Political parties .................................................................. 471
 
C H A P T E R  5  ■ C O N C L U S I O N
Table 5.1: Diﬀerent Forms of Democratic Legitimization .................. 479
Table 5.2:  Size Distribution of Local Governments [%] ..................... 484
xxii
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Table 5.3: Position of Directly Elected Mayors 
  in Analyzed Countries ....................................................... 486
Table 5.4: Signiﬁcance of Information Sources for Local Councilors ... 500
Table 5.5: Councilors’ Assessment of the Situation 
  in Their Countries and in Their Communities ................... 516
FIGURES
C H A P T E R  2  ■ B U L G A R I A
Figure 2.1:  Perceived Inﬂuence on Local Government (7-Point Scale) ... 78
C H A P T E R  3  ■ E S T O N I A
Figure 3.1: The Institutional Structure of Local Government in Estonia .. 172
Figure 3.2: LGs’ Rating of the Intensity of the Problem 
  of Too Many Responsibilities [%]  ..................................... 180
Figure 3.3: Capability of Local Governments 
  to Implement Assigned Tasks [%] ...................................... 183
Figure 3.4: Intensity of Problems of Fiscal Autonomy 
  of Estonian Local Governments According 
  to Size of Community (7-Point Scale) ............................... 187
Figure 3.5: The Impact of Information Requests 
  on the Eﬀectiveness of Local Administrations [%] ............. 200
Figure 3.6: Proportion of Local Governments 
  with Their Own Websites by Size of Community [%] ....... 201
Figure 3.7: Proportion of Local Governments Dependent 
  on the Formalization of Public Relations Tasks [%] ........... 203
Figure 3.8: Proportion of Availability of Public Relations Strategy 
  Dependent on Formalization of Public Relations Task 
  at Local Governments [% of Local Governments] ............. 205
Figure 3.9: The Proportion of Local Governments Having Plans 
  and Procedures for Control over Administration 
  by Size of Community [%] ................................................ 216
Figure 3.10: The Impact of Diﬀerent Institutional Actors 
  on Decisions of Local Government (7-Point Scale) ............ 219
xxiii
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  A N D  F I G U R E S
Figure 3.11: Assessment of the Intensity of Employment Problems 
  in Local Administration (7-Point Scale) ............................. 232
Figure 3.12: Structure of the Civil Service 
  of Local Governments by Age [%] ..................................... 234
Figure 3.13: Proportion of Civil Servants Who Have Participated 
  in Training by Duration of Training [%] ............................ 234
Figure 3.14: The Role of Scheduling of Council and Committees’  
  Work by Size of Local Community [%] ............................. 236
Figure 3.15: Proportion of Local Councils with Formal or Informal 
  Coalition Agreements [%] ................................................. 238
Figure 3.16: Cleavage of Opinions on How to Appoint the Mayor [%] ... 240
Figure 3.17: Capacity to Follow Current Operating Costs 
  Dependent on Techniques for Deciding on and 
  Planning Investments [%] ................................................. 244
Figure 3.18: Privatization or Contracting out of Communal Utilities 
  in the Last Five Years by Size of Local Community 
  [% of services] ................................................................... 246
Figure 3.19: Privatization and/or Contracting out of Public Utilities 
  in Local Governments by Size [%] ..................................... 248
Figure 3.20: Average Expenditures of Political Parties 
  on Campaign Activities in 2002 Local Elections [%] ......... 254
Figure 3.21: Number of Party Lists in Local Elections (1993–2002) ..... 256
Figure 3.22: Trends in Electoral Turnout (1989–2003) [%] .................. 258
Figure 3.23: Voters’ Support of the Political Parties 
  in the Local and National Elections (2002–2003) [%] ....... 260
Figure 3.24: Division of Mandates Nationwide 
  in the 2002 Local Elections [%] ........................................ 260
Figure 3.25: Votes Gained by Political Parties in Local Elections 
  across the Regions (2002–2003) [%] ................................. 262
Figure 3.26: The Age Structure of Local Representatives (2002) ............ 274
Figure 3.27: The Self-perceived Ideological Orientation 
  of Local Representatives (7-Point Scale) ............................. 282
xxiv
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Figure 3.28: The Impact of External Actors 
  on Local Government Decisions (7-Point Scale) ................ 291
C H A P T E R  4  ■ S L O V A K I A
Figure 4.1:  Perceived Inﬂuence on Local Self-government 
  (7-Point Scale) ................................................................... 392
Figure 4.2: Reciprocal Sympathies of Three Political Groups 
  in Local Councils .............................................................. 422
Figure 4.3:  Number of Times Citizens Used Diﬀerent Means 
  to Inﬂuence Local Government Decisions ......................... 454
Figure 4.4:  Citizens’ Conﬁdence in Local Governments 
  and the Central Government of the SR ............................. 458
 
C H A P T E R  5  ■ C O N C L U S I O N
Figure 5.1:  Distribution of Local Governments 
  According to Population Size ............................................. 484
Figure 5.2: Proportion of Councilors Who Were Party Members 
  or Councilors before 1990 ................................................. 488
Figure 5.3: Indicators of Functional Decentralization .......................... 489
Figure 5.4:  Impact of Upper Tiers on Local Decision-making
  —Perception of Councilors ............................................... 490
Figure 5.5: Structure of Municipal Government Revenues [%] ........... 491
Figure 5.6: Social Structure of Local Councilors .................................. 495
Figure 5.7: Turnout in Local Government Elections ............................ 496
Figure 5.8: Community Power Structure
  —Mean of Councilors’ and CEOs’ Opinions .................... 497
Figure 5.9: In Case of Conﬂict between What You Believe 
  Is a Correct Decision and the Opinion of People  
  in Your Municipality, Whose Opinion Do You Follow? ..... 499
Figure 5.10: The Strength of Civic Organizations and Political Parties .... 500
Figure 5.11: Does Success Depend on Good Contacts? ......................... 502
Figure 5.12: Availability of Information on Local Government 
  Activities ............................................................................ 503
xxv
L I S T  O F  T A B L E S  A N D  F I G U R E S
Figure 5.13: Average Number of Local Media in a Municipality ............ 504
Figure 5.14: Average Councilors’ Assessment of Local Media Quality .... 504
Figure 5.15: Councilors’ Opinions on Whether Local Government 
  Is Better or Worse Now Than under Communism ............. 506
Figure 5.16: Modernization Measures of Management 
  in Local Government ......................................................... 508
Figure 5.17: Councils’ Diﬃculties in Decision-making, 
  Mean of “Frequency of Abolished Decisions” and 
  “Meetings Stopped Because of Lack of Quorum” ............... 508
1C H A P T E R  1
I n t r o d u c t i o n
G á b o r  S o ó s
3S C H O O L  M A N A G E M E N T  A N D  F I N A N C E :  A N  O V E R V I E W
Introduction
Gábor  Soó s
This volume is a collection of country reports. Their goal is to evaluate the quality of 
local democracy in three countries: Estonia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. The country reports 
are part of the monitoring activity of the Indicators of Local Democratic Governance 
Project. The essence of this monitoring is cross-country comparison. Thus, the structure 
of country reports was kept similar to ensure comparability. This introduction outlines 
the conceptual framework on which the country reports are based. First, the need for 
democracy assessment and its diﬃculties are discussed. Then, the speciﬁc dilemmas of the 
evaluation of local democracy are considered and the initial choices made by the project 
are presented. Next follows an explanation of why David Beetham’s conceptualization 
and operationalization of democracy assessment was selected and how it was modiﬁed 
to meet the requirements of this project. A large part of this introductory chapter 
focuses on the questions authors addressed in their reports. At the end, the authors of 
the country reports are brieﬂy introduced.
THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT
Assessing democratic performance is not easy. The ﬁrst obvious diﬃculty is the lack 
of a countable means to measure performance. While economic performance can be 
measured by counting monetary units, one has no similar means for measuring the 
quality of political and administrative processes in democratic systems. This raises many 
serious methodological and conceptual questions. The researcher has to ﬁnd indicators 
that are reliable and valid not only in their home context, but also in a cross-national 
comparison. Moreover, any democracy audit must face the methodological problem of 
multidimensionality, i.e., the challenge of the proper transformation of various indicators 
into a single index.
Another problem is the complexity of political and administrative processes. A large 
number of actors are involved in any representative, decision-making, or implementation 
process. The participants change from time to time, but not at the same time. In most 
cases, it is extremely diﬃcult to determine precisely the amount of responsibility that 
individual stakeholders bear for the level of democratic quality of political processes and 
outcomes. Moreover, agents and issues are often interrelated. The form and outcome of 
many political activities are greatly inﬂuenced by other, sometimes distant, activities. 
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This complexity makes the evaluation of geographically, temporally, or thematically 
bounded processes highly diﬃcult (see March and Olsen 1995). The time lag between 
implementation and actual outcome further hinders correct evaluation. What seems 
democratic in the short run may have undemocratic consequences in the long run. In 
other cases, seemingly technical decisions lead to political consequences that greatly 
aﬀect the level of democracy. A related problem is contingency. Many circumstances are 
beyond the control of political actors. That also encumbers the assessment of democratic 
performance. Summing up, two constant features of politics, blurred responsibility of 
agents and unclear boundaries of processes, render the performance measurement of 
democracy diﬃcult.
Another group of diﬃculties that impedes the evaluation of democratic performance 
is related to the concept of democracy itself. As is often said, democracy is an essentially 
contested concept. Consequently, it has many rival deﬁnitions. All of them involve 
serious interests and values; therefore, a compromise or synthesis is much more than a 
question of constructive intellectual discussion. What is more, many conceptualizations 
suﬀer from imprecision and have an ad hoc nature. Few of them were designed to be used 
speciﬁcally for the measurement of democratic performance. Thus, they are often not 
operationalized in an adequate manner and are not ready for such operationalization. 
An additional conceptual problem is multidimensionality. Even the most parsimonious 
deﬁnitions of democracy often imply more than one conceptual aspect.
In sum, any intention to gauge democratic quality faces conceptual problems (lack 
of consensus, multidimensionality) and methodological challenges (lack of countable 
measurement units, blurred responsibility, and unclear boundaries of political processes).
THE NEED FOR DEMOCRACY ASSESSMENT
Still, the need for a measurement of democratic performance is signiﬁcant. Several 
attempts have been made to assess the quality of democracy for the last decade or so. 
Their focus ranges from speciﬁc aspects of democratic governance like the corruption 
index of Transparency International to more general assessments such as the rankings 
of Freedom House. Among the sponsors and initiators, one may ﬁnd both non-
governmental associations like Human Rights Watch as well as organizations of 
intergovernmental cooperation like IDEA. Some of them explicitly rank countries, 
like the Global Democracy Award, and others provide more descriptive surveys, like 
the Council of Europe. The rankings often provoke intense discussions over the state 
of aﬀairs and the responsibility of governments therein.
Why do we see this new wave of democracy measurement? One may list a number 
of reasons, linked to major sociopolitical trends in the world. A vast change in the 
developed world has been the breakup and fragmentation of large societal groups. As a 
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consequence, their political subcultures have also weakened and the cleavages have become 
more blurred. An increasing number of ﬂoating voters, with ever better education, have 
adopted a more critical attitude toward politics and politicians demanded more feedback 
about the performance of governments and political systems.
The new wave of neo-liberalism, partly due to the above societal transformation, 
has also contributed to this process. Since the 1980s, more emphasis has been put on 
competition and individual freedom than on solidarity and equity. This type of thinking 
has reached public administration too. New Public Management has widely been adapted 
in Western Europe at every level of government. For many, the idea of the measurement 
of democratic performance is an extension of NPM-type thinking.
Another major trend in the world has been democratization since the end of 1980s. The 
third wave of democratization made democracy the dominant and only legitimate mode of 
governing. In the mood of the triumphant democracy, the alternatives became discredited. 
Actually, many ceased to think of democracy as a historical phenomenon and began to per-
ceive it as an eternal and ﬁnal good. Everyone claims to be democratic nowadays. However, 
some of the claims are apparently unfounded. The demand to distinguish between real and 
bogus democracies has increased. The simple Cold War distinction between democracies 
and nondemocracies has turned out to be unsatisfactory for this task. Rather, a more precise, 
continuous assessment of the level of democratization was needed.
Consequently, many resources have been invested in the promotion of the 
democratization process. NGOs raise lots of funding for advocacy and governments 
also are willing to further democratic governments and groups. This naturally raises 
the question of performance measurement: how and where to invest to achieve the 
highest possible impact? The practical need of donors, whether corporate or individual, 
to control the ﬂow of their donations has also contributed to an increasing role for the 
measurement of democratic performance.
THE STRATEGIC CHOICES OF THE INDICATORS 
OF LOCAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE PROJECT
The Indicators of Local Democratic Governance (ILDG) project is also a product of the 
above-mentioned wave of democracy measurement. The project has two speciﬁcities. 
First, it focuses on a special dimension of democratic polities: local democracy. While 
political developments on the national level are often observed closely, local politics 
receives less attention. Second, it covers a geographical area, Central and Eastern Europe, 
where democracy, including local democracy, has been in motion for more than 15 
years. On the one hand, that provides a great opportunity to observe certain dynamics 
of contemporary democracy. On the other hand, the historic transformations have 
created more need for the assessment of progress (or relapse). The systematic evaluation 
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of local democracy is especially appropriate in the former communist area. In sum, the 
ILDG project aims to help decision-makers and researchers assess and explain the level 
of local democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.
To this end, the project collected original data in seven countries by means of 
surveys of local politicians and administrators. The ﬁrst results, the assessment of local 
democracy in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, were published in 2002 (Soós, Tóka, 
and Wright 2002). This volume is the second attempt, which is diﬀerent from the ﬁrst 
not only in the countries covered (Estonia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria), but also in its more 
reﬁned methodology. Based on the experience of the ﬁrst collection of country reports, 
three questions were explicitly addressed. All of them required an initial choice, which 
largely determined the form and content of the assessment methodology.
 (1) The quality of democracy can be interpreted in broader or narrower ways. The 
broader conceptualization focuses on the political regime in general, usually 
opposed to non-democratic alternatives. In this approach, the assessment of 
democracy involves broader societal processes and the consequences of political 
democracy (for recent examples, see Campbell and Sükösd 2002, Andreev 2005). 
In addition to more political variables, it also takes into account variables like 
gender equality or equal access to education. These variables measure the quality 
of life more than the outcome of government policies. The indicators used or 
proposed include the percentage of university students, ethnic tolerance, level 
of domestic violence, and mortality rates. The narrower view is more interested 
in the quality of representation, decision-making, and policy implementation. 
Its indicators include political stability, level of corruption, degree of freedom 
of expression, the number of human rights violations,  the quality of horizontal 
accountability, and government responsiveness (i.e., Hadenius 1992; Putnam 
1993; Beetham 1994; Przeworski et al. 1996; Freedom House 2005).
   This choice is obviously related to the conceptualization of democracy and 
the political. The broader view perceives democracy as a political and social 
phenomenon (or, in a Foucaultian sense, deﬁnes the political as omnipresent) 
and has a larger time frame. The narrower approach is built on a more traditional 
conception, focusing on government related activities, and makes more attempts 
to link outcomes to responsible agents and, thus, has a shorter time frame.
   In the ILDG framework, the second option was selected for four reasons. 
First, the general goal of the project, originally set by the Local Government 
and Public Service Reform Initiative, is to help  decision-makers and activists 
understand local political developments. That requires a more politically ori-
ented, shorter-range approach, which sheds some light on the impact of policies. 
The quality of life of a local society has too many determinants and the link to 
political processes is less clear. Second, many of the societal issues like gender 
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equality are less determined by local factors than by large social, economic, cul-
tural, and political processes. Thus, the local government-centered view seemed 
more appropriate for a local political study. Third, the fast transformation of 
post-communist countries blurred the responsibility for social changes, while 
it increased the need for the assessment of government bodies and other politi-
cal agents like the press. Thus, a more political view is expected to contribute 
more relevant knowledge. Fourth, such an assessment requires much work. The 
narrowing of the focus made the task of assessment much more manageable.
   As can be seen, the choice was made on a largely pragmatic basis, looking 
for the best possible approach for a speciﬁc democracy project. Thus, it is not a 
critique of the broad approach, which is an equally legitimate conceptualization 
of democracy.
 (2) A related question is the focus on formal institutions. The commitment to a 
traditional liberal conception of the political may result in a focus on formal 
actors such as individual political leaders, government parties, or local, regional, 
and national governments.  However, that would exclude many political 
interactions and external inﬂuences or would present them in a one-sided way. 
Thus, the framework used here is a broad interpretation of the narrow view of 
the political. Based on the previous arguments, it focuses primarily on formal 
political processes. However, it does not restrict itself to public administration or 
government institutions. Other political stakeholders like the media or NGOs 
are also involved in the analysis.
 (3) The third basic dilemma to be addressed is related to the previous one. Some 
democracy assessments (the index of the Freedom House is the major example) 
oﬀer a precise score that can describe performance by means of a single number. 
That makes the results easily comprehensible and accessible. Consequently, their 
rankings can be communicated eﬀectively in the media and both citizens and 
politicians can understand them quickly. The use of numbers suggests a precision 
and direct comparability. However, the scores that characterize complex political 
entities or processes by means of digits are far from being precise, as they reduce 
highly complex questions to a very simple presentation. While recognizing the 
importance of easily communicable results, this project voted for the more 
complex presentation at this stage of its development. The methodology is 
not ripe enough to provide reliable rankings of countries with diﬀerent legal 
systems, average municipality size, and national politics. The emphasis is placed 
on informative details rather than scores. The choice, again, was pragmatic and 
project-related. It is not a denial of the possibility or importance of rankings. 
Actually, the ILDG project has a long-term ambition to provide well founded 
rankings of countries, which could evaluate the quality of local democracy by 
means of one or a few scores.
8T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The next step is to answer the central question of any democracy assessment: What are 
the main criteria in the assessment of local democracy? Democracy is a contested term. 
Taking into account the above-mentioned challenges of democracy measurement and 
the initial choices concerning the previously presented dilemmas, the ILDG project is 
based on David Beetham’s conceptualization of democracy (Beetham 1999, Beetham 
et al. 2002). This decision was based on ﬁve considerations.
First, Beetham’s approach recognizes the inherent multidimensionality of the 
concept of democracy. The large number of deﬁnitions demonstrates the wide range 
of conceptualizations. Many of them focus on a single aspect of democracy and do 
not exclude each other. Since most of them are legitimate, a composite evaluation 
must involve them. Beetham’s approach makes this possible without becoming simply 
eclectic.
Second, Beetham’s list of criteria is not far from the usual enumeration of the elements 
of good governance. That shows the intuitiveness of the approach without being ad hoc. 
This is a pragmatic but important consideration.
Third, Beetham’s approach corresponds well with the ﬁrst choice mentioned 
previously. It is not simply procedural, as it focuses on more than the administrative or 
policy-related processes, but it does not embrace the quality of life aspect of democracy 
concepts.
Fourth, unlike many theoretical discussions of the concept of democracy, it provides 
a clear operationalization. Although the list of democratic criteria may not be directly 
applicable, it is easily adoptable by new initiatives of democracy assessment.
Finally, but very importantly, there have been several attempts to measure the quality 
of democracy on the basis of David Beetham’s conceptualization, sometimes with his 
personal contribution. Among the initiatives, one can ﬁnd the International IDEA’s 
program on the state of democracy all over the world: IDEA’s eﬀorts (Beetham et al. 2002, 
International IDEA 2001, 2003), the UK Democratic Audit (Democratic Audit 2005a, 
2005b), the Democratic Audit of Australia (Hindess 2002), the SNS Democratic Audit 
of Sweden (Petersson 2001). These projects provided proven techniques of methodology 
and potential means of presentation.
What are the fundamental elements of Beetham’s approach? David Beetham argues 
that democracy implies decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies. 
A decision-making process is democratic to the degree that it is “subject to the control 
of all members of the collectivity considered as equals” (Beetham 1994, 28). Therefore, 
the two key principles of democracy are popular control over decision-making (or at 
least decision-makers) and political equality. For the purpose of evaluation, democratic 
audits break down these two principles into four criteria.
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 (1) A guaranteed framework of equal rights. This includes access to justice and the rule 
of law, the basic civil and political rights. Citizens’ rights and their enforcement 
is another form of the limitation of government.
 (2) Institutions of representative government. Free and fair elections are a basic 
instrument of democracy to promote popular control. Elections are democratic 
if they are meaningful, inclusive, fair, and uninﬂuenced by government power. 
The idea of meaningful and fair elections also includes competition amongst 
political forces, which have equal access to communication.
 (3) Institutions of open and accountable government. A democratic government is 
transparent and politically, legally, and ﬁnancially accountable to other bodies. 
Government in democracy is limited by other formal institutions.
 (4) A civil or democratic society. Independent associations have the potential to 
encourage government responsiveness to public opinion and to increase equality 
among citizens. An organized society with a democratic political culture is a 
powerful instrument of democracy.
These four dimensions can be also adapted for a local democracy framework. 
Nevertheless, these dimensions are not of equal importance in the analysis of local 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and they must be adapted to the speciﬁcities 
of local government systems. Country reports should devote more energy to mapping 
the contribution of civil society to local democracy than, for example, to analyzing the 
problem of civil rights—which are better researched, are not a local issue, and show 
less variance in CEE.
The assessment of local democracy requires two other dimensions. The ﬁrst comes 
from the local nature of the subject of analysis. A distinctive feature of local governments 
is their autonomy, i.e., their freedom from the direct involvement by external forces. If 
local administrative units have no legal, political, and ﬁnancial autonomy, the term of 
local (self-) government loses its meaning. The degree of autonomy is a crucial element 
in the assessment of local democracy.
Swedish audits of democracy point to the relevance of a second addition to the 
above criteria. As the history of regime collapse in the 1930s demonstrates, a viable 
democracy requires a certain level of eﬀectiveness. Consequently, policy performance is 
a crucial dimension of a local democracy assessment.
In sum, local democracy is conceptualized as autonomous, eﬀective, open, and 
representative local government surrounded by a civil society in the framework of 
guaranteed political rights.
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COUNTRY REPORTS
Following the above framework, the structure of the country reports is organized around 
six institutional dimensions. As they are not equally important in the political reality of 
Central and Eastern Europe, two dimensions of local democracy (representation and 
civil society) will receive more space (chapters four and three, respectively). The ﬁrst 
part of the report contains four chapters, covering four components of local democracy 
(autonomy, eﬀectiveness, rights and the rule of law, and transparency and accountability). 
Their shorter discussion is explained by the availability of other publications (e.g., 
decentralization and eﬀectiveness are covered by other LGI books) and the focus of the 
original data gathered by the surveys of the project. Thus, the following country reports 
contain an introductory section, three larger parts consisting of a total of twelve sections, 
a concluding chapter, and appendices.
To maintain comparability among country reports within the volume, each chapter 
and section are presented here with general questions aimed at guiding the reports’ 
authors. The questions derived from the framework highlight some issues considered 
crucial to the evaluation of local democracy, but were not intended to serve as an 
outline or “form” to be simply ﬁlled out. Report authors were expected to consider each 
heading and, guided by their experience and the questions given, present an analysis of 
the issue in their respective country. No analytical division can be perfect, so there are 
issues that could appear in more than one place. In such cases, authors were requested 
to cross-reference information.
The ﬁrst part of each report is an introduction to the characteristics of the local 
government system of the country in question. Authors were ﬁrst asked to describe 
the local government system in their respective country by answering the following 
questions: What are the country’s basic socioeconomic characteristics like population, 
ethnic distribution, economic development, etc.? How has the local government 
system developed? What is the history of the local government reform? What are the 
main features of the local government system (e.g., tiers, constitutional status, average 
municipality size, etc.)? Second, the internal structure of local governments was presented 
by responding to the following questions: What are the main characteristics of the local 
elections? What are the main features of the civil service system (legal status, number, 
appointment, etc.)? Who are the main actors in local government? How is formal power 
separated within local government? Finally, authors gave some information about how 
the Indicators Project was implemented in their country by describing the size and 
distribution of the survey samples, date of the survey, response rates, and so on.
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PART I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
The ﬁrst large part of the reports, containing four sections, focuses on the internal 
functioning of local governments. The ﬁrst section assesses the level of local autonomy. 
The most general questions are the level of independence local governments enjoy from 
central and regional government and the degree to which the local government system 
is decentralized. The report framework distinguished between three types of autonomy: 
legal, political, and ﬁnancial. The main question about legal autonomy authors had 
to address was: To what degree can local governments act independently in local issues? 
The following questions required a more detailed analysis: How much consensus is 
there on the jurisdiction of local governments? How intense are the conﬂicts over the 
distribution of competences among tiers of public administration? How far are the tasks 
of local governments mandatory? To what degree are local services regulated by central 
standards? How strong is the regulatory power of the central agencies? How stable is 
the regulatory framework in which local governments operate? How quickly do rules 
change? To what degree do central and regional governments have an inﬂuence on the 
everyday working of local governments? 
The general guiding question of ﬁscal autonomy was: How dependent are local 
governments on central and regional resources? Fiscal autonomy referred to resources 
distributed and collected by local governments without the control of central or 
regional governments. Fiscal autonomy was regarded as high if local governments rely 
on their local revenue and allocate their revenues at their will. The particular questions 
were as follows: What is the proportion of state transfers in local government budgets? 
What is the proportion of earmarked grants in state transfers? To what degree can local 
governments collect own revenues? What is the share of local taxes in local governments’ 
budget? What is the role of equalization mechanisms? This section was obviously related 
to the ﬁrst part of the eﬀectiveness section, presented later. Finally, the problem of 
political autonomy was addressed by the following question: Are local political forces 
and politicians able to formulate their own local preferences independently of the inﬂuence 
of national or regional political organizations? More precisely: How much control do 
national and regional organs of political parties have over local party branches? Can a 
local mayor or councilor have other elected positions (e.g., MP)? If yes, how far does 
the cumulation of mandates inﬂuence the political autonomy of local governments? 
As at the end of each evaluative chapter, authors were expected to write a conclusion 
in which, based on their foregoing discussion, they evaluated the level of autonomy of 
local governments in their country and suggested or presented reforms and projects to 
improve the situation.
The second (usually short) section of the ﬁrst part concentrated on the performance 
of local governments in implementing legal rules. The leading question was as follows: 
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To what degree does the law guarantee rights and is everyone equally subject to the law? This 
section included a question on the civil and political rights asserted on the local level 
by asking: To what degree are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all? Related 
questions were: How inclusive is the local citizenship? Are there ethnic or other groups 
whose exclusion or inclusion provokes debate? To what degree are cultural diﬀerences 
acknowledged and how well are minorities protected? How much consensus is there 
on the political, economic, and social rights of citizens on the local level (e.g., access to 
basic health care or education)? 
The second problem the section addressed was the implementation of the rule 
of law: To what degree are local governments consistently subject to the law? Authors 
answered the following questions to provide more detailed information: How far do 
local governments as institutions observe legal regulations? How frequently are there 
violations of due process? To what degree are all public oﬃcials subject to the rule of 
law and to transparent rules in the performance of their functions? How much eﬀort do 
local governments make to guarantee due process for all? How do local representatives 
evaluate the political impartiality of the administrative staﬀ? To what degree does the 
legal system deliver fair and eﬀective justice in legal issues involving citizens and local 
government? How free are the courts and the judiciary from interference by the local 
government and inﬂuential local individuals? How far do citizens follow legal rules? A 
few of the questions (especially on perceptions of the level of the rule of law) could be 
answered with the help of the project surveys.
A crucial question was discussed in the third section within the ﬁrst part of reports: To 
what degree do local governments work in a transparent and accountable way? Transparency, 
generally a severe problem of CEE local governments, was approached by means of the 
following questions: To what degree can a citizen or citizen group understand local 
government policymaking from the public documents of local governments? How easy 
is it to gain access to public documents of local governments? How public are local 
government contracts? How developed is e-government? Do local governments have 
websites? How accessible are local government oﬃces via e-mail? How much do local 
governments do to disseminate their decisions? Are the sessions of the council and other 
local government bodies open to the public? If they are, how far do local governments 
attempt to advertise the time of meetings? 
Corruption, a problem strongly related to transparency, is the subject matter of 
the next section, too. The degree to which public oﬃcials are free from corruption 
was measured by the following questions: How eﬀective is the separation of public 
oﬃce from the personal business and family interests of elected and non-elected oﬃce 
holders? How eﬀective are the arrangements for protecting oﬃce holders and the public 
from involvement in bribery? To what degree do the rules and procedures for ﬁnancing 
elections, candidates, and local representatives prevent their subordination to sectoal 
interests? How far is the inﬂuence of powerful local business interests over public 
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policy kept in check and how free are they from involvement in corruption? How strict 
are the rules of public procurement and how far are they followed? How far do local 
governments make eﬀorts to diminish corruption? Do they formulate policies or ethical 
codes to preserve the integrity of public oﬃcials? How much conﬁdence do people have 
that public oﬃcials and public services are free from corruption? 
Finally, this section discussed one of the strong antidotes to opaque and corrupted 
practices, horizontal accountability. The extent to which the separation of local powers 
contributes to the accountability of local government actors was analyzed by means of 
the following questions: How extensive and eﬀective are the powers of the council to 
initiate, scrutinize, and amend local legislation? How rigorous are the procedures for 
approval and supervision of the revenues and expenditures of the local government 
budget? How extensive and eﬀective are the powers of the council to scrutinize the 
executive (the mayor or board) and hold it accountable? How eﬀective and open to 
scrutiny is the control exercised by councilors and the mayor over the administrative 
staﬀ of the local government? How important are local administrators in the making 
of policies? To what degree do they form an independent policymaking center? To 
what degree does the actual division of power correspond with the formal one? What 
determines the variance in the perceived power of local government actors? Most 
problems in this section were addressed on the basis of the existing empirical evidence 
that could be found in prior research.
The last section in the ﬁrst part, focusing on local government practices, dealt with 
the eﬀectiveness of local governments: To what degree are local governments capable of 
setting and attaining their own goals? This section concentrated on three interrelated 
dimensions of the policy capacity and performance of local governments: resource 
control, decision-making capacity, and output control. 
The problem of resource control is as follows: How much control do local governments 
have over an adequate supply of available resources? The more detailed questions are: 
How much right do local governments have to set the level of their ﬁnancial resources 
(especially local taxes) garnered from the local community, and how eﬀective is the 
collection of these resources (if collection is a local government competence)? This is 
linked to the ﬁscal autonomy question in the autonomy section, but focuses more on 
internal resources. How many resources originate from the cooperation of local govern-
ments with citizens and their organizations? How many resources do local governments 
gain from voluntary or legally required cooperation with other local governments or 
administrative bodies? Does the size of local administration correspond to its functions? 
How competent is the administrative staﬀ of local governments? How do local 
representatives and citizens evaluate the competence of local administrative staﬀ? 
The problem of the decision-making capability of local governments was evaluated by 
answering the following question: To what degree can local governments make informed and 
consistent decisions given the temporal constraints on them? The sub-questions were: How 
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smooth is the decision-making in local governments (quorum, extraordinary meetings, 
decisions by deadline, etc.)? What are the causes of decision-making deﬁciencies? How 
coherent is local policymaking? Is there long-term planning? Do policies follow these 
long-term guidelines? How cooperative is the relationship between the executive (mayor 
or board) and the council? 
The third element of eﬀectiveness, output control, was assessed by means of the 
question: To what degree can local governments implement their decisions? Some other 
questions made the discussion more detailed: To what degree do local governments reach 
the policy objectives that they set for themselves? Are local government projects and 
plans realized? How eﬃcient are local governments? To what degree do local governments 
endeavor to improve the relationship between cost and output? How are local services 
provided and what are common problems of service provision? What is the attitude of 
decision-makers concerning privatization and outsourcing?
PART II. REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The next large part of the report covers issues associated with the relationship between 
citizens and elected leaders, including concepts such as social and political representation, 
vertical accountability, authorization, responsiveness, and inclusive decision-making.
The ﬁrst section focused on local elections and direct democracy through local 
referenda by answering the question: How much control does the authorization process 
give the people over local government leaders? 
This general problem was addressed. First, the electoral system was evaluated by 
asking: How much popular control does the electoral system provide and how equally is it 
distributed in local society? More detailed analysis asked: How fair are the procedures 
for the registration of candidates and parties? How proportional is the representation? 
What is the share of votes not receiving representation in the council? How closely 
does the composition of the council reﬂect the choices voters make? What is the voter/
representative ratio? How far are the election results accepted by all political forces 
in the country? What are the proposals, if any, to change voting procedures and 
electoral rules? 
The electoral process was examined in the second section: How democratic is the 
electoral process on the local level? The assessment was based on these questions: How 
eﬀective a range of choice does the electoral and party system allow the voters? What 
is the level of competition in local elections? How extensively do citizens participate 
in electoral campaigns? To what extent do candidates have fair access to the means of 
communication with the voters? 
Authors were naturally expected to characterize the electoral results on the local 
level: What are the main electoral results on the local level? The following question guided 
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the evaluation: How frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties 
or personnel? How diﬀerent are the results in national and local elections? Do local 
elections follow the same pattern as national ones? What are the main political cleavages 
or stable patterns in local election results? 
A basic and frequent tool to measure participation is turnout; thus, the next section 
asked: To what degree do citizens participate in the local elections? The section answered two 
simple questions: What proportion of the electorate votes? What are the main ethnic, 
territorial, etc., diﬀerences in turnout rate? 
Finally, a formal means of direct democracy was analyzed by asking: How democratic 
are local referenda? The legal institution of local referendum does not exist in Estonia, so 
authors sought answers to these questions: Why does or does not the legal framework 
allow the local referendum? Are there propositions about its establishment? What is 
the obstacle to establishing the institution of local referendum? The other two reports 
tackled these questions: How frequently do local referenda take place? What are the 
reasons for their (un)popularity? What are the main topics of local referenda? Reports 
concluded with general statements about the state of electoral democracy.
A natural continuation of the previous section is a focus on party organizations on 
the local level and their factions in local decision-making bodies. The ﬁrst interesting 
question is the weight of local party chapters in local government representation: To what 
degree are political parties present in local governments? In a more detailed way: What is 
the proportion of party-nominated mayors and councilors? How does their proportion 
depend on municipality size and other factors? How active are NGOs and independent 
candidates in local elections? What is the proportion of non-party nominated mayors 
and councilors? How do parties diﬀer in their presence on the local level? 
The strength of local party organizations was assessed by asking: How organized are 
political parties on the local level? Further questions provided more detailed information: 
How active are parties during the electoral campaign? How active are parties between 
elections? What are the main forms of activity? How far are parties eﬀective membership 
organizations? How far are party members able to inﬂuence party policy and candidate 
selection on the local level? To what degree do parties have background organizations 
(political associations and foundations, press) on the local level? How many resources 
(oﬃce, staﬀ, technical facilities) do local party branches have? 
The next problem followed from the previous one: What characterizes the factions 
of political parties in local councils? The features of party factions were surveyed by 
means of the following questions: How loyal are elected oﬃcials to nominating and 
supporting organizations? How fair and eﬀective are the rules governing party discipline 
in the council? How fragmented are local councils? How eﬀective is the party system in 
forming stable majorities in the council? This discussion is related to the aforementioned 
section on decision-making performance in the eﬀectiveness section and the horizontal 
accountability section in the transparency section.
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The next section concentrates on individual political actors: the local representatives. 
To what degree do local representatives contribute to the working of local democracy? The 
term “local representatives” refers in the volume to elected leaders of local governments 
such as mayors and councilors. As the surveys of the ILDG project provided much 
information, this part of the chapters became longer than the average. Two classical 
problems of political sociology is discussed. 
First: What is the social background of councilors and mayors? More precisely: How 
far do local councils reﬂect the social composition of the ethnic, linguistic, religious, 
gender, generational, educational, and class divisions of the electorate? How much 
cultural capital do local representatives have? How are mayors and councilors positioned 
within the social structure? To what degree is there an intergenerational continuity in 
assuming public positions? 
The second question is related to the career of local politicians: What is the political 
background of councilors and mayors? The detailed questions were as follows: To what 
degree is there continuity with the Communist leadership? What functions did local 
representatives hold before becoming mayors or councilors? Are there typical career 
routes? What other functions do local representatives hold? To what degree are local 
representatives professional? To what degree do they live on (local) politics? How much 
political training did they obtain? How ambitious are local representatives? How many 
of them perceive their present position as a political stepping-stone in their public 
careers? 
The next problem related to the democratic assessment of local politicians focused 
on social embeddedness: How much social capital do local representatives have? These 
questions guided authors: How frequently do local leaders have social contact with 
family, friends, colleagues, and other members of organizations to which they belong? 
In how many and what kind of civil society organizations are local representatives in 
a leading position? What are the main characteristics of the civil society organizations 
in which local representatives have a function? How much political resource do local 
representatives extract from their membership in civil society organizations? To what 
degree do civil society organizations serve as meeting points of local politicians? 
Interpreting social capital as trust leads to the next problem discussed in each chapter: 
the political culture of local representatives. 
The general question was the following: How democratic are the values and attitudes 
of local representatives? That was detailed by these questions: How democratic are the 
attitudes of locally elected oﬃcials toward participation, equality, and other key values 
of democracy? How far do locally elected leaders trust each other? How far do local 
representatives trust people? How close are the ideological and party orientations of 
local representatives to those of citizens? To what degree do local representatives trust 
in institutions? How close are their opinions to those of ordinary people? How strong 
is the attachment of locally elected leaders to their municipality and other geographical 
17
I N T R O D U C T I O N
units? How do political attitudes and values interact with demographics, party and NGO 
membership, and the career orientation of locally elected leaders? 
Finally, authors examined local representatives’ attitudes toward representation: 
How democratic are local representatives’ attitudes toward representation? Who do local 
representatives represent? What explains the variance in representatives’ attitudes? What 
are the main sources of information for local representatives? Who inﬂuences the opinion 
formation of local representatives? Items from the survey questions are also mentioned 
in other sections.
The last section related to the representation activities of, and in, local governments 
dealt with institutional responsiveness. The general question was: To what degree do 
local governments respond to the needs and wants of their constituencies? The inclusiveness, 
responsiveness, and accessibility of local decision-makers were addressed here. Inclusive 
decision-making was evaluated by answering the following question: To what degree 
do local governments attempt to involve citizens, NGOs, local business, and media  in 
the decision-making process? How far do local governments attempt to involve civil 
society in service delivery? How systematic is the consultation of local governments 
with citizen groups and media over the budget and other important decisions? How 
frequently do local governments hold public hearings and forums? How deliberative 
are the discussions in these meetings with citizens? 
Since Putnam (1993), institutional responsiveness has been a major topic in 
democratic assessment. The project’s questions about local governments’ responsiveness 
on the level of policymaking and everyday administration were: How do citizens perceive 
the responsiveness of local governments to their policy demands? Do policies correspond 
to local needs? How much conﬁdence do people have in the ability of local government 
to solve community problems that they perceive as important? How responsive is local 
administration on the street level (bureaucratic responsiveness)? To what degree do 
citizens need patience and persistence to settle their issues in local government oﬃces? 
How (un)equal is the access of citizens to local government services? How systematic 
is the consultation of local governments with users over local service delivery? To what 
degree do local governments attempt to obtain feedback from the users of their services? 
The ﬁnal problem analyzed here was the accessibility of local representatives: How 
accessible are elected representatives to their constituents? How easy is it to meet local 
representatives? How important to local representatives is contact with citizens?
PART III. LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY
The third part of each country report assessed the political quality of the local societies. 
Three political stakeholders, the local media, NGOs, and citizens, were targeted in this 
part. The assessment of local media focused on the following question: To what degree 
do local media operate in a way that sustains democratic values? 
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First, the existence and availability of local media was surveyed by means of these 
questions: To what degree are local media available for citizens? To what degree does the 
availability of local media depend on municipality size, region, or other factors? How 
extensive is the audience of local media? What is the weight of local media compared 
to regional or national media? How frequently do local media appear? Then, the main 
perils of media quality, (in)dependence and (un)representativeness was discussed with 
the help of the following questions: How pluralistic is the ownership of local media? To 
what degree are local media independent of local government and (local) big business? 
How representative are the local media of diﬀerent opinions? How accessible are the local 
media to diﬀerent sections of society? Finally, the extent and form of media involvement 
in local political life were considered by answering such questions as: How frequently 
and to what degree do local media cover local politics? To what degree do local media 
contribute to an enlightened understanding of local public life? To what degree do 
local media contribute to the transparency, responsiveness, and societal accountability 
of local government? To what degree do local media have the ability to set the political 
agenda? How eﬀective are the local media in investigating local government? As the 
ILDG project collected lots of unique information on local media, this section contains 
especially interesting ﬁndings.
Civil society organizations are often portrayed as major contributors to the quality 
of democracy. Thus, the next section focused on the question: To what degree do local 
civil society organizations contribute to local democracy? As a ﬁrst step, the legal status 
of NGOs was examined by means of the following questions: What are the main 
legal regulations concerning the establishment of civil society organizations (forms, 
registration, etc.)? What are the main legal regulations concerning the operation of civil 
society organizations (bodies like boards, ﬁnancial and other reports, etc.)? Then, the 
density of local civil society organizations and their distribution was discussed: How 
many civil society organizations are registered? What is the distribution of civil society 
organizations by legal category (e.g., association, foundation, etc.) and activity (e.g., 
educational, sport, political, etc.)? What is the number and proportion of minority 
organizations? How many civil society organizations are active on the local level? What 
factors determine the distribution of civil society organizations in the country (e.g., size, 
location, development of municipalities)? 
After surveying the general infrastructure of civil society, the next section 
concentrated on the actual role of civil society organizations in local politics. The main 
questions included: To what degree is the internal operation of civil society organiza-
tions democratic? To what degree do civil society organizations inculcate democratic 
values into their members and the wider society? To what degree do civil society 
organizations foster solidarity, trust, and the sense of belonging in local society? 
To what degree do civil society organizations contribute to the development of the 
public sphere? How active are civil society organizations in organizing political 
19
I N T R O D U C T I O N
events? To what degree are local civil society organizations the auxiliaries of political 
parties? 
These problems were related to similar discussions in sections on media, political 
culture, and parties. 
Finally, the types and strength of contacts between civil society organizations and 
local governments were tackled: What is the number and proportion of civil society 
organizations that are supported by local government? What is the number and 
proportion of civil society organizations that provide support to local government? 
What is the role of civil society organizations in the provision of local services? What 
is the role of civil society organizations in the initiation and implementation of joint 
projects with local governments? What is the opinion of local representatives on the 
contacts between local governments and civil society organizations? What is the opinion 
of citizens and civil leaders on the contacts between local governments and civil society 
organizations? The results of the ILDG survey of local representatives and administrators 
contributed much to this section.
The last issue addressed within the broader theme of local political society was 
citizens’ political culture: Does citizens’ political culture contribute to local democracy? 
The ﬁrst problem here is whether and to what degree local citizens have an interest in 
local politics and what they know about it: To what degree are citizens interested in 
local public life? Does their interest focus on local or national issues? To what degree do 
citizens know local public issues? How well known are local political leaders? Are mayors 
better known than other politicians? These questions are linked to the transparency and 
media section, and the accessibility of representatives question. 
A deeper citizen involvement in local politics means actual participation, and this 
was tackled with these questions: To what degree do citizens participate in local political 
events? What are the main forms of local political participation? Who are the initiators 
of citizens’ collective participation in local politics? How do citizens try to inﬂuence local 
government decisions? These questions are related to the evaluation of local political 
party organizations. 
The rest of the section focused on three problems of political culture: political 
eﬃcacy, local solidarity and identity, and the legitimacy of local democracy. The extent 
to which citizens feel they can understand and inﬂuence local political issues is their 
level of political eﬃcacy. The questions here are as follows: To what degree do citizens 
feel they are able to understand local political issues? How much capacity do citizens feel 
they have to inﬂuence local political issues? A speciﬁc local problem of political culture 
is the degree to which local citizens have a sense of belonging and feel solidarity with 
others in the same local government. The speciﬁc questions included: How attached 
do citizens feel to their municipality compared to lower (sub-municipal) and higher 
(national or regional) levels? To what degree are citizens willing to ﬁght the preservation 
of the existing municipality’s borders? Would they change or defend them? To what 
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degree are citizens willing to cooperate with each other? Do they trust each other? These 
questions are related to the chapter on autonomy and legitimacy, but the focus here 
was more on local identity. 
The ﬁnal problem discussed in this section is the degree to which citizens feel the 
principles of the local government system are justiﬁed. More speciﬁcally: To what degree 
do citizens support the principles and institutions of the local government system? How 
do citizens evaluate the local government system compared to the Communist local 
administration and other, more centralized alternatives? How much consensus is there on 
the boundaries of local governments? The conclusion of this section generally discussed 
how democratic the political culture of citizens was in the reported country.
EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS
Contributors were expected to meaningfully address the above questions. With this 
said, the extensiveness of the coverage of the diﬀerent issues was dependent upon the 
relevance of the respective issue, the availability of data, and whether space permits. The 
relative length of the sections and sub-sections depends on four factors: (a) the relevance 
of the topic in the framework; (b) the relevance of the topic in the country’s political 
discourse; (c) the amount of original data from the surveys of the Indicators Project; 
(d) the availability of other (quantitative and qualitative) data.
Country reports were required to use the data from the project’s two surveys as much 
as possible. Contributors made much eﬀort to fully exploit the opportunities oﬀered by 
the surveys. At the same time, contributors used other data when and if it strengthened 
the argument of their report. The data from the Indicators Project were contrasted with 
earlier data or with data from diﬀerent countries. Some parts of country reports (e.g., 
citizens’ satisfaction) required the use of data from other sources (e.g., public opinion 
polls). Moreover, the use of qualitative data was also encouraged if it shed light on the 
causal mechanisms or if general quantitative data were not available.
Country reports were expected to focus on arguments and not the presentation of 
the data. The goal of the country reports was to present the state of aﬀairs on the local 
level, with an evaluation conducted from the viewpoint of local democracy. Therefore, 
reports made clear statements on the situation and took stands or presented the 
standpoints in the ongoing political and academic debates. Contributors were required 
to base their statements on evidence. Evidence could be quantitative or qualitative or 
could follow logically from other data. If no data were available for a certain question, 
potential reasons (hypotheses), based on experience and intuition, could be formulated 
as intelligent and informed speculation.
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COUNTRIES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND COMPARISONS
Similarly to the ﬁrst volume, this one also contains cases that represent the geographical 
subregions of Central and Eastern Europe. Estonia, as Latvia in the ﬁrst volume, 
represents the Baltic group of countries. It is also a good example of small countries. 
The authors of the report were Georg Sootla, Anu Toots, and Rein Ruutsoo from the 
Pedagogical University of Tallinn. Slovakia, as Poland and Hungary in the previous 
publication, is a representative of the “Visegrad” group. The report was written by a team 
from Bratislava University, comprising Jan Sopóci, Jan Bunčak, and Anna Hrabovska. 
Finally, Bulgaria, like Romania previously, is a sample case from South Eastern Europe. 
The ﬁrst part of the report was prepared by Rumyana Kolarova, Milena Stefanova, and 
Dimitar Dimitrov from Soﬁa University. Milena Minkova wrote the second part and 
ﬁnalized the report. The three countries all together provide a broad picture of the 
region to be covered by the ILDG project.
The ﬁnal chapter of this volume attempts to draw lessons from the country-
level assessments of local democracy. Relying on the ﬁndings of country reports and 
independent analysis of the data of the project, the concluding chapter compares the 
state of local democracy in ﬁve countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland and 
Hungary, where ILDG surveys were conducted earlier, are added to the three countries 
reported in the book). The author of the paper, Paweł Swianiewicz from the University 
of Warsaw, introduces his topic by reﬁning the analytical tools of democracy assessment. 
He starts with an analysis of local government institutions, especially of their position 
vis à vis the central level, using three analytical dimensions: functions, discretion, 
and access. Then the author turns to indirect measures of democratic performance, 
distinguishing between input, throughput, and output dimensions of legitimacy. They 
are measured mostly through the results of CEO and local representatives’ surveys. One 
of the conclusions is that there is no universal model of local government reform or of 
local democracy in the region. Countries diﬀer in terms of institutional design: some 
of them are territorially consolidated (Poland, Bulgaria), while others are fragmented 
(Hungary, Slovakia); they also diﬀer in terms of functional decentralization, electoral 
systems, ﬁnancial autonomy, etc. The same applies to the practical functioning of local 
democracy. In Bulgaria, there is more continuity of local elites after the political turnover 
in 1990 than in other analyzed countries. Bulgarian local governments are the most 
strongly inﬂuenced by party politics, while civic organizations play the most important 
role in Poland. Corruption is an important problem in all analyzed countries, although 
Estonia may be considered an exception to this rule. Data suggest that ideas of New 
Public Management and the shift from local government to local governance have been 
profound in the region—these are perhaps more visible in Poland and Estonia than in 
the other three countries. Satisfaction with the results of local government functioning 
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also seems to be higher in Estonia and Poland than in other countries. Although local 
governments are struggling with limited public interest, there are also signs of the success 
of the decentralization reform. For example, in all ﬁve countries, local authorities enjoy 
a much higher level of trust and satisfaction with their activity than is the case with 
central powers. The cross-country comparison concludes with a cautious optimism, 
which the editor of this book also shares.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Country
After almost ﬁfteen years of transition, Bulgaria is now a “consolidated democracy” 
(Freedom House 2002). In spite of the many challenges encountered during more than a 
decade of building and strengthening democracy, Bulgarian society has proved in practice 
its maturity and adherence to the values of freedom and democracy. It has consistently 
conducted elections assessed by observers as free and fair, and the transfer of political 
power from one governing party to another has always followed legally established 
procedures. Fundamental freedoms and rights are guaranteed by the constitution and 
other supporting legislation, and the media are free from political control. The absence 
of nationalist, irredentist, and xenophobic political agendas appears to be one of the 
most stable and enduring elements of Bulgaria’s democracy. A vibrant civil society has 
come into existence. 
Bulgaria has made progress in establishing the rule of law, but further improvements 
are needed. After a period of poor performance, the economy has recorded six years 
of robust growth. Economic reforms have advanced considerably, with more work 
remaining to improve the institutional framework and the business environment. The 
European Commission’s 1999 Regular Report on Bulgaria’s Progress towards Accession 
declared that “Bulgaria fulﬁlls the Copenhagen political criteria,” demonstrating that 
the country has achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights, and respect for the protection of minorities.” The country’s 
accomplishments in establishing democracy and a market-oriented economy have laid 
the foundation for its successful integration into the EU. The negotiation chapters with 
the EU have already been ﬁnalized and an accession target date of January 2007 has 
been conﬁrmed. An exceptional achievement for Bulgaria’s foreign policy is the fact that 
in 2004 the country joined NATO.
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Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic, based on a clear division of powers and a 
set of institutional checks and balances within the political system. Supreme power 
resides with the legislative branch—the National Assembly. As Bulgaria has signed 
an Association Agreement with the EU in 1993, the National Assembly has been put 
under enormous pressure to bring the Bulgarian domestic legal system into conformity 
with the acquis communautaire of the EU. Draft preparation is transparent and is 
eﬀectively communicated to the public by means of the Internet; important sessions 
are broadcast live on national television. The executive—the Council of Ministers—is 
appointed by the National Assembly after the president has handed the mandate to 
form a government to the individual nominated by the National Assembly to form a 
cabinet. The recent history of Bulgaria has oﬀered quite a few opportunities to test this 
system and the constitutionally established procedures have been strictly followed. The 
president is both head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Several 
acute crises in Bulgaria have proven the potential of the presidential institution to unify 
diﬀerent positions around a constitutionally sound consensus. The legislative branch is 
counter-balanced by an independent judiciary, including the public prosecutor’s oﬃce, 
and also by a constitutional court that has the power to turn down legislation judged 
to be unconstitutional. Weaknesses in the Bulgarian judicial system have been a focus 
of criticism, and remain an area of increasing concern with respect to the strengthening 
of democracy and the protection of rights.
Bulgaria’s population was 7,973,671 at the time of the 2001 census, and has been 
rapidly decreasing for the last ten years. Between 1990 and 2000 it decreased more than 
7% (see Appendix 1). Of the general population, 83.6% are ethnic Bulgarians, 9.5% 
ethnic Turks, and 4.6% Roma. In terms of religious aﬃliation, the National Statistical 
Institute reports Eastern Orthodox Christians at 83.8%, Muslims at just over 12%, 
nonreligious persons at 3.9%, and others at 0.2%. 
The economic transformations since 1989, which have been of a controversial 
nature, fall into four fairly distinct periods. Initially, a stumbling and cautious policy 
of liberalization and debt default led to economic stagnation. Next came a period of 
inconsistent economic reforms and feckless privatization policies, that led to a brief 
period of uncontrolled proﬁteering and the mass bankruptcy of banks. This resulted in 
a deep economic and social crisis and a brief hyperinﬂation cycle. The beginning of the 
forth period was marked by the introduction of a currency board in 1997, followed by 
speedy privatization and reforms in all spheres, including public administration, social 
policy, and the health insurance system. This is the only period that saw stable economic 
growth, low inﬂation, a gradual improvement in the standard of living, and a decrease 
in the shadow or gray economy. In 2001, Bulgaria was recognized as a market economy 
with good prospects for economic growth and for increase of foreign investments. The 
dark side of this development has been persistent low consumption, high unemployment, 
and low incomes, still about one quarter of the average income of EU member states.
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Table 2.1
 Key Economic Indicators
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Growth in GDP [%] 2.9 –10.1 –7.0 3.5 2.4 5.4 4.1 4.8
Inﬂation [%] 34 310 579 1 6.2 3.5 11.3 3.8
Unemployment rate [%] 11 12.5 14 12 16 18 17.9 16.3
Monthly wages [US$] 130 56 108 128 122 122 118 139
Total revenues [% of GDP] 36 32 33 39.7 40.7 41.4 39.8 38.7
Total expenditures [% of GDP] 41 42 36 38.4 40.6 42.0 40.4 39.4
Fiscal balance [% of GDP] –5.6 –10.4 –3 1.3 0.2 –0.6 –0.6 –0.6
Source: World Bank (1999) and national statistical data.
1.2 The Local Government System
 
The tradition of local self-government in Bulgaria dates back to the 17th century, when the 
taxation and judicial systems within the Ottoman Empire were based on local community 
notables. Later in the 18th century, the local self-government functions were extended 
to the spheres of education, public utilities, and church wards. The early municipalities 
included only the population of one village or town. The tendency since then has been 
towards decreasing the number of municipalities and consequently increasing the average 
number of residents per municipality as seen in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Number of Municipalities in Bulgaria
Year 1880 1934 1944 1946 1949 1959 1979 1981 1987 1992 2003
Municipalities 1,354 1,211 1,771 2,113 2,178 979 291 300 273 255 263
Average 
population
1,483 5,019 3,936 3,359 3,319 7,997 30,400 29,685 32,880 33,283 30,987
Source: H. Stanev et al. 2000.
Modeled after the French system, the modern Bulgarian state is characterized 
by a highly centralized administrative and governmental system. Even though local 
government autonomy may have increased from 1888 to1934, during the decades 
that followed, from 1935 to1990, the tendency toward increasing centralization is 
indisputable. 
Local government (LG) reform was initiated in 1991, when free and competitive local 
elections were held. These elections were preceded by the adoption of a new, democratic 
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constitution that provided stable guarantees for individual rights and freedoms. However, 
the new constitution reaﬃrmed the existing strong tradition of centralized government. 
As a result, certain rigid constitutional provisions have blocked one of the substantial 
elements of LG reform—the decentralization process—and especially its vital aspect, 
ﬁscal decentralization. For example, since 1991 the requirement for a three-quarters or 
two-thirds majority has been an ongoing impediment even for minor constitutional 
amendments.
Another distinctive feature of Bulgarian local government reform has been its 
inconsistency. According to the 1991 Local Self-Government and Local Administration 
Act (hereinafter the LSGLA Act), the administrative structure must be tri-level: 
regional, district, and municipal. But the district level was never introduced and was 
legally abolished in 1995. A similar reversal occurred with the decentralization of city 
municipalities with a population above 300,000. In 1995, self-governing city districts 
were introduced with elected district councils and mayors, but four years later the 
districts were abolished, perhaps because these representative bodies had never acquired 
real powers (the LSGLA Act envisaged no delegation of competencies, as it stipulated 
that “the district councils should assist the municipal council”). There is an intrinsic 
link between the ineﬀective decentralization eﬀorts and the frequent reversals of local 
government reforms. Certain constitutional amendments will be indispensable for the 
furthering of local government reforms. 
The current local government system may be brieﬂy characterized as follows. 
According to the 1991 Constitution, “The Republic of Bulgaria is a unitary state with 
local self-government” (article 2, paragraph 1). Chapter 7 of the Constitution deals 
exclusively with the local self-government and the local administration. It regulates the 
separation of powers between the legislative body (municipal council) and the executive 
(mayor) and gives the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court 
the authority to decide, respectively, on disputes over competencies between municipal 
authorities and between the municipal and central authorities. The 1991 Constitution 
gives the municipality the status of a juridical person/legal entity with respective property 
rights and the right to independently dispose of its autonomous budget. The municipality 
is deﬁned as “the fundamental unit of local self-government.” Two tiers of territorial 
division are introduced: municipal (obshtina) and regional (oblast). The regional level 
has never been considered a part of the local government, but rather a subdivision of 
the central government. While the municipal authorities are to be elected by free and 
competitive elections, the region has no elected bodies: the Cabinet appoints the regional 
governor, who is authorized to appoint the regional administration. The constitution also 
stipulates that in addition to the municipal and regional tiers of territorial administration, 
“other administrative territorial units and bodies of self-government shall be established 
by law.” Table 2.3 provides a good illustration of the changes in the tiers of administrative 
and territorial division during the last 65 years.
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Table 2.3
Type and Number of Territorial Units (1949–2003)
Type of Units 1949 1981 1992 2003
Municipalities 2,178 300 255 263
District 117 — — —
County* 14 28 — —
Regions — — 9 28
Note: * In 1987 nine regions replaced the existing 28 counties.
Source: M. Stefanova 2003.
In order to make possible the constitution of democratic and autonomous local 
government, the parliament passed the LSGLA Act immediately after the promulgation 
of the new constitution on September 6, 1991. The law deﬁned the competencies of the 
municipal authorities broadly, as a separate branch of power. On the other hand, the 
parliament did not abolish the existing legislative acts; hence, the freedom of municipal 
authorities to decide and act autonomously was substantially restricted. In order to resolve 
some of the existing legislative inconsistencies, the Constitutional Court reaﬃrmed the 
property rights of the municipalities vis-à-vis the state (Decision No. 14 of December 
1993) and with the same interpretative decision deﬁned “public property” in a way that 
favored citizens’ rights and public “needs.” These vital local government issues came to 
be regulated by a speciﬁc law three years later, when the Law on Municipal Property was 
passed (May 21, 1996). The Law on the Municipal Budget was passed even later—in 
1998, followed by a new Law on the Municipal Budget, enacted in 2003.
According to the 1991 model of separation of powers, the citizens directly elect 
both the mayor and the councilors, but the mayor is not a member of the municipal 
council. The council meetings are presided over by a chair elected from the councilors, 
who determines the agenda and calls the sessions of the council. The mayor, on the 
other hand, as the head of the executive, is the oﬃcial (legal) representative of the 
municipality.
The process of democratization in all post-communist countries has been charac-
terized by a rapid increase in the number of municipalities. This would have been the 
tendency in Bulgaria too, as more than 1,000 requests for the establishment of new 
municipalities were ﬁled at the Council of Ministers in 1991, when the introduction 
of the right of municipal self-diﬀerentiation was discussed. However, driven by the 
presumption that Bulgaria is a uniﬁed and centralized state, the legislators decided to 
set a threshold: in the 1995 Law on the Administrative and Territorial Division of Bul-
garia, a minimum requirement of at least 4,000 inhabitants for a newly diﬀerentiated 
municipality was set, which later was raised to 6,000. These restrictions substantially 
32
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
slowed down the increase in the number of municipalities (see Table 2.4). The table also 
reﬂects the changes in the adopted classiﬁcation of the municipalities by size.
Table 2.4
Breakdown of Municipalities by Population Size
Population of Municipality Number in 1997 Number in 2003
< 5,000 23 29
< 10,000 58 68
< 20,000 78 73
< 30,000 33 34
< 50,000 26 26
< 75,000 — 12
< 100,000 24 9
> 100,000 12 11
Capital Soﬁa 1 1
Total 255 263
Source: M. Stefanova 2003.
1.3 Internal Structure of Local Government
Local elections have been conducted regularly since October 1991. The term of oﬃce 
of elected oﬃcials is four years. Following this cycle, local elections were held in 1995 
and 1999; in 2003 the most recent local elections took place. Mayors of municipalities 
and of mayoralties and members of municipal councils are elected by popular vote. By-
elections are held for mayoral positions that have fallen vacant before the term of oﬃce 
expires. Local elections are administered in accordance with international standards 
for a free and fair election process, but they usually attract fewer voters than national 
elections.
Municipalities are subdivided into mayoralties (kmetstva) and/or city wards 
(rayoni). Following the tradition of local self-government, the Law on Administrative 
and Territorial Division of Bulgaria stipulates that all settlements with the status of 
mayoralty elect their mayors, and those settlements not having such status have no 
mayor and are under the jurisdiction of a nearby mayoralty as deﬁned by the Law on 
Administrative and Territorial Division of Bulgaria. The status of mayoralty has not 
been deﬁned in any formal way and is mainly considered to be the outcome of former 
administrative decisions or of self-government acts. Hence, it is appropriate to deﬁne it 
as “based on common law.” The formal distinctions and requirements were introduced 
in 1999: settlements (villages and towns) with more than 500 inhabitants could elect 
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their mayors, while those with fewer than 500 and those with the status of mayoralty 
had lieutenant mayors elected by the municipal council. The big cities have warrant 
mayors, responsible for the local self-government in the city districts.
 Administrative reform in Bulgaria aimed at introducing a transparent and 
accountable public administration and civil service had a very late start—the Civil 
Service Act and the Law on Public Administration were passed only in 1998. These 
laws introduced a uniﬁed structure, status, and coordination between the three tiers of 
government—central, regional, and local. The process of implementation of the Civil 
Service Act at the local level began in 1999 and is not yet ﬁnalized. According to the 
2002 Annual Report of the Cabinet, the administrative reform has not been implemented 
(not completed) in nine municipalities. 
Although the municipal councils may decide on the structure of the local 
administration and the number of administrative staﬀ, the Cabinet is authorized 
to determine the maximum number of administrative positions according to the 
municipality size (number of inhabitants).
Not all members of the municipal administration have the status of civil servants. 
In most municipalities the number of civil servants is restricted to one or several—the 
Chief Administrative Oﬃcer and the Directors of the Directorates. Hence, there is 
currently no reliable data about the total number of civil servants. The results of the 
Local Government Survey of the ILDGP show that the number of administrative staﬀ 
per municipality varies from 11 to 585, while the number of civil servants ranges from 
zero to 91. 
The council is the most “authentic” municipal actor, as all its competencies are 
derived only and entirely from its status as local/municipal authority. While the mayor 
is an actor both in the municipal and central governments, a substantial part of his or 
her competencies is delegated by the central government or the state authorities.
The council has both legislative and executive functions as deﬁned in article 21 of 
the LSGLA Act. They are: 
 • to adopt the budget of the municipality, exercise control over its implementation, 
and approve the relevant report;
 • to set the size of local taxes and fees within the statutory limits;
 • to decide on the acquisition, management, and disposing of municipal property, 
and to deﬁne the powers of the mayor, the ward mayors, and other mayors;
 • to decide on the formation, reorganization, and termination of municipal 
companies and ﬁrms, and to designate its representatives in such companies;
 • to decide on bank borrowing, interest-free lending, and municipal bond issues 
under terms and procedures provided by law;
 • to decide on the design and approval of general and detailed territorial 
development plans for the municipality or parts thereof;
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 • to adopt municipal development strategies, projects, programs, and plans;
 • to deﬁne the requirements governing the activities of natural and legal persons 
within municipal boundaries as they arise from the environmental, historical, 
social, and other characteristics of the inhabited places, and from the condition 
of the existing technical and social infrastructure;
 • to decide on the establishment and termination of municipal foundations and 
on the management of donated property; 
 • to decide on the municipality’s participation in local authority associations in 
this country and abroad and to designate its delegates to such associations; 
 • to create districts and mayoralties under terms and procedures provided by law;
 • to propose changes in the administrative and territorial divisions, when these 
aﬀect the territory and the boundaries of the municipality;
 • to make decisions to name or rename streets, squares, parks, engineering facilities, 
zones, recreation areas, and other places of local importance;
 • to consider and adopt decisions on the advice of the mayors, within its terms 
of reference;
 • to decide on the holding of referendums and general meetings on issues within 
its terms of reference;
 • to approve the municipality’s coat of arms and seal; and
 • to confer honorary citizenship on Bulgarian and foreign individuals.
The competencies of the mayor are within the sphere of the executive, and she or 
he has a key role in:
 • management of the human resources of the municipal administration—she/he 
is personally authorized to make all personnel appointments and dismissals, 
with the exception of the appointments of vice-mayors, which are to be approved 
by the municipal council. Currently the Civil Service Act sets strict requirements 
for the appointment and promotion of those administrative oﬃcials that have 
the status of civil servants;
 • management of the economic and ﬁnancial resources of the municipality—
she/he manages the municipal property and the municipal budget. The mayor 
works out and proposes the budget, which has to be approved by the council; 
she/he is also solely responsible for the implementation of the budget. The 
Law on the Municipal Budget introduces clear procedures for the division of 
competencies and responsibilities between the council and the mayor so that 
conﬂicts may be avoided or productively resolved. The Law on Municipal 
Property also regulates eﬀectively the interactions between the council and the 
mayor—the council decides, while the mayor is entitled to represent legally the 
municipality in disposing of municipal property; and 
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 • decision-making on municipal policies—the mayor has the broad ability to 
make proposals in all spheres and may participate in all sessions of the municipal 
council (debating without the right to vote); the mayor has weak veto powers—
she/he may veto any decision of the council, and the council may override the 
mayor’s veto with a qualiﬁed vote of 50% plus one of the votes of all members. 
 The initial design of the local government system was “weak mayor−council,” but 
the practice during the last few years has led to a gradual evolution towards “strong 
mayor–council.” In 1999, there were legislative amendments strengthening the 
councils’ powers to dismiss the mayor. Immediately after their promulgation, at least 
three councils attempted to dismiss their mayors. The mayors appealed the decisions 
of the councils to the Supreme Administrative Court, which declared the procedures 
null and void. In 2000, new legislative amendments reinstated the autonomy of the 
mayor vis-à-vis the council and thus reaﬃrmed the tendency towards strengthening the 
mayors’ powers to decide on municipal policy.
The Bulgarian model of separation of powers between the central, regional, and 
local levels is usually deﬁned as a “fused system” (Leemans 1970; Benet 1997), and is 
characterized by elected local authorities and very strong central government control. 
This system is undergoing a substantial reform, but the dominance of central government 
is still very strong. Article 144 of the 1991 Constitution stipulates that state authorities 
and their territorial oﬃces “shall exercise control over the legality of the acts of the bodies 
of local government only when authorized to do so by law.”
The regional governor exercises administrative control over the acts of municipalities. 
According to the Public Administration Act (article 29), the regional governor is the 
sole executive governmental oﬃcial within the region to be given power by the central 
government to guarantee consistency between national and local interests through 
the implementation of regional policy. The governor is appointed by the Council of 
Ministers. The governor has veto power over the decisions of local government: he/she 
may block the execution of acts of municipal councils by appealing them to the regional 
courts. The governor may also annul acts of the mayors, who in their turn may appeal 
the annulment to the Supreme Administrative Court. It is important to emphasize 
that the mayor may not convene the municipal council, while the regional governor is 
empowered to do so.
1.4 Project Indicators in Bulgaria
The current analysis is based on a systematic comparison of statistical and polling data; 
in addition, it draws extensively upon the results of two parallel empirical surveys carried 
out speciﬁcally for the purposes of this study.
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The ﬁrst survey was a face-to-face interview with Local Chief Administrative Oﬃcials 
(CAOs). The ﬁeldwork was carried out from October 2002 to December 2002. All 
263 municipalities (one was constituted during the second half of 2002) were targeted 
and face-to-face interviews were conducted with individuals holding the administrative 
position, “secretary of the municipal administration.” Where the position of secretary 
was vacant at the time of interviewer’s visit, the persons holding the position of “acting 
secretary” were interviewed.
The return rate was 72% or 189 interviews. The secretaries of the larger municipalities 
(regional centers in particular) were more diﬃcult to reach and more often refused to be 
interviewed. They were approached several times (at least twice). The other considerable 
group of refusals came from position holders with less than a year of experience. A 
number of administrators were not available as they were on leave for business trips, 
vacation, or illness during the time of the ﬁeldwork. The survey was carried out with the 
support of the National Association of the Secretaries of Municipalities (NASM), and 
the interviewers reported easier contacts and fewer refusals when association members 
were contacted (80% of the 263 secretaries are members of the NASM).
The survey indicators were adapted to the speciﬁcs of the Bulgarian local government 
system—all questions about the regional level were omitted and the speciﬁcs of the local 
government constitution were taken into account.
The second survey was a mail interview with local representatives—municipal 
councilors and mayors—conducted during the period of December 2002 to May 2003. 
The total number of councilors elected in 1999 was 5,252, but in December 2002, 
the number of serving or acting councilors was 5,244. A sample of 134 representative 
municipalities with regard to size, geographic location, ethnic composition of the 
population, and level of economic development was designed. All local representatives 
from the sampled municipalities were addressed—2,575 councilors and 134 mayors. 
The return rate was 35.7% for the councilors (920 cases) and 32% for the mayors (42 
cases).
The sample is representative with regard to the basic characteristics of the general 
population of councilors as seen in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
Table 2.5
 Representativeness of the Sample by Gender
Gender Male Female Total
General population of councilors 4,141 79.0% 1,103 21.0% 5,244 100%
Sample of interviewed local representatives  759 78.8%  204 21.2%  963 100%
Source: National statistical data.
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Table 2.6
Representativeness of the Sample by Age
Age Under 30 30–39 40–49 50–59 Above 60 Total
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
General population 
of councilors
133 2.5 1,075 20.5 1,895 36.1 1,456 27.8 685 13.1 5,244 100
Sample of 
interviewed LRs
20 2.1 165 17.5 337 35.6 297 31.4 126 13.3 945 100
Source: LRS 2002.
2. AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT
2.1 Legal Autonomy
Since 1991, the record of four consecutive mandates of local government has produced 
wide-ranging public consensus that independent and autonomous local government is 
of crucial importance for all public services provided to the society. At the same time, 
there is a general consensus that the existing legal framework is outdated and restrictive, 
limiting the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of local government. The municipal authorities 
are empowered to make decisions and to act deliberately and autonomously on any issue 
of local importance, but there is no legal deﬁnition that distinguishes between issues of 
national, regional, and local importance. This is an impediment for the development 
and implementation of local strategies and the implementation of coherent policies in 
the various areas where the municipal governments have constitutionally and legally 
deﬁned competencies.
Article 11 of the LSGLA Act broadly deﬁnes local self-government in a municipality 
as “the right of the citizens, or of their elected bodies with such terms of reference as 
conferred thereon, to resolve issues relating to:
 1. municipal property, municipal enterprises, municipal ﬁnances, taxes and fees, 
and municipal administration; 
 2. the organization and development of the municipal territory and its component 
inhabited places;
 3. education, including: pre-school, primary, basic, and secondary;
 4. health, including: out-patient and hospital care, health prevention, community 
care, and sanitation;
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 5. culture, including: community clubs, theaters, orchestras, libraries, museums 
and museum collections, amateur art, rituals, local traditions, and customs;
 6. public works and utilities, including: water and sewer, electricity, heating, 
telephone, streets and squares, parks and gardens, street lighting, green spaces, 
adjustment of river courses and gullies, domestic waste disposal, local public 
transport, local bath-houses, laundries, hotels, garages, and cemeteries;
 7. social assistance, including: social care and allowances, social housing, and other 
similar activities of local importance;
 8. protection of the natural environment and rational use of the natural resources 
of local importance;
 9. conservation of cultural, historic, and architectural monuments of local 
importance; and
 10. sports, recreation, and tourism of local importance.”
The LSGLA Act makes no distinction between mandatory and optional tasks of 
local government; in fact, such notions are not applicable. Instead, there is a clear 
distinction between the following two groups of tasks. First, those that are speciﬁc 
to the local self-government and are deﬁned in the constitution as belonging only to 
the municipal authorities, i.e., constituting the local government per se. The second 
group of tasks stems from the competencies of the central government, and they are 
managed by a hierarchical structure subordinated to the central government, but are 
executed by departments or individual servants within the municipal administration. 
This group is subdivided into two: ﬁrst, the tasks that are mandatory by instruction 
and, second, contracted tasks. The central government exercises tight control mostly on 
the contracted tasks. These include maintaining the civil register, conducting censuses, 
and administering elections. For each of those activities a detailed manual containing 
prescribed rules, regulations, and a timetable is provided by the central government 
and is strictly followed by the local administrators. The funds needed for these activities 
are allotted separately. Tasks that are “mandatory by instruction” are performed in 
accordance with special laws, such as the Traﬃc Law or the laws setting strict standards 
and technical prescriptions for such things as building construction standards. As a 
rule, when performing these tasks the local administrators provide paid services to 
citizens and local businesses. In some cases, these activities are partially funded by the 
republican budget. 
The local authorities have exclusive competencies and are able to decide and act on 
their own discretion only in the provision of the following services:
 • refuse collection and disposal;
 • sewerage;
 • street cleaning;
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 • maintenance of cemeteries;
 • public transport; and
 • the organization and maintenance kindergartens and nurseries.
Though the quality of the services is controlled by the state (on the basis of 
legally introduced standards), the municipality bears the political and administrative 
responsibility for their provision. In all of the spheres listed previously, the central 
government agencies have the power to use administrative mechanisms to block and 
sanction activities that do not meet the state standards.
In all other spheres of local government—education, social services, culture, sport, 
tourism, healthcare, economic development, environmental protection, provision of 
administrative services, and maintaining public order—the central and local governments 
have “shared responsibilities” that are vaguely deﬁned and regulated.
Being the sole embodiment of executive power at the local level, the mayor represents 
the municipality in all legal and economic interactions and, in fact, is much more 
popular than the chair of the municipal council. In addition to the competencies of a 
local executive, the mayor has some competencies delegated by the central government. 
The municipal council may also delegate some of its competencies to the mayor. During 
the ﬁrst years after 1991, there was a tendency towards transfer of competencies to the 
mayors, but this substantially decreased the controlling powers of the council. These 
accumulated experiences led to the opposite tendency—the next two mandates are 
characterized by restriction of the powers and competencies delegated to the mayors. 
An example concerning one of the main functions of local government, education, 
will provide an illustration of the limits of the legal autonomy currently imposed on 
municipal authorities in Bulgaria. A substantial part of the municipal budget (32.1% 
for the 2001 ﬁscal year) is used for the primary and secondary schools, and it is worth 
examining the way education is managed. There are both municipal and state public 
schools (as well as private ones), but the municipalities are responsible for guaranteeing, 
providing, and controlling compulsory education (i.e., to the end of the eighth grade). 
The municipalities are also responsible for the provision of healthcare at the schools, the 
repair and maintenance of school buildings and equipment, the remuneration of school 
personnel, and the provision of food and accommodation for students, transports, and 
sport facilities, etc. While the mayors control the spending of the allotted funding at 
all educational institutions, they only appoint and dismiss the personnel in nurseries 
and kindergartens. Personnel appointments in all municipal and state schools are 
made by the regional education inspectorate—namely, by the head of the inspectorate, 
a civil servant appointed by the minister of education. At least two types of tension 
are provoked by this model of shared competencies. First, while the municipalities are 
responsible for the ﬁnancing of all schools, they can only fully control the expenses 
(including the remuneration of the teachers, which constitutes a major share) of the 
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municipal schools, not the state ones. And second, although competent to control the 
budget in the municipal schools, the local authorities have no say on the appointment 
or dismissal of teachers and other personnel. These tensions are partially due to the lack 
of ﬁscal decentralization in Bulgaria; a majority of the municipalities depend on state 
subsidies and in reality have very limited revenues.
Local government in Bulgaria functions within the context of insuﬃcient legal 
autonomy, which is the source of a complicated tangle of problems. As seen in Table 
2.7, the unclear division of responsibilities between the central and local levels (due 
exclusively to the legislative vacuum and lack of eﬃcient decentralization) goes hand 
in hand with the assignment of too many responsibilities, which is the perverse version 
of the dismantling of the totalitarian state. The decentralization of policies and services 
is in apparent contradiction with the lack of ﬁscal decentralization and the ensuing 
persistent budget deﬁcits. In an attempt to maintain uniﬁed standards for the public 
services provided at local level, the central government blocks the industrious use of local 
resources and practices. This imposition of standards in how responsibilities are to be 
executed creates problems. Despite the lack of explicit and consistent legal regulations, 
there are no visible problems in the interaction between regional and local government, 
mostly because the regional level is still insuﬃciently developed and is, de facto, a branch 
of the central administration.
Table 2.7
Identiﬁed Problems in the Interaction of Central and Local Government
Type of 
Municipality
by Population
 Size 
Problem of 
Too Many 
Responsibilities 
Problem of 
Assigned Standards 
in Responsibilities 
Problem of 
Unclear Division 
of Responsibility 
Problem of 
Interference from 
Regional Authorities 
Less than 4,999 5.29 5.58 5.15 4.14 
5,000–9,999 5.79 5.50 5.12 3.63 
10,000–49,999 6.10 5.78 5.52 3.58 
50,000–99,999 5.90 5.25 6.00 3.84 
Over 100,000 5.90 5.50 5.50 4.40 
Total 5.93 5.62 5.45 3.71 
Source: CAO survey.
2.2 Fiscal Autonomy
The municipalities in Bulgaria have had their own autonomous budgets since 1991, but 
the introduction of a consistent legal framework for a coherent model of local ﬁnance 
was substantially delayed, being passed only in 1998. From 1991 to 1998, local ﬁnances 
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were regulated on the basis of articles in Chapter 7 of the LSGLA Act, “Property and 
Finance of the Municipality,” where the texts are formulated very generally and vaguely. 
In addition, there have been permanent amendments and addenda to the normative 
bases of ﬁscal policy at the municipal level. According to these legislative texts, municipal 
budgets were completely dependent on the discretion of the central government (both 
legislative and executive), such that the constitutional principle of local self-government 
and the autonomy of local powers was not consistently and entirely followed. As a result, 
a severe problem faced by Bulgarian local governments is the discrepancy between their 
responsibilities and competencies and their actual capacity to implement them eﬀectively. 
The considerable dependence of municipalities on central government, their limited 
capacity to inﬂuence their total revenue base, insuﬃcient incentives to increase their 
own revenues and to improve the cost-eﬃciency of services, “unfunded mandates,” and 
the problem of unsettled expenditures (a result of the municipalities’ unpaid bills for 
goods and services) formed a pool of issues that called for action by central government. 
In addition, the reforms in a number of ﬁelds such as restitution, privatization, health 
insurance, and social security schemes also negatively aﬀected the local ﬁnance system 
in a way that required comprehensive and long-term changes.
The Bulgarian Government took a major step in extending local ﬁscal autonomy 
by adopting the Fiscal Decentralization Program in 2002, thus declaring a political will 
to implement ﬁscal decentralization and setting a more structured policy framework to 
further the ﬁscal decentralization process. Implementation of the ﬁscal decentralization 
program has brought a number of legislative changes. A new Municipal Budget Act 
was enacted in November 2003, to rearrange the expenditure responsibilities between 
the state and the municipalities. The new Local Taxes and Fees Act of December 2002 
has added to the ﬂexibility of local representatives to develop independent municipal 
policy with respect to fees and cost of services, ways of delivering the services, etc. The 
purpose of the Corporate Income Tax Act and the Natural Persons Income Tax Act of 
2002 was to increase the predictability, regularity, and proportional allocation of the 
shared taxes. The State Budget Act of 2003 has restructured the ﬁscal relationship with 
municipalities by introducing two types of subsidies from the state budget: one to ﬁll 
in the deﬁcit for ﬁnancing state activities, and another to secure the minimum resources 
for local activities. A draft Municipal Debt Act has been prepared to signiﬁcantly extend 
the credit portfolio of Bulgarian municipalities. It is expected that this act will come into 
force in January 2005. The tasks performed by municipalities were conditionally divided 
into municipal tasks (to be provided by local revenues) and tasks delegated by the state 
to the municipalities (to be provided by shared taxes and state subsidies). Standards 
were adopted in 2003 for expenditure responsibilities for education, healthcare, social 
welfare and social services, and cultural activities. The main goals of the development 
of the standards were to unify the criteria for ﬁnancing similar activities by the state 
and the municipalities; to ﬁnancially provide for the tasks delegated by the state to the 
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municipalities; and to ensure equality between municipalities in implementing the 
expenditure responsibilities assigned by the state.
Following the whole process of economic restructuring and the introduction of 
the Currency Board in 1997, local governments in Bulgaria went through a period of 
severe ﬁnancial pressures with increasing budget deﬁcits starting in 1998 and peaking 
in 2000 (see Table 2.8).
Table 2.8
 Municipal Budget Deﬁcits (1997–2001)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Deﬁcit/surplus of operating 
budget [millions of BG leva]
12.7 –16.3 –57 –62.4 0.7
Source: National statistical data, 2002.
At the moment, the ﬁnancial picture across municipalities demonstrates wide 
ranging diﬀerences. Size and economic potential are among the key factors to 
inﬂuence the present situation. Table 2.9 shows the diﬀerence in budget deﬁcits across 
municipalities for 2003. Out of all 263 municipalities, 120 have budget deﬁcits and 
76 of those have a level of deﬁcit higher than the national average. The worst situation 
is that of large municipalities with more than 100,000 residents, as well as small ones 
with fewer than 10,000 people.
Table 2.9
Cross-diﬀerences among Municipalities
Type of Municipality by Population Size Level of Indebtedness [%]
Soﬁa 0.0
> 100,000 –4.8
50,000–100,000 –2.4
30,000–50,000 –1.8
10,000–30,000 –2.7
< 10,000 –2.8
Total –2.5
Source: Monitoring of the Reform towards Fiscal Decentralization, 2003, 2004.
The basic principles of the municipal budgeting model in Bulgaria since 1998 have 
been:
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 •  the municipal budget is autonomous;
 •  the budget is open to public scrutiny and controlled by citizens and public 
authorities (municipal council, audit court, etc.);
 •  budget revenues include: own municipal revenues (local taxes and fees,  
concessions, proﬁts and dividends, rental and lease of real-estate, etc.), state 
transfers to the municipalities, subsidies and subventions from the republican 
budget; and
 •  expenditures should meet the requirements of law, expediency and feasibility, 
eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, and the public interest.
However, because Bulgaria has a highly centralized ﬁnancial system, some of these 
principles are hardly enacted. The municipal authorities have very limited autonomy in 
determining their own tax revenues. According to the constitution, it is the prerogative 
of the national parliament to determine the taxes by type and size. As stipulated in the 
Local Taxation and Fees Act, the central authorities strictly regulate even the local taxes. 
The law gives autonomy to the municipalities only in determining the size of the local 
fees (levies).
Municipalities in Bulgaria have six types of own revenue: 
 • local taxes as deﬁned by law; 
 • local fees;
 • revenues from concessions;
 • ﬁnes (both deﬁned by law and decided by local administration);
 • proﬁts and dividends; and
 • income from renting and leasing municipal real estate, and other revenues.
The distribution of the revenues of municipal budgets is shown in Tables 1.10 and 
1.12, which also indicate the structural changes introduced by the Municipal Budget 
Law.
Table 2.10
 Structure of Revenues in Municipal Budgets [%]
Types of revenues 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
State subsidies 44.23 41.86 32.75 34.79 36.61
Shared taxes 33.96 37.21 46.05 55.65 46.58
Own source revenues 18.42 18.96 19.27  9.23 15.50
Attracted revenues  3.39  1.97  1.93  0.33  1.31
Source: S. Ivanov 2000.
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The structure of the revenues in the municipal budget and its changes during the 
period 1994-98 shows that the share of local/municipal revenues is relatively small. More 
than 80% of the revenues came from state subsidies and shared taxes, which meant 
that the central government was responsible for the predominant part of the municipal 
revenues—it determined their size and provided them to the municipalities. During 
that period, the municipal authorities had no incentives to design and implement their 
own ﬁscal policy. The existing budget regulations have also provoked a series of conﬂicts 
between central and local authorities. The budgeting prerogatives of the former, and 
especially its power to decide on the distribution of subsidies, were a useful tool for 
domination over local policy. This tendency becomes more distinctive when the structure 
of the so-called “own revenues” is examined (see Table 2.11).
Table 2.11
Structure of Own Revenues in Municipal Budgets [%]
Types of Revenue 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Shared taxes 64.84 66.25 70.49 85.77 75.04 70.60
Income tax 45.69 47.57 48.11 52.28 48.83 46.66
Tax for municipalities 15.28 15.86 20.27 32.06 24.68 22.24
Local taxes 12.45  9.46  8.20  2.93  7.39  7.62
Local fees  8.66  8.96  7.43  4.88 10.00 10.50
Other local revenues 14.06 15.34 13.88  6.42  7.57 11.27
Source: S. Ivanov 2000.
From the data in Table 2.4 it is evident that the biggest share of own revenues come 
from the shared taxes—of which the income tax constitutes the most substantial share. 
But the sharing of taxes both by type and proportion is deﬁned by the central government. 
In fact, the local governments cannot decide on the balance between stimulating local 
business or providing welfare beneﬁts to the local residents.
In 2003, the own revenues have amounted to 32.2% of all municipal revenues. 
The tendency in the last year is to increase the share of the own revenues. Following 
the amendment of the Local Taxes and Fees Act in 2002, local governments have now 
full competencies to determine the amount of local fees. The National Assembly is only 
competent to rule on the type of service for which fees may be charged. The opposite 
tendency is to decrease the share of the state budget transfers. 
The structure of own revenues in the municipal budgets of 2002–2003 is presented 
in Table 2.12.
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Table 2.12
Structure of Own Revenues in Municipal Budgets (2002–2003)
Structure of Own Revenues 
in Municipal Budgets 2002 [%]
Structure of Own Revenues 
in Municipal Budgets 2003 [%]
Local taxes 30.5 28.6
Local fees 41.0 37.3
Non-tax revenues 28.5 34.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Monitoring of the Reform towards Fiscal Decentralization, 2003, 2004.
Table 2.13 shows the structure of municipal revenues after the passing of the Local 
Budget Law in 1998. The share of tax revenues is relatively high and stable. The share 
of non-tax revenues has steadily increased, while the state subsidies are ﬂuctuating.
Table 2.13
Revenues in Local Budgets of Bulgarian Municipalities [%] 
Type of Revenues 1998 1999 2000 2001
Tax revenues 52.27 47.09 44.50 51.25
Non-tax revenues 10.29 13.30 13.26 16.92
Aids 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.38
Transfers 37.43 39.60 42.23 31.45
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Consolidated state budget of the Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Finance, 2002.
The municipal budget expenditures depend on the competencies and responsibilities 
of local government. The Local Budget Act clearly deﬁnes the expenditures in accordance 
with the speciﬁed competencies of the municipal government—both delegated and own 
(see article 11 of the LSGLA, cited previously).
Table 2.14
Local Expenditures by Type [%]
Type of Expenditures 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Current 92.1 87.4 90.8 92.2 90.0
Capital/investment  7.9 12.6  9.2  7.8 10.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:  Bulgaria: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No 02/173, August 
2002.
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During the last several years, the share of current expenditures has been extremely 
high—about 90% of total expenditures. The limited capital expenditures indicate the 
restricted investments that have characterized local policy for more than a decade. This 
is also indicative of the high deﬁcits and the shortage of own revenues—municipalities 
are forced by these circumstances to limit investment plans and to reallocate available 
ﬁnances to cover current expenditures. However, ﬁscal decentralization reform and the 
increased own municipal revenues have led in 2003 to investment expenditures that 
are 22.7% higher than the investment expenditures in 2002. This is the highest level 
of investment for the last ﬁve years.
Table 2.15
Current Municipal Expenditures [%]
Type of Expenditures  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
Salaries and insurance  48.0  49.3  43.3  37.7  48.0
Maintenance of facilities  40.8  40.9  41.4  36.5  40.8
Subsidies  4.5  1.57  1.2  9.0  4.5
Interest  0.1  0.03  0.5  0.6  0.1
Social security and welfare  6.6  8.2  13.6  16.2  6.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source: Consolidated state budget of the Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Finance, http://www.minﬁn.
government.bg\bg.
The most substantial share of current expenditures is spent on remuneration 
of municipal administration and public service personnel (in education and health 
care), i.e., salaries and respective social and health insurance fees. The other substantial 
share of expenditure goes for the maintenance of schools and hospitals. After the 
introduction of a health insurance system, the remuneration of doctors and medical 
personnel gradually was covered mostly by the National Health Insurance Fund (in 1999 
the ﬁnancing of pre-hospital healthcare and in 2001 health services in regional hospitals 
and orphanages). However, the maintenance of hospital buildings and equipment 
is still the responsibility of the municipal authorities and is to be covered by local 
budgets. With the social security system, changes have been in the opposite direction—
the share of expenses covered by the municipalities is gradually increasing. The dynamics 
of the expenditures for public service (health, education, and social security) may be 
seen in Table 2.16.
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Table 2.16
Structure of Local Expenditures by Policy Area [%]
Type of Expenditure 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001
Education  32.8  29.3  30.5  31.0  32.1
Health care  28.3  25.8  25.6  20.5  9.0
Social security and welfare  9.0  9.2  12.8  15.5  19.2
Other  29.9  32.3  31.1  33.0  39.7
Total 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bulgaria: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 02/173, August 
2002.
The equalization mechanism envisaged by the law is provided by the debates on 
the annual state budget. Following a period of negotiation between representatives of 
the National Association of Bulgarian Municipalities and the Ministry of Finance, the 
cabinet proposes a formula for the redistribution of municipal revenues—the inputs 
from the “donor” municipalities are redistributed through state subsidies to the poorer 
municipalities. The state budget is voted on as a block by the parliament, although the 
section on the municipal budget is debated separately. When the municipalities submit 
their budget reports at the end of the ﬁscal year, the government may decide, in its 
discretion, to cover a share of the reported deﬁcits. The overall annual deﬁcit of all 263 
municipalities is made public by the Ministry of Finance; for 2003, it is available in the 
Annual Report on the State Budget Implementation.
The 2003 overall annual deﬁcit has been reported as minimal, at 625.825 million 
leva. However, the diﬀerences among municipalities are considerable: 56.7million surplus 
in some municipalities against 57.3 million leva deﬁcit in others (see Table 2.17). 
Table 2.17
Scale of Diﬀerences across Municipalities
Type of 
Municipality
Surplus/Deficit 
[Leva per Resident]
Surplus Deficit
1. Soﬁa 18.9 18.9 0.0
2. > 100,000 –8.7 4.3 –12.9
3. 50,000–100,000 –3.7 2.6 –6.3
4. 30,000–50,000 1.1 5.7 –4.6
5. 10,000–30,000 0.1 7.7 –7.6
6. < 10,000 –4.1 5.7 –9.8
Total (Bulgaria) –0.1 7.2 –7.3
Source: Monitoring of the Reform towards Fiscal Decentralization, 2003, 2004.
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The data show that with the exception of Soﬁa, all groups contain municipalities 
with both surpluses and deﬁcits. At the end of 2003, 120 municipal budgets showed a 
surplus compared to 143 registering a deﬁcit. The worst situation occurs in the biggest 
(above 100,000 residents) and the smallest (below 10,000 residents) municipalities. The 
richest Bulgarian municipalities are located in the Black Sea area, while those in depressive 
economic zones, including rural mountain areas, are the most disadvantaged.
The monitoring report on the state of ﬁscal decentralization in 2003 has concluded 
that it is yet too early to speak of decentralization as a transfer of resources from the 
center to the local authorities. Indeed, municipal budgets have decreased as an absolute 
sum and as a percentage of the country’s GDP. The report acknowledges that some of 
the objectives set in the Concept and Program for Fiscal Decentralization adopted by 
the Bulgarian government are partially achieved. Achievements so far include the full 
competencies of local authorities over determination of local fees, the strengthening 
of ﬁnancial discipline, and the abolishment of particular obstacles to raising own 
revenues. However, there is a tendency towards centralization of the public services 
oﬀered. Municipal budgets are still not stable. The causes of destabilization are the state 
budget transfers and the system of subsidies, which do not allow local authorities to 
plan their expenditures and revenues. In 2003, the share of own revenues in municipal 
budgets was markedly increased. Local authorities gained full local competency over the 
allocation and management of 40% of municipal expenses. At the same time, Bulgarian 
municipalities substantially increased the share of their investment expenses, whereas 
the created immovable property in 2003 was twice the amount of the property sold. 
Smaller municipalities are rapidly being capitalized. Only ten municipalities of 263 in 
the whole country have been decapitalized. The biggest diﬀerences among municipalities 
are seen in their capital expenditures, while expenses for activities delegated by the state 
are almost even.
2.3 Political Autonomy
The political autonomy of local governments is heavily inﬂuenced by the degree of 
power political parties have in the determination and implementation of local 
policies. Even in 2003, Bulgarian political parties had yet to complete the process 
of crystallization and stabilization. There is an ongoing process of proﬁling and re-
proﬁling of parties, new parties are being created (e.g., Democrats for a Strong 
Bulgaria in 2004 and the National Movement “Simeon II” in 2002), and split-oﬀs 
from parties have occurred (e.g., the split of the UDF in 2004). The fact that the party 
system is not yet well stabilized directly aﬀects the stability of local politics. In pursuing 
their party policies, local party representatives often show little ﬂexibility and in most 
cases adhere strictly to the central party directives, thus causing frequent conﬂicts 
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in the local municipal councils. The main political parties that have an inﬂuence on 
local policy are the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP), the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the Bulgarian Social Democracy 
(BSD), the National Movement “Simeon II,” the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party 
(BSDP), the Peoples’ Union (PU), and the Internal Macedonian Organization 
(IMRO).
All Bulgarian parties are based on local structures that have been developed following 
the administrative and territorial division of the country. The basic or primary units 
of Bulgarian parties are organizations, with the exception of the Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF), which has clubs and unions. The primary units (one for each local 
community) are subordinated to and coordinated by hierarchically ordered levels of 
municipal, regional, and national party structures.
The establishment of primary structures at the local level within each village or town 
is relatively easy. Most political parties require a minimum of ten party members in a 
primary organization, with the exception of BSP, where the minimum number is three, 
and IMRO with a minimum of seven. In the capital, Soﬁa, and in the other big cities, 
more than one primary organization can be established. These are not hierarchically 
subordinated, but are coordinated by the city organization and regulated by party 
statutes.
It is relatively easy to join most parties. The primary organizations may independently 
decide on the admission of new members, with the exception of MRF and IMRO: in 
MRF, the municipal party council has to approve the decision of the primary organization 
within one month, while in IMRO the new members have to submit a written request 
to the National Board of the party.
The only party that envisages dissolution of the primary organization by a higher 
party body is the BSDP, while all the other parties have statutes guaranteeing the 
independent existence of the primary party organizations.
The procedures for nomination of candidates for councilor and mayor are mostly 
identical with the ones for nomination of members of parliament. The procedures are 
usually not ﬁxed in the party statute, but are worked out through discussion and voted 
on in the highest party forum. The primary party organizations take active part in 
the nomination, but usually the nominees are voted on at municipal sessions and are 
approved by a higher party organization. Only the BSDP gives full rights to the primary 
structures to nominate the candidates for local representative.
The two major parties with the highest number of representatives as local councilors 
and mayors are the BSP and the UDF, which have been the governing parties at the 
central level as well. The other major parties, though represented in the national 
parliament, rely on the support of speciﬁc regions and have political inﬂuence only 
within their respective regions. This is especially true for the third largest party—the 
MRF—which is the party of the Turkish ethnic minority. It is represented only in local 
50
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
governments in regions with a dense Turkish population, located in north-eastern and 
south-central Bulgaria.
The recently established National Movement “Simeon the Second” (NMSE), 
which won a landslide victory in the June 2001 parliamentary elections, is still not 
represented at the local level. One year after the parliamentary victory of the NMSE, 
its candidates failed to get any support in the by-elections for mayors in two of the 
28 regional centers (Rousse and Blagoevgrad). In light of the election results of 2001, 
the party’s performance in the last local elections of October 2003 (10% of the votes) 
was far from satisfactory.
The establishment of local coalitions, which diﬀer from the ones functioning on 
the national (parliamentary) level, is acceptable both legally and in party statutes. These 
unlimited opportunities for establishing a variety of local coalitions have been constantly 
and productively utilized since the ﬁrst free elections. But this practice makes the precise 
assessment of the inﬂuence of each party on local decision-making a very diﬃcult task. 
Generally, parties are considered to be the most inﬂuential actor in Bulgarian politics, 
both at the central and local levels. This is also indicated by the LRS survey data. 
The primary (local) and municipal party structures in Bulgaria, with the exception 
of the MRF, have considerable autonomy from the national party bodies in determining 
their policy with regard to the municipal authorities and government. In the party statutes 
of the BSP and the UDF there are special regulations concerning the interaction between 
local party organizations and its representatives in local government. The democratic 
procedures for coordination and control are explicitly deﬁned. The rights of the local 
party structures of the BSDP are similarly deﬁned.
All parties have Internet sites, where the party statutes are available as well as 
information about current decision-making at the central and local levels. A number 
of municipal party organizations have their own sites, linked to the sites of their parties 
and to the oﬃcial site of the municipality.
As stipulated by the 1991 LSGLA, the municipal councilors and mayors may not be 
elected or appointed to any other government body—either municipal or central. There 
have been a number of cases when politicians had to choose between the positions of 
member of parliament and mayor, and very recently between that of mayor and Cabinet 
member (minister). Two of the ministers in the 2001 cabinet of Simeon Saxe-Cooburg 
Gotta were acting mayors, who resigned.
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2.4 Conclusion
Since 1991, the record of four consecutive mandates of local government has produced 
convincing evidence of the democratization of political and public life in Bulgarian 
communities and cities. The society has reached a wide-ranging public consensus 
that independent and autonomous local government is of crucial importance for the 
provision of all public services. At the same time, the public administration reform, 
mainly involving its decentralization, has yet to be completed. Despite the fact that 
substantial progress  has been achieved in many areas, e.g., Public Access to Information, 
Public Procurement, etc., some parts of the existing legal framework are outdated 
and restrictive, limiting the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of local government. Local 
government in Bulgaria still functions with insuﬃcient legal autonomy, which is the 
source of a complex set of problems. An unclear division of responsibilities between 
the central and local levels, together with the assignment of extensive responsibilities, 
creates obvious problems. The decentralization of policies and services is in apparent 
contradiction with the lack of ﬁscal decentralization and persistent budget deﬁcits. In 
an attempt to maintain uniﬁed standards for public services provided at the local level, 
the central government blocks the industrious use of local resources and practices. 
The move to legal and ﬁscal autonomy in local self-government in Bulgaria has yet 
to come to completion. The remaining challenges include the extension of the legal 
and ﬁscal autonomy of local governments, the adoption of supporting normative 
regulation, the ﬁnalization of appropriate institutional arrangements, and the 
implementation of the new regulations. 
It is still too early to speak of decentralization as a transfer of resources from the center 
to local authorities. Despite the adoption of the Fiscal Decentralization Program by the 
Bulgarian government and the number of legislative and administrative changes that 
have come into eﬀect, there are major changes in the ﬁscal autonomy of municipalities 
still pending. Achievements so far include the full competence that local authorities 
have acquired over determination of local fees, the strengthening of ﬁnancial discipline, 
and the abolishment of certain obstacles to raising own revenues. Municipal budgets 
remain unstable because of state budget transfers and the system of subsidies, which 
do not allow local authorities to plan their expenditures and revenues. Positive trends 
seen in 2003 include the increase of the share of own revenues in municipal budgets, 
the increased competence of local authorities over the allocation and management 
of municipal expenses, and the raising of the level of investment expenses and of the 
created immovable property. 
Whether the various parties currently represented at the local level will be able 
to move along together towards completion of the reforms remains to be seen. The 
fact that any fundamental change in the ﬁscal autonomy reform needs constitutional 
empowerment means that it requires a broad national consensus and consolidated 
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political will. How soon these steps will be taken is a matter of serious consequence. 
Any postponement in this respect has high social and political costs.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT
3.1 Civil and Political Rights
From the earliest stages of the post-communist democratization of Bulgaria, the issue 
of minority rights and especially of the rights of Bulgarian Turks has been considered 
of primary importance. The last years of the communist regime were marked by severe 
infringement of the rights of Bulgarian Muslims. All persons having traditional Muslim 
names—Turkish and Roma Bulgarians—were forced to change them. The 1991 
Constitution provides for suﬃcient protection of the civil rights of all Bulgarian citizens, 
and oﬀers eﬀective guarantees against any type of discrimination. Special attention has 
been paid to article 11 of the Constitution, which bans the formation of “political parties 
on ethnic, racial, or religious lines.” The text was initially considered restrictive and an 
infringement on the equal right to participate in politics. The established practices are 
in line with the 1992 decision of the Constitutional Court, which interprets article 11 
in relation to the provisions of article 44, paragraph 2: “No organization shall act to 
…. incite racial, national, ethnic, or religious enmity or an encroachment on the rights 
and freedoms of citizens.” This aﬃrmed the constitutionality of the Turkish minority 
party—the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). It should be emphasized, 
however, that the MRF has never explicitly stated (in its name or its statute) that the 
party is organized along ethnic lines. Currently the MRF is a member of the European 
Liberal Democratic Reform Party and has observer status in the Liberal International. 
There are adequate constitutional provisions for the protection of human rights in 
Bulgaria. 
The Bulgarian Constitution guarantees freedom of expression (article 39), of religious 
belief (article 37), of association (article 44), as well as the right to privacy (articles 32, 
33, and 34), property, inheritance (article 17), and economic initiative and enterprise 
(article 19). Article 19 also bans the abuse of monopoly power. In practice, the protection 
of these rights by the state is generally eﬀective. 
The two major ethnic groups, the Turks and the Roma, tend to live in separate 
communities; since 1990, they have been gradually and consistently integrated into the 
social and political life of the country. The constitutional concept of local citizenship is 
inclusive—no individual can be denied his or her rights on the grounds of any cultural, 
ethnic, or religious identiﬁcation. Manifestations of extreme forms of ethnic and religious 
intolerance are rare in Bulgaria, mostly because of the recognized national tradition of 
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tolerance. At the same time, there has been a considerable delay in the establishment 
of both representative and administrative bodies performing and coordinating policies 
aimed at the integration of minorities (especially at the level of local government). The 
establishment of a National Council for Ethnic and Demographic Issues was the ﬁrst 
step towards promotion of national minority strategies and administrative assistance for 
ethnic and religious pluralism. This specialized body was formally set up in June 1995, 
but did not function eﬀectively until December 1997. Since the beginning of 1998, 
the central government has started to establish regional minority councils as part of 
the regional administration. The establishment of a specialized administration is now 
complete, with the appointment of municipal experts on minority policies in most of 
the municipalities with a mixed population. A representative of the largest minority 
group in the community usually holds the position of municipal expert. As of May 
2002, twelve out of 28 districts have adopted district programs at the local level on the 
integration of minorities, and ﬁve of these have planned concrete activities. Currently, 
the development of administrative capacity in the area of minority integration is 
considered complete.
At the local level, municipalities can, and sometimes do, enact ordinances prohibiting 
discrimination. For example, the municipality of Stara Zagora has passed an ordinance 
prohibiting discrimination in the provision of public services, subject to administrative 
ﬁnes (Annual Report, Human Rights Project 1999). However, until recently there were 
no successful court challenges to discrimination in access to public accommodation. Since 
the new anti-discrimination legislation came into force on January, 2004, the European 
Roma Rights Center (ERRC), acting along with the Romani Baht Foundation (RBF) and 
the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee (BHC), has ﬁled a number of civil actions alleging 
discrimination against Roma citizens. Following this course of action, as of September 
30, 2004, ﬁve landmark judgments have been obtained from Bulgarian courts that 
sanction perpetrators of discrimination. Key factors in this success have been not only 
the new piece of legislation, but also the increased public awareness and the courts’ 
willingness to be involved in these matters.
Since the early 1990s, a considerable number of NGOs have been working primarily 
in the ﬁeld of protection of minority rights. The issue of minority integration became 
the focus of NGO projects later, starting in 1995–96. Most of the NGO programs are 
implemented in cooperation with local authorities. In an eﬀort to facilitate partnerships 
with a variety of donors supporting minority integration, municipal authorities have also 
developed programs aimed at coordination of diﬀerent projects within the municipality. 
The eﬀorts of Roma organizations to develop the common platform articulated in the 
1999 Framework Program, and to negotiate with the government to have it adopted 
(OSCE report 2000), exemplify the success of Roma political participation. Moreover, 
as part of the government’s eﬀorts to fulﬁll its commitments under the Framework 
Program, a total of 24 Roma were employed as experts in District Government Oﬃces 
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by September 2000. The eﬀectiveness of these and similar actions is somewhat limited 
by the fact that responsibilities and functions have not been deﬁned, and most of the 
Roma participating in the programs have not even had appropriate job descriptions. In 
the light of the gross underrepresentation of Roma in the public employment sector, 
particular success stories remain sporadic. A more systematic approach and consistency 
within the government units are needed.
The Bulgarian Constitution protects cultural diversity and guarantees everyone 
the right to “develop his own culture in accordance with his ethnic self-identiﬁcation” 
(article 54, paragraph 1). The oﬃcial language is Bulgarian, but all Bulgarian citizens 
have “the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study 
of the Bulgarian language” (article 36, paragraph 2). Compulsory education (from the 
ﬁrst to the eighth grade) is provided only in Bulgarian, but on the initiative of any 
ethnic community optional courses in the mother tongue may be organized. The most 
common is Turkish language courses, oﬀered in areas with a high Turkish population. 
There are several schools where Hebrew and Armenian are taught and a few where basic 
courses in Roma are being piloted. 
The freedom to disseminate information in their mother tongue is guaranteed to all 
minorities by law. There are printed media in Turkish, and public television and radio 
deliver daily short news in Turkish. There are several private Turkish and Roma radio 
and television stations operating at the local level. Several Roma media—newspapers, 
magazines, radio, and television—rely on NGO support or have the status of NGOs.
The 1990 Bulgarian constitution provides for equal and free health care for all citizens 
(article 52). Since the introduction of the Health Insurance System, the health insurance 
of the socially vulnerable and unemployed (the Roma minority is predominantly in this 
group) is to be provided by the state budget, but administered by the municipalities. As 
a rule, the healthcare system now provides for the minimum required health services. 
Some vital health services are oﬀered only in the bigger cities and some only in Soﬁa; 
furthermore, the access to them is extremely limited. Since the minorities tend to live 
in the peripheral municipalities, they are are disadvantaged with respect to public health 
care services. 
3.2 Rule of Law
The local government institutions must observe legal regulations, and control over the 
administrative and governmental acts is exercised on several levels. The mayor may 
appeal any act of the municipal council to the courts. One of the main competencies 
of the regional governor is to control the legality of all local government acts: he or she 
may overrule acts of the mayor on the basis of their illegality and may appeal acts of the 
municipal councils to the court, arguing that they violate the law.
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The Audit Court and the Public Internal Financial Control Agency check the legality 
of all privatization deals (including those involving municipal property). Public expenses, 
including the management of municipal budgets, are also controlled. The annual reports 
of the Audit Court provide information to the public. According to the 2001 annual 
report, in 52 municipalities the audit resulted in the sanctioning of fourteen violations 
of legal procedures for the renting of municipal property. 
The lack of administrative capacity and the practices of direct interaction between 
local business and local government still serve as a basis for legal violations, which are 
ineﬀectively sanctioned because of the slow and unproductive judicial procedures. 
The activities of the public oﬃcials are regulated both by the general laws and by 
the rules and regulations passed by the municipal council. These rules, regulations, and 
statutes are promulgated in a variety of ways—the sessions of the municipal council and 
its committees are public, and the media and individual citizens may actively debate 
all issues and organize actions to inﬂuence local government decisions. Even the closed 
discussions within party fractions are subject to public scrutiny, and deals struck between 
councilors and business interests are often revealed by the local media, thus becoming a 
public issue. With respect to eﬀective implementation of these rules, however, relevant 
examples show considerable diversity across the country, depending on the level of 
public and media involvement in speciﬁc cases.
The right to fair trail is guaranteed to every Bulgarian citizen and since 1992, when 
Bulgaria ratiﬁed the European Convention of Human Rights, it is explicitly required by 
law. The public provision of legal defense is limited: the state guarantees it to those who 
cannot aﬀord a private lawyer only in penal law cases and when the prosecution brings 
charges that would result in more than ﬁve years’ imprisonment (a detailed deﬁnition of 
these rights is given by Decision No. 479, January 8, 1996, of the First Division of the 
Supreme Courts on penal case No. 67). The existing system of separation of powers in 
Bulgaria leaves no role in this process for local government. The Bulgarian judiciary is 
highly autonomous and organized in a centralized manner. The funds for public defense 
are provided by the budget of the judiciary (passed by the parliament as part of the state 
budget). The courts are authorized to administer the provision of free legal defense, but 
the funding is so limited that the lawyers are only paid a symbolic honorarium.
Financial restrictions are considered to be the major impediment for the introduction 
of public defense in civil law cases. To mitigate these barriers, NGOs have organized the 
provision of free legal services by law clinics. Also, some municipalities have introduced 
the institution of Ombudsman. In certain cases of conﬂict of competencies, the courts, 
including the Constitutional Court, play the role of umpire in disputes between 
institutions of central and local government and between citizens and institutions. 
The major problem, however, stems from the serious ineﬃciency of the judicial system 
(investigation, prosecution, and the courts) and the diminishing public trust in their 
law enforcement capacity. Adjudication by Bulgarian courts is unanimously assessed as 
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slow and inconsistent. Imbalances in the power structure allow for abuse of rules and 
procedures (Nations in Transit 2004). The extent to which such abuse actually occurs 
is unknown, but public trust in the judicial branch is low. Surveys of public opinion, 
such as those conducted by Gallup International, have found that Bulgarian citizens 
do not believe the law applies equally to all. More speciﬁcally, respondents feel that 
wealthy people, politically connected people, and the state get better treatment than 
the average citizen. 
Annual reports of the European Commission on Bulgarian accession have regularly 
acknowledged the need for reform of the judiciary, but actions so far have produced 
unsatisfactory results.
As seen in Table 2.19, the local representatives who were interviewed assess municipal 
administrative staﬀ as slightly biased along party lines. The mean score varies in the 
diﬀerent size groups, but shows no coherent correlation with the size or the party 
aﬃliation of the local representatives.
Table 2.19
Partiality of Local Administration (7-Point Scale*)
Type of Municipality by Population Size Mean N Standard Deviation 
Less than 4,999 3.00 25 2.10 
5,000–9,999 3.95 205 2.00 
10,000–49,999 3.46 364 1.73 
50,000–99,999 3.30 145 1.58 
Over 100,000 3.31 229 1.60 
Total 3.49 968 1.77 
Note: * 1—very biased; 7—not biased.
Source: LRS 2002.
Despite their low trust in the judiciary, the citizens have a relatively high level of 
respect for the law. Even though legal norms are considered to be ineﬀective and in 
permanent ﬂux, the citizens show general respect towards legal norms. As can be seen in 
Table 2.20, which presents data from a general survey on political culture (administered 
in October 2000 with a sample of 1,024 respondents), the attitudes of “ordinary people” 
are characterized by a basic respect for the law.
The lack of eﬀective law enforcement, low administrative capacity, and mostly the 
slow and ineﬃcient judicial procedures have led to low levels of compliance with legal 
regulations (traﬃc and tax regulations). Local representatives tend to think that most 
of the citizens consider the violation of the legal regulations as a “normal practice”; 
22% of the respondents say that their fellow citizens don’t obey the legal regulations at 
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all or hardly at all. The mean scores by type of municipality are shown in Table 2.21; 
obedience to legal norms is slightly higher in small municipalities, where traditional 
culture and norms of solidarity are dominant.
Table 2.20
Index of Respect for the Law [%]
 Survey Statements Agree Disagree Do Not Know
It is not unjust to “go around” the law 10.4 66.9 22.7
The government should have the possibility of “going around” 
the law when solving important social and political problems
16.3 64.6 19.1
One can violate a law that one views as unjust 21.0 56.8 22.2
Source: Alfa Research, Political Culture Survey, October 2000.
Table 2.21
Respect for Legal Regulations by Type of Municipality (7-Point Scale*) 
Type of municipality Mean
Less than 4,999 3.80
5,000–9,999 3.89
10,000–49,999 3.50
50,000–99,999 3.43
Over 100,000 3.31
Total 3.53
Note: * 1—not at all; 7—completely.
Source: LRS 2002.
3.3 Conclusion
Eﬀective enforcement of the new legislation is a condition sine qua non for the success 
of the public sector reforms. Weaknesses in this respect are numerous and have been 
continuously addressed at all levels. Annual reports of the European Commission on 
the Bulgarian accession emphasize the need for reform of the judiciary. Actions so far 
have produced unsatisfactory results. Law enforcement remains ineﬃcient, slow, and 
vulnerable to corruption, so that it generates low trust in the judiciary. In spite of 
this, however, the citizens demonstrate a generally high respect for the law. The lack 
of suﬃcient administrative capacity and some practices of direct interaction between 
local business and local government still serve as a basis for legal violations, which are 
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ineﬀectively sanctioned because of the slow and unproductive judicial procedures. 
Relevant examples show considerable diversity across the country, depending on the 
level of public and media involvement in speciﬁc cases.
Within the transition period, Bulgaria has introduced adequate constitutional 
provisions for the protection of civil and political rights. Currently, the development 
of administrative capacity to specialize in minority integration is considered completed. 
There are also local eﬀorts to rule against discrimination by issuing municipal ordinances. 
Recently, some landmark judgments have been obtained from Bulgarian courts that 
sanction perpetrators of discrimination. Key factors in this success have been not only 
the new Anti-Discrimination Act, but also the increased public awareness and the courts’ 
concern about these matters.
4. TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
4.1 Transparency
The Law on Access to Public Information (LAPI) passed on July 7, 2000 regulates the 
access to documents of local government. The law deﬁnes public information broadly: any 
information relevant to public life (i.e., to the activities of central and local government), 
which gives the citizens an opportunity to develop an opinion about governmental 
activities, is considered to be public. The restriction of access is based on the deﬁnition 
of “classiﬁed” and/or “secret” information, deﬁned in accordance with EU standards. The 
distinction between oﬃcial and service information is also legally deﬁned—the former 
is the information provided by governmental acts, while the latter is the information 
related to the functioning of governmental bodies or their administrations.
  The access to public information is guaranteed to all Bulgarian citizens, to citizens 
of other states, and to persons without citizenship. The basic principles of access are:
 • transparency, reliability, and thoroughness of information; 
 • equality of access; 
 • legality of the process of seeking and receiving public information; 
 • protection of the right to be informed; 
 • protection of personal information (data); and
 • guarantees for the national security.
The LAPI deﬁnes the rules and procedures for access to public information. The 
access to oﬃcial information is assured through the publication of all governmental 
acts, including acts of local governments. The access to service information is free and 
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unrestricted with the exception of cases related to negotiations on forthcoming deals or 
pending tender procedures. All restrictions are valid for no more than two years after 
the information is produced. The access to public information is free of charge—the 
citizens who receive it pay a small fee that covers the expenses for the information carrier 
and the delivery service.
In order to ensure transparency and to enable easy access to information, the heads of 
administrative units are required to publish information regularly about the functioning 
of their unit, about the competencies and the responsibilities it assumes, and the current 
activities it performs; the information resources used by the respective administrative 
unit; and contact information (name, exact address, working hours, phone, etc.) of the 
person or persons responsible for the provision of public information to citizens.
The procedure for providing public information is simple and clear—it is provided 
after a written or oral request (e-mail is considered a written request and a telephone 
call an oral one). All submitted requests are registered and the local government body 
is obliged to answer the requests within fourteen days. The deadline may be extended 
for no more than ten days, when the information is sizable or diﬃcult to accumulate. 
The administrative oﬃcials who violate the LAPI or the procedures for its application 
are liable to administrative sanctions in the form of ﬁnes or penalties. 
The request may be denied only if: 1) the requested information is a classiﬁed state 
secret; 2) it concerns a third private person who has given no written permission for 
making it public; 3) it has been requested and provided to the same subject within the 
previous six months. A citizen may appeal the denial to the regional courts. 
 By December 2002, most of the municipalities had reorganized their administra-
tions in order to meet the requirements of LAPI, which implies that the regulations, 
ﬁnancial and human resources, and administrative reorganization are completed. The 
2002 government report states that in only 31 of the 263 municipalities have these 
preparatory administrative changes not been ﬁnalized. There is not suﬃcient data to 
determine whether the delays have been sanctioned.
 During the year 2002, 2,718 requests for access to public information were 
submitted to the municipal administrations in Bulgaria (see Table 2.22). The data show 
that the majority of requests come from individual citizens; the other two registered 
subjects are the NGOs and the journalists. It is also noticeable that the number of refusals 
is relatively low; considering the even lower number of court cases, one may conclude 
that the procedures for requesting and delivering public information to citizens are 
eﬀective and in accordance with the requirements of the law.
The 2002 report of the Minister of Public Administration on the state of Bulgarian 
public administration reported 190% growth in the annual number of requests for access 
compared to the previous year, which indicates that the procedures and the practices 
introduced in municipal administration are popular among citizens and stimulate regular 
requests for public information.
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Table 2.22
Requests for Access to Public Information Submitted 
to the Municipal Administration (January–December 2002)
Number of requests submitted by: Total
requests:
 2,718
 journalists  83
 NGOs  33
 other citizens  2,545
Number of refusals  44
Number of initiated court cases/law suits  7
Source: 2002 Report of the Minister of Public Administration.
The most frequently requested public information is copies of data or documents 
about the administration’s activities and public management, copies of certiﬁcates or 
documents about real-estate property rights, a variety of statistical and demographic 
data, information about the remuneration of administrative staﬀ, copies of minutes of 
sessions, and decisions taken by diﬀerent municipal bodies.
E-government at the municipal level is in the process of being established: 125 out 
of 263 municipalities have their own websites, and another ﬁve have Internet sites under 
construction. The Internet sites provide comprehensive information about municipal 
activities both in Bulgarian and English. The CAO survey shows that 123 of the 
interviewed Chief Administrative Oﬃcials declare that they have a municipal website 
(see Table 2.23). The National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria (NAMB) has as 
its priority the provision of Internet services to the municipalities and the introduction 
of e-government at the municipal level. One of the projects of NAMB was the design 
and maintenance of municipal Internet sites. Some of the bigger municipalities such 
as Veliko Tarnovo, Pazardjik, Stara Zagora, and Montana maintain two web pages. 
There are several commercial and public Internet providers oﬀering an exhaustive list 
of municipal web sites.
The general format of the municipal Internet sites provides the following 
information:
 • broad information about the natural and human resources and a brief  
history of the municipality;
 • social and economic proﬁle on economic development, major enterprises,  
employment/unemployment dynamics, infrastructure parameters, education,  
healthcare, cultural institutions and activities, sport, tourism, and leisure  
facilities;
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 • information about the structure of local government and administration 
supplemented with personal information about the local representatives 
(councilors and mayors) and more general data about the administrative staﬀ 
(number, educational qualiﬁcations, and functions);
 • information about the oﬃce times of diﬀerent municipal agencies and the    
services provided by them;
 • information about the municipal budget and its current balance; and
 • access to all documents voted on by the municipal council, including rules,  
regulations, policy strategies, and investment plans, as well as the shorthand  
records from the sessions of the municipal council.
The website of the municipality of Soﬁa provides citizens with the opportunity to 
get current, day-to-day information about the ﬂow of documents they have submitted 
to the diﬀerent administrative agencies, thus making both service and control easier. 
This has not remained an isolated practice, but has been followed by a number of 
municipalities. 
On the sites of all large municipalities there are open discussion forums, where 
citizens may actively participate in debates on hot policy issues, express and exchange 
opinions, or make suggestions about desirable improvements and changes in the 
municipal government and administration.
The review of the municipal Internet sites shows that the bigger municipalities 
regularly update their information, while in the smaller ones there is a signiﬁcant delay. 
In fact, the ﬁrst sites were created around three or four years ago.
The CAO survey data show that information is also provided by e-mail in more 
than half of the surveyed municipalities. The provision of services by e-mail is not as 
widespread as it should be because of the limited use of electronic signatures.
The various sources of municipal e-government are presented in Table 2.23. 
Table 2.23
Sources of Municipal E-government [%]
Yes No Total
Municipal government has a website (N 183) 67.2 32.8 100.0
Local government provision of information by e-mail (N 183) 58.5 41.5 100.0
E-mail usage by local representatives (N 953) 28.2 71.8 100.0
Internet usage by local representatives (N 950) 39.1 60.9 100.0
Source: CAO and LRS surveys.
The LSGLA Act stipulates that municipal governments have the obligation to inform 
the citizens about their decisions and the activities carried out by the mayor and the 
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municipal administration in a timely and appropriate way. The Public Administration 
Law allows for the establishment of an autonomous public relations unit within the 
administration of the municipality. This is a recognized practice in big municipalities, 
where the available resources are larger. In the smaller ones there is usually just an 
administrative oﬃcial, who bears the responsibility for managing the public relations 
of the municipality. Since government provisions limit the number of administrative 
employees, and ﬁnancial resources are limited in two-thirds of Bulgarian municipalities, 
there is no separate position of public relations oﬃcer (see Table 2.24). More than 40% 
of the interviewed CAOs state that they do not have public relations duties assigned 
to a speciﬁc person or position in the municipal administration. As seen in the cross 
tabulation, these are predominantly small and medium size municipalities, where the 
number of local media is limited. 
Table 2.24
Staﬀ Member to Inform Journalists
 Frequency Valid Percent 
As main duty 47 25.5 
With other duties 59 32.1 
No 78 42.4 
Total 184 100.0 
Source: CAO survey.
In about 40% of the municipalities contacts with journalists are organized regularly, 
while in more than 50% they are organized on speciﬁc occasions. Only in 7% of the 
municipalities did administrative oﬃcials indicate they do not organize meetings with 
journalists (see Table 2.25).
Table 2.25
Frequency of Contact with Journalists
 Frequency Valid Percent 
Regularly 74 40.2 
Occasionally 96 52.2 
Never 14 7.6 
Total 184 100.0 
Source: CAO survey.
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As a rule and as part of an established tradition, the decisions of the municipal 
council and the rulings of the mayor are announced on a special board in the town hall 
(the municipality’s premises). On that board the citizens can also get information about 
the services provided by the municipality, the required documents and forms, the terms 
of delivery of the services, etc. In bigger municipalities, the written announcements 
are duplicated by electronic ones provided by a computer available to the public in an 
easily accessible place within the town hall. Thus, diﬀerent groups of the population 
with diﬀerent information skills are targeted.
When reviewing the issues that have been the subject of public relations campaigns, 
it is important to emphasize that some of the most important municipal matters are 
not discussed in public. For example, in only about 15% of the municipalities is there 
a practice of organizing public discussions on the draft municipal budget, where 
representatives of NGOs and journalists are invited (Table 2.26). Just publishing the draft 
budget is considered a standard by only 23% of the interviewed Chief Administrative 
Oﬃcials. This data strongly indicates a deﬁcit of transparency in decision-making 
on issues of budgeting of municipal activities—and hence, all major policies of the 
municipalities. Perhaps to a certain extent the lack of publicity when working out 
the budget is due to the highly centralized system of local ﬁnancing, which requires a 
complicated procedure of coordination and approval of the draft budget by the central 
government. This undermines the importance of public discussions at local level.
Table 2.26
Public Deliberation on the Local Budget
Yes No Total
Discussed planned budget with civic organizations (N 141) 20.6 79.4 100.0
Held public hearings on the budget (N 142) 20.4 79.6 100.0
Publication of draft budget (N 145) 30.3 69.7 100.0
Discussed planned budget with journalists (N 144) 21.5 78.5 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
The sessions of the councils are open to the public and there are no restrictions to 
access for individual citizens or for representatives of NGOs or journalists from the local 
or central media. The municipal councils usually convene their sessions according to a 
preliminary, announced schedule, where the sessions are held regularly on the same day 
of the week in the same place and starting at the same time. This is intended to facilitate 
regular public access. The only impediments are of a physical or technical nature—usually 
there is not enough space for the public in the halls where council meetings are held, and 
this may be used as an argument to limit the number of those present. To compensate 
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for these technical limitations, the local media (television networks, radio stations, and 
newspapers) usually not only report on the decisions, but also cover the debates. When 
an important issue is debated, there is an established practice of direct transmission of 
the debates on local television and radio, while in regular cases the debate is covered by 
an extended report. Some times not only the local, but also the national media advertise 
the forthcoming sessions of municipal councils. This is done on a regular basis for the 
bigger municipalities and occasionally for the smaller ones.
There are no regulations concerning access to the sessions of the permanent 
committees of the municipal councils. Usually there is an established practice of inviting 
people who have an expertise on the matter under discussion, representatives of NGOs, 
etc. The technical secretaries of the municipal council or the councilors themselves usually 
provide information about the forthcoming meetings of the permanent commissions. 
When regular brieﬁngs with journalists are held, the issues to be discussed on the 
forthcoming sessions of the permanent commissions are announced. Some municipalities 
provide this information on their Internet pages.
4.2 Corruption in Local Government
Corruption is currently one of the hottest issues in Bulgarian public debates, of equal 
importance with issues like the unemployment rate and the low living standard of the 
majority of the population. This is true both for local and national politics. While 
Bulgaria’s ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index has 
improved considerably, from 66th place out of 85 in1998 to 47th place out of 91 in 2001, 
and 54th place out of 133 in 2003, the share of the public that ranks corruption among 
the most serious problems facing the country has risen from 36% in 1999 to 45% in 
October 2001 (Freedom House 2004).
Corruption at the local government level is a particular problem. A study carried 
out by the NGO Coalition in 2000 has identiﬁed the following areas of local public 
administration as especially prone to corruption: municipal procurement; licensing of 
economic and trade activities; renting and tenders for reconstruction of municipal sites; 
tenders for privatization of municipal property, and supplying of municipal premises with 
fuel and consumables. In discussing corruption at the local level of public administration, 
one should bear in mind that because of the relatively centralized system, a wide range 
of public services are provided not by local governments and agencies appointed by and 
accountable to local citizens, but by local oﬃces of central institutions. For example, 
gaining a construction permit requires signatures from four such institutions (UNDP 
Report on Anti-corruption Initiatives in Bulgaria, 2002).
The existing legal regulation provided only a partial and imprecise basis for a clear 
distinction between the public and private interests of local representatives (municipal 
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councilors and mayors). According to article 34, paragaph 5 of the LSGLA Act, 
the municipal councilors cannot be members of the managing bodies of municipal 
ﬁrms (directors, general managers, vice-directors, or vice-managers). This restriction 
was introduced right before the 1999 local elections as part of the UDF strategy for 
preventing corruption and embezzlement practices on the local level. However, the 
problem of conﬂict of interest, including conﬂict between private and public interests 
as well as between partisan and public ones, has not been thoroughly resolved. With 
regard to the local elections in October 2003, the parliament has amended the LSGLA 
Act, banning the participation of municipal councilors in the supervisory bodies of 
municipal ﬁrms, e.g., boards of directors. There is no restriction, however, against the 
election of owners of enterprises and ﬁrms as councilors (such a restriction does exist 
for cabinet members and public servants). As indicated in Table 2.27, about 20% of 
the interviewed local representatives have their own private business ﬁrms and 6.4% 
are self-employed. Hence, 27% of the respondents have private interest, which might 
be in conﬂict with the public interests of the municipality.
Table 2.27
Municipal Councilors: Nature of Employment
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Owner with more than ﬁve employees 111 11.4 16.4 
Owner with one to ﬁve employees 75  7.7 11.1 
Self-employed 62  6.4  9.1 
Employee, executive supervisor 315  32.3 46.5 
Employee 115 11.8 17.0 
Total 678 69.5 100.0 
Missing 298 30.5  
Total 976 100.0  
Source: LRS 2002.
In order to restrict partisanship among mayors and to guarantee stronger protection 
against conﬂict of interest, the LSGLA Act (article 41) stipulates that mayors (of 
municipalities, mayoralties, and districts) cannot participate in party leaderships, 
own business ﬁrms, or be members of managing or supervisory bodies of any ﬁrm 
or enterprise. Though cabinet members and high magistrates are required to publicly 
declare their property on an annual basis, there are no such requirements for the local 
representatives.
There are no statistical data on existing conﬂict of interest cases, but the media 
regularly report on such cases and as a rule the public is kept informed about attempts 
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to use public positions for private interest. There is a high level of social intolerance 
for such practices, and electoral support rapidly decreases when conﬂict of interest is 
known to exist. It is widely believed that the UDF lost support in the 1999 and 2001 
elections due to lack of party sanctioning for such cases (in 1997 the same party won 
a landslide electoral victory). Public opinion polls also show an increasing intolerance 
towards embezzlement and corruption.
The Public Servant Act (PSA) regulates the separation of public and private interests, 
including at the level of municipal administration. Since a limited number of municipal 
administrators have the status of public servant, conﬂict of interest is thus neither 
regulated nor sanctioned for a substantial part of the municipal administrative staﬀ. 
For example, the number of people with civil servant status in district and municipal 
administrations by May 2002 amounted to 3,460 people, only about 18% of the 19,000 
employees. In most municipalities, however, people at the higher administrative level 
generally have the status of public servants. For them, the PSA upholds the European 
standards: public servants may not be owners or co-owners of a ﬁrm or limited company, 
or be managers or on the supervisory boards (responsible partner) of any ﬁrm, or hold 
any equivalent position. Also, they may not have any kinship relations with staﬀ members 
who are their direct subordinates. The law requires a written declaration of any kinship 
relation of this type.
There is still no eﬃcient process for holding public servants and administrative 
oﬃcials accountable for acts of corruption. Despite the fact that the Bulgarian Penal 
Code deﬁnes corruption as a crime (for bribery, both citizens and public servants face 
sanctions of three to ten years of imprisonment and a penalty of up to 15,000 Bulgarian 
leva), these measures often cannot be eﬀectively applied.
During the last three years, as part of the public administration reform, the 
municipalities have introduced one-stop, single counter service. These measures not only 
increase eﬃciency in the provision of services, but also substantially limit the practice 
of oﬀering or requesting bribes. There is no available data on how many municipalities 
have introduced this service. The National Strategy for E-Government and One-Stop-
Shop Service was prepared in 2002; hence, the ﬁrst results of the implementation of 
the uniﬁed standards and models introduced by the strategy will be available as early as 
the end of 2003. The number of services available via the Internet is still limited, but 
is rapidly increasing. By the end of 2003, two of the largest municipalities (Soﬁa and 
Rousse) will oﬀer fourteen services to citizens and eight to businesses via Internet.
The rules for ﬁnancing the election campaigns of mayors and councilors are deﬁned 
by the Local Elections Law of July 25, 1995. Election campaigns may be ﬁnanced by 
party funds or by donations from citizens and legal entities. Donations from state or 
municipally owned companies and companies owned by foreign investors are banned 
(article 68). A candidate for councilor may spend up to 3,500 levas, and a municipal 
mayoral candidate up to 20,000 levas. Not later than a month after the elections, each 
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of the elected candidates must submit a report to the municipal council detailing his 
or her campaign sources and expenditures. If violations come to light and the regional 
prosecutor brings the case in front of the court, the election result of the candidate in 
question may be annulled and the money conﬁscated. There is no data to show that 
this has ever happened so far.
 The Law on Political Parties, which came into eﬀect in March 2001, contains several 
anti-corruption provisions, including: a ban on the involvement of political parties in 
commercial activities and from owning shares in organizations involved in commercial 
activities; and an exhaustive list of admissible own-revenue sources and regulation of 
the annual state subsidy (granted proportionally to parties represented in the National 
Assembly on the basis of votes cast in the election, as well as to parties not represented 
in Parliament but which received at least 1% of votes cast). Among parties’ own sources 
are: enlisted membership dues, property rents, and incomes from publishing and 
copyrights. Parties may also receive donations from private citizens and contributions 
(including testaments) from people. Donations coming from companies and citizens 
may be anonymous but they cannot exceed 25% of the budget subsidy. Small parties 
with less than 1% of the valid votes are treated the same as the smallest party receiving 
a budget subsidy. No individual may donate more than 30,000 levas per year. 
Restrictions on company donations to political parties are similar to those applying 
to election campaigns. State or municipally owned companies (with over 50% ownership 
control) and companies having municipal or state contracts may not donate to political 
parties. This restriction also applies to the companies of foreign governments and 
organizations. Despite serious objections during the parliamentary debate and the 
subsequently imposed presidential veto, the right to anonymous donations was partially 
maintained in the law. The Act has assigned full control over political parties’ ﬁnances to 
the National Audit Oﬃce. Thus, every registered party is obliged to submit an annual 
ﬁnancial report to the Audit Court by March 15. Failure to submit can result in a loss of 
the budget subsidy, if the party is entitled to one. Although the issue of party ﬁnancing 
has been frequently debated in the last ten years, eﬀorts to come up with relevant legal 
regulations came rather late, and the controversial practice of anonymous contributions 
was legalized. Liberal rules on donations, a non-transparent system for determining state 
subsidies, and the virtual absence of supervision are among the factors underpinning 
widespread illegal funding and corruption, although direct evidence of corruption is 
scarce (Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy in Bulgaria, 2002). According to the 
National Statistical Institute there were 45 convictions in bribery-related cases in 2000. 
Table 2.28 shows ﬁgures on corruption cases reported by the Ministry of Justice. These 
statistics would seem to indicate lack of enforcement more than low levels of bribery.
Eﬀorts to limit the inﬂuence of powerful local business interests over public policy 
date back to 1992. The Law on the Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises 
(1992–2002), the Public Procurement Law (1999), and the Law on Privatization 
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and Post-privatization Control (2002) require the introduction of transparent and 
accountable public management. In addition, municipal councils establish rules and 
regulations aimed at improving the eﬃciency of the legislative processes. There is an 
explicit legal requirement for municipalities to work out such regulations in order to 
manage and privatize municipal assets (property). The council has administrative control: 
the mayor implements the decisions of the council and is accountable to the council 
for the outcomes. Judicial control may be initiated both by private persons (citizens, 
parties, NGOs, etc.) and by governmental institutions. 
Table 2.28
Bribery Cases among Public Oﬃcials (1997–2001)
Year Number of Convictions Acquittals
1997 26 3
1998 21 4
1999 25 2
2000 21 1
Source: Ministry of Justice.
The major aim of the Public Procurement Law is to guarantee eﬃciency and 
accountability in public expenditure. The basic principles are competitiveness and 
transparency. The law covers a wide range of goods and services used or provided 
by the public sector. It strictly deﬁnes the procedures of application, selection, and 
assessment. It has been substantially improved by some amendments passed in 2002, 
as the application was simpliﬁed and the procedure for appealing to the courts has been 
made more precise. On the whole, control over the management and privatization of 
public assets has been substantially improved.
A Register of Public Procurement and Tenders was established in 2000 and is updated 
on a daily basis as required by the Public Procurement Law. The control over public 
procurement is centralized and carried out by the Public Internal Financial Control 
Agency, which is subordinate to the Ministry of Finance and the Audit Court. 
At the municipal level, the mayor announces public tenders as manager of the 
municipal budget. The Public Procurement Law stipulates that decisions made by the 
mayor have to be approved by the Municipal Council before their implementation, so 
even if the council has worked out general rules and regulations, the public procurement 
decisions are approved case by case. Perhaps this is the reason why half of the interviewed 
Chief Municipal Administrators state that in their municipality the councilors have not 
worked out such rules and procedures (Table 2.29).
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Table 2.29
 Public Procurement Regulations in Municipalities
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Exist  90 47.6 50.8 
Do not exist  87  46.0 49.2 
Total 177  93.7 100.0 
Missing  12  6.3  
Total 189 100.0  
Source: CAO survey.
The personal assessments of the municipal councilors about the inﬂuence of local 
business interests on municipal policy are presented in Table 2.30. Though most 
councilors consider this inﬂuence to be lower and not comparable with the inﬂuence 
of the mayor and the political parties, a substantial group (36.2%) assesses it as higher 
than the medium. This split in the opinions of the councilors shows that despite strict 
regulations, local business may still, in certain cases, have a dominant inﬂuence on the 
decision-making of the municipality.
Table 2.30
 Inﬂuence of Local Business on Local Government Policies (7-Point Scale*)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
1–3 Low 382 39.1 40.8 
4 Medium 215 22.0 22.9 
5–7 High 340 34.8 36.2 
Total 937 95.9  100.0 
Total 976  100.0 100.0
Note: * 1—very little inﬂuence; 7—very great inﬂuence.
Source: LRS 2002.
When asked to assess the inﬂuence of local business interests on their own opinion 
and positions, the majority of the municipal councilors chose marks below the average 
(see Table 2.31) and only 19.3% admitted that local business interests had a high or 
very high inﬂuence on their decisions.
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Table 2.31
 Inﬂuence of Business on Local Councilors’ Opinions (7-Point Scale*)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
1–3 Low 547 56.1 58.1 
4 Medium 211 21.6 22.4 
5–7 Higher 182 18.6 19.3 
Total 940  96.3 100.0 
Missing 36 3.7  
Total 976 100.0  
Note: * 1—very little inﬂuence; 7—very great inﬂuence.
Source: LRS 2002.
Manipulation of the public procurement procedures and the management of public 
property is possible despite formal compliance with legal requirements; thus, certain 
corrupt practices are introduced. Decisions of public authorities on applications for 
public tender can be appealed to the courts, but the judicial process is slow. Since 
generalized data are not available, it is diﬃcult to assess the overall eﬀect of judicial 
control. But appeals are made regularly, on both the national and municipal levels.
In 2001, a National Anti-Corruption Strategy was unveiled by the cabinet (www.
government.bg). The general principles framing the strategy are: 
 • transparency; 
 • minimizing personal discretion in the administrative process of provision of 
public services to private citizens and businesses; 
 • optimizing ﬁnancial and ﬁscal control;
 • precise and highly speciﬁed regulation of interactions between the public and 
private sectors; and
 • detailed regulation of practices for protection of both public and private interests 
involved in service provision.
The strategy puts an emphasis on anti-corruption measures at the level of local 
government. 
Corruption that takes place in locally elected bodies and in the local administration, 
where daily contact with citizens takes place with regard to the most frequently demanded 
services, is oﬃcially deﬁned as “small/low level” corruption. However, it has long-term 
and long-lasting negative consequences, distorting local self-governance and aﬀecting 
society negatively. 
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The regulatory and administrative framework for ﬁghting corruption in Bulgaria 
continued to improve in 2003. Two government bodies created in late 2002 became 
operative in 2003. The Commission for Coordinating Actions Against Corruption (www.
government.bg) was formed by the Council of Ministers, while Parliament created the 
permanent Parliamentary Committee on Fighting Corruption. In the executive branch, 
special anti-corruption units have been created within diﬀerent ministries and the police. 
Further legislation to ﬁght corruption was adopted during 2003. The eﬀects of these 
measures, however, have yet to be observed (Freedom House 2004). 
To increase the transparency of the activity of the local authorities, certain 
mechanisms and instruments have been provided as part of the new legislative framework 
for the creation of a functioning local self-governance in the country (the Constitution 
of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Local Authority and Local Administration Act, the 
Administrative and Territorial Governance Act, and the Referenda Act). These should 
be applied more eﬃciently through:
 • improving the eﬃciency of the local councils and more eﬀectively implementing 
the legislation on local administration (the Regulations for the Organization and 
the Activity of the Local Council and the Local Administration, the regulations 
for disposing of and renting local property, etc.), thus limiting the possibility 
of exerting pressure on the local administration; 
 • improving the activities of the permanent and temporary local commissions, and 
better implementing their functions of control over the local municipal council 
decisions as provided for in the Local Authority and Local Administration Act; 
involving experts from civil organizations when important decisions on local 
issues are taken; 
 • improving civic control over the elected local representatives by creating legal 
mechanisms for their dismissal; 
 • improving the eﬃciency of the local public relations and information services. 
The Annual Report of the Minister of Public Administration (www.government.bg) 
describes some of the speciﬁc measures taken in the struggle against corruption. The 
report states that during 2002, special telephones and mailing boxes were installed in 
128 municipalities to enable citizens to anonymously and easily report on occasions of 
corruption requests by local representatives and administrators. The report also points 
out the low number of complaints received: 74. A possible explanation is the lack of 
social or cultural experience in these practices, and the relative lack of conﬁdence of the 
public that their reports would be adequately and eﬃciently processed.
Public servants working in the municipal administration are obliged to declare their 
assets annually as part of the policy for income transparency, but the requirement does 
not apply to their closest relatives (spouses and children).
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An important development in business regulation pertaining to corruption was 
the adoption in 2003 of the Limitation of Administrative Regulation and Control over 
Economic Activity Act, eﬀective from December 2003. The goal of the act is to simplify 
the relationship between business and the government, including local self-government. 
By introducing the “silent consent” principle on the part of administration and “one-stop 
shopping” for the provision of administrative services to businesses, the act attempts 
to counteract ineﬃciencies in providing public services. Thirty-nine speciﬁc business 
activities are now subject to licensing and permission regimes, and only acts of Parliament 
can introduce new regimes. The act obligates Parliament to perform rigorous impact 
assessments of future legislation. This regulatory change, together with the continued 
stability of the tax regime and economic policy, should ease administrative pressures on 
economic activity and create a stable anti-corruption environment. 
Diﬀerent NGOs, including some with nationwide networks (e.g., the Foundation 
for Local Government Reform—FLGR, and the Center for the Study of Democracy—
CSD), have developed comprehensive programs aimed at supporting local government 
eﬀorts to implement anti-corruption practices and to increase the transparency of local 
government. Two organizations periodically perform and publish measurements of 
corruption in Bulgaria. The ﬁrst is the local branch of Transparency International, called 
Transparency Without Borders, which compiles an annual Corruption Perceptions Index. 
The second organization is a broad coalition of Bulgarian NGOs known as Coalition 
2000, which has monitored various aspects of corruption in Bulgaria since June 1998. 
Most of its measurements showed improvement between 1998 and 2000; the results have 
stabilized since then. Among the main tasks of Coalition 2000 are the dissemination of 
the Ethical Code of the Assembly of Regional Governments of the Council of Europe 
and the preparation of a draft Ethical Code for Bulgarian Municipal Councilors. There 
is an adopted Ethical Code of Public Servants, which has no obligatory power, but 
the civil servants in 227 municipal administrations are aware of it. During 2002, 315 
disciplinary sanctions were imposed on staﬀ members of municipal administrations. 
Some individual municipal councils have already adopted their own Ethical Codes as 
part of the Municipal Council Statute, thus making the code norms obligatory.
There are also instances of the introduction of the institution of municipal ombuds-
man, mainly on the initiative of NGOs. A Law on the Ombudsman has been adopted, 
leading to the appointment of a National Ombudsman in Bulgaria.
The number of media outlets alleging corruption in Bulgaria is around 500 per 
month, which suggests that the media do not feel too threatened to report corruption. 
However, the practical eﬀect of such media reports is unclear (Freedom House 2004). 
Bulgarian media outlets tend to paint any suspicious story as a proven act of corruption, 
regardless of the facts and evidence. As a result, they are instrumental in exposing cases 
of corruption. Care should be taken in the reporting, however, because this may foster 
an exaggerated public perception of the widespread nature of the problem. 
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Regular opinion polls measuring the dynamics of public perceptions about the 
spread of corruption are published both in the daily newspapers and on specialized 
Internet sites (e.g., Coalition 2000 reports its survey results two or three times a year). 
The corruption indexes have had a steady, relatively high value during the last four years. 
Bulgarian public attitudes toward corruption have two levels, according to Coalition 
2000. On the one hand, public intolerance for oﬃcial corruption is growing. On the 
other hand, many Bulgarians still feel that resorting to acts of corruption is an eﬀective 
way to solve problems. However, Coalition 2000 has reported a drop in the readiness 
of average citizens to engage in corrupt practices. 
The Coalition 2000 surveys on corruption pressure (requested bribes) lists 23 
professional groups, including municipal administrators and local representatives. 
The data show that municipal administrators are rated as more corrupt than local 
representatives (mayors and municipal councilors), but in general the two groups 
are given medium rating in the overall scale, being positioned 12th and 16th among 
the 23 professional groups. According to the results of the May 2003 survey, lawyers 
are identiﬁed as the most corrupt group and journalists the least. If we compare the 
results of the regular surveys from the period January 2000–May 2003 (see Table 
2.32), we see that the corruption index for both groups (local representatives and 
municipal administrators) has been ﬂuctuating and exhibits a slight tendency towards 
decreasing. 
 
Table 2.32
Corruption Pressure by Occupational Group [%]
May
2000
April
2000
Sept.
2000
January
2001
October
2001
January
2002
May
2002
October
2002
January 
2003
May
2003
Municipal 
oﬃcials
 11.3  11.7  10.3  11.2  11.3  10.0  5.5  10.9  4.4  8.4
Mayors and 
municipal 
councilors 
 6.7  5.6  3.2  2.1  1.4  2.0  2.7  5.3  3.0  4.1
Source: Corruption Indexes of Coalition 2000, May 2003.
In the same survey, the respondents were also asked about their general opinion 
on the levels of corruption among 22 professional groups. Among those groups, local 
representatives were placed 14th and municipal administrators 15th. In the May 2003 
survey, customs oﬃcers were assessed as the most corrupt (74.3% of the respondents 
considered them corrupt), while teachers rated as the least corrupt professional group 
(only 11.6% of those interviewed considered them corrupt).
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Table 2.33
Spread of Corruption by Occupational Group (2000–2003) [%]
Relative Share of Those Who Answered, “All or Nearly All Are Involved in Corruption”
January 
2000
April
2000
Sept.
2000
January
2001
October
2001
January
2002
May
2002
October
2002
January
2003
Mayors and 
municipal 
councilors
 32.5  35.2  32.1  30.9  26.3  31.8  23.4  48.3  45.7
Municipal 
oﬃcials
45.0  46.5  41.6  35.9  39.6  39.4  30.0  49.1  40.9
Source: Corruption Indexes of Coalition 2000, May 2003.
As seen in Table 2.33, between January 2000 and May 2003 there was a slight 
increase in the tendency for respondents to consider local representatives to be corrupt, 
while the opinion about the municipal administrators is much steadier. Perhaps because 
of the approaching elections, the general public was much more focused on cases of 
misconduct of local representatives.
4.3 Horizontal Accountability in Local Government
Municipal councils in Bulgaria elect their chair, who is responsible for the eﬃcient 
functioning of plenary sessions and committee meetings. There are permanent (standing) 
committees, and temporary (ad hoc) ones. The committees assist the chair in preparatory 
work, which guarantees eﬃcient decision-making. The committees also assist decision-
making within a speciﬁc area by preparing assessments, working out common positions, 
or outlining alternatives. All issues decided by the municipal council have to be discussed 
by the committees. The committees have also controlling functions, as they monitor the 
implementation of council decisions. The Rules of the Procedures and Standing Orders 
of the council deﬁne the number and the speciﬁc proﬁle of the committees.
Municipal councils establish committees covering the major spheres of competence 
of local government, in keeping with the policy priorities speciﬁc to each municipality. 
As a rule, bigger municipalities have more committees. The councilors are elected as 
members of the committees in accordance with their professional skill and experience. 
When necessary, a committee may invite people with expertise in an area being discussed 
to attend its sessions. Usually, however, members of the municipal administration can 
provide the needed expertise and prepare the preliminary assessments.
The mayor is not a member of the municipal council and participates in the council 
sessions without the right to vote. The mayor executes the decisions made by the council. 
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According to law the mayor has no legislative authority, but in practice the mayor and 
his administration initiate the majority of the council decisions. 
Though the mayor is responsible for the eﬃcient functioning of the municipal 
administration, the municipal secretary (appointed by the mayor) manages the 
administration. The municipal council decides on the structure of the municipal 
administration, but the law does not specify who prepares the proposal; usually the mayor 
does this. The Public Administration Law of 1998 has introduced some administrative 
requirements and standards, which have led to similar administrative structuring. This 
makes the coordination of public management easier, both horizontally and vertically. 
An amendment to the LSGLA Act is under preparation, aimed at avoiding potential 
conﬂicts between the council and the mayor, by specifying that the mayor will propose 
the structure of the municipal administration. Currently the council has no authority to 
decide on the personal appointments and dismissals of the municipal administration. 
The mayor is responsible for the preparation of the draft budget; the council 
deliberates on and adopts the ﬁnal version of the budget, which is to be implemented 
by the mayor. The council controls the implementation of the budget and passes the 
budget report.
The municipal council has overall control over the activities of the mayor. If the 
council decides that the mayor has acted in contradiction to the council decisions or to 
the adopted policy priorities, it may overrule these acts. The mayor has weak veto powers 
on council decisions (the mayor’s veto is overruled by a simple majority). When this 
happens, the mayor is obliged to implement the decision of the council, but may appeal 
it to the court. The court is to decide only on the legality of the council decisions.
The municipal council has no administrative staﬀ. The required administrative 
services are provided by the mayor’s administration, including information supply. 
The municipal administration managed by the mayor is solely responsible for the 
preparation of the draft proposals to be passed by the council. Hence, the role of 
the administration is commensurable with the role of the council committees. The 
eﬀectiveness and the eﬃciency of the decision-making of the municipal council depend 
entirely on the cooperation between the councilors and the administrative staﬀ. In 
case of conﬂicts, decision-making is substantially impeded. When there is no stable 
majority in the council, the situation of non-decision in the council may diminish the 
mayor–council interactions and hamper the communication between the councilors 
and the administration. Recently, there have been some good practices that structure 
communication between municipal councils and the mayor’s administration in a more 
eﬃcient format, e.g., internal ordinances have been adopted and ISO systems introduced 
and maintained. 
According to the 1991 legislation, municipal councils had the right to appoint 
their own expert groups, but due to lack of democratic tradition and experience, 
these appointed bodies were highly ineﬃcient. The 1995 amendment to the LSGLA 
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Act abolished the competence of the municipal councils to make administrative 
appointments. The need for an autonomous expert unit appointed by the municipal 
council is now being recognized again, and with regard to the forthcoming local elections, 
a new amendment to the LSGLA Act is under discussion that would restore the practice 
of municipal councils appointing their own expert bodies. 
The current Bulgarian model of distribution of competencies clearly implies a leading 
role for the municipal council. But established practice and the requirements for eﬃcient 
decision-making procedures often lead to the mayor taking this role. The results of the 
two surveys conﬁrm this tendency. Both the local representatives and the administrative 
oﬃcials were asked to assess the inﬂuence of diﬀerent governmental and private agencies 
on local government decision-making. The results can be seen in Table 2.34.
Table 2.34
Perceived Inﬂuence on Municipal Decisions (7-Point Scale*)
Less than
4,999
5,000–
9,999
10,000–
49,999
50,000–
99,999
Over
100,000 
Country 
mean
CAO Rep. CAO Rep. CAO Rep. CAO Rep. CAO Rep. CAO Rep.
Mayor 5.9 5.6 6.1 5.5 6.4 5.1 6.8 5.3 6.9 5.5 6.4 5.3
CAO 4.9 4.6 4.1 3.7 4.3 3.4 4.0 3.4 5.0 3.4 4.3 3.5
Civil servants 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.5 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.5
Committees 5.6 5.3 5.0 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.4 4.3 5.9 4.9 5.2 4.7
Factions 4.1 3.2 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.3 5.2 5.0 5.4 4.7 4.3 4.4
Individual 
councilors
3.7 5.0 3.9 4.1 3.7 4.0 3.8 3.7 4.3 4.0 3.8 4.0
Central 
government
3.9 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.4 4.1 4.4 4.3 5.2 4.3 4.3 4.2
Regional 
government
3.6 3.5 3.7 4.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.6 4.7 3.7 3.8 3.8
Country mean 
score
4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.6 4.9 5.1 4.2 4.5 4.2
Note: * 1—very small inﬂuence; 7—very high inﬂuence.
Source: CAO and LRS surveys.
Table 2.34 shows the mean values of the perceived inﬂuence on decision-making 
of diﬀerent actors and institutions of local and of central government. The two groups 
of respondents (chief administrative oﬃcers and local representatives) assessed the 
mayor and the council committees as the most inﬂuential agents. As a whole, local 
government institutions were assessed to have a key role in shaping local policies. The 
inﬂuence of party fractions and local branches of political parties was also high (see 
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Table 2.34 and Figure 2.1). The respondents indicated a persistent inﬂuence of central 
government, apparently due to the centralized ﬁscal system and the considerable level 
of state regulation in some policy areas. The results show a clear distinction between 
the political and the administrative bodies of local government, with civil servants and 
administrative oﬃcials having a smaller inﬂuence on municipal decision-making. 
The inﬂuence of the other local societal actors (local business, NGOs, local media, 
churches, trade unions, etc.) on local policy was perceived to be low (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1
Perceived Inﬂuence on Local Government (7-Point Scale)
Source: CAO and LRS Surveys.
4.4 Conclusion
Achievements in Bulgaria in terms of local governments providing information to citizens 
have been considerable. Access to public information is guaranteed; clear and simple rules 
and procedures have been deﬁned by speciﬁc legislation, as well as by municipal acts by 
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the majority of municipalities. The procedures are popular among citizens and stimulate 
regular requests for public information. There has also been considerable progress in 
establishing E-government at the municipal level. The majority of municipalities have 
developed advanced websites that are being regularly updated, although in smaller 
municipalities the process has been developing more slowly. Contacts with media repre-
sentatives are organized regularly and a structured system for announcing the decisions of 
local representatives is in place. There is still inadequate transparency in decision-making 
on major policies and budgeting issues in the municipalities. To address some of these 
concerns, a mandatory public hearing of municipal budgets was introduced in 2004. 
Sessions of municipal councils are open to the public with no restrictions. 
Corruption at the local government level is a particular problem, with certain areas 
being especially prone to corruption: municipal procurement; licensing of economic and 
trade activities; renting and tenders for reconstruction of municipal sites; and tenders 
for privatization of municipal property and supplying of municipal premises with fuel 
and consumables. A number of acts have been introduced or amended to create a more 
stable anti-corruption environment, including the Law on Political Parties, the Public 
Procurement Act, etc. However, despite some progress in this respect, there are still no 
eﬃcient mechanisms and rules for holding public servants and administrative oﬃcials 
accountable for acts of corruption. Convictions for bribery-related cases have begun to 
occur, but lack of enforcement rather than low levels of bribery is probably the reason 
for the low numbers. The corruption index for both groups (local representatives and 
municipal administrators) ﬂuctuated somewhat during 2000–2003, and exhibited a 
slight tendency towards decreasing. A Register of Public Procurement and Tenders, 
including those made by the municipalities, was established in 2000 and is updated on 
daily basis. The control over public procurement is centralized and carried out by the 
Public Internal Financial Control Agency. It is still possible to manipulate the public 
procurement procedures and the management of public property, despite formal 
compliance with legal requirements.
The current Bulgarian model of distribution of competencies clearly implies the 
leading role of the municipal council, but established practice and requirements for 
eﬃcient decision-making procedures often result in the mayor assuming this role. 
The inﬂuence of party fractions and local branches of political parties is also high. The 
inﬂuence of the other local societal actors (local business, NGOs, local media, churches, 
trade unions, etc.) on local policy is perceived to be low. 
Despite considerable progress in developing appropriate legal, administrative, and 
informational frameworks for providing a more transparent and accountable local 
government, a meaningful change in the system may be achieved only by having citizens 
more active, involved, and interested in the management of their local aﬀairs. In this way, 
improving transparency and accountability is a twofold process, requiring a combined 
eﬀort on the part of all stakeholders, with citizens being the major one.
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5. EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
5.1 Resource Control
The eﬀective and autonomous control over resources is of key importance for the 
establishment of eﬃcient local government.
The structure of the own revenues of the municipalities is given in Table 2.11. The 
constitutional provisions do not allow for independent management and control over the 
size of their own tax revenues, and allow only some control over revenues from local fees 
(within the limits deﬁned by law). Before the passing of the Local Budget Law (MBL) 
the share of own revenues in the budget was relatively small—about 16%–18%. Since 
1998, as the MBL changed both the deﬁnition of the types of revenues and broadened 
the sphere of the own revenues, the share of own revenues has tended to increase to levels 
above 60%.The limited ﬁscal autonomy of local governments, discussed previously in 
detail, is unanimously considered to be a substantial impediment to the planning and 
controlling capacity of local government.
The cooperation between local governments and NGOs is a widespread practice in 
Bulgaria. In 1996 the National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria (NAMB)1 was 
established and all municipalities are currently members. The NAMB role as legitimate 
representative of the municipal authorities vis-à-vis the central government institutions 
is legally aﬃrmed, and it has proved to be a powerful mediator between local and central 
government, especially in negotiating the amount of state subsidies and in forming 
the part of the annual State Budget related to municipalities. The legal regulation on 
the interaction between NAMB and the diﬀerent central government institutions needs 
more precision and speciﬁcation in order to guarantee eﬃcient negotiation procedures 
and eﬀective partnership relations. Other important NGOs, which work exclusively 
within the sphere of local government, are the Foundation for Local Government Reform 
(FLGR), founded in 1995, and the established regional associations of municipalities. 
The projects and activities of the FLFR are well known among local representatives and 
administrative oﬃcials. Their aim is to provide information, expertise, and ﬁnancial 
support for local government initiatives. FLGR publishes a monthly newsletter (in 
print and in electronic versions) on local government innovations.2 There are a number 
of well developed local and regional NGOs. In many municipalities (Chepelare, 
Smolian, Kardjali, etc.) there are well functioning NGO centers that actively assist local 
governments in their policy implementation and in strengthening their interactions 
with citizen associations and local business. 
The general objectives and speciﬁc tasks of municipal associations, as deﬁned in 
their statutes, are aimed at providing additional management resources to its members: 
information services, legal assistance, and management expertise. Currently there are 
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twelve regional associations of municipalities. The quantitative data on the resources 
provided by these associations will be unreliable, as a substantial part of it is in kind 
(without a precise ﬁnancial equivalent). The major impact of the municipal associations is 
the promotion of voluntary cooperation, which provides for uniﬁcation and coordination 
of management and services, based on intensive networking.
In Bulgaria, the number of municipal administrative staﬀ is determined on the 
basis of the number of inhabitants, according to a standardized ratio worked out by the 
central government. The municipal council considers these standards when deciding 
on the number of administrative staﬀ. Only a small number of the administrative staﬀ 
enjoys the status of civil servant, while the others are just municipal employees. Tables 
1.34 and 1.35 show how the number of civil servants and municipal employees varies 
within the ﬁve groups of municipalities: the correlation between number of population 
and number of administrative staﬀ is very strong. 
Table 2.35
Number of Full-time Civil Servant Positions
 Number of Full-time Civil Servant Positions 
Type of Municipality Less than 10 11–20 21–30 More than 30 Total
Less than 5,000  13 1   14 
5,000–9,999  42 3   45 
10,000–49,999  59 35 1 1 96 
50,000–99,999 1 9 8 2 20 
Over 100,000 1  4 5 10 
Total 116 48 13 8 185 
Source: CAO survey.
Table 2.36
Total Number of Employees in Local Administration
Type of Municipality 
by Population
Total Number of Employees in Local Administration 
Fewer than 
25
 26–50  51–100 101–150 More than 
150
Total 
Lower than 5,000 8 2 3  13 
5,000–9,999 9 29 7   45 
10,000–49,999 1 30 51 13 2 97 
50,000–99,999   1 15 4 20 
Over 100,000  2  1 7 10 
Total 18 63 62 29 13 185 
Source: CAO survey.
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The competencies of municipal authorities are universally deﬁned and do not depend 
on the size of the municipality. All local governments are obliged to perform these general 
functions, but they are assisted to a diﬀerent extent by the central government depending 
on size, geographic location, social and demographic parameters, and economic and 
infrastructure speciﬁcities. The quality of the services provided also diﬀers. Smaller 
municipalities usually have limited resources, but there are exceptions, such as small 
municipalities with proﬁtable businesses located on their territory. When state subsidies 
are accounted for, only eight municipalities contribute to the state budget rather than 
being subsidized by it. Among them are both the municipality of Soﬁa with a population 
of 1.2 million people and the municipality of Chelopech with just 1,710 inhabitants. 
Even some very big municipalities have more than half of their budget subsidized by 
the state (see 2000 UNDP Human Development Report).
The competence of the administrative staﬀ may be assessed on the basis of the LGA 
survey. The number of years’ experience within the municipal administration, especially 
of the chief administrative oﬃcers (CAOs), is usually considered to be an indicator for 
his or her competence. The usual practice is that each newly elected mayor dismisses all 
chief administrative oﬃcials (the secretary of the municipal administration and the heads 
of departments). Unfortunately, this practice has been reaﬃrmed despite the passage of 
the Public Service Act, which gave the CAOs the status of public servants. Despite having 
legal guarantees, the municipal secretaries aﬃliated to the previous mayor either resign 
or are dismissed for a variety of reasons. This means that the principles of continuity 
and professionalism are seriously curtailed; currently, more than 60% of the municipal 
secretaries have less than four years of experience in their current position (see Table 
2.37). Only 13.8% of the CAOs have kept their position for more than two mandates. 
In eleven municipalities, there is the extreme case of people having worked as CAO even 
during the communist regime. The only professional requirements for the appointment 
of municipal secretary are educational, and even these are rather general—a university 
degree, with no speciﬁc preference for the type of education. The forthcoming local 
elections will be a genuine challenge to such practices, as these will be the ﬁrst elections 
after the implementation of the public administration reform.
Table 2.37
Number of Years in Present Position as Chief Administrative Oﬃcer
Frequency Percent
Less than 4 118 62.4
5–8 34 18.0
9–12 26 13.8
More than 12 11 5.8
Total 189 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
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Most municipal secretaries are totally integrated into the life of their local 
communities, because they were either born there or have lived there for a very long 
(see Table 2.38). Six respondents claimed that they have never lived in the municipality 
where they work, but these are newly established municipalities, that have only recently 
acquired autonomy from a nearby big town. It can be said of CAOs in general that 
they are familiar with municipal problems even at the everyday level and are deeply 
entrenched in the local community.
Table 2.38
Length of Residence in Municipality
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Always 101 53.4 53.4
For a long time 70 37.0 37.0
For a short time 12  6.3 6.3
Never 6  3.2 3.2 
Total 189 100.0  100.0 
Source: CAO survey.
According to a survey carried out in 2002, fewer than half of the sample of 164 
municipal secretaries had no experience in the municipal administration before their 
appointment as CAO, while 54.7% had some experience. The same survey provided 
information about the education of CAOs. The greatest share of municipal secretaries 
(39.1%) had a general humanities education; a similar proportion of councilors (37.9%) 
had a degree in engineering or another technical specialty; 14.6% of the interviewed 
secretaries had an economic degree; fewer than 1% of the respondents (six persons) had 
law degrees and only two were graduates in public administration. Two-thirds declared 
they had no specialization or secondary qualiﬁcation in the ﬁeld of public administration. 
As a whole, the municipal secretaries seem to have a low level of speciﬁc qualiﬁcation 
for their administrative position. 
Despite their educational background, almost 70% of the municipal secretaries 
consider rules and procedures to be a priority in their work (see Table 2.39). Second 
comes the accomplishment of speciﬁc tasks; general satisfaction with the decision-making 
process seems to have little if any priority for the interviewed CAOs. 
The chief administrators see the basis of their authority as coming from, ﬁrst, 
promotion and increase in salary, and second, formal power and authority. Least 
signiﬁcant was personal relations based on trust and conﬁdence. 
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Table 2.39
 Chief Administrative Oﬃcers’ Priorities at Work
First Priority Second Priority Third Priority
Fre-
quency
[Per-
cent]
Fre-
quency
[Per-
cent]
Fre-
quency
[Per-
cent]
Priority Consideration—rules 132 69.8 46 24.3 11 5.8
Priority Consideration—task accomplishment 40 21.2 97 51.3 52 27.5
Priority Consideration—general satisfaction 17 9.0 46 24.3 126 66.7
Leadership priority—motivation 78 41.3 66 34.9 45 23.8
Leadership priority—formal power 59 31.2 72 38.1 58 30.7
Leadership priority—personal relations 51 27.0 52 27.5 86 45.5
Source: CAO survey.
The deﬁcit of administrative competence is considered to be a general problem for 
all levels of public administration in Bulgaria, outlined in all annual reports for the 
accession of Bulgaria to the EU. This is a common problem for all new democracies. 
The building of administrative capacity is a key priority both for the legislature and the 
executive. However, careful monitoring shows no signs of substantial improvement in 
the desired direction—towards a professional, competent, politically independent, and 
transparent public administration.
On the whole, the perceptions of the local representatives conﬁrm these general 
assessments. Table 2.40 presents municipal councilors’ evaluation of the competence of 
the local administrative staﬀ (1 stands for “poor” and 7 for “excellent”). The results do 
not correlate to the size of the municipalities, which contradicts the natural assumption 
that big municipalities have greater resources (human resources included). It is also 
important to point out that local representatives consider administrative staﬀ members 
to be politically biased, which undermines the available administrative capacity and is 
a serious impediment in achieving the general goals of administrative reform.
Table 2.40
Councilors’ Assessment of Local Administration’s Competence and Partiality
Size of Municipality by Population Partiality of Local Administration Competence of Local Administration 
Less than 4,999 3.00 3.61 
5,000–9,999 3.95 4.13 
10,000–49,999 3.46 3.91 
50,000–99,999 3.30 3.68 
Over 100,000 3.31 3.79 
Total 3.49 3.88 
Source: LRS 2002.
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5.2 Decision-making Capability
Decision-making capability provides a genuine test for the eﬀectiveness of cooperation 
between the diﬀerent branches of local government (the council and the mayor); between 
the diﬀerent party fractions represented in the council; and between politicians and 
administrative oﬃcials.
The law requires each municipal council to hold at least six sessions per year, but the 
number of sessions needed for eﬀective decision-making is much higher. As shown in 
Table 2.41, a clear majority of the councils (74.8%) held at least one session per month 
in 2003, if the holiday season is excluded. In 14.3% of municipalities, the councils held 
sessions more often, but in at least nineteen municipalities (10.9% of respondents) the 
legal requirements for at least six sessions were not met and the decision-making process 
was consequently blocked.
Table 2.41
Number of Assembly Sessions in Municipalities (2003)
Number of Assembly Sessions Frequency Percent
Less than 6 19 10.9
6–12 131 74.8
More than 12 25 14.3
Total 175 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
The municipal councils are supposed to meet regularly and in accordance with a 
set schedule. The number (share) of extraordinary sessions is one of the indicators of 
ineﬃciency in the councils’ work. During the last year there have been extraordinary 
sessions in more than half of the Bulgarian municipalities (120 out of the 263). In 
fact, the total number of extraordinary sessions is comparable to the number of regular 
sessions. It is normal to have one or two extraordinary sessions per year, and there are 
some extreme cases with more than six (reported by three CAOs in the LG survey). There 
is no reliable information about the cause for these unplanned sessions (we can only guess 
whether emergency issues or lack of quorum at the regularly scheduled sessions led to 
the calling of an extraordinary session). We may also presume that there is a correlation 
between the existence of an unstable majority in the councils which blocks the decision-
making process and the other indicators of ineﬃciency in decision-making included in 
Table 2.42. Irresolvable conﬂicts and unproductive debates, which are time consuming, 
often provoke “failing quorum” as one of the main reasons for the low performance of 
municipal councils. Lack of quorum was cited as a cause for early dismissal of a council 
session by 42.9% of the local government oﬃcials interviewed. 
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The postponement of decisions on certain issues is another indicator for low 
performance of municipal councils (Table 2.42). The data show that approximately 
half of the municipalities (55.5%) perform very eﬀectively, while just 7% have very low 
performance. The other two indicators—budget promptness and mutual trust between 
the mayor and the council—are consistent with this tendency. The mayors in more than 
one-third of municipalities enjoy a permanent consensus with the council majority; 
just 9.4% face irresolvable conﬂicts. A distinctive feature of mayor−council relations 
in Bulgaria is the opportunistic strategies of both parties—56.9% of the respondents 
indicate that the support for the mayor depends on the issue and is given ad hoc. 
On the basis of the performance index, we can conclude that the ineﬃciency of a 
limited number of municipal councils (about twelve) has been so destructive that they 
have ceased to function as they approach the end of their election term. 
Table 2.42
Indicators for Decisional Performance
High Performance Medium Performance Low Performance
Quorum (N 182) Always 
a quorum—55.5%
Lack of 
quorum—44.5%
Postponement of decisions 
(N 182)
Very rare or 
no delays—55.5% 
Delays from time 
to time—37.4%
One or more delays 
per session—7.1%
Mayor–council relationship 
(N 181)
Supportive of 
each other—33.7%
Depending on the 
issue—56.9%
Confrontation
—9.4%
Budget promptness (N 179) Yes—90% No—10%
Extraordinary sessions Less than 10% 
or none—82%
10–20%
—5.8%
More than 20%
—12.2% 
Source: CAO survey.
One of the fundamental reasons for the low performance (delayed decisions) of 
the municipal councils is the general lack of information—see Table 2.43. This is 
symptomatic of the ineﬀective communication between the municipal administration 
and the council and in some cases may be caused by the low administrative competence of 
the mayors, who often set the agenda of the council meetings without proper assessment 
of the available information and the preparatory work done by the administration.
The other substantial reason for delay and/or postponement of decisions is the 
diﬃculty in achieving consensus among various party fractions. Given the relatively low 
level of bargaining skills of local representatives and the unstructured and ineﬃcient 
communication among party leaders and groups, shifting majorities appear to be 
counterproductive in many cases.
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Table 2.43
 Most Frequent Reason for Delay in Council Decisions
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Lack of information 67 35.4 39.0
Lack of time 4 2.1 2.3
Obstruction 23 12.2 13.4
No agreement 46 24.3 26.7
No ﬁrm opinion 18 9.5 10.5
Other reason 14 7.4 8.1
Total 172 91.0 100.0
Missing 17 9.0
Total 189 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
Table 2.44
Planning and Programming in Local Policy by Sector [%]
Type of Document (Program, Action Plan, or Regulation) Exists Does Not Exist
Work schedule for the municipal council and its committees 74.1 25.9
Long-term economic development program 87.4 12.6
Long-term program for local government investments 50.9 49.0
Public sanitation or environment protection program 73.6 26.4
Program on public education 38.1 61.9
Sports program 41.0 59.0
Cultural program 46.3 53.7
Plan for the ﬁnancial supervision of local government institutions 47.7 52.3
Guidelines for CAO reports for the mayor and the councilors 21.9 78.1
Public safety and crime prevention program 69.8 30.2
Health protection program 28.9 71.1
Housing program 19.0 81.0
Program to develop mass transportation 31.8 68.2
Communication strategy 56.0 44.0
Citizens’ appeals and petitions 48. 9 51.1
Public procurement regulation 50.8 49.2
Source: CAO survey.
The CAO interviews conﬁrm that in all cases prescribed by the law, municipal 
councils have adopted detailed rules of procedures, statutes of the municipal 
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administration and regulations, as well as long-term economic sector programs. 
As seen in Table 2.44, the majority of municipalities have developed long-term economic 
programs, work schedules for the activities of the municipal council and its committees, 
public sanitation or environment protection programs, and public safety and crime 
prevention programs. Relatively new on the local agendas are public procurement 
regulations, communication strategies, and citizens’ appeal and petition regulations, 
adopted by the majority of municipalities. In the sectors heavily regulated by central 
regulations (education, health care, culture, etc.), the local councils are least active. 
Municipality size also inﬂuences sector activities. In small municipalities it makes little 
sense to have a long-term program in education and school programs. Housing is the 
most neglected sector of local policy.
5.3 Output Control
Output control is the crucial test for government eﬃciency and is symptomatic of the 
ability of local authorities to mobilize the appropriate and available human, ﬁnancial, 
and material resources. The key indicator in the implementation of local government 
projects is the correspondence between the goals and objectives on the one hand and the 
produced outcomes on the other. According to the CAOs’ assessment (Table 2.45), local 
authorities in Bulgaria still need to improve their eﬀectiveness in the implementation 
of their projects and to tighten control over their performance.
Cost planning is eﬀective in one-third of the municipalities. The share of cases 
with bad planning is the same. Projects are completed by the deadline in half of the 
municipalities, while the majority of answers suggests that there are few or no diﬃculties 
with operating costs.
Table 2.45
Municipal Planning Capacity [%]
Most 
of Them
Half 
of Them
Some 
of Them
Do Not 
Know
Total
Projected and real budget costs are 
similar 31.7 15.3 37.6 15.3 100.0
Projects are completed by deadline 43.9 23.8 26.5 5.8 100.0
Great 
Difficulty
Little 
Difficulty
No 
Difficulty at All
Diﬃcult to pay for current 
operating costs 32.8 36.0 17.5 13.8 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
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Cost reviews occurred in approximately half of the municipalities (Table 2.46). 
Most often they dealt with contracted-out or privatized municipal property. Others 
tracked administration costs. Least troublesome are the services provided by the local 
government via independent agents and municipal ﬁrms.
Table 2.46
Cost Reviews by Sphere [%]
Yes No Missing Total
Review of administrative costs 56.6 38.6 4.8 100.0
Review of the costs of local government institution services 42.9 48.1 9.0 100.0
Review of the costs of local government services 48.7 43.9 7.4 100.0
Functions privatized or contracted out 66.7 28.6 4.8 100.0
Source: CAO survey.
Bulgarian local government is highly autonomous in the area of provision of services. 
The process of privatization of municipal assets started in 1991, right after the passing 
of the new constitution. At that time there was a legislative vacuum, which allowed 
for a high degree of discretion. Later, with the passing of the 1996 Law on Municipal 
Property, the central government introduced uniﬁed procedures and speciﬁc regulations 
for privatization and contracting out of services. The administrative services are still 
exclusively within the competence of the municipal administration, while all other 
services (refuse collection and disposal, public transport, water supply, central heating, 
construction, reconstruction, and maintenance of roads and infrastructure) are provided 
by a variety of public and private agencies. In fact, private companies are increasingly 
involved in contracting out services, which are within the sole competence of municipal 
governments. 
Privatization deals or deals for contracting out of services were ﬁnalized in 66.7% 
of municipalities in 2002. The local government administrators were asked to evaluate 
how successful the deals were, and also to what extent they have reduced the number of 
local government employees. As Table 2.47 shows, they rated the success factor much 
higher than the eﬀectiveness in terms of reducing the number of employees. Privatization 
of municipal assets in Bulgaria is obviously driven by the lack of investment capacity 
and not by concerns over high cost of operation. Also, the assessment of success may 
prove to be very unrealistic. The long investment cycle usual for infrastructure projects 
makes it diﬃcult to judge their eﬃciency during the initial stage.
The lower result for municipalities with a population of 50,000 to 100,000 reﬂects 
several controversial water deals that ended with municipalities pulling out of the 
privatization contracts after waves of public protests over price policy.
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Table 2.47
Assessment of Outputs from Privatization and Contracting Out (7-Point Scale*) 
Type of 
municipality
How Successful is the 
Privatization/Contracting Out 
Effect of Privatization/contracting Out 
in Reducing LG Employees 
Less than 5,000 5.38 3.33 
5,000–9,999 3.68 2.60 
10,000–49,999 4.36 3.00 
50,000–99,999 3.81 3.69 
Over 100,000 4.60 3.44 
Total 4.26 3.07 
Note: * 1—total failure; 7—total success.
Source: CAO survey.
5.4 Conclusion
At the moment, ﬁscal decentralization is the main challenge for Bulgarian local self-
government in its eﬀorts to further the public administration reforms. The transfer of 
responsibilities and competencies has made necessary the transfer of resources to fund 
the new mandate, but for a variety of reasons, this crucial phase of ﬁscal decentralization 
has been slow to operate. The lack of eﬀective and autonomous control over resources—
crucial to the eﬃcient running of local government—is considered a substantial 
impediment to the planning and controlling capacity of local government. The human 
factor is also signiﬁcant in planning, allocating, and managing the otherwise scarce 
ﬁnancial resources, as well as in the provision of public services. Yet in spite of the 
legal and administrative changes made, the principles of continuity of services and 
professionalism are seriously curtailed. There is an overall deﬁcit of administrative 
competence and professionalism. The many capacity building programs notwithstanding, 
monitoring has not yet shown much progress towards the goal of a professional, 
competent, politically independent, and transparent public administration. The decision-
making capacity of local governments is undermined by the frequently opportunistic 
character of mayor–council relations, insuﬃcient information, the poor administration 
skills of some mayors, and the lack of bargaining skills of the various party fractions 
that makes a consensus diﬃcult to reach. Following the October 2003 local elections, 
the composition of local governments shows a diversity of parties and coalition patterns 
that will challenge their decision-making capacity. It remains to be seen whether pressure 
from the EU accession requirements for decentralization, and the declared political 
will of the Bulgarian government to implement eﬀective and autonomous control of 
resources by local governments, will be suﬃciently strong inﬂuences to move the agenda 
of change along.
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6. LOCAL ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA
 Local elections have been held four times since the collapse of the communist regime 
in 1989. The ﬁrst multi-party local elections occurred in October 1991, scheduled 
simultaneously with the second democratic parliamentary elections. The government 
appointed temporary mayors for the interim period between the ﬁrst democratic general 
elections of June 1990 and October 1991. The parties receiving the majority of votes 
in a municipality nominated the interim mayor. Democratization of local politics was 
somewhat delayed, however, as it was totally overwhelmed by a national transitional 
agenda focused on democratic institution building, the introduction of market rules, 
restitution, privatization, and other policy issues. Local democracy was not a priority 
in the complicated transformation and reconstruction of society.
Since the ﬁrst local election in 1991 was held simultaneously with the general 
elections, the results showed a similar pattern. The national party preference pattern 
registered in the parliamentary elections in December 1994 was still very much dominant 
in the October 1995 local vote. In fact, signs of the independence of local politics from 
the national agenda only occurred in 1999. The trend towards divergence has several 
components:
 1. the number of registered parties was twice as high as in the preceding national 
elections; 
 2. the tactic of building coalitions of local party branches did not come from a 
national directive; in fact, coalitions were formed across the left–right spectrum 
that were considered “unacceptable” at the national level; and
 3. the average number of parties participating in local elections jumped from 3.44 
in 1995 to 5.17 in 1999. In the 1999 local elections, voters had on average 
at least two additional party or coalition choices compared to the previous 
parliamentary vote in 1997.
Table 2.48 illustrates that fragmentation of the party system at the local level is much 
stronger than the somewhat unclear dynamics in the parliamentary elections.
Table 2.48
Number of Electoral Parties in Parliamentary and Local Elections (1991–2001)
Election Year 1991 1994 1995 1997 1999 2001
Parliamentary 4.18 3.85 2.99 3.93
Local 2.75 3.44 5.17
Source: Electoral Oﬃce.
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The national party system is not uniform across the country. In municipalities with 
a Turkish minority population represented by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF) and in rural communities politically dominated by the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP), the number of parties participating in local elections is much lower than the 
national average. In a number of municipalities with a mixed population and weak 
support for the left parties, the vote is so fragmented that the national party system 
might be considered not applicable to the local conditions. The 2003 local elections 
clearly showed the separation of local politics from the national political agenda. There 
was an extremely large number of candidates for mayor, and a great variety of political 
party representatives ended up in the present municipal councils.
6.1 The Electoral System
Since 1999, the following positions are contested in popular elections: member of 
municipal council, mayor of the municipality, and mayor of the mayoralty (a settlement 
or a village with population above 500). The municipal council elects lieutenant mayors 
for settlements smaller than mayoralty. In 1995, ward mayors and ward councilors were 
also directly elected. The 1999 revision to the legal framework included the following 
changes:
 1. The number of municipal councilors was reduced by one-third (from 7,029 to 
5,252). 
 2. Indirect elections were introduced. Prior to 1999 each mayoralty (a village 
or a settlement) elected a mayor by popular vote. With the new deﬁnition of 
mayoralty, this status was given to settlements with populations over 500. For 
smaller settlements the institution of lieutenant mayor was created and they 
were to be elected by the municipal council by a simple majority.
 3. The same indirect election procedure was to apply to the 35 ward mayors in 
the cities of Soﬁa, Plovdiv, and Varna; previously they were directly elected.
 4. Previously existing ward councils were abolished, as bodies that lack practical 
functions.
A pure proportional electoral formula is applied in the elections for municipal 
council (and in the 1991 and 1995 ward councils). Every municipality is a separate 
multimember district. D’Hondt divisors are applied to the total number of votes received 
by registered lists. There are no thresholds except for the barriers built into the size of 
the multimember district, i.e., the number of municipal council members. Within 
such a formula, the actual threshold depends on the number of registered lists and on 
the distribution of votes. Ex post analysis of election results suggests that in rare cases 
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the actual threshold may reach levels over 7% in municipalities with eleven to thirteen 
council members, while in the cases of seventeen to twenty-one council members it is 
usually lower than the 4% threshold applied in parliamentary elections. For the councils 
comprised of 29 members and over, the actual thresholds are around 2%.
Table 2.49
Positions Contested in Local Elections (1995–1999)
Election 
Year
Municipal 
Councilors
Municipal 
Mayors
Mayoralty 
Mayor
Ward 
Councilor
Ward Mayor Total Number of 
Elected 
Representatives
1995 7,029 255 3,739 461 35 11,519
1999 2,525 262 1,695 Abolished Elected by 
municipal 
council
4,982
Source: Electoral Oﬃce.
A majority run-oﬀ election formula is used in all types of mayoral elections. Unless 
a candidate has received a majority of valid votes, the two candidates with the most 
votes from the ﬁrst round participate in a run-oﬀ competition. Pre-term elections are 
held in case a position becomes vacant.
Registration for local elections consists of two steps. Parties register at the Central 
Election Commission (CEC), certifying their legal status at the moment of application. 
In the last elections, 96 parties applied to the CEC and all of them were registered. A 
certiﬁed party applies at every municipal election commission (MEC) where it chooses 
to stand in the elections. Of the 96 CEC-certiﬁed parties, 93 applied to at least MEC 
for participation in the council member elections, while 84 participated at least in one 
mayoral election.
Coalition registration rules are extremely permissive. A certiﬁed party may establish 
one municipal coalition for the proportional council member elections and another for 
the majority mayor elections. There is one common sense restriction—a party may not 
enter two diﬀerent coalitions or support two diﬀerent candidates in one election. Over 
250 diﬀerent local (municipal) coalitions have been registered for the proportional vote 
and 190 for the majority vote.
Independent candidates are registered at the Municipal Election Commission upon 
presentation of a petition with support signatures. The number of required signatures 
depends on the population ﬁgures. A higher share of independent candidates among 
municipal mayor candidates (14% of all registered) is a product of the speciﬁc party 
election tactics. To broaden their appeal to voters beyond traditional party supporters, 
candidates register as independents running with the support of one of the established 
parties. The voter–representative ratio has never been an issue in local politics. In the 
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smallest municipality of Chavdar, 1,148 voters elect eleven representatives, while in 
Soﬁa 1.1 million voters are represented by 61 councilors. 
There is a recurring debate on how many representatives should be elected in a 
municipality. Throughout the 1990s, the clear trend was towards reducing the number 
of representatives, while seeking a format for a municipal council that would function 
in a more eﬀective way. Fragmentation is another clear trend, i.e., the splitting of one 
municipality into several smaller ones based on existing communities and the local sense 
of separate identity. Since 1990, thirteen new municipalities have been established, 
bringing the total number to 263.
The other hot issue is the status of the mayoralty. The sharp reduction in the number 
of popularly elected mayoralty mayors in 1999 has been perceived as an attempt of the 
(then) dominant coalition, the UDF, to narrow the electoral base of its main rival, the 
BSP and the smaller and fragmented Agrarian Union. The same argument developed 
concerning ward councils and ward mayors.
Although the election results are usually widely accepted, some dozen cases are 
appealed to the regional courts after each election. There were seven appeals after the 
1995 elections, three of which were annulled on the grounds of a technical breach of the 
election law. New elections were held in those cases. In 1999, no annulments occurred 
in the twelve appeal cases.
Bulgarian voting procedures are based on a separate ready-made party ballot for each 
vote cast. No voting is possible prior to election day or outside the polling stations. All 
the party ballots are placed behind the booth; the voter picks one, places it in an oﬃcial 
envelope, and delivers the vote to the box. The fact that voters are not required to mark the 
ballot and the practice of presenting ready-made lists have provoked frequent proposals 
to introduce a preferential vote or a variety of mixed electoral systems. However, when 
the mayor ballot used in 1999 contained the names of all participating candidates and 
voters were asked to mark their choice, the share of invalid votes tripled from 3–5% to 
10–15%. Electoral reform is again being debated. A new comprehensive electoral code 
has been drafted and submitted to the parliament. For the parliamentary election, the 
code proposes the introduction of the German-style mixed proportional system. For 
the local vote, the proposal is to elect councilors in smaller (four member) districts with 
preferential choice for up to four candidates. 
6.2 The Electoral Process
 Voters enjoy a broad range of choices in the municipal elections, with an average of 5.9 
candidates per municipal mayor seat and 6.0 candidates per councilor seat. The choice 
is somewhat more limited in mayoralty mayor elections: 39 candidates per seat. 
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Table 2.50
Registration of Lists and Candidates in Local Elections (1999)
Elections of: 262 Municipal Councils 262 Municipal Mayors 1,695 Mayoralty Mayors
Number of 
registered lists
2,918 
Number of candidates 30,972 including 
267 independent 
candidates
1,574 including 
221 independent 
candidates
6,596 including 
849 independent 
candidates
Average number of 
candidates per seat 
5.9 6.0 3.9
Source: Electoral Oﬃce.
In the mayoralty mayor elections, 38 seats (2.2% of the total) were won by 
acclamation. Elections with more than seven candidates were also a relatively small 
share (5.5%).
The municipal mayor elections had ten instances (3.7%) with only two registered 
candidates, while at the opposite end, ten or more candidates were registered in 22 
municipalities (7.5%) of the cases.
The election of local councilors is by far the most open competition. In fourteen 
council elections (5.5%), there were three or four registered lists. This is similar to the 
share of elections having 22 or more registered lists. In some, there were as many as 
43 lists! 
Table 2.51
Citizen Participation in Election Campaigns
 Frequency Percent
Fewer than ten 156 16.0 
11–20 154 15.8 
21–50 188 19.3 
51–100  96  9.8 
More than 100 298 30.5 
Total 892 91.4 
Source: LRS 2002.
The extent of citizens’ participation in local election campaigns, measured by number 
of volunteers, depends on the size of the municipality, i.e., number of voters and the size 
of the political party or coalition that respondents refer to in their answers. The election 
rules based on ﬁxed list proportional representation exclude the inﬂuence of personality 
in the campaign, except for the leading name on the list in some cases. 
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The election law guarantees equal access of registered candidates to local media. 
No major complaints concerning access have been lodged, either to the election 
administration or to local courts. Tough competition between local media within 
very small markets forces them to be as interesting as possible. Election campaigns 
unquestionably provide a lot of attractive topics for coverage.
6.3 Electoral Results and Turnout
6.3.1 Electoral Results
In the October 1991 elections, party preferences in the local and general elections nearly 
overlapped. The UDF gained a majority in the eight largest urban centers, while the 
BSP was dominant in smaller municipalities and in the rural areas. In medium sized 
municipalities (with populations between 20,000 and 100,000) the vote was split, with 
a considerable share of the votes going to the third party (BANU) lists. The MRF won 
in all (30) municipalities having a majority Turkish population.
In the early 1990s, left−right party preferences followed the deeply rooted divisions 
of the center−periphery cleavage. In the rural municipalities, the incumbent socialist 
local elites retained control and support, challenged by the MRF and the BANU. In 
all but one of the municipalities with a population over 100,000, the UDF established 
a majority.
In the 1995 local election, the BSP recovered much of its losses in the previous 
elections. Tables 1.52 and 1.53 illustrate the socialist dominance in all types municipalities 
except for the three largest cities—Soﬁa, Plovdiv, and Varna. The elections were held 
ten months after the BSP had gained a similar absolute parliamentary majority in the 
pre-term general elections of 1994.
The parties represented in Parliament (the BSP, the UDF, the PU, the MRF, and 
the BBB) gained 88.6% (6,214 seats out of 7,029) of the council seats. The two main 
parties (the BSP and the UDF) had 66.6%. Independents accounted for 1.6% (114) 
of the elected councilors and the rest of the seats went to smaller parties or local lists 
(9.8% or 701 seats).
Socialist party candidates were also victorious in two-thirds of the elections for 
municipal mayor. The MRF gained similar support as in previous elections and conﬁrmed 
its control over the municipalities with a majority Turkish population.
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The 1999 local election results were somewhat surprising and indicated a diminishing 
importance of the center–periphery cleavage. The UDF and the BSP achieved similar 
results in all but one class of municipalities. The UDF retained its majority in Soﬁa and 
Plovdiv, but in the next eight municipalities by size, no majority emerged. Councilors 
elected from small parties or local lists thus achieved an important position. In addition, 
in six of those eight municipal centers, socialist or nominally independent but socialist-
supported candidates were elected mayor. However, for the ﬁrst time in over 30 
municipalities, the council majority was other than socialist and/or the elected mayor 
was not socialist or a socialist-supported candidate. The variety of local lists proved to 
be as popular as the traditional parties. Some of those may foreshadow the debut of 
a political platform with possible long-term eﬀects, e.g., the Roma party named Free 
Bulgaria. Others were just as exotic—the list of a football club, that fans named the 
Green Party of Bulgaria, came in third with over 11,000 votes in the municipality of 
Bourgas.
Parties represented in the Parliament (the BSP, the UDF, the MRF, the PU, and the 
BBB) took 79.9% of the councilor seats (4,197 of a total of 5,252), indicating a slight 
decrease of support compared to 88.6% in the previous local elections. Further, the 
share of the two principle protagonists, the BSP and the UDF, also dropped to 60% 
from their previous 66%. The support for independent candidates marginally increased 
from 1.6% to 2.5% (133 seats), while smaller and local lists nearly doubled their share 
to 17.6% (922 seats) from previous the 9.8%.
Table 2.56
Election Results for Municipal Mayors by Party (1999)
Type of 
Municipality 
BSP BEL MRF Inde-
pendent
BANU NU UDF Others Total
< 5,000 11 3 — 1 2 3 4 3 27
< 10,000 19 — 7 10 3 1 20 2 62
< 20,000 21 4 10 9 3 2 26 4 79
< 30,000 6 — 3 8 — 3 10 4 34
< 50,000 8 1 3 4 — 1 8 2 27
< 75,000 4 2 — 2 — — 3 — 11
Source: M. Stefanova 2003
Only one municipal mayor, Veselin Uzunov from Razgrad, has had enduring enough 
support to be elected in three consecutive elections. In half of the mayoral elections 
in 1999, the candidates nominated by the incumbent majority party or coalition lost 
the race. 
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Table 2.57
Election Results for Municipal Mayors by Party (1999) [%]
Type of 
Municipality 
BSP BEL MRF Inde-
pendent
BANU NU UDF Others TOTAL
< 5,000 4.3 1.2 — 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.1 10.3
< 10,000 7.3 — 2.6 3.8 1.2 0.4 7.6 0.7 23.6
< 20,000 8.0 1.6 3.9 3.4 1.2 0.7 9.9 1.4 30.1
< 30,000 2.3 — 1.1 3.0 — 1.2 3.8 1.6 13.0
< 50,000 3.0 0.3 1.1 1.6 — 0.3 3.0 1.0 10.3
< 75,000 1.5 0.7 — 0.8 — — 1.3 — 4.3
< 100,000 1.9 — — 0.8 — — 0.7 — 3.4
< 160,000 0.8 0.3 — — — — 1.2 — 2.3
> 160,000 — — — 1.6 — — 0.7 — 2.3
Capital Soﬁa — — — — — — 0.4 — 0.4
Total 29.1 4.1 8.7 15.4 3.0 3.8 30.1 5.8 100.0
Source: M. Stefanova 2003.
In order to broaden their appeal, many mayoral candidates choose to register in 
the elections as independents. Of the 40 municipal mayors who were elected on an 
independent platform, only two ran against candidates from the two main parties. The 
others relied on support from one of those parties, which did not register candidates.
In 2001, the former King Simeon the II unexpectedly registered in the general 
elections as the National Movement, only 63 days before election day. The movement 
succeeded in winning a majority with 120 of the 240 parliamentary seats (see Table 
2.58). The persistent center–periphery cleavage was swept aside by personal charisma 
and a skillful, populist program based on the Berlusconi model.
Public approval of and trust in the government slipped to lows reaching 15% 
after 2001. In the local elections of 2003, support for the Movement fell to 10% from 
43% in 2001.The Bulgarian Socialist Party won 33% of the vote in the country’s 263 
municipalities. The UDF won 21% and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms 10%. 
A total of 147 political parties and coalitions registered to run. 
One of the distinctions of the 2003 local elections was the extremely large number 
of candidates for mayor and the intense competition among them. The average number 
of municipal mayoral candidates nationally was 8.5, while 8.7 candidates on average 
ran for each municipal councilor position. The biggest cities had the greatest number 
of municipal councilor ballots. Seventy-four mayors of municipalities were elected in 
the ﬁrst round of the local elections, while the remaining 189 were elected in runoﬀs. 
Women were elected in 23 municipalities (8.75% of all mayors), up from fourteen prior 
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to the elections. A total of 119 mayors of municipalities (45.22%) were reelected in these 
elections. The total number of mayors of mayoralties elected was 2,545, and the total 
number of municipal councilors in Bulgaria was 5,281. Bulgarian municipal councils 
are now characterized by a great diversity of political party representatives.
Table 2.58
 General Election Results by Political Party (1990–2001) [%]
June 10, 
1990
Oct. 13, 
1991
Dec. 18, 
1994
April 19, 
1997
 June 19, 
2001
Valid votes 87.8 81.6 74.3 61.5 66.4
Invalid votes 3.0 1.9 0.9 1.1 0.6
Total votes 90.8 83.5 75.2 62.6 67.0
Political parties:
1 Coalition for Bulgaria—Bulgarian Socialist Party 47.2 33.1 43.5 22.5 17.1
2 Union of Democratic Forces 36.2 34.4 24.2 53.2 18.2
3 Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 8.0 3.9 6.5 — —
4 Movement for Rights and Freedoms 6.0 7.5 5.4 — 7.5
5 Fatherland Party of Labour 0.6 0.3 — — 0.0
6 Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (Nikola Petkov) — 3.4 — — —
7 Union of Democratic Forces (Center) — 3.2 — — —
8 Union of Democratic Forces (Liberal) — 2.8 — — —
9 Kingdom of Bulgaria Confederation — 1.8 1.4 — —
10 Bulgarian Business Bloc — 1.3 4.7 5.0 0.0
11 Bulgarian National Radical Party 0.1 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.1
12 Democratic Alternative for the Republic — — 1.9 — —
13 Bulgarian Communist Party — 0.7 1.5 1.2 —
14 New Choice Alliance — — 1.5 — —
15 Patriotic Union — — 1.4 — —
16 Alliance for National Salvation — — — 7.7 —
17 Euroleft — — — 5.6 1.0
18 Union for the King — — — 1.1 —
19 National Movement Simeon the Second — — — — 42.7
20 “Simeon II” Coalition — — — — 3.4
21 National Union for Tzar Simeon II — — — — 1.7
Others 1.9 6.4 7.4 3.5 8.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Elections and Parties in New European Democracies, Rose and Munro 2003.
103
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  B U L G A R I A
6.3.2 Election Turnout
Election turnouts have been steadily declining since 1990, except for the 2001 
parliamentary elections where the turnout was higher than in 1997. Table 2.59 illustrates 
the general trend to lower participation.
Table 2.59
Total Number of Voters in Millions and Percentage Turnout in Elections (1991–2001)
Election Year 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2001 2001
Parliamentary 5.699 5.261 4.291 4.568
83.9% 75.2% 62.9% 66.1%
Local 5.650 3.933 3.558
83.2% 57.7% 51.6%
Presidential 5.206 4.317 3.775
75.9% 63.1% 55.1%
Source: Electoral Oﬃce.
This rather sharp decline in voter turnout reﬂects both a decline in population (from 
8.9 to 7.9 million for the last twelve years, of which an estimated 0.6 million is due to 
emigration) and rising alienation from politics.
Since the number of registered voters has not followed this trend—rising slightly 
from 6,790 million in 1991 to 6,916 million in 2001, the oﬃcial ﬁgures concerning 
proportions are considered the least reliable of the election statistics. Though participation 
rates are bitterly discussed among experts, there is general agreement that local elections 
attract fewer voters than the parliamentary ones, which have levels close to the presidential 
elections.
Turnouts in local elections depend on the size of the municipality. In the largest 
urban centers, turnouts in local elections are far beneath the levels registered at the 
preceding parliamentary elections, while in the small (and peripheral) municipalities, 
turnouts are either about the same or higher. The higher motivation to vote in small 
municipalities is linked to two factors. First, there are far fewer voters per candidate—in 
the smallest municipalities one councilor is elected with 60 to 70 valid votes, while in 
Soﬁa the number is between 5,000 and 7,000. Second, there is a sensitivity to small 
group solidarity regarding the choices to be made in the additional mayoralty mayor 
elections. Young voters in urban centers are especially indiﬀerent to local elections. In 
campus precincts, the usual turnouts sink to single digit ﬁgures. 
Nationwide, the turnout in the 1999 local elections was 83% of the 1997 
parliamentary election turnout. Table 2.60 illustrates high and low turnouts in samples 
of peripheral versus urban municipalities. 
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Table 2.60
Turnouts in the 1999 Local Elections Compared to the 1997 Parliamentary Elections
Sample of 
Peripheral Municipalities
Number of Votes 
1997
Number of Votes 
1999
Increase from 
1997 to 1999 [%]
Belitsa 4,971 6,201 125
Garmen 6,364 7,807 123
Satovcha 7,390 10,201 138
Kresna 3,258 4,124 127
Soﬁa 69,5521 413,016 59
Plovdiv 201,803 105,713 52
Varna 184,665 101,040 55
Burgas 120,741 87,211 72
Source: Electoral Oﬃce.
The election turnout in the 2003 local elections marked the lowest result since the 
beginning of the transition—47% in the ﬁrst round and 50% in the second round. This 
raises serious concerns about citizen support and involvement in local politics. However, 
as the ﬁrst elections in recent Bulgarian history to be conducted without international 
observers, they are evidence of Bulgaria’s success in establishing and maintaining a 
tradition of free and fair elections. 
6.4 Local Referenda
The Law on Referenda (1996) regulates all application of direct democracy to national 
and local issues as well as procedural and technical rules related to holding a referendum. 
Any of the existing communities—municipality, ward, mayoralty, or settlement—may 
take a decision by referendum on questions of local importance that are within the 
authority of the local council.
The holding of a referendum is a binding aspect of the procedure for establishing 
a new municipality. The government can establish a new municipality only upon the 
positive outcome of a popular vote on the matter.
Certain issues are excluded as subjects of referenda. Questions related to local taxes, 
local budgets, or agreements with ﬁnancial institutions (including loans), cannot be 
put on the ballot. Matters that are subject to direct democracy include concessions, 
privatization and leasing of municipal property, as well as construction and infrastructure 
projects of importance for the community, when investments exceed usual local revenues. 
A referendum may be initiated by one-fourth of the voters, one-fourth of council 
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members, the municipal mayor, or the regional governor, who submit a request to the 
local council. A valid decision for the holding of a referendum requires support by 
more than half of the council members, and only a petition supported by half of the 
voters in a community is binding for the local council, which then sets only the date 
of the ballot. On issues related to municipal boundaries, a petition of one-fourth of 
the voters is binding for the council if the regional governor supports it. A referendum 
is valid if more than half of the voters participate and half of them have supported the 
proposition on the ballot. The outcome is binding for the local council, which should 
then take measures to implement the decision.
Because of the high threshold barriers, the absence of a tradition of referenda, 
and the quality of representative channels, referenda are not practiced except for cases 
related to the change or establishment of municipal boundaries. A variety of NGOs 
have attempted to provoke a local vote with limited success. In March 2003, the 
Swiss Fund for Development oﬀered ﬁnancial support to local NGOs in their eﬀorts 
to organize referenda on local issues in the municipalities of Elena and Sevlievo. One 
issue involved establishing a pedestrian area in the Sevlievo town center and the other 
was about whether to turn a municipal building into a library. Both of these eﬀorts to 
motivate citizens to get involved in community issues failed. The turnout in both cases 
was about 7%. 
6.5 Conclusion
Ever since the ﬁrst democratic, multi-party local elections of October 1991, Bulgaria 
has conducted free and fair local elections. The legal and administrative framework 
allows for eﬀective democratic participation of citizens in local politics, by controlling 
or providing feedback to their representatives. The severing of local politics from the 
national political agenda was somewhat delayed and occurred in the 1999 elections. A 
large number of diverse electoral parties was registered and new coalition tactics of local 
party branches emerged, driven by local partnerships rather than directives from national 
oﬃces. The trend of party fragmentation, the expanding role of independent candidates, 
and the divergent pattern of participation in urban and peripheral municipalities was 
tested in the 2003 local elections. These elections featured an extremely large number 
of candidates for mayor, intense competition, and the greatest diversity of political 
party representatives ever in the municipal councils. Election turnouts registered a 
considerable decline, reﬂecting both a strong negative demographic trend and rising 
alienation from politics. The general lack of interest in municipal aﬀairs is also reﬂected 
in the low election turnout. Thus, the 2003 local elections marked the lowest turnout 
since the beginning of the transition—47% in the ﬁrst round and 50% in the second 
round. Local referenda as a form of direct participation of citizens in local public aﬀairs 
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have been initiated in only a few cases and with rather limited success. They are subject 
to the same range of problems as local elections and, in addition, a lack of relevant 
tradition and certain institutional obstacles. 
7. LOCAL PARTIES AND FACTIONS
The 2001 country report of Freedom House states: “After a series of false starts, and 
having paid a high price in human suﬀering, Bulgaria has been transformed into a stable, 
multiparty democracy with a functioning parliament, a high degree of transparency, 
and a vibrant civil society.”
Since the beginning of the transition, Bulgaria has provided a clear and convincing 
example of a constructive, democratic form of political decision-making. It stands alone 
in the post-communist world as the only country to have had, for most of the period 
since 1989, a classical two-party system with a left–right divide (Dainov 2002). Until 
2001, Bulgarian politics was dominated on the right by the Union of Democratic Forces 
(UDF), established at the end of 1989, and on the left by the Bulgarian Socialist Party 
(BSP), established in 1990 as heir to the former Communist Party. The two parties have 
taken successive turns in government following the ﬁrst democratic elections of June 
1990. The BSP has won elections and formed governments twice (1990 and 1994), 
as has the UDF (1991 and 1997). Both parties are well situated in the international 
fora: the UDF is a full member of the European People’s Party and the BSP joined the 
Socialist International in 2003. 
With the development of political debate since 1990, however, the political spectrum 
has changed. The two major parties appear to have lost some of their political supporters. 
Compared to the late 1990s, when the core supporters of the two major parties together 
constituted half of the adult population of the country, in the 1999 municipal elections 
their support fell to one-third of the votes cast. The same thing occurred in the 2001 
parliamentary elections. Among the variety of reasons for this drop in support, some 
deserve particular notice. Following the development of political discourse after 1996–97, 
the majority of the public has come out decisively in favor of the agenda traditionally 
upheld by the UDF: a free market economy, democracy, and membership in NATO 
and the EU. The BSP has not managed to formulate an alternative political agenda, 
so the challenge of the Left has been removed. As commentators have noted, “the 
foundations of the two-party system have weakened” (Dainov 2002). As the strategic 
orientation of the country has become clearer, the focus of political discourse has shifted. 
The traditional ﬁght over the content and essence of politics and the orientation of the 
country has been replaced by a new political debate focused on a diﬀerent set of issues, 
such as the transparency and accountability of government, anti-corruption measures 
and so forth. 
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With the loosening up of the rigid two-party system, some of the smaller parties 
have disappeared from the political scene, while new ones have begun to play an 
important role. The non-political mass unity movement, the National Movement 
Simeon II, headed by the exiled former king Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha, was swept 
into power with the wave of mass disappointment in mainstream political parties, 
and largely by the appeal of populist political promises. It was consolidated into a 
political party in 2003, and its very entry into government has erased its initial 
declarations that the movement would stay above the “old-style left–right divide.” 
The government of 2001 was inevitably situated at the center-right of the political 
spectrum, as it followed the political goals already formulated by the outgoing UDF 
government (Dainov 2002). These included completing the transition to a free market 
system, membership in the EU and NATO, completing privatization and restructuring 
of the economy, attracting foreign investment, etc. The ﬁrm foreign policy maintained 
by the new government of Simeon Saxe-Coburg Gotha, that chose to side with NATO 
in the ﬁght against terrorism, coincides with the strategic line drawn by the former 
UDF cabinet.
 The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), representing the ethnic Turks, 
has had increasing inﬂuence. In Bulgarian political life the MRF has established itself as 
a powerful balancing factor and has always managed to get an adequate representation 
in the Bulgarian Parliament (approximately 6% to 8% of the seats). In 1991–92 and 
in 2001 the MRF was pivotal to the construction of majorities in the government 
and thus became a coalition partner with a massive representation at senior levels of 
government. In 1993–94 the MRF also managed to form a government on its own 
“mandate.” The party is well established at the local level, especially in speciﬁc areas that 
are largely populated with ethnic Turks. In terms of mainstream politics, the MFP has a 
liberal proﬁle and is aﬃliated with the Liberal International. The party’s leadership has 
demonstrated a ﬁrm commitment to the constitutional foundations of the Bulgarian 
political system and has never encouraged radical demands for collective minority rights. 
Political integration of the ethnic Turks, the largest minority group, in Bulgarian political 
life is further evidence of the stability and predictability of the Bulgarian political system. 
Markedly diﬀerent from other Balkan countries, Bulgaria has never allowed the birth of 
extreme nationalist or xenophobic political parties or movements, but has encouraged 
adequate representation of minority interests according to the established rule of law 
and principles of democracy. 
Compared to the political representation of ethnic Turks, the Roma minority (about 
half the size of the Turkish ethnic minority) has not yet succeeded in making an impact 
on the Bulgarian political scene. The National Statistical Institute reported 9.5% ethnic 
Turks compared to 4.6% Roma in 2001. Notwithstanding their success in the 1999 
municipal elections, in the parliamentary elections of 2001 the Roma parties did not 
manage to pass the 4% election threshold.
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In 2003-04, the center-right wing of the political spectrum was joined by a new 
party, the Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria (DSB), established by former UDF leaders 
under the former premier, Ivan Kostov. Following their success in the municipal elections 
of 2003, the Union of Free Democrats, headed by the Mayor of Soﬁa- Stefan Soﬁansk, 
increased its inﬂuence. 
The overall resilience of the established political patterns seems clear, given these 
developments. One can expect that the center-right will no longer be dominated by 
the UDF, but by a larger number of political parties following the same political goals, 
which mainly are: accession to the EU, completion of the reforms, and the attraction 
of foreign investment. The BSP continues to occupy the political left, and the MRF 
has yet to play its crucial balancing role. Political debate will focus on how to achieve 
the set political goals—transparency, accountability, the ﬁght against corruption, an 
appropriate scale of reforms, etc. This political proﬁle suggests that Bulgaria continues 
to be a predictable and stable political subject. 
Political parties do play an important role in local politics through their local 
branches. Furthermore, some branches have the political capacity to inﬂuence the 
political agenda nation-wide as well. Acting within a multi-party system is a challenge 
for most local leaders. The traditional left–right divide has acquired new complexities 
and involves players with diﬀerent degrees of political inﬂuence. This current dynamic 
requires that the local branches of political parties strengthen their organizational and 
political capacity, as well as their ﬂexibility to deal with the new context of local political 
life. 
7.1 Political Parties at the Local Level
 Political parties in Bulgaria do not typically have large memberships. The country has 
established a relatively liberal process of registration of political parties and organizations, 
as a result of which there are more than 200 registered parties (Freedom House Report 
2003). Only a small percentage of these actually function as parties. Reliable data on 
the proportion of the population having a membership in political parties is lacking. 
According to Freedom House analysts, that ﬁgure is likely to be no more than 1%. 
Working through branches has long been recognized as an important tool for 
mobilizing the local electorate. Therefore, each political party endeavours to build a 
dense network of branch oﬃces as the basis for its activities at the local level. Also, the 
inﬂuence of the local branches often reaches beyond the particular local communities, 
aﬀecting the policy direction of political parties nation-wide. Not all parties have been 
successful in building local oﬃces, however, because of their limited constituencies, 
marginal inﬂuence, ﬁnancial limitations, etc. Relevant traditions, experience, and 
institutional capacity do play an important role in this respect. The BSP, as a long 
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established, consolidated, structured, and experienced political party naturally enjoys 
the densest net of branches across the country. The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), 
the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the National Movement Simeon II, and the 
Bulgarian National Agricultural Union also have relatively dense networks of branch 
oﬃces. This has been reconﬁrmed by the present survey as well. The distribution of 
branches across the country shows some regional speciﬁcs as well. Factors that play a role 
here are the ethnic composition of the region, the social composition of the electorate, 
and also the size of the communities. Thus, the MRF branch network is particularly 
strong in regions densely populated with ethnic Turks (mostly the Eastern Rhodope 
mountain in the south and the cities of Razgrad, Shumen, and Targovishte in the north). 
The Union of Free Democrats’ party network, led by the mayor of Soﬁa, Stefan Soﬁanski, 
is concentrated in the capital and the big cities. The Union managed to capitalize on the 
political image of Soﬁanski, who has been successfully reelected three times as mayor of 
the capital. According to the LGS research, most of the surveyed municipalities have at 
least one political party branch or an oﬃce. There is a direct relationship between the 
size of community and the number of party oﬃces in it. According to the research, in an 
insigniﬁcant minority of municipalities there is no party is represented. Municipalities 
of between 20,000 and 50,000 people are particularly well endowed with branches of 
political parties. 
The LGS research has also found that 81.1% of the mayors and 86.7% of the 
councilors are members of a political party, thus leaving unaﬃliated mayors and 
councilors as an insigniﬁcant minority. Independent candidates form only a small 
percentage (7.6%) of representatives. A dominant majority of the representatives with 
no party aﬃliation were nominated by a political party (see Table 2.61). Bulgarian 
political parties at the municipal level rarely form coalitions during elections to jointly 
nominate a particular candidate. Even less well established parties with a small electorate 
prefer to run independently in the ﬁrst round of the elections. Coalitions are more likely 
to be formed at the second round of local elections, when the distribution of votes is 
clearer and some serious trade-oﬀs among political parties take place. Independent 
candidates for local self-government are small in number. In general, they appear to 
be more successful in smaller communities, although there have been some successful 
independent candidates in large cities as well. This was conﬁrmed by the results of the 
municipal elections of 2003, where some independent candidates for mayor won in 
several major cities. Usually, however, these were well established local leaders who held 
a mayors’ mandate previously, with the political support of a political party.
The nomination of candidates by political parties tallies with the size of municipality. 
The research shows that in municipalities with populations of 10,000 to 50,000 people, 
most of the representatives have been nominated by a party, while in the smaller and 
larger municipalities there have been more independent candidates (Table 2.62). 
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 Table 2.61
Party Membership of Representatives by Type of Nomination
Not a Member Member Total
Not party nominated 34
26.4%
37
4.6%
71
7.6%
Party nominated 95
73.6%
765
95.4%
860
92.4%
Total 129
100%
802
100%
931
100%
Source: LGS 2003.
Table 2.62
 Party Nomination of Representatives by Size of Municipality
Population Size No Yes Total
Below 10,000 17
7.5%
210
92.5%
227
100%
10,000–50,000 18
4.9%
349
95.1%
367
100%
Above 50,000 38
10.5%
323
89.5%
361
100%
Total 73
7.6%
882
92.4%
955
100%
Source: LGS 2003.
The results are similar for party membership (Table 2.63). In small municipalities, 
over 20% are non-party members, with the ﬁgure dropping to 13.1% in large 
municipalities and to 10.1% in municipalities of 10,000 to 50,000 people.
Table 2.63
 Party Membership of Representatives by Size of Municipality
Population Size Not a Member Party Member Total
Below 10,000 47
21.1%
176
78.9%
223
100%
10,000–50,000 36
10.1%
319
89.9%
355
100%
Above 50,000 46
13.1%
306
86.9%
352
100%
Total 129
13.9%
801
86.1%
930
100%
Source: LGS 2003.
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7.2 Nomination and Endorsement 
 
Diﬀerent from some other Central and East European countries, Bulgaria allows 
civil society organizations (CSOs) to nominate candidates for positions in local 
self-government. This promotes the possibility of a diverse range of interests being 
represented. According to the survey, political parties still provide the most nominations 
for oﬃce (89.4%). The rest are split among independent nominees, nominations by 
CSOs, and some nominations by coalitions between parties and CSOs. Examples of 
the latter, although few in number, are still an extremely positive development in the 
overall context of elections in Bulgaria, where the most consolidated and organizationally 
strong political parties have traditionally dominated the process.
Table 2.64
Mayor and Councilor Nominations by Party
Independent Party Civil Society 
Organizations
Party + 
Civil Society 
Organizations
Total
Councilor 35
4.1%
776
90.1%
31
3.6%
19
2.2%
861
100%
Mayor 79
83.2%
7
7.4%
9
9.5%
95
100%
Total 35
3.7%
885
89.4%
38
4.0%
28
2.9%
956
100%
Source: LGS 2003.
Table 2.65
Councilors’ and Mayors’ Endorsements by Type
None By Party By NGO By Party + NGO Total
Councilors 182
21.1%
503
58.4%
55
6.4%
121
14.1%
861
100%
Mayors 1212.6%
53
55.8%
2
2.1%
28
29.5%
95
100%
Total 19420.3%
556
58.2%
57
6.0%
149
15.9%
955
100%
Source: LGS 2003.
 
The survey shows that more than half of the councilors (58.4%) have been endorsed 
by a party, while 21.1% have had no endorsement. The rest have been endorsed either by 
coalitions between a party and a civil society organization (CSO) (14.1%) or by CSOs 
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alone (6.4%). The situation is diﬀerent with mayors’ endorsements, as coalitions between 
parties and CSOs come to play a bigger role. Thus, almost every third mayor has been 
given endorsement by a coalition of a party and a CSO (29.5%). The percentage of 
elected mayors without endorsement remains small (12.6%). Traditionally, a majority 
of mayors is endorsed by a political party (see Table 2.65).
7.3 Party Activity
The activities of political parties need to be examined in their particular electoral 
context at the local level, because diﬀerent patterns of behavior occur throughout the 
various stages of the election cycle. Thus, election campaigns are a time when the local 
branches of a party are consolidated under a certain election agenda. But this process is 
no longer as smooth as it has been in the past. The more democratic and decentralized 
from the central party headquarters the process becomes, the harder it is to agree on 
speciﬁc candidates. In the municipal elections of 2003, even the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party, known for its ability to impose party discipline, had diﬃculty in consolidating 
branch oﬃces around particular candidates. Once a consensus has been reached, local 
party branches organize public meetings for the party nominees. Political activism at 
this stage of the election campaign is outstanding. Quite often higher party oﬃcials, 
members of parliament, or members of the central boards and oﬃces participate in 
public meetings and discussions, thus lending their authority to the candidates. Most 
often, local party branches intensify their participation in public debates, in radio 
broadcasts, and in interviews in print and mass media. The public relations campaigns 
of local representatives are usually conducted by professional organizations. However, 
speciﬁc local issues remain an inherent element of the campaigns, which in some places 
turn into personal battles. 
Another phase of party activity begins when the local representatives assume oﬃce. 
The LGS research reveals a generally low level of activity of local party oﬃces in Bulgarian 
municipalities. One reason is that political parties in general are not very active between 
elections, with only a few actually continuing to function. Technically speaking, most 
of them are not suﬃciently institutionalized, have a limited base in the constituency, 
have no particular experience, and lack technical equipment, oﬃces, and adequate 
personnel for successful participation in local politics. These minor parties are mostly 
dependent on sponsors, which use them as tools to further their political, economic, 
or other interests whenever needed. 
The major political parties represented locally are in a diﬀerent situation. They 
have established oﬃces, historical records, experience, communication channels, and 
connections with the local media and local businesses. Following elections, their activities 
are directed mostly to political lobbying through the elected representatives. Eﬀorts 
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to further the political interests of parties and the economic interests of powerful 
groups often turn into ﬁghts among the municipal council members, especially 
when no party has a majority in the council, or between the mayor and the council if 
they have been nominated by and come from diﬀerent parties. It is not surprising 
that the decision-making process is diﬃcult, given the general lack of a professional 
political culture and the absence of eﬃcient mechanisms to facilitate the process and 
to balance diverse political interests. Fights within the municipal councils or between 
municipal councils and mayors, often with unclear agendas, get in the way of making 
timely and productive decisions that would beneﬁt the community as a whole. Such 
externalities are clearly a hindrance to local policymaking. A textbook example of 
this is the budget process. Securing the support of the municipal council for the 
budget prepared by the mayor and its administration can be a very slow process in a 
considerable number of municipalities in Bulgaria. The problem is compounded by the 
insuﬃcient opportunity for public input on matters of particular importance to the 
community. Though increasing in number (some municipalities have already adopted 
internal rules of practice on public hearings incorporated in the Municipal Ordinance 
on Local Budgets), these initiatives are still mostly ad hoc, insuﬃciently institution-
alized and not oﬀering a strong corrective to the local policymaking process. 
7.4 Factions
The degree of fragmentation in the councils depends mainly on the total number of 
political parties in the municipality and, as stated previously, this is ﬁgure is related 
mostly to the size of the community. Larger communities where more numerous local 
branches of political parties exist are potential candidates for coalitions. This is less likely 
in small communities with, at most, one or two branches of political parties.
The LGS research shows that in one-third of all assessed municipalities, an agreement 
between the political parties or deputies on the establishment of a majority coalition in 
local municipal councils has been eﬀected. Most preelection coalitions survive during 
the whole election term. In addition to these coalitions, however, there are frequent 
informal alliances between representatives with diﬀerent political aﬃliations, established 
for the purpose of majority voting on particular issues.
7.5 Conclusion 
The driving force behind the current multiparty political proﬁle of Bulgaria is the agenda 
of transition towards a mature democracy, characterized by stability, predictability, 
and the democratic representation of the political interests of minority groups. The 
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functioning of the party system is underpinned by a high degree of political consensus 
and widely shared political goals: accession to the EU, completion of the reforms, 
and the attraction of foreign investment. Political debate has shifted its focus to the 
incremental improvement of the existing structure of democratic institutions, in order 
to ensure transparency, accountability, the rule of law, and action against corruption. 
Some signiﬁcant changes have occurred at the local level of politics in Bulgaria as well. 
Although still largely dominated by the major political parties through both their local 
oﬃces and central headquarters, the local political spectrum now involves various actors 
so that a plurality of interests is represented. Civil society organizations have come 
to play an increasing role in local elections through nominating candidates for local 
representative. Public discourse has intensiﬁed and attempts have been made to create a 
more structured environment for it. Citizens and civil society organizations have so far 
had a limited inﬂuence in local political life in Bulgaria. The prevalence of representative 
over direct democracy in the country sustains the strong yet direct inﬂuence of political 
parties over local politics. However, as reconﬁrmed in the 2003 municipal elections, the 
more politics becomes a contest between personalities and structural party capacities 
than one of divergent political projects, the more opportunities appear for local leaders. 
Constructing sustainable democratic institutions necessarily involves the issue of a 
more eﬃcient means of engaging citizens in the process. As illustrated by the recent 
introduction into law of mandatory public hearings of the local budgets, the trend is 
towards setting up a more institutionalized framework for citizens’ participation. What 
use will be made of these opportunities and how the experiment with direct democracy 
will develop in Bulgaria is a challenge for the next decade. 
8. LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES
Becoming a mayor or councilor in Bulgaria is seen as a signiﬁcant step in advancing 
one’s professional career. A successful candidate runs for election in local government 
once he or she has the ambition, the political support, and an eﬀective strategy. Voters, 
for their part, make their choice according to subjective preferences, political biases, 
preelection propaganda, as well as what they consider will best serve their interests. 
Although the two perspectives of candidate and voter complement each other and are 
interrelated, they will be considered separately because of their speciﬁc and diﬀerent 
impacts on election outcomes.
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8.1 Demographic Features of Local Representatives
8.1.1 Participation of Women
In terms of women’s participation in politics in Bulgaria, an important role is played 
by the political parties, since the slate of candidates presented to the voters is already 
limited to a certain extent by the process of party nomination and the selection rules 
that exist inside the parties. Repeated studies of gender and voting indicate that the 
predominance of men in electoral oﬃce is less a result of voting in general elections 
than of party nomination practices (Lovenduski and Regulska 2000). Bulgaria is no 
diﬀerent from other CEE countries that experienced profound changes with respect 
to women’s participation in the public sphere after the break from socialism. In the 
socialist period, women had a secured quota of around 20% female membership in 
the communist parliament, but no meaningful presence in any government structures 
(Videva 2003). As in other CEE countries, in Bulgaria there was a signiﬁcant decrease 
in the number of female politicians elected in the post 1989 parliamentary elections 
(8.5% in 1990 compared to 21.7% in 1981). Developments in the 1990s, however, 
led to an overall increase in women’s share of parliamentary seats, with Bulgaria, Latvia, 
and Poland breaking 20% (Sloat 2003). Bulgaria saw a signiﬁcant breakthrough in this 
respect in the 2001 elections, when 26.7% of representatives elected to parliament were 
female. This outcome occurred in the context of a favorable preelection platform and 
policy oﬀered by the ruling political formation, National Movement Simeon II, which 
actively promoted bringing more women into parliament. 
As far as the participation of women in the Bulgarian government is concerned, since 
1989 there has been a stable trend of strong representation of women in the executive. 
In the 2001 government, Bulgaria had the largest number of female ministers in its 
history:  ﬁve of 22. At the moment, women are not as prominent at the local level 
as they are nationally. Their participation in professional guilds is also high, and this 
trend is generally referred to as the “feminization of the professions.” According to the 
LGS research, two of ten representatives in municipal councils in Bulgaria are female, 
compared to one in ten mayors. Overall, these numbers indicate a relatively low rate of 
participation of women in the local political elite. Indeed, because of the high percentage 
of women elected to parliament in 2001, there is now a higher percentage of female 
MPs than of councilors and mayors (Sloat 2003). Various factors have contributed to 
the above picture: women are less often aﬃliated with political parties; the policies 
of political parties for nominating candidates are not helpful; some women are more 
attracted to a professional than a political career, etc. In these circumstances, building 
a strong women’s elite in local politics remains an ongoing challenge.
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8.1.2 Age and Political Experience
According to the LGS research, the majority of local representatives is between 41 and 
60 years of age. Almost one-third are between 41and 50 and another third are between 
51and 60. Those under 40 years of age amount to 17.4%, a bit more than those over 
61 years of age (15.1%). Mayors account for more than one-third of the 51-60 age 
group. The age factor is closely linked with the political experience of candidates. The 
survey shows that most of the local representatives have spent their working lives in 
municipal politics and only 1.2% are new to the career. The ﬁndings conﬁrm a high 
threshold level of political experience, which makes it diﬃcult for younger candidates 
to successfully start a career in local politics. One reason for the predominance of older 
and more experienced representatives may be that local political parties prefer to trust 
candidates who are already established and well known by the majority of voters. The 
case of mayors provides a good example in this respect. The percentage of the mayors 
who have spent all of their working lives in the municipality (78.7%) is higher than that 
of the councilors (69.5%). Another reason may be that eligible and talented younger 
people seek diﬀerent professional careers and leave local politics to the ones who have 
been there for years and have both the experience and the ambition to continue. Party 
credentials and previous experience in local government aﬀairs turn out to be key factors 
for assuring participation in local political life. 
8.1.3 Ethnic Representation
Another important characteristic to consider when looking at the proﬁle of local 
representatives is ethnic representation. According to the LRS research, the dominant 
group among local representatives is of Bulgarian descent (86.5%). The Turkish ethnic 
minority group holds 10.2% of seats, which is proportional to its share of the population. 
The rest are representatives from small minorities. The Roma parties did well in the 1999 
municipal elections and managed to elect about 200 municipal councilors. Although 
the elected Roma representatives (0.7%) do not reﬂect the part of the population they 
represent, the local elections result may well be considered an achievement compared 
to the overall political underrepresentation of Roma parties in Bulgarian politics. The 
latter may be explained by the lack of relevant tradition of Roma political participation 
so far, the self-identity problem that Roma people face, their uneven concentration 
across the country, etc. 
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8.1.4 Education, Languages, and Use of Technology
Bulgarian local representatives are traditionally known for their strong education record, 
and this has been conﬁrmed by the survey. A large majority of local representatives has 
completed a higher education, followed by 16.3% with a trade school diploma, and an 
insigniﬁcant minority has graduated from secondary school only.
Table 2.66
Level of Education of Local Representatives
Not Completed 
Primary
Primary Trade School Secondary Higher 
Education
Total
Councilors 1
0.1%
6
0.7%
147
17.3%
36
4.2%
662
77.7%
852
100%
Mayors 8
8.4%
3
3.2%
84
88.4%
95
100%
Total 1
0.1%
6
0.6%
155
16.4%
39
4.1%
746
78.8%
947
100%
Source: LRS 2003.
In light of the challenges the country faces in its preparation for accession to the 
EU, and as international contacts with local leaders intensify, communication at the 
international level becomes essential. With respect to foreign language proﬁciency, the 
survey shows that half of the local representatives are ﬂuent in a foreign language. Four 
of every ten mayors speak a foreign language. Internet communication is no rarity for 
42.6% of mayors or for 39% of local representatives. E-mail users are slightly fewer in 
number, amounting to approximately one-third of all mayors and councilors. 
8.1.5 Income
Income becomes an important factor when we look at the incentives for local 
representatives to join the local political elite, as well as the preferences of the local 
electorate who, especially at the local level, is well informed about the social standing 
of particular candidates. Income is not necessarily linked to education, skills, and 
professional history. In fact, the current economic proﬁle of the country is quite rich in 
examples of the concentration of wealth and businesses in the hands of people whose 
education and professional experience are not noteworthy.
According to the survey, a little fewer than half of the councilors rank their income 
as average (group four), and one-third of all representatives assessed consider themselves 
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to have a higher than average income. A rather insigniﬁcant minority (6.0%) claims 
to have the highest level of income (see Table 2.67). Unlike councilors, a higher 
percentage of mayors claims a higher income. Three of ten mayors rate their income 
as average (group four); with minor exceptions all others consider themselves to have 
above average income. Like councilors, a rather insigniﬁcant minority (7.4%) claims 
to have the highest income.
Table 2.67
Income Levels of Councilors and Mayors (7-Point Scale*)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
Councilors 63
7.7%
47
5.7%
81
9.9%
364
44.4%
129
15.8%
88
10.5%
49
6.0%
819
100%
Mayors 2
2.1%
1
1.1%
28
29.8%
36
38.3%
20
21.3%
7
7.4%
94
100%
Total 63
6.9%
49
5.4%
82
9.0%
392
42.9%
165
18.1%
106
11.6%
56
6.1%
913
100%
Note: * 1—lowest income; 7—highest income.
Source: LRS 2003.
8.2 The Political Background of Local Representatives 
Political background matters. It not only refers to membership in a given political party, 
but also includes experience, political inﬂuence, party credentials, political preferences, 
biases, even opportunities to become the target of campaigns built on the records from a 
previous mandate. The political background of local representatives is important because 
it directly aﬀects the stability of institutions and the local political climate. 
Notwithstanding the profound political changes that have taken place in Bulgaria 
since the beginning of the transition in 1989, the past is still a factor for some political 
actors on the local scene. The aﬃliation of local representatives and elected mayors with 
the former communist party is not without signiﬁcance. The fact that almost one-third 
of all councilors and mayors were members of the communist party before 1990 deserves 
some attention, as it speaks to continuity of political participation, as well as the high 
threshold barrier for new entrants. In considering the above data, however, we need to 
take the age factor carefully into account (only 17.4% of all local representatives are 
below 40 years of age) and also the fact that in the former one-party system, the only 
opportunity to participate in politics was to be a part of the communist elite. A small 
minority of local representatives and mayors has held an oﬃce in a party before 1990: 
11.6% of mayors compared to 7.1% of councilors. Every ﬁfth mayor and 14.3% of the 
councilors were members of a municipal council before 1990.
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A majority of representatives has had practical political experience in working 
in local governance. One-half of all mayors have been reelected. The percentage for 
councilors is slightly higher—57.5%. In Bulgaria, being a municipal councilor has 
always been considered a political assignment and not a professional occupation. It is 
clear from these ﬁgures that having strong party credentials is a serious precondition 
for a successful election.
Experience and training become increasingly important in managing local aﬀairs. 
With major donor support, there have been numerous capacity-building programs in the 
local government ﬁeld, which have provided local representatives with more analytical 
and practical tools for managing local politics and administration. Also, networking and 
participating in workshops and similar events at both the national and international 
levels have added to the capacity of mayors and local representatives. A large majority 
of mayors has completed political career training compared to one-half of councilors. 
Becoming a local representative is a considerable step in one’s political career. The 
ambition to get reelected is quite natural, easy to explain, and has a lot to do with consist-
ency in politics and government. It comes as no surprise that, according to the survey, 
a large majority of representatives wishes to be reelected. It will be important, however, 
to establish a mechanism of checks and balances to guarantee free access to the local 
political scene for all candidates nominated in a democratic and lawful way. Keeping the 
system open to new entrants is the only way to sustain its democratic development.
8.3 The Social Capital of Local Political Leaders
 
The involvement of local representatives in the nongovernmental sector is a relatively new 
phenomenon, which has no parallel and no established traditions so far. Participation 
may take various forms and does not necessarily mean membership in a particular 
not-for-proﬁt organizational unit. More often, local representatives get involved 
in programs, capacity-building events, pilot programs, and social projects that are 
initiated and conducted by civil society organizations. It should be emphasized that the 
National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria is itself a not-for-proﬁt organization 
with an established strong presence in the local governance sector. Most mayors are 
its members. Together with other extremely inﬂuential associations in this sector, 
including the Foundation for Local Government Reform and nine regional associations 
of municipalities, it creates conditions for local representatives to eﬀectively participate 
in the nongovernmental sector. It promotes activities to advance their interests and 
enhance their political vision. 
Besides this, the results of the survey demonstrate that one-ﬁfth of all councilors 
and one-third of all mayors hold a position in a civic organization. The majority of 
representatives holding a position in a civic organization participates in only one, less 
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than one-third participate in two, and a minority participates in more than 
two organizations. Associations are the preferred form of CSO for a majority of 
representatives, followed by foundations and trade unions. Foundations are mostly set 
up for a speciﬁc purpose and have a limited membership. However, some of them have 
a strong record of projects and initiatives in the local government ﬁeld, which involve 
local representatives in one form or another. However, most of them are project-driven 
and have limited chances for sustainability once the massive donor support, mostly by 
USAID, terminates. The participation of local representatives in trade unions is relatively 
low, similar to that of other groups or professions.
8.4 The Political Culture of Local Representatives
In the survey, local representatives were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
personally agree or disagree with particular statements that concern the political or legal 
systems. The statements were presented on a scale with aﬃrmative and negative poles. 
The answers are presented in Table 2.68, grouped according to the extent of agreement 
with the statement. For local representatives, there are three main groups of values and 
attitudes: a) the dominant view, shared by a signiﬁcant majority of the representatives; 
b) majority views, agreed with by more than half and disagreed with by less than one-
quarter of all representatives; c) values and attitudes that provoke diﬀerent or opposing 
political views among representatives. 
The attitude towards competition shows the most positive and consolidated response, 
with a large majority believing that competition provides incentives for more eﬃcient 
work. To a majority of representatives, democracy implies protection of rights and private 
property. A majority also agrees with the necessity to increase private ownership in the 
business sector. A signiﬁcant majority believes that even political extremists must be 
given the right to hold public meetings, while a small minority disagrees. Thus, according 
to the results of the survey, the values of free competition, protection of rights, private 
property, private ownership, and freedom of assembly are most widely shared by local 
representatives. Issues of freedom of media, prevalence of national over local priorities, 
and trust in leader attracted fewer votes. Half of all representatives support the freedom 
of media to cover local issues in a fair way even if this would hurt some residents or 
focus criticism at local government. Every second representative believes that national 
priorities come ﬁrst compared to local problems; a small minority disagrees. Those 
who trust leaders and experts are almost equal in number to those who do not. Almost 
every second person interviewed shares the opinion that income should be more equally 
distributed, and supports widespread public participation in decision-making process. 
A small minority, however, considers such participation to bring undesirable conﬂicts 
and to be a waste of time and resources.
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Table 2.68
Democratic Values and Attitudes of Local Representatives [%]
Agree Ambivalent Disagree
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard. 74.7 18.3 7.0
In a democracy everyone should have exactly the same rights. 60.8 15.5 23.7
Private ownership of business and industry should be increased. 51.6 33.5 14.9
Local media should point out the problems they see, even if 
their coverage could hurt some community residents or the 
local government.
42.9 29.2 27.8
Achieving national goals must always have a priority over 
solving local problems.
41.7 45.5 12.8
In this complicated world, the only way we can know what is 
going on is to rely on leaders and experts who can be trusted.
30.0 39.7 29.3
The government should take more responsibility to ensure 
that everyone is provided for.
25.2 42.3 32.6
Local leaders can never achieve anything if they are too 
concerned with preventing conﬂicts in the community
22.5 31.7 45.8
Income should be more equal. 13.1 38.8 43.1
Even political extremists must be given the right 
to hold public meetings.
12.6 28.2 59.2
Widespread public participation (in decision- making) 
often leads to undesirable conﬂicts or wastes time.
10.0 41.5 48.5
Source: LRS 2003.
Challenges are presented by the results concerning the level of trust local 
representatives have in central government and in the presidency. Trust in democratic 
institutions is a fundamental element of political culture, crucial for the vertical as well 
as horizontal integration between various levels of government. This has often been 
considered an independent variable of the political environment and, therefore, not much 
has been done towards creating a climate of conﬁdence between all levels of government, 
as well as other powers. As the survey results show, trust of local representatives in central 
government and in the courts of law is below average compared to the relatively high 
(4.51 on the seven-point scale) trust in the president. The rest are about average. On 
the whole, mayors show more trust, while councilors remain more skeptical toward 
institutions.
According the survey, local representatives’ trust in people is relatively low. One-
third of representatives say that most people can be trusted while a large majority states 
that they need to be very careful when dealing with the people. Here again the mayors 
show more trust than the councilors. Four of ten mayors say most people can be trusted, 
compared to three of ten councilors.
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The division is similar on the issue of whether people will be fair or not. A signiﬁcant 
majority of representatives says that people would try to take advantage. The mayors 
have greater trust than councilors—45.7% of mayors and 33.6% of representatives 
believe that people will try to be fair.
All representatives feel a strong attachment to all levels of the government system, 
but the strongest attachment is felt on the country level where the average is 6.61 
out of 7.
The ideological orientation of local representatives either towards left or right 
reﬂects the orientation of the local electorate. Ideologically left-oriented councilors and 
voters had a good match in positions on basic values and beliefs. The majority of local 
representatives share a belief in fundamental democratic values. There is a general liberal 
approach towards freedom of economic activity, protection of private property, personal 
freedom, freedom of the media, freedom of political action, etc. Basic challenges to 
political systems that have been identiﬁed in the course of analysis concern credibility 
in both institutions, including the executive and court systems, and individuals. The 
relatively low credibility of institutions in the eyes of local representatives has been 
largely conﬁrmed by recent polls among the general population. Particularly critical is 
the attitude towards the Bulgarian court system. 
8.5 Local Representatives’ Attitudes toward Representation
Three aspects of local representatives’ attitudes towards representation are discussed in 
this section: how they internalize their role as representing the local community, how 
they regard their interaction with local residents, and their view of factors shaping their 
opinion.
The survey used structured interviews in which local leaders were asked to what 
degree they feel it is important to give some special consideration to certain groups of 
people. The results show that local representatives generally consider themselves to be 
delegates of all citizens of a community or city (a response of 6.07 on the seven-point 
scale). Consideration for those citizens who voted for them is similarly high. Beliefs 
that local representatives are delegates of particular area of the municipality, of the 
party to which belong, of certain occupational groups, of ethnic groups, and of central 
government are all at an average level. The councilors assessed gave a higher rating in 
all of these categories.
The inﬂuence of constituents on local representatives depends on the situation for 
most representatives. A small minority feels they are obligated to take the opinion of the 
people into account, and one-fourth would rather follow their own policy judgment.
For a variety of reasons, the process of informed decision-making has always been a 
challenge in Bulgaria and the local level is no exception. Barriers to informed decision-
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making include: relatively underdeveloped communication channels, insuﬃcient ability 
to process information, lack of data analysis skills, usage of limited sources of information, 
and so on. The survey question focused on the relative importance of selected sources 
of information for the respondents (local representatives). 
Table 2.69
Consideration Given by Local Representatives to Selected Groups (7-Point Scale*)
Group of People Mean on Scale of Importance
All inhabitants oﬀrom the municipality 6.07
Citizens who voted for themher/him 5.73
Party to which theyshe/he belongs 4.75
A particular area infrom the municipality 4.08
Certain occupational groups 3.86
Central government authorities 3.67
Ethnic groups 3.15
Note: * 1—little importance; 7—great importance.
Source: LRS 2003.
The results, as shown in Table 2.70, demonstrate that most local representatives 
consider direct contact with citizens to be the best source (6.06). Other sources seen 
as reliable are: their work place (5.37), meetings (5.23), information from their own 
family (5.23), and information from their own party branch (4.89). The rest of the 
options are viewed as being of average value. Civil organizations, media, as well as the 
administration are seen as less important sources of information. The comparatively low 
value given to the media as a potential source of information is worth noting. It raises 
serious concerns about the quality of the media, its correspondence to local needs, its 
relevance to local interests, etc. The fact that the family circle as a source of information 
rates higher than local media, for example, shows a lack of concern for the value in 
having diversiﬁed sources. 
The degree of inﬂuence various stakeholders in local political life have over the 
formation of opinion and views of local representatives is presented in Table 2.71.
Councilors consider meetings with local residents the most decisive for them to form 
an opinion. This comes as no surprise, considering that information from local residents 
is the preferred source of information by councilors (see Table 8.4).The following factors 
are ranked next: councilors from the same faction, representatives from the same party, 
the mayor, and councilors of other factions. The low inﬂuence of local businesses on 
the formation of opinion by local representatives speaks of relatively underdeveloped 
public–private dialogue. Media has a minor impact on the local decision-making 
processes and the church generates the lowest inﬂuence of all. 
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Table 2.70
Local Representatives’ Ranking of Information Sources 
as Reﬂection of Citizens’ Views 
Rank Information Source Mean
1 Personal contacts with citizens 6.06
2 Work place 5.37
3 Own family 5.23
4 Meetings 5.23
5 Own party branch 4.89
6 Administration 4.47
7 Civil society organization 4.23
8 Oﬃce hours 4.23
9 Media 4.10
10 Letters from citizens 3.97
Source: LRS 2003.
Table 2.71
Inﬂuence of Diﬀerent People on Local Representatives’ Opinion (7-Point Scale*)
Rank People Who Influence Formation of Opinion Mean
1 Local residents they meet 5.49
2 Councilors from the same faction 5.30
3 Own party representatives 5.04
4 Mayor 3.97
5 Councilors of other factions 3.60
6 Civil organizations 3.35
7 Civil servants 3.06
8 Local businesses 3.02
9 Other party representatives 2.80
10 Media 2.78
11 Chief Administrative Oﬃcers 2.71
12 Churches 2.29
Note: * 1—little importance; 7—very great importance.
Source: LRS 2003.
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8.6 Conclusion
Examining local representatives’ social background is essential for assessing the political 
culture of elected local leaders and their attitude towards representation. Doing justice to 
this requires a complex approach that is sensitive to political tradition, historical patterns, 
emergent opportunities, and established trends. Our proﬁle of local representatives is 
largely based on the LGS research and similar studies. The results signal the birth of a 
new approach to local government that goes well beyond the narrow understanding of 
managing local aﬀairs in a closed world of scarce resources, limited tools, and more or 
less the same well known actors. Given the dynamics of the transition and the scope of 
the reforms, local politics has increasingly become a competitive arena where various 
new actors take a stand, and new rules and new requirements of local representatives 
apply. The dynamic of the decentralization reforms has shifted away from disputes 
on the content of the reforms. As a basic consensus on strategic changes has already 
been reached, what is crucial now is the incremental improvement of the structure of 
democratic institutions. 
The new circumstances come with a diﬀerent set of preferred values. As conﬁrmed 
by the survey, the values of free competition, protection of rights, private property, 
private ownership, and freedom of assembly are widely shared by local representatives. 
New patterns of dialogue are emerging, which increasingly involve local businesses 
and civil society along with the decision-makers. This synergy becomes an important 
element of a new political culture of local representatives. Along with the positive 
aspects of this development, there are some important concerns to watch out for. For 
example, it will be crucial to deal with the deﬁcit of trust in both institutions and people. 
Upgrading the information environment with the many existing good practices will 
deﬁnitely add to building more trust in the progress of the reform. 
9. RESPONSIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
 
The issue of responsive local government is relatively new in the political proﬁle of 
the Bulgarian transition, though experience in this respect is evolving. The various 
strategic programs for local, regional, and urban development obviously reﬂect some of 
the priorities of the particular regions and localities. But on a deeper levels, responsive 
local government must involve making decisions and formulating policies with proper 
consideration of local needs, local interests, and local potential. This implies that local 
governments are suﬃciently able to identify problems, reach solutions, involve partners 
at the local level, communicate their position, analyze demands, and incorporate 
them into the decision-making process. Responsive government presupposes an open 
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channel of communication between stakeholders and local governments in the interest 
of advancing a common agenda.
In the following sections we examine a number of related issues: how and to what 
extent decisions of local government are inﬂuenced by external actors; the issue of 
participation, i.e., how institutional actors involve residents and their organizations in 
the policymaking process; and how well the provision of services by local authorities 
has met local community members’ expectations. The analysis is based on criteria such 
as the involvement of citizens and civil society organizations, the correspondence of 
local politics to identiﬁed local needs, and transparency and openness of the decision-
making process. 
9.1 Inclusive Decision-making 
Various stakeholders at the local level, such as citizens, civil society organizations, 
local businesses, and the media have diﬀerent social and political standing, presenting 
uneven opportunities for meaningful inﬂuence on the local decision-making process. 
The trend so far is that individuals and social groups with more social status have far 
more opportunities for a meaningful impact on the policy process at the local level. 
The LGS questionnaire from which the data was obtained inquired about the level of 
inﬂuence that speciﬁc persons and bodies exercise on decisions of local government 
(see Table 2.72).
The results conﬁrm that the mayor is the ﬁgure of greatest importance in the local 
government’s decision-making process. The role of various council committees, fractions 
and local branches of political parties, central government, and local representatives is 
quite signiﬁcant as well. Next in inﬂuence come local businesses and regional governor 
administrations. Civil servants, media, and citizens groups play some role, although far 
less signiﬁcant than the other stakeholders. Civil society organizations, churches, and 
trade unions have only a low impact on the local decision-making process. 
From the perspective of decentralization, these results show a high level of inﬂuence 
of central and regional administrations over the decision-making process at the local level. 
Some background is necessary here, to provide a context in terms of administrative reform 
aimed at decentralization. In 1998–99, signiﬁcant steps were made to establish a clear 
delineation between the political and administrative levels of government, to improve 
transparency and accountability in administration, and to set transparent criteria for 
recruitment and promotion of civil servants. Considerable success in the decentralization 
process was achieved with the adoption of the Program for Fiscal Decentralization in 
2002. There is a strong trend to redesign the system of taxation at the local level to 
allow more rational management of local resources. The New Regional Development 
Act of 2004 attempts to provide a more eﬃcient structure for the formulation and 
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implementation of regional development policy, while responsibilities at the local level 
are clearly deﬁned. These and other related reforms indicate an eﬀort to strengthen 
local government as a strong and independent actor on the local decision-making 
scene. However, the high degree of dependency on the central authority, sensed by 
local representatives and illustrated by the survey results, has a lot to do with the lack of 
suﬃcient own ﬁnancial resources at the local level. The rather slow development of the 
ﬁscal decentralization process has led to a situation where local administrations are not 
ﬁnancially able to meet the tasks of their extended competencies as deﬁned by law. The 
dependence on central budget transfers to meet local needs is one cause of the feeling 
that central authority has a strong inﬂuence. The increased role of local businesses is quite 
encouraging, and suggests the emergence of a new level of public–private dialogue.
Table 2.72
Inﬂuence of Selected People and Bodies on the Decisions of Local Government 
(7-Point Scale*)
Mean
Mayor 5.32
Committees 4.75
Factions 4.44
Local branches of political parties 4.29
Central government 4.21
Representatives 4.02
Local business 3.88
County government 3.81
Chief administrative oﬃcer 3.47
Civil servants 3.46
Media 3.45
Most interested citizens 3.38
Civic organizations 2.92
Churches 2.29
Trade unions 2.20
Note: * 1—very small inﬂuence; 7—very big inﬂuence.
Source: LGS 2003.
The low participation of civil society organizations in the decision-making of 
local governments is largely due to their uneven distribution across the country and 
the considerable diﬀerence between the impact of their activities in large and small 
municipalities. According to the research, there is at least one civic organization in slightly 
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less than half of the assessed municipalities. The number of organizations varies with 
the size of the municipality. There are 8.5 civil society organizations in municipalities 
with over 50,000 residents, compared to 0.98 in municipalities with less than 10,000 
people. One-third of the local civil society organizations participated in the decision-
making process of the local government. 
 
Table 2.73
Number of Civil Society Organizations in Municipalities
Number of 
Civil Society Organizations
Number of 
Municipalities
Percent
0 84 44.4
1 23 12.2
2 30 15.9
3 17 9.0
4 10 5.3
5 6 3.2
6+ 19 10.1
Total 189 100.0
Source: LGS 2003.
In the provisions of the Local Self Government and Local Administrations Act, 
local governments are in charge of providing speciﬁed public services. Public or social 
services may also be provided by civil organizations as not-for-proﬁt groups. This way, 
municipalities with lower budgets can participate in the provision of local services 
through joint involvement in projects, sharing the project’s funds, technical equipment, 
etc. The new Municipal Budget Act of 2003 has provided further opportunities for more 
active involvement of civil society organizations by requiring that municipal budgets be 
exposed to public hearings before being voted on by the municipal council. The results of 
the survey reﬂect the situation prior to this new act. The data show that a large majority 
of the municipalities had already undertaken measures to present the local budget before 
the public. Because of the diﬀerent methods used, however, possibilities for citizens to 
get directly involved in the discussion and to inﬂuence the decision-making have varied. 
In a quarter of the municipalities, a draft of the budget was published. Open discussions 
took place in almost half of the municipalities, although these involved diﬀerent groups 
of stakeholders. Discussions with journalists (16.4%), public hearings (15.3%), and 
discussions with civic organizations (15.3%) were the other actions taken.
Given the new framework conditions, it might be expected that mandatory public 
hearings of local budgets will facilitate more responsive decision-making by local 
governments. 
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 Table 2.74
Forms of Public Discussion of the Local Budget
Action Taken Percent of Municipalities
Discussion with civic organization 15.3
Public hearing 15.3
Publication of draft budget 23.3
Discussion with journalists 16.4
Source: LGS 2003.
There have been some outstanding new practices with respect to responsiveness 
in decision-making that are worth reporting. These entail the establishment of quality 
management systems (ISO 9001:2000) in quite a few municipalities in Bulgaria. ISO-
certiﬁed municipalities include the municipalities of Veliko Tarnovo, Pazardjik, Kardjali, 
Shoumen, and some others. In addition, the municipality of Shoumen has introduced 
an integrated quality management system that incorporates the requirements of ISO 
14001:1996, governing the protection of the environment. Given that Bulgaria is also 
the ﬁrst country in South Eastern Europe to have a regional administration certiﬁed 
against the standards of ISO 9001: 2000, the above practices are evidence of an enormous 
qualitative change in the perception of local and regional governance in Bulgaria. They 
also indicate the new managerial attitudes that have begun to emerge among local 
representatives who prefer to invest scarce ﬁnancial resources in strengthening the 
administration by improving quality, transparency, and accountability. Beginning with a 
local initiative of some municipalities, joined quite quickly by others, the introduction of 
the ISO management system in local administrations has now became a trend supported 
by major stakeholders in Bulgaria, including the Minister of Public Administration, the 
National Association of Municipalities in Bulgaria, etc. In practical terms, one immediate 
and positive result of maintaining an ISO system in local administrations is the fact 
that structured communication with all stakeholders is established and monitored. 
Proposals, opinions, and complaints of citizens are recorded and adequately processed. 
Transparency and openness are sought and monitored.
9.2 Accessibility of Local Representatives
 In terms of citizens’ relationship with the local representatives, both the mayor and 
the councilors are part of the picture. Their roles are deﬁned by law and by the existing 
administrative practices. Their accessibility is to a large extent determined by the format 
governing their encounter with citizens. The responsibilities of the mayor include regular 
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oﬃce hours to meet with citizens and hear their demands and complaints, participation 
in public meetings and public debates, giving interviews and press conferences, and 
contributing items in the local press. By law the mayor is also obliged to take action 
within one month on any complaints brought before him or her. The processing of 
complaints should be transparent, recorded in writing, and easy to trace. In addition 
to these legally prescribed responsibilities towards citizens, there are various other cases 
where mayors meet the public. Analysis of the current situation, including reports of 
oﬃce hours, press releases, and so on, suggests that mayors in Bulgaria are generally quite 
accessible. Compared to mayors, councilors have far more limited responsibilities with 
regard to formal communication with citizens. As they have no formal oﬃce hours, their 
accessibility is largely dependent on their personal involvement in municipal aﬀairs.
According to the LGS study, local representatives participate in an average of three 
public hearings or forums each year. Most of these occurred in large municipalities 
(7.28 per year). The lowest number of public hearings and forums in 2002 is registered 
in municipalities of between 20,000 and 50,000 residents. In small municipalities the 
average is two and a half public meetings. Thus, the participation of local representatives 
in public hearings or forums tallies with the size of the municipality.
Table 2.75
 Number of Public Hearings and Forums by Size of Municipality (2002)
Size of Municipality Mean
Below 10,000 2.23
10,000–20,000 2.74
20,000–50,000 1.69
Above 50,000 7.28
Total 3.09
Source: LGS 2003.
However, another factor to be considered is the level of citizens’ participation and 
the eﬀort they are willing to make to access local representatives. The process, after all, 
goes two ways and requires eﬀort on both sides. According to a survey done in 2004 by 
the National Center for the Study of Public Opinion, the majority of Bulgarian citizens 
feel that municipal administrations provide services in the most easily accessible format. 
The level of satisfaction with the quality of public services at the municipal level has 
risen by 15% compared to 2003. Notwithstanding the diverse means of communication, 
the same survey conﬁrms that nine of ten interviewed citizens prefer to communicate 
in person with local leaders and representatives of local administrations, or through 
intermediaries. The Internet is used the least, and 10% try to reach local authorities by 
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phone. The survey results conﬁrm that personal contacts are still largely considered to 
be the most eﬃcient channel of communication with local representatives.
Some newly institutionalized forms of policy dialogue between local representatives 
and citizens appear to be very positive. One example is the Forums for Development, 
usually conducted at a municipal level around a speciﬁc local agenda, with local 
government playing a leading role and with the partnership of an NGO (CSP report 
2001).
9.3 Conclusion
 
The dynamics involved in eﬀorts to build a responsive and transparent local government 
are an open question in the current proﬁle of local aﬀairs. Our analysis has been limited 
to some of the existing variables available from the survey interviews and features 
only certain aspects of the relationship between citizens and local governments. In 
addition to that data, there are examples of very innovative practices that demonstrate 
outstanding eﬀorts to increase responsiveness and transparency of local governments. 
For example, the introduction of quality management systems in local administrations 
in Bulgaria provides encouraging evidence that the task of building a responsive and 
citizen-focused administration has become a priority. The Forums for Development 
illustrate the emergence of institutionalized forms of policy dialogue between local 
representatives and citizens. 
Because of the complexity of the issue of local government responsiveness, simply 
measuring the level of satisfaction of local inhabitants with the provision of public 
services by the municipality is not an adequate indicator of success. Given the current 
dynamics in Bulgaria, we can expect to face many challenges around this issue over the 
next few years.
10. LOCAL MEDIA
Bulgaria, like most of the countries in this region, may be considered small in terms of 
both territory and population. Accordingly, the media market remains small, deﬁned 
by linguistic borders and audience numbers. Income levels and purchasing power 
are considerably lower than in EU member states. Notwithstanding the constraints, 
Bulgaria has been very successful since 1990 in expanding the media both quantitatively 
(number of media outlets and titles) and qualitatively (protection of freedom of speech 
and plurality of media representation). Thus, by the mid-1990s it had the greatest 
number of independent media titles and outlets per capita in Europe (McGann and 
Weaver 2000). Although some of these titles fell victim to the severe economic crisis 
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of 1996–97, the current media proﬁle of the country remains extremely pluralistic and 
rich in information sources. The interrelated issues of freedom of speech and plurality 
of independent media were successfully resolved for the most part as early as 1990–91. 
A dense network of independent presses and television and radio stations has main-
tained pluralism and open public debate, such that Bulgarians now refer to the 
independent media as the “fourth power.” 
10.1 Availability of Local Media
The monitoring of local public life in Bulgarian municipalities by the media is an 
established tradition. Thus, according to the subjective view of chief administrative 
oﬃcers, there is at least one newspaper dealing with local public life in most municipalities 
(see Table 2.76). However, there are marked diﬀerences across municipalities depending 
on their territorial size and population. More than half of the assessed municipalities with 
fewer than 10,000 people have at least one newspaper that covers local social and political 
aﬀairs. This increases with the size of municipalities, so that almost all municipalities with 
over 50,000 residents have local media coverage. In half of all assessed municipalities 
there are at least three printed media concerned with local problems. The majority of 
municipalities with fewer than 10,000 people have an electronic media source dealing 
with local life. The percentage increases with the size of the municipalities, so that nine 
of ten municipalities with more than 50,000 residents have at least one electronic media 
source covering local events. 
 
Table 2.76
Number of Media Covering Local Aﬀairs by Size of Municipality
Municipalities by 
Population Size
Number of 
Newspapers
Number of 
Television or Radio Stations
Size None [%] 1 [%] 2 [%] 3+ [%] None [%] 1 [%] 2 [%] 3+ [%]
Below 10,000 45.60 24.60 15.80 14.00 49.10 26.30 22.80 1.80
10,000–20,000 14.90 46.80 27.70 10.60 31.90 31.90 23.40 12.80
20,000–50,000 18.40 30.60 30.60 20.4 36.70 36.70 36.70 12.20
Above 50,000 3.10 15.60 37.50 43.80 9.40 9.40 50.00 34.40
Source: CAO survey.
As shown in Table 2.77, in most cases local or regional print media provide coverage 
of municipal public life. The national media mostly cover events in large municipalities, 
except when something extraordinary happens at the local level. 
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Table 2.77
Type of Media Covering Local Municipal Aﬀairs
Type of Media Newspapers Television or Radio Stations
Number of 
Municipalities
Proportion of 
Municipalities [%]
Number of 
Municipalities
Proportion of 
Municipalities [%]
None 44 23.20 54 28.50
Local media 60 31.74 81 42.80
Regional media 85 44.97 79 41.70
National media 20 10.58 13 6.87
Source: CAO survey.
Quite understandably, the largest audiences of all types of media may be found in 
larger municipalities, where events are covered by several media or by one with high 
frequency. The size of the municipality can make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in this respect. 
The listening and viewing patterns of radio and television audiences are also diﬀerent. The 
situation is especially problematic in remote rural and mountain village areas, where the 
national radio and television channels are the only feasible options for local residents. 
 
10.2 Independence and Representation of Local Media
 
Article 40 of the Bulgarian constitution enshrines the right to information and freedom 
of the press. Free competition among media outlets is guaranteed by law and the print 
media are considered to be independent from governmental control. Despite the 
pluralism of the Bulgarian media landscape, however, it remains uncertain whether 
certain media outlets are truly free from the inﬂuence of political and economic power 
groupings (Freedom House 2003). 
Bulgarian print media are not monopolized, but pluralistic. None are government-
owned, with the exception of the “State Gazette” that publishes Statutes of Parliament 
and Government Decrees. Few municipally owned dailies have survived the competition. 
With the above exceptions, all other print media are privately owned. According to 
the Freedom House Report at the end of 2002, the nation’s largest private newspapers 
with national coverage had the following levels of circulation: Troud, 180,000; 24 
Chasa, 120,000; Standard, 30,000; Monitor, 50,000; Sega, 17,000; Novinar, 20,000; 
Dnevnik, 6,000; and Kapital (a weekly), 34,000. Overall, there are 247 newspapers and 
magazines, including ten large weekly magazines, 26 monthly magazines, and 53 large 
regional dailies. The few party-run and ﬁnanced newspapers and publications have gone 
bankrupt; the latest to be discontinued is the Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF) 
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daily, Democratzia. The independent media have made signiﬁcant progress, the print 
media are pluralistic, and increasingly, they are better managed. 
However, it is important to note that the German West Deutsche Algemeine 
Zeitung (WAZ group) owns the two largest daily newspapers, with over 70% of the 
total distribution in the country. Their regional editions have threatened to drive most 
of the local Bulgarian-owned press out of business. Given this pluralistic structure of the 
media market, many of the existing outlets have a speciﬁc bias or focus. This invites a 
situation where special interests can override professional journalistic concerns (Freedom 
House 2003). Apart from the question of the ownership of the largest newspapers, 
there is not suﬃcient transparency with regard to who owns particular print media 
outlets. The danger of this is that it can prevent some consumers from forming their 
own independent judgment on the objectivity of the news reported (IREX 2002). The 
majority of local print media are in the hands of private companies or individuals. The 
local newspapers face some serious competition from the regional editions of the largest 
national daily newspapers and, compared to the latter, they exert far less inﬂuence. A 
positive development for the local print media is the newspapers published by regional 
associations of local governments. These are mostly monthlies or quarterly periodicals 
that provide speciﬁc information on municipal political life. 
The major newspapers (and major magazines, television stations, and radio operators) 
run Internet editions. These provide interactive discussion forums for the increasing 
Internet audience. There are also independent news agencies operating on the Internet 
since 1999, as well as one major national “electronic newspaper”—Mediapool. The 
Internet in Bulgaria, as in many other countries, is perhaps the most independent media 
platform, free of regulation and subject to no control whatsoever (Nahabedian 2002). 
Over the past few years, numerous new portals and electronic journals have emerged in 
Bulgarian web space. The growing popularity of electronic media gives us reason to expect 
a real boom in this ﬁeld in the next few years. According to Alpha Research, a Bulgarian 
marketing and social research agency, there has been an almost 100% increase in the 
number of Internet users in Bulgaria between August 2001 (7.8% of the population) 
and January 2002 (14%). 
Compared to print media, which managed to entirely emancipate themselves 
from direct governmental control, electronic media are still not completely free from 
interference by the state. Bulgarian National Radio and Bulgarian National Television 
are state owned and are rated as inﬂuential broadcasters in the country with a country-
wide coverage. Their strong ﬁnancial and organizational linkage with the state remains a 
factor in their strategic orientation and their independence. Since 1997, the state-owned 
television and radio stations, BNT and BNR, have been subject to regulation by an 
independent regulatory body called the Council on Electronic Media. Its members are 
inﬂuential, politically unaﬃliated individuals, elected on a quota basis by the Parliament 
and the president.
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Both radio and television businesses have undergone a signiﬁcant expansion at 
both the national and local levels. Freedom House reports 63 television operators in the 
country, ten of which reach national audiences and only one of which (the Bulgarian 
National Television—BNT) is state owned (Freedom House 2003). Notwithstanding the 
strong presence of the BNT, private television stations are developing extremely rapidly, 
especially after the licensing of two independent channels with national coverage. These 
private stations have also become increasingly inﬂuential at the local level. The most 
popular nationally broadcast television network, BTV, owned by the international media 
magnate, Robert Murdoch, has already surpassed the BNT in audience and market share. 
There are also more than 140 cable stations, including thirteen satellite operators (as of 
2002). According to data from the Media Resource Center, Soﬁa, in 2002 there were 
71 local, 59 regional, and 16 national television channels (Dainov 2002).
The radio broadcast proﬁle is no less pluralistic. In 2002, only one radio station (the 
Bulgarian National Radio) of eleven stations with national coverage was state owned. 
There were 98 local radio stations. Private radio networks (some with international 
backing) successfully compete with the still dominant Bulgarian National Radio. Dozens 
of newly licensed independent radio stations broadcast in all major Bulgarian cities 
(Media Sustainability Index 2002). In 2002 there were 140 regional radio stations. The 
same source reports a high number of radio operators—175 in 2002, of which 31 are 
cable stations and 144 wireless stations (Dainov 2002).
The expansion in print media outlets and television and radio stations has not been 
matched by similar developments in the advertising market, so that advertising revenues 
remain limited so far. The media markets are segmented, and there is considerable 
dependence on the few players who do consider investing in public relations and 
advertising. In addition, the concentration of funds in particular media groups means 
that costly activities like investigative journalism cannot be pursued regularly or have 
high quality. 
In this pluralistic media environment in Bulgaria, minority language sources remain 
underdeveloped. Besides some minority language print media (Turkish and Roma) 
and some bilingual periodical publications, there are national television (BNT) news 
broadcasts in the Turkish language. However, these do not enjoy much popularity 
among ethnic Turks, according to the polls. Donor-driven initiatives include some Roma 
publications, but their circulation cannot meet the needs of the relatively large Roma 
population in Bulgaria (IREX 2002). The local Roma television station in the town of 
Vidin (in northwest Bulgaria) is also dependent on donor support. Considering the ethnic 
composition of the population—9.5% ethnic Turks, 4.6% Roma, and 1.5% smaller 
ethnic groups (National Statistical Institute 2001)—the representation of minorities in 
both national and local media remains insuﬃcient. 
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10.3 Media in Local Political Life
The way in which information and news stories are collected and communicated is 
revealing of the role of local media in the political life of municipalities (see Table 2.78). 
Information on political life is channeled mostly through interviews with mayors and 
representatives of local administration and/or municipal councilors. Both print media 
and television and radio stations give them prime coverage. Reports on decisions taken 
by local governments are also well covered by all media, often with a special focus on 
how the decisions were taken. A good deal of time on local television and radio stations 
is devoted to the arguments for and against particular proposals of councilors or mayors. 
Unfortunately, more attention is paid to these arguments and counterarguments than 
to serious examination of the proposals themselves. This undermines the possibility 
for public discussion on particular issues before the matter is ﬁnally resolved by local 
authorities. 
 
Table 2.78
Political Topics in the Local Media [%]
Do Local Media Publish the Following Types of News? 
(Percentage of ‘Yes’ Answers)
Newspapers Television 
or Radio
Reports on decisions of local government 79.30 79.90
Information on arguments for and against proposals 77.10 81.80
Information on proposals made to the council 57.60 57.50
Interviews with representatives of local government or councilors 90.60 92.07
Source: CAO survey.
The results shown in Table 2.78 demonstrate that local media mostly present the 
views and statements of local representatives, including local municipal administrations 
and councilors, as well as announcing facts and decisions already taken. This leaves little 
room for an informed public debate on issues of local importance. In small municipalities, 
the media become active participants in municipal political life mostly during elections 
or when scandals arise. 
In large cities, the regional and national media predominate, especially in the print 
media, where the market share of regional editions of the major national newspapers 
is substantial. In this situation, the inﬂuence of the regional and local content of the 
“large” media becomes an important factor in local political life. This is especially true 
for investigative journalism focused on local governments. “Large” media are also the 
preferred platform for local representatives to attract votes and stimulate interest.
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10.4 Conclusion
The current media proﬁle of Bulgaria is extremely pluralistic and rich in information 
sources. The media market is rapidly developing and changing, along with the format 
of communication that now includes the entirely new electronic media. The results of 
the survey indicate that the role of the media as a forum for communication between 
local governments and citizens on speciﬁc local issues is still insuﬃcient. Although 
increasing in range, coverage, and professionalism, the local media have yet to create 
a space where informed public debate can have a meaningful inﬂuence on decision-
making by local leaders. 
Despite the variation across regions and localities, as well as some other factors that 
negatively inﬂuence the media market, this “fourth power” is an increasingly strong 
inﬂuence within Bulgarian society. As expressed so aptly by the political analyst, Evgenii 
Dainov, “No government that has failed in its job—or turned against the media—has 
survived in post-communist Bulgaria” (Dainov 2002).
11.  LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
For certain reasons, the history of the Balkans has fostered a general view that it is 
a region of weak states with fragile civil societies, sharp interethnic conﬂicts, wide-
spread corruption, and a feeble rule of law. Giving justice to history, however, requires 
an acknowledgement of the increasing and successful breakthroughs of some Balkan 
countries towards modernity and democracy. In this respect, a convincing case can 
be made that Bulgaria has established the most dynamic and “vibrant civil society” in 
South Eastern Europe (Dainov 2002), which compensates to a degree for the sometimes 
ineﬃcient political discourse between the government and the people. The large 
number and the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of nongovernmental organizations in Bulgaria 
are quantiﬁable indicators that bear this out.
11.1 The Legal Status of Civil Society Organizations 
 
The legal status of civil organizations in Bulgaria is governed by the Non-Economic 
Purpose Legal Persons Act, in force since January, 2001. The participatory process of 
drafting the act illustrates a new and higher level of constructive dialogue between 
legislators and the civil society organizations (CSOs). Experts and activists from the 
not-for-proﬁt sector were active participants both in drafting the act and in lobbying 
for its approval in Parliament. The act governs the establishment, functioning, and legal 
status of the CSOs. It sets clear and easy-to-operate frames. The registration of CSOs is 
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uncomplicated, not too costly, and may only be denied if the legal requirements are not 
satisﬁed or if the purposes of the organization are illegal. The state has limited powers 
over the dissolution of not-for-proﬁt organizations. 
According to the Bulgarian constitution, “No organization shall act to the detriment 
of the country’s sovereignty and national integrity, or the unity of the nation, nor shall it 
incite racial, national, ethnic, or religious enmity or an encroachment on the rights and 
freedoms of citizens; no organization shall establish clandestine or paramilitary structures 
or shall seek to attain its aims through violence.” So far, there has been compliance with 
the ban on the establishment of anti-liberal organizations. 
Three main types of organizations compose the bulwark of civil society in Bulgaria: 
public beneﬁt organizations, mutual beneﬁt organizations, and foundations. All have 
to be registered in court at their seat of establishment. In addition, public beneﬁt 
organizations must register with the Public Registry at the Ministry of Justice. The 
purpose of their establishment should fall into one of the categories of public beneﬁt 
speciﬁed in law. 
Civil society organizations are proﬁt-making, but not proﬁt-distributing entities. 
They may perform economic activities related to the main purpose of the organization 
and use the generated return from their activities, but they may not distribute the return 
among their members. CSOs may also set up subsidiaries, which are also permitted to 
engage in economic activities. The government does not tax civil society organizations. 
However, they must pay all due taxes on for-proﬁt activities and invest their returns 
back into their main activities. Allowing civil society organizations to get involved in 
economic activities enhances their sustainability, as they are acquiring the ability to 
provide various services. 
The new regulatory regime established in 2001 is generally considered to be 
progressive (NGO Sustainability Index 2002). However, legislators have not yet 
succeeded in providing favorable conditions that would encourage businesses to support 
civil organizations through tax beneﬁts. While there have been some incentives in the 
Corporate Taxation Act of 1997, they are limited in scope and do not suﬃce to stimulate 
civil society organizations. A ﬁeld study of the Center for Social Practices of 2001 has 
asserted that both NGOs and donors consider the current tax regime absurd, where in 
order to avoid tax on a donation, the donor company has to disguise the donation as 
an “expenditure.” The tax policy on donors and donations has also led to a situation 
where most companies choose to donate “in kind,” rather than provide the NGOs 
with the ﬁnancial resources they need to achieve their policy ends. Amendments to the 
applicable tax and public procurement legislation have been continually discussed, but 
no progress has been made so far in this respect. 
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11.2 Density of Local Civil Society Organizations 
 
As reported by the National Statistical Institute (NSI), in 2002 there were 14,779 
registered not-for-proﬁt organizations in the country. Of these, 2,881 are foundations, 
11,888 are associations, and ten are foreign not-for-proﬁt organizations. About half 
of the registered organizations are the so-called “chitalishta,” traditional Bulgarian 
educational and organizational institutions, which provide a rather limited range of 
services nowadays (NGO Sustainability Index 2002). A study completed by the MBMD 
polling agency refers to a large number of additional organizations registered as NGOs, 
which are indeed direct heirs of former “mass organizations.” These include “creative 
unions,” sports clubs, etc., which have a limited, if any, eﬀect on the civil agenda. 
Recent developments include the appearance of professional associations and guilds in 
the NGO arena. Most of them have managed to enter into a direct dialogue with the 
public authorities on speciﬁc professional issues and to ﬁnd their niche as stakeholders 
in the decision-making process. 
A steady trend, conﬁrmed by analysts, is that the “NGO sector continues to increase 
its sustainability and expand its inﬂuence in Bulgarian society” (NGO Sustainability 
Index 2003). There are several major indications of this. An important one is the increase 
in the number of CSOs that actually function. According to data published by the 
Information Center of the Open Society Fund in Soﬁa, in 1998 over 1,000 not-for-
proﬁt organizations were functioning in more than 50 towns. The NGO Sustainability 
Index of 2000 conﬁrms a growth in the number of “active” NGOs in the civil society 
sector to about 1,500 in 2,000, and to approximately 1,900 in 2003.
For a variety of reasons, including the dynamics of donor support, the ﬁnancial 
viability of CSOs is by no means easy to reﬂect on a sustainability indicator. In the 
ﬁndings of a survey made by the Center for Social Practices in 2001, Bulgarian NGOs 
until then had managed to attract funds equal to about 1.5% of the country’s GDP, 
or the total of the national budget for the protection of the environment. In 1998, 
one-tenth of all foreign funding for Bulgaria, including investment and loans, was 
received by the civil sector. But the funding problem remains critical. The same study 
observes that in 2000 only 6% to 7% of Bulgaria’s NGOs received ﬁnancial assistance 
of USD 50,000 or more. The concentration of funding in a small segment of the most 
inﬂuential NGOs signiﬁcantly undercuts the viability of smaller NGOs. According 
to the 2000 NGO Sustainability Index, about 20% of the civil society organizations 
received some government funding and about 40% received funding from businesses. 
Some organizations collect membership fees and charge for their services, though the 
income generated is extremely small. Apart from that, opportunities for domestic fund-
raising are limited, and local sources of philanthropy are almost non-existent. As put by 
the 2003 NGO Sustainability Index, “local ﬁnancial and in-kind support for NGOs 
remains relatively low, although it is continuously increasing.” According to diﬀerent 
140
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
analyses, the reported rise in the NGO’s own proceeds was 10% of their total income 
in 2001, compared to practically 0% in 1997 (CSP 2001). The ﬁnancial viability of 
the civil society sector in the coming years will be heavily inﬂuenced by the increased 
potential of NGOs to absorb EU funding. At the same time, other major donors, 
including USAID, the Swiss Government, etc., are preparing to phase out their support 
in 2007, which is the prospective year of Bulgaria’s entry into the EU . 
Ethnic groups are also represented in civil society organizations in Bulgaria. Most 
ethnic, religious, and cultural minorities in Bulgaria, including Turks, Roma, Bulgarian 
Muslims, Armenians, and Jews, have become organized since 1989, setting up their own 
not-for-proﬁt organizations and becoming involved in various civil society initiatives. 
The Turks stick mostly with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and in 2000 set 
up a national NGO named “Evet (Yes).” The ethnic Roma have more than 150 active 
organizations, while the number of registered Roma organizations amounts to more 
than three times this number (LGI 2002). Some of the NGOs function as political 
discussion clubs and proto-parties. The Jewish community has become organized 
around two diﬀerent national associations. Armenians form cultural and religious clubs 
in many communities. 
According to LGI data, the Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant communities are 
among the most dynamic religious organizations in Bulgaria in terms of charitable 
activities, distributing aid and establishing local networks that assist the elderly and 
the poor. The Orthodox church remains the most inﬂuential religious group in the 
country.
The distribution of civil society organizations across the country directly aﬀects their 
inﬂuence on the local political agenda. As shown by the LGS results of 2003, in about 
half of the municipalities there are no active civil society organizations. The majority 
of small municipalities (with fewer than 10,000 residents) have no active CSOs. The 
number increases with the size of the municipality, so that in municipalities with over 
50,000 residents, the majority of locally active CSOs are non-local ones. The reported 
average number of CSOs per municipality is three.
 
Table 2.79
Number of Civil Society Organizations in Municipalities by Type [%]
None 1 2 3 4 5 6 and 
More
Number of CSOs in municipality 44.4 12.2 15.9 9.0 5.3 3.2 10.1
Number of non-local CSOs active locally 74.6 11.1 7.4 1.6 1.1 1.6 2.6
Number of ethnic minority organizations 56.6 26.5 10.6 3.2 0.0 2.1 1.0
Source: LGS 2003.
141
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  B U L G A R I A
11.3 Civil Society Organizations in Local Public Life
 
The development of civil society organizations in Bulgaria after 1989, together with 
the massive explosion of independent media, are widely held to be the major elements 
in the formation of a modern civil society (CSP 2001). The same study restates the 
opinion of authoritative international analysts that the Bulgarian NGO sector “exerts 
a more eﬀective inﬂuence over the development of the country than its counterpart 
sectors in neighboring countries, including Greece and Turkey.” The role of civil society 
organizations in the modern political agenda of the country has proceeded through 
several major stages. In the early 1990s, the two predominant types of NGOs to be 
formed were research institutes and centers known as “think-tanks,” and a group that 
covered a large spectrum of issues, from charities to professional guilds and environmental 
pressure groups (Dainov 2001). The economic crises of the mid-1990s caused a growing 
gap between democratic policy goals and the government’s and public’s massive 
abandonment of reforms. From 1993 on, it was the NGO sector that established itself 
as the “keeper of the democratic agenda” (Krastev 2002). Together with the independent 
media, the NGOs in that period became a public force that not only took part in the 
political debate, vigorously defending the democratic reform process, but also put a 
mark on the form in which public debate has developed.
The 2003 NGO Sustainability Index conﬁrms the increasingly active role of 
Bulgarian NGOs in shaping the public agenda, although institutionalized mechanisms 
to ensure NGOs’ input in these processes remain underdeveloped. A considerable 
number of NGOs have established themselves as participants in the decision-making 
processes, cooperating with government bodies at various levels, participating in joint 
work with the legislative and the executive branches, engaging in advocacy campaigns, 
and gradually becoming an important player in Bulgarian political life. This has also led 
to some changes in the legislative and administrative framework to enable participation 
of NGOs in important policymaking committees. Besides the established practice of 
recruiting certain NGO experts as policy advisors on some parliamentary committees, 
the 2001 Parliament set up a permanent committee to address the needs of civil society 
and to secure the more eﬃcient representation of their interests. This committee is meant 
to function as a bridge between policymakers and civil society. The committee’s public 
council includes 21 members representing 28 NGOs, able to participate actively in the 
legislative process by commenting on and drafting proposals (LGI 2001). Important 
proposals to emerge from this committee include the new Act on Lobbying, the new 
Electoral Code, and the Ombudsman Act, among others. As for the executive side, 
most ministries today maintain a continuous dialogue with NGOs in the relevant ﬁeld, 
and involve civil sector representatives and experts in the decision-making process. 
Some good examples of this are the practices of the Decentralization Group in the 
Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works and the Fiscal Decentralization 
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Working Group in the Ministry of Finance. Proof of the increased role of civil society 
organizations in political life is evident in the case of the Bulgarian Media Coalition, 
which initiated the ﬁrst public session of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court to review 
the newly adopted Radio and Television Act. As a direct result of this action, a drastic 
violation of the constitution has been eliminated—the breach of privacy in allowing 
authorities to search private homes for undeclared television sets. Notwithstanding this 
particular success, the general receptivity to NGOs’ input is often dependent upon a 
great number of subjective factors, including the good will of the lawmakers (NGO 
Sustainability Index 2000). 
NGOs have strengthened their capacity to initiate public debate on particular issues. 
A successful example is the anticorruption debate, which was initiated by a group of 
NGOs in 1998 and developed into a major nationwide public discourse (CSP 2001). 
While cooperating with various government institutions, Bulgarian NGOs have so 
far succeeded in preserving their independent status and keeping the sector safe from 
the inﬂuence and control of government and politics. 
Though NGOs have become increasingly inﬂuential at the central and regional 
levels, their role in local public life has been limited to working together with local 
representatives on speciﬁc issues and on larger projects and programs. However, certain 
newly institutionalized forms of policy dialogue between local representatives and 
NGOs are a positive development. An example is the Forums for Development, usually 
conducted at the municipal level around a speciﬁc local agenda, with local government 
playing a leading role and with the partnership of an NGO (CSP 2001). Another example 
is the various NGO-piloted initiatives to introduce the institution of the Ombudsman 
into Bulgarian decision-making machinery. However, apart from a small core of strong 
and inﬂuential NGOs with permanent staﬀs in Soﬁa and other big regional centers, the 
organizational and technical capacity of most civil society organizations at the local level 
is not yet suﬃcient to allow their meaningful participation in local political life. As noted 
by the 2000 NGO Sustainability Index, 20% of the NGOs do not have any computer 
equipment. They are mostly project driven and have a limited constituency. In addition, 
their ability to establish local networks for joint action is still not well developed in 
most cases. All this aﬀects the status and work of civil society organizations in Bulgarian 
communities and cities. The opportunity to nominate candidates for municipal elections 
could have an impact on their successful participation in local political life.
11.4 Contacts between Local Government 
  and Civil Society Organizations
As stated in the CSP report of 2001, “Cooperation between NGOs and local govern-
ments, however, has not yet been placed within any ﬁxed and stable—let alone agreed 
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upon in detail—framework.” Cooperation so far exists in an institutionalized framework 
consisting largely of ad hoc initiatives that are either project- or problem-driven. Apart 
from the few exceptions already reported, a long-term vision of cooperation between 
local governments and the third sector has not yet developed beyond random joint 
actions. The complexity of the current relationship between local governments and civil 
society organizations (CSOs) is apparent in the LGS research ﬁndings as well. The results 
show that small municipalities with fewer than 10,000 residents have received almost 
no support from locally active CSOs (91.1%). The picture is considerably diﬀerent in 
bigger municipalities. One-third of municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants have 
been supported by locally active CSOs. 
Neither local self-governments nor civil society organizations have yet shown an 
ability to tap the potential harbored by these organizations at the local level. Field 
studies have established a “deﬁnite connection between positive attitudes and the 
municipal administrations’ practical experience with NGOs: the longer the experience 
of working with NGOs, the greater the number of problems that have been solved 
and the greater the administration’s inclination to cooperate with NGOs” (CSP 2001). 
Strong associations of municipalities have already proven their capacity to stimulate 
cooperation between local representatives and CSOs. These include the National 
Association of Municipalities in the Republic of Bulgaria, the Foundation for Local 
Government Reform, and the well-established regional associations of municipalities. 
All of them have been extremely successful in bringing together local representatives, 
with a particular focus on mayors. The eﬀect of such involvement is that mayors and 
members of municipal councils and municipal administrations become more open and 
politically sensitive to activities initiated and carried out by civil society organizations. 
Thus, it may be assumed that the good record of participation of local representatives 
in projects and other capacity-building events organized by the third sector will 
contribute to a more productive dialogue and more meaningful cooperation between 
local governments and local CSOs.
Meanwhile, the social environment that will encourage a new level of dialogue and 
cooperation between local representatives and the third sector organizations has already 
improved. Research conducted in 1999 by the MBMD polling agency concluded 
that: “An evolution of public opinion with respect to the nongovernmental sector is 
evident; this evolution ﬁnds its expression in the formation of ever clearer ideas of 
the sector’s role and importance among the young, the educated, and the residents 
of the larger cities, and in a growing lack of interest in the weaker social groups—the 
elderly, the poor, the uneducated, and the residents of villages.” The 2001 ﬁeld work 
of the CSP, carried out in 40 sites, conﬁrms that “virtually everyone who has had some 
contact with NGOs and their work has formed a strongly positive attitude towards the 
nongovernmental organizations, their activists, and their activities.” The 2003 NGO 
Sustainability Index has also conﬁrmed the improved public image of the NGO sector 
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with the general public, as well as with the government units and businesses at various 
levels. This evolution of attitudes, if capitalized on by NGOs, may well turn into a 
strong force for an intensiﬁed and meaningful dialogue between local representatives 
and their electorates, and local NGOs.
With regard to service provision, NGOs are active in a wide range of ﬁelds, 
although there are legal restrictions on working in particular areas such as health and 
education, where speciﬁc professional requirements apply. Although local governments 
generally appreciate the value of the services delivered by NGOs, the percentage of 
CSOs contractually providing public services is still low. The LGS results show that 
in almost 90% of the municipalities assessed, the local CSOs do not contract any 
public services. The situation is slightly diﬀerent in large municipalities. In 80% of 
municipalities with over 50,000 residents, the local CSOs do not contract any public 
services. The understanding of civil society as a service-selling “third sector” has not 
developed outside the big cities. NGOs are also rarely asked to provide services to 
businesses, partly due to the perception among businesses that NGOs are unprofessional 
(NGO Sustainability Index 2003). Since 2003, a change in the legislative framework 
has allowed local governments to contract out the provision of certain social services, 
including to NGOs. As the interests of urban dwellers in the countryside are mainly 
residential, it will be necessary for experts who commit to work in the countryside to 
become integrated into local community life. On the other hand, local capacity and 
expertise are gradually being developed. 
11.5 Conclusion 
Since its rebirth in 1989, the Bulgarian civil society sector has shouldered immense 
responsibilities in establishing an agenda, promoting public, civic dialogue, and 
upholding the reform in several major spheres, including decentralization and local 
government reform. Having found itself from the beginning at the very heart of public 
debate, the sector has had no choice but to gradually establish itself as a powerful 
player in the political arena. A key element in the history of Bulgarian NGOs was its 
sustained contact with the decision-making and policy-formation spheres (CSP 2001). 
Notwithstanding the many constraints, including political, institutional, organizational, 
ﬁnancial, informational, and societal issues, Bulgaria’s civil sector has achieved undisputed 
sustainability. Its inﬂuence is ever increasing and it is widely accepted as a “permanent 
force in the country, actively representing citizens’ interest and providing needed services” 
(NGO Sustainability Index 2003). 
The next area of NGOs’ activity will be working intensely with local communities. 
This will involve communities, media, government units, NGOs, and other local 
action groups in the process of designing and implementing various development 
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strategies, plans, and projects. Such cooperation presents both serious challenges and 
extraordinary opportunities. The nongovernmental sector in Bulgaria is calling for 
the intensiﬁcation of transfer of experience, resources, knowledge, and personnel in 
the sphere of civic initiative. The rather disproportionate development of the NGOs 
(in terms of territoriality and the priorities of their activity) highlights the necessity 
of establishing working mechanisms for overcoming the “center–periphery” gap. An 
appropriate organizational frame is needed to successfully institutionalize contact 
between local representatives and CSOs. Even though the most active NGOs have 
already started to specialize (rather than chase all possible funding), they still continue 
to work in more than one ﬁeld and lack coordination of their eﬀorts. On the other 
hand, the opportunities are outstanding. A remaining challenge is the CSOs’ capacity 
to manage eﬀectively the incoming EU accession funds in support of the civil society 
democratic agenda. 
12.  CITIZENS’ POLITICAL CULTURE
12.1 Political Interest and Knowledge
The level of participation of citizens in the management of public aﬀairs at the local level 
has been a focus of concern a number of times in this report. We have discussed both 
how they elect their representatives and how, through them, they eﬀectively participate 
in local politics. Throughout the report, factors inﬂuencing the direct participation of 
citizens in local political aﬀairs have been observed: the previous political environment, 
the existing legal and administrative framework, tradition and experience, the margin 
left by political parties and other interest groups, etc. Citizens’ political culture is an 
extremely important element in this spectrum of factors. Indeed, this is the feature that 
draws the distinction between citizens as political actors and citizens as a pool of votes 
activated from one round of local elections to another. 
The collapse of socialist rule in Bulgaria was as spectacular as in any other Central 
and East European country. But compared to other countries with long-established, 
democratic social and political cultures, Bulgaria’s route to modern political culture was 
by no means an easy one. As expressed by Dainov (2001), “although Bulgaria emerged 
out of the communist period with some clear points of democratic potential—such 
as the absence of nationalistic and ethno-centric temptations, sensitivity to issues of 
rights and exclusion, pronounced preference for parliamentary forms of government 
and so forth—the general structure of popular attitudes was not conducive to rapid 
democratization, to market reform or, more generally, to what later came to be known 
as ‘Europeanization’.” Indeed, until 1944, neither the 80% of the population that were 
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peasants who held on to traditional, group-focused patterns of communication and 
life-style, nor the weak political parties that were periodically dissolved by the Tzar, 
managed to formulate a coherent and stable political vision for society. After 1944, the 
mass political culture promoted by the communists further weakened the formation of 
modern democratic attitudes and values. Indeed, the dynamic transition from totalitarian 
socialist rule to democratic governance since 1989 required new skills of governance and 
political attitudes that had never been part of the country’s “mentality” (Kapitanova and 
Minis 2003). In the changing context of dramatically modiﬁed relationships between 
political parties and governing institutions, people were left to formulate for themselves 
their new responsibilities as citizens. This process was especially diﬃcult at the local level 
where there was not only one party that completely dominated policymaking, public 
opinion, media, trade unions, etc., but also one vision of how political life functions. 
In general, the breakdown of the old system not only changed the matrix of economic 
and political power in society, but was a true cultural revolution as well (Kapitanova 
and Minis 2003). 
The ongoing battle to establish a new type of political culture in Bulgarian society 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. To do justice to Bulgaria’s achievements, however, 
requires the highlighting of some signiﬁcant changes in political attitudes. The shift in 
attitude towards market economy reforms is illustrative in this respect. Following the 
initial post-communist enthusiasm of 1992, 53% of Bulgarians supported the transition 
to a market economy, while 36% preferred a state-directed economy. By the spring of 
1993, disappointment with the government led to a massive retreat from the reform 
agenda, and support for a market economy shrunk to just 13% in one year. In the summer 
of 1994, nostalgia for the communist past was reﬂected in 42% of Bulgarians preferring 
a state-run economy. But following the severe economic crisis of 1996, 63% stood for 
rapid privatization and market reforms (Mitev 1998). A number of studies conducted 
after 1996 conﬁrm the formation of a new political value system, evolving away from 
dependent attitudes and rejecting the “entire package of socialism—human, reformist, 
or otherwise”(Dainov 2001). By the end of 1999, “most Bulgarians categorically 
understand that the European and, more speciﬁcally, the West European international 
context is best suited to the interests of the country. They also believe that Bulgaria 
should become an integral part of the community of those European countries that 
possess stable democracies and embody the most modern civilization trends” (Soﬁa: UN 
Development Program and the Friedrich Schtiftung Foundation 1999). According to 
the results of the study, about 83% of Bulgarians support integration into the EU and 
63% support membership in NATO. 
The newly established political value system has already passed some serious tests. 
The most challenging were the diﬃcult choice to support NATO in the Kosovo crisis of 
1999 and the ﬁrm position to join the war on terrorism in 2001. A textbook example of 
the sustainability of Bulgaria’s democratic political value system was the events related 
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to the victory of the former king-in-exile, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (or Simeon II) 
and his National Movement Simeon II (NMSS) in the parliamentary elections of 2001. 
The former tsar did not succeed in sweeping away the rules of the multiparty game 
and found it impossible to escape the burden of being a prime minister after having 
won parliamentary elections in a republic. He had to follow the rules of the multiparty 
democracy in its political decision to transform the National Movement Simeon II 
into a political party, announced at the end of 2001. The fact that in the presidential 
elections of 2002 the movement failed to nominate its own candidate, but instead 
backed the UDF candidate like all center-right parties, indicates the resilience of the 
established political system. In the words of one analyst, Bulgarian political culture 
managed to survive the “populist onslaught,” and its political infrastructure, being 
“the country’s greatest achievement since 1990, had survived its greatest challenge” 
(Dainov 2001). 
Notwithstanding these considerable achievements, there are issues to watch for in 
Bulgarian political attitudes. One important concern is the growing gap between popular 
expectations of the democratic system and the political elite’s own agenda (Ivan Krastev 
2003). Antiparty sentiments are growing among Bulgarians. Currently, only 20% claim 
to trust political parties and to consider them instruments of change (Freedom House 
2003). At the local level, trust in local representatives is decreasing. According to the 
results of a 2004 poll, the majority of local residents are more interested in their own 
businesses than in the activities of their local government. Other important concerns 
mentioned by analysts are “the residual fascination with the state,” particularly among 
citizens over 40 years of age, and the “feeling of dependency” sensed in the 2001 massive 
election victory of the tzar, who won on the election platform of “care” for everybody 
(Dainov 2001).
 However, the above concerns are elements of the same positive political environment 
Bulgaria has managed to create and sustain. This includes a solid and stable democratic 
system, fair and free elections for more than a decade, peaceful post-election transition 
of power, etc. Developing a strong democratic system is not just a matter of creating 
the right political and legal framework, but also a matter of educating citizens in their 
rights, responsibilities, and opportunities. In this respect, creating a political culture 
guarantees the sustainability of the democratic process.
12.2 Local Political Participation
 
Citizens’ participation in local politics depends on a variety of conditions, including 
their level of political culture and political awareness, the quality and quantity of 
information available, citizens’ education and training, as well as their genuine interest 
in local aﬀairs. 
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Most Bulgarian citizens exercise no other form of public participation in local 
political life than taking part in local elections. The LGS research established that the most 
popular action taken against decisions of local governments is to debate them in public 
meetings. Such meetings occurred in 60% of municipalities, and in almost two-thirds 
of the cases they were held at least three times. However, given the fact that such public 
meetings are usually ad hoc and often lack a structured framework, planning, and follow-
up assessment, their potential to inﬂuence the local political agenda in a meaningful way 
remains limited. The second favorite method of showing public disagreement with local 
government is the collection of signatures. This action was taken at least once in 27.2% 
of the municipalities, but the practical eﬀect of petitions remains weak, as there is no 
real machinery by which they could eﬀect change. The results of the survey conﬁrm that, 
in general, residents are not used to challenging decisions of local governments directly. 
Thus, challenges occured in 20% of the municipalities assessed. Demonstrations and 
protests are the least popular actions against decisions of local governments.
Table 2.80
Percentage of Municipalities Where Actions against Local Government Decisions Occur
No Action Once Twice Three and 
More Times
Demonstrations 83.6 5.3 5.8 5.3
Collection of signatures 72.8 7.9 6.9 6.3
Protests 85.2 9.0 4.8 1.1
Public meetings 39.2 9.0 12.2 39.7
Challenges to decisions 79.9 9.0 4.8 6.3
Source: LGS 2003.
The low participation of citizens in local politics has been conﬁrmed by polls and 
other surveys. Informal channels for lobbying the mayor, municipal councils, or the 
administration on particular personal interests are generally considered the most pro-
ductive. Face-to-face contact regarding administrative procedures, rules, and sanctions 
is still the preferred route, becoming an integral part of the culture. Such practices not 
only invite corruption, they also jeopardize institutionalization of the rule of law and 
eﬀective administrative and judicial processes. Citizens are less likely to believe they 
might get institutional support from civil organizations or political parties on their 
particular concern. Mass media are also generally not thought of as a tool for exercising 
some inﬂuence on local political life. 
The relative lack of public participation in local political life apart from electoral 
activities demonstrates that knowledge and experience in using the tools of direct local 
democracy are still underdeveloped. 
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12.3 Political Efficacy
 
The form of participation of citizens in local politics discussed previously has led to a low 
level of political eﬃcacy. Thus, only 15% of respondents from a 2004 public opinion poll 
think that local residents can inﬂuence the local decision-making process. One-third are 
not interested in local aﬀairs, as they are convinced that this will not change their personal 
situation. The majority is unaware of the opportunities available for participation in local 
political life beyond elections. Generally, respondents diﬀerentiate between the local and 
national political agendas only on speciﬁc issues. The central government is considered 
to be the focus of all problems related to unemployment, poverty, the ineﬃcient legal 
system and rights protection, the high level of criminal activities, and so on. Local 
governments are blamed for not providing suﬃcient infrastructure, maintaining roads 
and streets, providing housing for the needy, and similar failings. It is widely believed 
that most public servants are corrupt. The majority of Bulgarian citizens believe that 
most politicians and administrators are corrupt (Vitosha 2003). 
The general lack of information and experience with local politics partially accounts 
for these views. Most citizens are not aware of the possibilities they have to inﬂuence 
local political life and to provide some corrective to decisions or actions. They remain 
external observers to what happens in the community, as the information they get is 
mostly from the central media and concerns central government. In this way a vicious 
circle is perpetuated. One way forward is to involve the media, civil society, and 
businesses in a more vibrant discussion. Public discourse needs improved information 
and communication channels. The challenge now for both local governments as service 
providers and citizens as major stakeholders is to structure and intensify this dialogue. 
12.4 Conclusion
Political culture remains a major challenge for the development of democratic processes 
in Bulgaria. The community of Western nations has recognized the political stability of 
Bulgaria and the country’s progress in establishing democracy and a market-oriented 
economy, by including it in NATO and setting a target date of 2007 for its accession to 
the EU. Therefore, the time has come for Bulgarian citizens to realize their own crucial 
importance in the further development of the democratic process. Political activism 
beyond participation in elections or mass demonstrations requires a qualitatively new 
discourse. Even where local representative democracy dominates over direct participatory 
democracy, the opportunities and tools for citizens’ involvement exist. The recent 
political proﬁle of Bulgaria provides us with clear examples of more advanced forms of 
political culture. The discussion is no longer an abstract discussion of the democratic 
potential of Bulgarian citizens. Rather, it has become a concrete debate on how to 
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strengthen citizens’ political culture in order to achieve the set goals of a political 
democracy. A major achievement of the transition so far is the fact that democratic 
institutions in Bulgaria have already recognized their enormous responsibilities with 
regard to strengthening citizens’ political culture. But this alone does not suﬃce. Now 
there must be an intensiﬁed and structured dialogue between citizens and institutions 
that allows for setting concrete and measurable goals and is based on the clear allocation 
of roles, responsibilities, and tasks on both sides. The degree to which the government 
succeeds in improving the quality of life of Bulgarian citizens will be very important, 
as it will set the conditions for upgrading the political landscape with new incentives, 
new entrants, and new ideas. 
 
13. CONCLUSION
During the last ﬁfteen years of transition from communism, Bulgaria has managed to 
establish an autonomous system of local government that has fundamentally changed 
the proﬁle of local politics. The strong presence of local government in local political 
life has not only brought new democratic perspectives and opportunities for citizens’ 
participation in the management of their communities and cities, but has proved in 
practice the maturity and adherence to the values of freedom and democracy of Bulgarian 
society. 
On the whole, the current situation and prospects for the future of local self-
government in Bulgaria can be given a very positive rating. In spite of all the diﬃculties, 
including deﬁciencies in ﬁnancial and/or political support that have negatively 
aﬀected the local autonomy and decentralization process, Bulgaria has managed to 
successfully implement the ﬁrst stage of public administration reforms. The model of 
local democracy and local politics thus far has been based on representative, rather than 
direct (participative) democracy. Since 1991, the record of four consecutive mandates 
of local government provides convincing evidence of the democratization of political 
and public life in Bulgarian communities and cities. Although it has taken some time, 
Bulgarian local politics has managed to separate itself from the national political agenda. 
With the transition to a mature democracy as a driving force, the current multiparty 
political system in Bulgaria is already characterized by stability, predictability, and the 
democratic representation of the political interests of minority groups. Although still 
largely dominated by the major political parties, the local political spectrum now involves 
a plurality of actors. Civil society organizations have come to play an increasing role in 
local politics, public discourse has become more intensiﬁed, and attempts have been 
made to secure a more structured environment for such a discourse.
What comes next in the local arena is, ﬁrst of all, the completion of the move toward 
legal and ﬁscal autonomy of local self-government. Other challenges include reforming 
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the system of law enforcement and introducing eﬃcient accountability mechanisms 
and rules to prohibit corruption among public servants and administrative oﬃcials. 
Substantial progress is required in the eﬀort to build a professional, competent, politically 
independent, and transparent public administration at the local level.
Political debate has already shifted its focus to issues of incremental improvement 
of the existing structure of democratic institutions, based on securing transparency, 
accountability, an anti-corruption environment, and the rule of law. Constructing 
sustainable democratic institutions involves ﬁnding a more eﬀective means of citizen 
involvement. The local media have yet to create a venue for inﬂuencing local decisions 
on the basis of an informed public debate. The next area of CSOs’ activity will be to 
work intensely with local communities. This includes participatory involvement of 
communities, media, government units, CSOs, and other local action groups in the 
design and implementation of various development strategies and projects. Based on the 
2003 election results, we have reason to expect new developments in the establishment 
of a much more diversiﬁed local political life. Despite the prevalence of representative 
over direct democracy in Bulgaria, the more politics becomes a contest between 
personalities and structural party capacities rather than divergent political programs, 
the more opportunities for local leaders will appear.
The following lists of strengths and weaknesses in speciﬁc areas are an attempt to 
present a simpliﬁed proﬁle of the current state of local democracy in Bulgaria.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Local Democracy in Bulgaria
 
Autonomous Local Government
Strengths
 • There is a wide ranging public consensus that independent and autonomous 
local government is of crucial importance;
 • The legal autonomy of local self-government in Bulgaria has been established; 
self-governed communities are politically independent from the central state 
administration; 
 • Legal foundations governing the authority and activity of local government 
have been laid; laws are constantly reﬁned and improved; 
 • Central administration has transferred considerable competencies to local self- 
governments;
 • Interaction between regional and local government is structured; no noticeable 
problems have occurred;
152
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
 • A ﬁscal decentralization program has been launched; corresponding legislative 
amendments have been made; local governments have increased their powers 
with respect to the determination of local fees.
Weaknesses
 • Local government in Bulgaria functions under conditions of insuﬃcient legal 
autonomy. The division of responsibilities between the central and local levels 
is not always clear;
 • An anomaly exists between decentralization of service provision and the lack of 
corresponding ﬁscal decentralization, leading to persistent budget deﬁcits. As a 
result, numerous powers of local self-governments have yet to be put to practice; 
local governments are often unable to handle their extended responsibilities, 
either ﬁnancially or technically;
 • Tax reform has not been completed; municipal authorities have very limited 
autonomy in determining their own tax revenues; and 
 • Municipal budgets remain unstable; state budget transfers and the system of 
subsidies do not allow local authorities to plan their expenditures and revenues 
eﬀectively. The revenues of local self-governments are insuﬃcient and not 
eﬃciently managed. 
The Constitutional Character of Local Government 
Strengths
 • Bulgaria has introduced legislation to protect human, civil, and political 
rights that comply with established European standards and international 
agreements;
 • The building of adequate administrative capacity specializing in the integration 
of minorities is in progress; and
 • Some progress has recently been made in obtaining court judgments against 
violations of human rights.
Weaknesses
 • Laws are not always consistently applied and law enforcement remains ineﬃcient, 
slow, and liable to corruption, generating low trust in the judiciary; 
 • The integration of minorities in local political and social life remains limited, 
apart from some sporadic examples and initiatives; and
 • Insuﬃcient administrative capacity and some practices of direct interaction 
between local business and local government still serve as a basis for violations of 
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the law, which are ineﬀectively sanctioned because of the slow and unproductive 
judicial procedures. 
Transparency and Accountability of Local Government
Strengths
 • The laws requiring local representatives to account for their activities to local 
residents have been well designed and implemented in practice;
 • Access to public information is guaranteed by special legislation and by municipal 
acts; established procedures are popular among citizens and stimulate regular 
requests for public information; 
 • Bulgaria has made considerable progress in establishing E-government on the 
municipal level. The majority of municipalities have advanced websites that are 
being regularly updated, although progress is slower in smaller municipalities;
 • Contacts with media representatives are organized regularly and a structured 
system for the announcement of decisions of local representatives is in place; 
 • A number of acts have been introduced or amended to create a more stable 
anti-corruption environment, including the Law on Political Parties, the Public 
Procurement Act, the Act on Restriction of the Administrative Regulation and 
Administrative Control, etc.;
 • The corruption index for local representatives and for municipal administrators 
in the period 2000–2003 has been ﬂuctuating, exhibiting a slight tendency 
towards decreasing. Convictions for bribery-related cases began to occur, but 
the statistics may reﬂect lack of enforcement rather than low levels of bribery; 
and
 • A Registry of Public Procurement and Tenders, including those made by the 
municipalities, was established in 2000 and is updated on daily basis; the control 
over public procurement is centralized and carried out by the Public Internal 
Financial Control Agency.
Weaknesses
 • There is still inadequate transparency concerning municipal budgets and some 
of the major policies of the municipalities; 
 • Despite existing opportunities, local residents are not yet suﬃciently well 
informed about the activities of local representatives, mostly because of the low 
level of interest in local aﬀairs; 
 • The Bulgarian state is considered to have high levels of corruption and clien-
telism, but corruption at the local government level is a serious problem as well. 
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Especially prone to corruption are the following: municipal procurement, licens-
ing of economic and trade activities, renting and tenders for the reconstruction 
of municipal sites, tenders for the privatization of municipal property, and the 
supplying of municipal premises with fuel and consumables;
 • Despite some progress in this respect, there are still no eﬃcient mechanisms 
and rules for holding public servants and administrative oﬃcials accountable 
for acts of corruption;
 • The current model for the distribution of competencies clearly implies a leading 
role for the municipal council, but established practice and the need for eﬃciency 
often lead to the mayor being the dominant decision-maker; 
 • The inﬂuence of party fractions and the local branches of political parties on 
local politics is high, while the inﬂuence of the other local actors (businesses, 
NGOs, local media, churches, the trade unions, etc.) on local policy is perceived 
to be low. 
Eﬀectiveness of Local Government
Strengths
 • The majority of local self-governments in Bulgaria are now fairly eﬀective at 
designing and implementing long-term economic programs, development plans, 
and action plans for the activities of the municipal council and its committees, 
and deciding on matters concerning the municipality. 
Weaknesses
 • The limited ﬁscal autonomy of local governments is unanimously considered 
to present substantial impediments to the planning and controlling capacity of 
local government;
 • The deﬁcit of administrative competence is considered a problem for all levels 
of public administration, including local governments; despite legal and 
administrative changes, continuity in services and professionalism are seriously 
lacking; 
 • Local authorities still need to improve the implementation of their projects and 
to tighten control over their performance; and
 • The decision-making capacity of local governments is often aﬀected by 
opportunistic mayor–council relations, insuﬃcient information, the weak 
administrative skills of some mayors, and the low bargaining skills of various 
party fractions that make a consensus diﬃcult to reach.
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The Representative Character of Local Government (Elections and Referenda)
Strengths
 • Since 1999 local politics has achieved independence from the national agenda;
 • A legal and administrative framework has been established that allows for eﬀective 
democratic participation of citizens in local politics; and
 • A tradition of free and fair elections has been established and maintained. 
Weaknesses
 • The turnout in local elections has been steadily declining, with the 2003 local 
elections reaching the lowest level since the beginning of the transition; and
 • Local referenda as a form of direct participation of citizens in local public aﬀairs 
have been held in only a few cases and with rather limited success. 
Local Parties and Factions
Strengths
 • The overall resilience of the established political patterns has been conﬁrmed. 
The current multiparty political system in Bulgaria is characterized by stability, 
predictability, and the democratic representation of the political interests of 
minority groups;
 • Markedly diﬀerent from other Balkan countries, Bulgaria has not permitted the 
birth of extreme nationalist or xenophobic political parties or movements, but 
has encouraged adequate representation of minority interests according to the 
established rule of law and principles of democracy;
 • The party system is underpinned by a high degree of political consensus and 
widely shared political goals: accession to the EU, completion of the reforms, 
and the attraction of foreign investment. Political debate has shifted its focus to 
the incremental improvement of the existing structure of democratic institutions, 
through the securing of transparency, accountability, an anti-corruption 
environment, and the rule of law; 
 • Although still largely dominated by the major political parties through both 
their local oﬃces and central headquarters, the local political spectrum now 
involves various actors and represents a plurality of interests;
 • Civil society organizations have come to play an increasing role in local elections 
through the nomination of candidates for local representative; and
 • Public discourse has become more intensiﬁed and attempts to secure a more 
structured environment for it have been made. 
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Weaknesses
 • In smaller municipalities, political parties have no branch oﬃces; in an 
insigniﬁcant minority of municipalities there is no party represented; 
 • Citizens and civil society organizations have so far had a limited inﬂuence on 
local political life in Bulgaria.
Local Representatives
Strengths
 • Minorities with an advanced political identity (the Turkish ethnic minority) are 
adequately represented in municipal councils; 
 • The level of education of local representatives has been high;
 • A majority of representatives has practical political experience in working in 
local governance;
 • One-ﬁfth of all councilors and one-third of all mayors hold a position in a civic 
organization; 
 • Fundamental democratic values are shared by a majority of local representatives, 
including the values of free competition, protection of rights, private property, 
private ownership, and freedom of assembly; and
 • New patterns of dialogue are emerging, which increasingly involve local 
businesses and civil society along with the decision-makers. This synergy becomes 
an important element of the new political culture of local representatives.
Weaknesses
 • Women are not represented proportionally in elected positions at the local level; 
they are not as prominent at the local level as they are at the national political 
level and in professional guilds; 
 • Minorities with a weaker political identity (mainly the Roma) are politically 
underrepresented in local councils; 
 • There is a high threshold level of political experience, which makes it diﬃcult for 
younger candidates to launch a career in local politics. Having party credentials 
and previous experience in local government aﬀairs are key factors assuring 
participation in local political life; 
 • A basic challenge for the political system is the low credibility of the executive 
and court systems and of individual politicians. A particularly serious concern 
is the low trust in courts; and
 • Barriers to informed decision-making include the relatively underdeveloped 
communication channels, the insuﬃcient ability to process information, the 
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lack of data analysis skills, and the usage of limited rather than diverse sources 
of information. 
Responsiveness of Local Governments
 
Strengths
 • A commitment exists to create a responsive and transparent local government. 
Steps have been taken to establish a clear delineation between the political 
and administrative levels of government, to improve the transparency and 
accountability of administration, and to set transparent criteria for the 
recruitment and promotion of civil servants. Innovative practices in this area 
are the Forums for Development and the introduction of quality management 
systems in local administrations;
 • A large majority of citizens considers that municipal administrations provide 
services in an easily accessible format. The level of satisfaction with the quality 
of public services at the municipal level has risen 15% compared to 2003; 
 • One-third of the local civil society organizations have participated in the 
decision-making process of the local government; 
 • There is a generally high level of accessibility of mayors in Bulgaria; and 
 • Public gatherings are an important means of communication of local govern-
ments with citizens.
Weaknesses
 • Central and regional administrations still exert a high level of inﬂuence over 
the decision-making process at the local level; and
 • The needs and expectations of citizens go far beyond what local governments 
can provide; the sense of inequality and injustice persists among the Roma 
minority. 
Local Media
Strengths
 • The media are becoming a strong inﬂuence in Bulgarian society and have 
expanded since 1990 both quantitatively (number of media outlets and 
titles) and qualitatively (protection of freedom of speech and pluralism in 
representation); and 
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 • The monitoring of local public life by the media has an established tradition in 
Bulgaria. In a large majority of municipalities there is at least one newspaper 
dealing with local public life. In most cases, the local or regional print media 
cover municipal public life. The national media mostly cover events in the big 
municipalities, except when some extraordinary local event occurs. · 
Weaknesses
 • The role played by the media in facilitating communication between local 
governments and citizens in order to resolve speciﬁc local issues remains limited. 
Although increasing in range, coverage, and professionalism, the local media have 
yet to create a space where a meaningful inﬂuence on local politics might occur;
 • The local media mostly present the views and statements of local representatives 
and announce facts and decisions. This leaves insuﬃcient room for an informed 
public debate on issues of local importance. The media in small municipalities 
become more engaged in municipal political life during elections or when 
scandals arise. In large cities the regional and national media tend to 
predominate; 
 • Given Bulgaria’s diversity, the representation of minorities in both national and 
local media remains insuﬃcient;
 • Compared to the print media that successfully divested themselves of direct 
governmental control, the electronic media (Bulgarian National Television and 
Bulgarian National Radio) are still not completely free from interference by the 
state; and
 • The growth in number of print media outlets and of radio and television stations 
has not been matched by a growth in the advertising market, thus leading to 
the segmentation of media markets. 
Local Civil Society Organizations
Strengths
 • Bulgaria’s civil sector now has undisputed sustainability, increasing inﬂuence, 
and is widely accepted as “a permanent force in the country, actively representing 
citizens’ interests and providing needed services;” 
 • Ethnic groups have found representation in civil society organizations in 
Bulgaria; and
 • A considerable number of civil society organizations have established themselves 
as participants in the decision-making processes, cooperating with government 
bodies at various levels, participating in joint work with the legislative and 
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the executive branches, and engaging in advocacy campaigns. Certain newly 
institutionalized forms of policy dialogue between local representatives and 
civil society organizations have already begun to appear, e.g., the Forums for 
Development and the institution of ombudsman.
Weaknesses
 • Although civil society organizations have become increasingly inﬂuential at the 
central and regional levels, their role in local public life is limited to working 
together with local representatives on speciﬁc issues and on larger projects and 
programs;
 • Bulgarian legislators have not yet succeeded in providing favorable conditions 
such as tax beneﬁts that would encourage businesses to support civil 
organizations; 
 • Local ﬁnancial and in-kind support for civil society organizations remains 
relatively low, although it is continually increasing; 
 • A stable, institutionalized framework for cooperation between local governments 
and civil society organizations has not yet been created; and
 • The percentage of civil society organizations contracted to provide public services 
remains low, with some exceptions.
Citizens’ Political Culture
Strengths
 • Clear examples of the developing political culture can be observed in the most 
recent political proﬁle of Bulgaria. A new political value system has been formed, 
one that has evolved away from dependent attitudes and rejects all forms of 
socialism; and
 • Democratic institutions in Bulgaria have already recognized their enormous 
responsibilities with regard to strengthening citizens’ political culture. 
 
Weaknesses
 • There is a growing gap between popular expectations of the democratic system 
and the political elite’s own agenda. Antiparty sentiments among Bulgarian 
citizens are increasing and trust in local representatives is decreasing;
 • Citizens’ participation in local politics remains weak. The relative lack of public 
participation in local political life apart from electoral activities demonstrates 
that knowledge and experience in using the tools of direct local democracy are 
still underdeveloped. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Local Government System 
Estonia is known for its success in the transition from socialism and for being included 
in the ﬁrst wave of EU accession in 1997. Departing from the ideology of a managerial 
and hollow state, Estonia has chosen a very radical version of economic transition. The 
role of the private sector in Estonia’s GNP is 75%. Income from economic activities (i.e., 
the provision of services) is only 4.26% of total revenues. Government, including local 
government, has devolved as much activity as possible to private legal subjects, in which 
public authorities are shareholders or foundations (Sootla et al. 2002). This approach 
has caused rather fast development rates and also a rather fast and deep recession. 
The price of such a rapid transformation was an extremely unequal development 
of the regions, an increasing gap between large towns and remote areas, and a rather 
high rate of exclusion of disadvantaged employees and especially their descendents from 
active economic and social life (Table 3.1).
The increasing disparity among local communities in their capacity to implement 
projects, programs, and services has become the most important obstacle to developing 
a balance of central–local relations. 
According to the Wall Street Journal, Estonia is sixth among countries with the most 
economic freedom (BNS 2004) and has the lowest rate of corruption of all Central 
and East European (CEE) countries. Estonia is also rated as the highest among CEE 
countries (0.37, as compared with 0.25 in the Czech Republic) according to the Gini 
index, which deﬁnes the proportion of income of the most and least aﬄuent inhabitants 
(Vetik 2003). The radical nature of the transition in Estonia caused many other rather 
sharp contrasts or contradictions, e.g., in the development of local governance. 
Estonia is the smallest CEE accession country, with a population of 1.35 million, 
but with a rather extensive territory (43,000 square km.) compared to Holland (with 
a population of ﬁfteen million) or the Slovak Republic (ﬁve million). This explains an 
important aspect of the organization of local life in Estonia. It has a very low population 
166
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Ta
bl
e 3
.1
Re
gi
on
al
 G
ro
ss
 D
om
es
tic
 P
ro
du
ct
 a
t C
ur
re
nt
 P
ric
es
 (2
00
0)
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 E
st
o
n
ia
C
en
tr
al
 
Es
to
n
ia
N
o
rt
h
-e
as
te
rn
 
Es
to
n
ia
 
W
es
te
rn
Es
to
n
ia
So
u
th
er
n
Es
to
n
ia
To
ta
l
G
D
P 
at
 m
ar
ke
t p
ric
es
, m
ill
io
n 
kr
oo
ns
52
,1
99
6,
12
7
6,
64
3
7,
87
8
14
,5
31
87
,3
79
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 re
gi
on
s t
o 
G
D
P, 
%
59
.8
7.
0
7.
6
9.
0
16
.6
10
0
M
ea
n 
an
nu
al
 p
op
ul
at
io
n
52
5,
56
4
14
4,
12
4 
17
9,
51
9
16
6,
19
4
35
4,
11
4
1,
36
9,
51
5
G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
, k
ro
on
s
99
,3
20
42
,5
11
37
,0
06
47
,4
02
41
,0
36
63
,8
03
G
D
P 
pe
r c
ap
ita
, %
 o
f E
sto
ni
an
 a
ve
ra
ge
15
5.
7
66
.6
58
.0
74
.3
64
.3
10
0
So
ur
ce
: 
Re
gi
on
al
 S
ta
tis
tic
s o
f E
sto
ni
a 
20
02
; S
ta
tis
tic
al
 O
ﬃ
ce
 o
f E
sto
ni
a 
20
03
, p
.1
47
.
167
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
density, at 31 people per square kilometer;1 however, more than one-third of the 
population is concentrated in the capital city, Tallinn, where 75–80% of all investments 
in Estonia are made. 
Extensive distances and geographical variation (e.g., the existence of large wetlands) 
pose particular challenges for the maintenance of a communications infrastructure. True, 
the electronic infrastructure of Estonia has reached the level of developed European states. 
Nevertheless, small communities have low capacity in this regard, and amalgamation 
would endanger the integrity of community ties and accessibility of services. 
The second speciﬁc challenge derives from Estonian history. Estonia acquired 
statehood only in 1918. Local government emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as 
institutions for the self-management of social issues under foreign (Russian) central rule 
and under the dominance of non-Estonian (Baltic German) regional elites (landlords). 
Hence, modern Estonian values of governance and local government mirror this implicit 
opposition—and even hostility—of the community to state structures, which are seen 
as both alien and alienating. Paradoxically, a defensive (as opposed to cooperative) 
stance towards the central government and bureaucracy was considerably strengthened 
during Soviet rule. At the same time, Estonians have close contacts and emotional 
aﬃliations with neighboring Nordic countries. During the Soviet regime, Nordic 
countries represented the dream or aspiration of quality of social life for the Estonian 
people. As Estonians were developing local government in the 1990s, many solutions 
were adopted from this region. But the system of local governance in Finland, and 
especially in Sweden, was historically rather diﬀerent from that of Estonia. In Finland, 
the animosity between local communities and central government was not so great, 
because, although within the Russian empire, the administrative elites at both levels 
were staﬀed by natives. Swedish local government has very deep democratic traditions 
of governance and consensual balance in the dimension of central–local relations. The 
particular model of autonomous local government (Montin 2000) adopted in Estonia, 
combined with the spirit of hostility to central authorities, have produced rather speciﬁc 
controversies in the Estonian local government system.
A third speciﬁc feature of Estonia is the existence of a large Russian-speaking minority 
(35% of the population) living in concentrated communities in Tallinn and in large towns 
in the northeastern part of Estonia. In the latter region they form the overwhelming 
majority. In Narva, which borders with Russia, the proportion of Estonians is around 
3%. In addition, the majority of Russian speakers do not have Estonian citizenship: 
the proportion of non-citizens in the Estonian population is 12% and citizens from the 
Russian Federation comprise 7%. Of all Russian-speaking residents, 12% have Estonian 
citizenship through naturalization (http://www.mig.ee/eng/CMB/). This causes ethnic 
and citizenship problems to be especially pronounced in community life. 
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1.2 The Formation of the New Local Government System 
A cornerstone of Estonian local governance—the municipality—was abolished by the 
Soviet regime. Local life was organized around production units: collective farms in 
rural areas, enterprises in urban areas. This took a heavy toll on local communities. 
The formation of a new system began at the end of 1989, with the adoption of the 
Local Government Act (LGA). This reform destroyed the Soviet politico-administrative 
hierarchy. It was targeted to the fast devolution of tasks and resources from central 
authorities to democratically elected local authorities, which were elected as early 
as 1989. First, the municipal level of local government was restored. The division 
of competence between regional and municipal governments was deﬁned, and the 
devolution of resources to autonomous budgets of the municipalities began. It involved 
a rather collaborative process between the tiers of government. After the presentation of 
a development plan, local communities would receive a mandate for government from 
a special commission of the Supreme Council of Estonia. The devolution of tasks was 
quite eﬀectively linked with an evaluation of the actual capacity of the local communities. 
Thus, the foundations for an Estonian local government system were established and 
legitimized far before formal state independence. 
After Estonia achieved independence in 1991, the Constituent Assembly began 
to work out a new system of government that departed from the 1937 constitution of 
pre-war Estonia. In the same year, intensive reform of the local government system was 
launched. This reform was largely aimed at increasing the capacity of the municipal level 
of government and severing the dependent relationship of regional self-government on 
the central government. During this period, a non-democratic, soft authoritarian regime 
prevailed in Estonia. That is, many of the initial ideas of local government reﬂected the 
previous situation (Sootla 2001), including the general attitude of central government 
toward the autonomy of regional government and elites.
Regional elites in the Soviet era had rather important potential power, being cohesive 
vis à vis the new and weak central political elites. In this distribution of actual power, 
the new political elites saw a serious danger to fast democratization and market reforms. 
This was the main reason why the constitution contained an implicit statement on 
the abolition of regional tiers of self-governing authorities. The Estonian Constitution 
adopted in 1992 provided ﬁrm guarantees for autonomous local government.
The new LGA adopted in 1993 was inﬂuenced by very speciﬁc situational variables, 
including, above all, the deep economic and social crisis and the power struggle between 
the new and old elites. The minister of the interior, as the main architect of the new 
act, described the institutional framework created by the act as a temporary one bearing 
many of the traits of a “childhood disease.” The most contentious idea was the abolition 
of the regional tier of self-governing authorities and the creation of a regional state 
administration based on specialized ﬁeld services. The county governor would only play 
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the role of a “proxy hand” of central government, coordinating the units and supervising 
the legality of actions and the enactment of legislation. 
Besides, the authors of the act considered the devolution of tasks of the central 
government to local authorities as a kind of unloading of its responsibilities and spreading 
of the political and ﬁscal risks of the economic and social crisis that had peaked in 1993. 
Local authorities did not resist these intentions, because they saw in it the possibility 
of increasing the amount of local government assets that would soon be privatized. 
The illusion that emerged at the end of the 1980s of an immanent beneﬁt from self-
governance was still strong among local elites. This enabled a one-way devolution of 
assets and assignments without economic and demographic calculations, which soon 
resulted in a crisis of capacity. This has been characteristic of all transition countries 
that launched decisive reforms based on democratic values.
In 1993, a quite centralized system of taxation was developed that was rather 
incongruent to the system of autonomous policymaking and spending practices of local 
government. The Local Taxes Act, adopted in 1994, was not able to raise revenues more 
than 0.8% to 1%. A system of revenue equalization was created to compensate for the 
capacity gap. It was developed with the aim of creating incentives for local authorities 
to increase their revenue base. The hidden agenda of that system was the neutralization 
of pressures from local authorities to receive compensation for their actual expenditures 
according to established indicators. 
After the controversies regarding the new system had become obvious, intensive 
eﬀorts were made to amend the existing acts. But the elaboration and legitimation of 
such proposals met with serious diﬃculties at the institutional level. During 1993–96, 
the leading agency of local government development was reorganized twice and ﬁnally 
became a department of the Ministry of the Interior. This Ministry was by deﬁnition 
the “police ministry,” where issues of PA building had secondary importance. Besides, 
since there were ten ministers in charge of the ministry between 1993 and 1999, they 
were not able to provide suﬃcient political input to accomplish serious reforms. Only 
minor amendments were made. 
Attempts at reform became especially active during the minority cabinet of M. 
Siimann (1997–99). A commission chaired by the Minister of Regional Aﬀairs (without 
portfolio,) P. Aru, elaborated a comprehensive conception of local government reform.2 
This conception tried to achieve a balance between the democratic dimension and the 
concern for capacity and eﬃciency, as well as balancing central–local relations. As this 
government was very consensual and conducive to dialogue, local government unions 
and other constituents had rather easy access to decision-makers in government. 
Unfortunately, this cabinet did not have suﬃcient decision-making and implementing 
capacities and the reform was not even launched. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the 
idea of autonomy and the interests of the new local elites were by this time so dominant 
that later attempts to create such a balance failed.
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The next lap of reform started in 1999 under a new coalition, which was the political 
successor of the coalition that adopted the Local Government Act in 1993. (Also, Prime 
Minister M. Laar took oﬃce for the second time.) Instead of the further development 
of autonomy and balance, the coalition launched reforms with a clear centralist spirit. 
On the one hand, county governors were de facto politicized and had become highly 
dependent on their masters at the central level. On the other hand, a comprehensive plan for 
the amalgamation of local government was developed. It presumed a sharp reduction in the 
number of LG units, from 245 to 80 or 110 units. The Aru commission had also proposed 
such amalgamation, but it was to be voluntary. The new reform was rather smooth at the 
initial stages, but stopped because of cleavages in the coalition, which ﬁnally dissolved. 
New attempts at reform in central–local relations have been made since 2003. The 
new conception of regional governance, aimed at creating a second self-governing level, 
has been developed. This reform generated substantial conﬂict over the LG issues between 
members of the coalition. The recent reform makes the formerly powerful governor 
into a weak oﬃcial subordinated to the minister of regional aﬀairs, appointed for a ﬁve 
year term after an open competition (a situation having considerable political impact). 
If the minister  ﬁnds that the governor has not demonstrated enough cooperation, he 
or she must resign.
1.3 The Internal Structure of Local Government 
The conﬁguration of vertical power in the Estonian system of governance is a “split 
hierarchy” that R. Bennett (1997) suggests is speciﬁc to Central and Eastern Europe. 
This is a combination of autonomous and fused3 (integrative4) models of local democracy, 
where a strong state hierarchy reaches the regional level but not the municipal. Self-
governance exists only at the municipal level and has wide autonomy within its area of 
competence. The legal status of local government is that of a territorial public corporation, 
i.e., all its residents are members of that legal corporation.
The institutional form of local government in Estonia is characterized by Mourizen 
and Svara (2000) as a council–mayor balanced model, where legislative and ﬁscal 
responsibilities are clearly separated from implementation and development. The 
executive is also rather independent formally, while council maintains political oversight 
through various checking mechanisms. Estonian legislation establishes only the 
framework of local institutional structures and procedures, so the division of authority 
between institutions and their concrete tasks can diﬀer substantially in individual 
communities. Analysis of these conﬁgurations is one of the aims of our research. 
Estonian local government is small in several ways. Firstly, the size of the local 
community is rather small in terms of managing the roles assigned (Table 3.2). Half of 
the municipalities have fewer than 2,000 habitants. 
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Table 3.2
Number and Percentage of Municipalities by Population
Population of 
Local Community
Number of 
Residents
Percent of 
Population
Number of 
Municipalities
Percent of 
Municipalities
less than 1,000 23,653 1.7 33.0 13.7
1,000–1,999 143,510 10.5 98.0 40.7
2,000–4,999 217,889 16.0 69.0 28.6
5,000–9,999 178,532 13.1 27.0 11.2
10,000–49,999 231,311 17.1 11.0 4.6
50,000 and more 567,691 41.6 3.0 1.2
Total 1,362,586 100.0 241.0 100.0
Source: Calculations based on the data from ESO (online). http://www.stat.ee/.
Secondly, the number of services directly provided by local government is quite 
small. Public management doctrine accepted in Estonia assumes that all activities not 
linked with the exercise of authority, and ones that could be managed in economically 
feasible ways by the private sector, should be delegated or devolved away from LG to 
the private sector. Revenues from economic activities formed only 5.64% of all revenues 
in 2002. If LG has invested in a sports hall, for example, the hall would be privatized as 
soon as it was economically proﬁtable. (For debates on the concept of decentralization, 
see Leemans 1970, Pollitt et al. 1998, and Wright 1996.)
Thirdly, the local administrations have a rather limited number of civil servants 
(Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3
 Size of the Local Administration as a Proportion of the Population 
in Local Communities [%]
Number of 
Civil Servants
Population Size of Local Community
less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
All 
Municipalities
1–6 53.8 13.0  2.3 — 10.9
7–10 42.3 70.0 25.0  9.4 40.4
11–15 — 12.0 50.0  5.7 —
16–25  3.8  4.0 21.6 54.7 19.9
25 and more —  1.0  1.1 30.2  6.7
Source: LGS 2002.
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A “ local bureaucracy” really only exists in the largest (5,000 and more habitants) 
and in some of the medium sized municipalities. 
Figure 3.1 characterizes the main actors at the local level and the type of relationship 
between them.
Figure 3.1
The Institutional Structure of Local Government in Estonia
Source: Sootla 2002.
Commissions Local Agencies
Local public
organizations
Local foundations 
and NGOs 
established by LG
Corporations 
owned or shared 
by LG
PRIVATE  SECTORMEMBERS OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT UNIT
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
LOCAL COUNCIL
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT
Government 
Commissions
Head of local 
council
Governor Major
Local government 
union
County governor
173
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
1.4 The Legal Foundations of the Local Government System 
 in Estonia
The main pillars of local government autonomy were introduced by the Constitution 
(Põhiseadus ja Põhiseaduse Assamblee) in 1997. The Estonian parliament (Riigikogu)
also ratiﬁed a European Local Government Charter on September 28, 1994. In addi-
tion, eight special acts on LG were elaborated and adopted:
 1. The Local Government Organization Act (LGA), adopted on June 2, 1993. 
From 1994 to 1999, 26 amendments were made to this act; 
 2. The Rural Municipality and City Budgets Act, adopted on June 16, 1993. 
Provisions concerning borrowing by a municipality are considered to be the 
most important amendments to the act;
 3. The Rural Municipality and City Budgets and State Budgets Correlation Act, 
adopted on December 13, 1995. Since 2001, interrelations of central and local 
budgets have been regulated by the State Budget Act; 
 4. The Local Taxes Act, adopted on September 21, 1994. The act largely followed 
the text of a similar act adopted in 1938, and did not take into account the 
substantial changes that had occurred since that time;
 5. The Territory of Estonia Administrative Division Act, adopted on February 22, 
1995; 
 6. The Local Government Council Election Act, adopted on May 29, 1996; 
 7. The Act of Cooperation of Local Government Unions, adopted on November 
6, 2002; and 
 8. https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=224392 regulates the status and 
activities of regional and national local government unions.
Local governments are also regulated by the following four very important general 
acts: 
 1. The Government of the Republic Act (GRA), adopted in December 1995, 
regulates the activities of government agencies, including the functions of county 
government in relation to the LG, as well as the right of LG unions to inﬂuence 
the nomination of the county governor;
 2. The Public Service Act, adopted on February 15, 1995; 
 3. The Act of Administrative Procedure, adopted in 2001, regulates legislative as 
well as administrative activities, ﬁrst of all through more exact deﬁnition of those 
activities and by providing more exact mechanisms in the implementation of 
those actions by local authorities. 
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 4. The Administrative Cooperation Act, adopted in 2003, regulates relations 
between local authorities and delegates its tasks or obligations as allowed by the 
law to the other units or subjects. 
There are numerous special and sectoral acts that regulate diﬀerent aspects and links 
of the local governance system. For instance, the Principles of Property Reform Act 
introduced the institution of municipal property and Rules of Municipalization of the 
State Property were adopted in 1992. It was last amended in 1999. Legal issues in the 
development of local government in Estonia are more thoroughly analyzed in comments 
on the Estonian Constitution (Eesti vabariigi 2002) and by the expert Commission of 
Amendments of the Constitution.
1.5 The Indicators Project in Estonia
The survey that produced the core data for the current study was carried out from 
December, 2002 to January, 2003. This was quite a complicated time for a survey, 
because it took place between two elections: local elections in October 2002 and 
parliamentary elections in early March 2003. Because they were busy organizing election 
campaigns, many council members and top oﬃcials had no time and no good will to 
answer the questionnaire. Also, new local councilors felt they lacked enough experience 
to answer some of the questions, which caused a high percentage of missing values in 
the database. 
The sampling procedure was carried out on the basis of statistical advice from the 
Tocqueville Research Center (T-RC). A list of municipalities obtained from the Statistical 
Oﬃce of Estonia (ESO) served as the sampling frame. According to the research design, 
two diﬀerent sub-samples were compiled. The sampling for the local councilors’ survey 
(LRS) was done by T-RC according to population size. If a municipality was sampled, 
all local councilors of that municipality were included in the study. The sample included 
120 municipalities of a possible 241 (n = 1,878). For the administrative oﬃcers’ survey 
(LGS), at least two top oﬃcials were selected from each of the 241 municipalities 
in the sampling frame. The sub-samples do not oﬀer much in all cases, as for some 
municipalities we have LGS data but no LRS data, if this municipality was not sampled 
for the councilors’ survey. 
Despite the complicated timing, we succeeded in meeting the response rate standard, 
with a rate of 56.5% for the LRS survey and 76.4% for the LGS survey. Table 3.4 shows 
the distribution of samples across the regions. 
An international format of LRS and LGS questionnaires was used, with minor 
adaptations derived from the peculiarities of the Estonian LG system. For example, 
Estonia does not have an elected mayor. Nongovernment organizations (NGOs) cannot 
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present their lists at local elections. Instead, a list of local citizens can be composed. Some 
changes were made given the extremely small size of Estonia and Estonian municipalities. 
These minor amendments have been necessary and will not harm the comparability of 
the data. The Estonian version of the questionnaires has been retranslated into English 
and checked for correctness and adequacy in the T-RC. The LRS contains 68, and the 
LGS questionnaire 95 items. 
Table 3.4
Distribution of Sent and Received Survey Samples by Region
Regions Included Counties Survey Samples
LRS 
Sent
LRS 
Returned
LGS 
Sent
LGS 
Returned
Western Estonia Hiiu, Saare, Lääne, Pärnu 307 128 66 51
Northeastern Estonia Lääne-viru, Ida-Viru 378 190 41 54
Northern Estonia Harju, Rapla, Järva, Tallinn 528 278 102 65
Central Estonia Jõgeva, Viljandi, Tartu 282 234 106 66
Southern Estonia Valga, Võru, Põlva 244 153 40 36
Total 1,739 983 355 272
Source: LGS 2002, LRS 2002.
LRS questionnaires were taken to the sites to test administrators and were gathered 
again from the municipal oﬃce a week later. LGS questionnaires were sent personally by 
post to the sampled respondents and returned in the same way to the research group. 
In addition to the original survey data, governmental databanks and other polling 
data have been used to analyze the state of local democracy. The National Electoral 
Committee and the Ministry of the Interior have provided most of the statistics employed 
in the current report. Diﬀerent opinion polls and research reports add valuable primary 
information for our investigation as well.
The survey data are analyzed against a number of background variables. Although 
data limits restrict this eﬀort in some cases (especially with LGS data), we succeeded in 
ﬁnding interesting evidence for many tendencies and theoretical assumptions. The more 
commonly used background variable was the size of municipality. Socioeconomic issues 
were also tested against the geographical position, namely, against the distance from 
the capital. Table 1.2 shows the population size categories in use and illustrates their 
statistical weight in the Estonian population and in the administrative structure.
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2. AUTONOMOUS, CONSTITUTIONAL, EFFECTIVE, 
 AND ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
2.1 Autonomous Local Government
The main aim of all local government reforms in Estonia in the 1990s and early 2000s 
was advertised as the further delegation of roles and assignments of government to the 
exclusive responsibility of local authorities. Even the need to merge LG units, i.e., the 
centralization of local government, was justiﬁed by the statement that the low capacity 
of these local units did not enable further decentralization. It seems that local autonomy 
has the highest rate of political support in Estonia. 
In formal terms, Estonian local government has considerable autonomy in all 
dimensions. However, formal autonomy did not ensure real autonomy for a majority 
of local communities over the most important aspects of local life (Sootla and Vergun 
2002). During the second part of the 1990s, a majority of constituents became aware 
that the democratic value of LG (self-governance) had been promoted at the expense 
of economic values and considerations of capacity. It is widely accepted now that the 
priority is to develop capacity, thus ensuring an increase in the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness 
of local communities. There are two contending approaches on how to realize these 
objectives. One promotes a centralizing strategy, primarily through the amalgamation 
of LG units and the development of partisan politics along national lines at the local 
level. The other view insists on the further radical decentralization of resources for the 
purpose of increasing local capacity. Neither of these approaches actually overcomes the 
dichotomy of democracy versus eﬃciency that was characteristic of the 1990s, because 
they rely on simple distributive eﬀects in the complex system of central–local power. 
There is still no general awareness that the crucial reason for discrepancies is unbalanced 
vertical power between the central and local authorities. A solution to the impasse of 
this dichotomy would be to introduce balances in central–local relations, ﬁrst of all by 
redeﬁning roles at the regional tier of governance. 
Our survey as well as previous analyses of recent developments have conﬁrmed this 
general diagnosis and enabled more detailed explanations of the controversial results 
of local autonomy in Estonia. Intergovernmental relations are the most problematic in 
comparison with other dimensions— four of the six most serious problems identiﬁed 
by local oﬃcials were in this domain.
177
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
2.1.1 Legal Autonomy
Autonomy in the legal sense can be measured as the extent to which:
 1. it is guaranteed by higher general acts, and in the ﬁrst instance, by the 
constitution;
 2. the central government only establishes the framework principles for managing 
local life; local authorities should have considerable discretion in developing 
the normative context for institution building and ﬁnding solutions for local 
issues;
 3. new competencies and assignments to LG are delegated with general consent 
and through participatory decision-making;
 4. the competencies and responsibilities are divided between tiers of government 
according to clear principles ensuring that the limits of those competencies and 
responsibilities are understood in a similar way by all tiers of government.
2.1.1.1 The Paradox of Constitutional Guarantees 
The main pillars of autonomy were enacted by the constitution of 1992. These were: an 
independent representative council (Ch. 156), an independent budget and the right to 
levy and collect taxes (Ch. 157), guarantees that the state cannot impose supplementary 
functions without funding from the state budget (Ch. 154), the right to form unions 
and joint agencies with other municipalities (Ch. 159), and the provision that the 
boundaries of municipal units shall not be altered without considering the opinion 
of the municipalities concerned. While these guarantees are meant to protect local 
autonomy, they can not ensure it in practice. Autonomy is not an independent variable: 
the extent to which it exists and the ability to retain it depend on the distribution of 
power and consequently on other resources between tiers of government. In cases 
where the general context does not support the development of real autonomy, these 
same constitutional provisions tend to become constraints in the development of more 
balanced central–local relations.
2.1.1.2 Discretion in Issuing Own Legislation
Estonian legislation mainly establishes framework principles and norms for local 
legislation. Exceptions are the regulation of democratic processes and institutions at 
the local level, on the one hand, and technical standards and procedures, on the other 
hand. Thus, the Local Government Council Election Act is the only constitutional 
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act regulating LG. Also, the Local Government Organization Act (LGA) contains the 
most detailed provisions concerning the formation, structure, and working procedures 
of council and the status of its members. The LGA has only a few general provisions 
concerning LG structure. Most of the actual life of the community is regulated by acts 
adopted by local councils themselves. Local government has its statutes and numerous 
orders, regulations, guidelines, etc. For this reason, local oﬃcials do not see meaningful 
restraints against rearranging and restructuring local governance. Hence, the main 
problem is to ascertain whether these acts are in congruence with higher laws and the 
basic rights of citizens. This dimension of autonomy (i.e., legislative supervision) will 
be considered in section three.
In any case, higher authorities cannot directly intervene in LG aﬀairs. The county 
government has the right of ex post legal supervision over adopted acts and—after 
disagreement with local authorities concerning the legality of an act—can appeal to the 
Legal Chancellor. The latter can only express an opinion and make a proposal to resolve 
the controversy. Ultimately, only the court has the authority to impose a resolution to a 
disagreement. Also, the State Audit cannot impose control on local governments, except 
over the use of money transferred to local authorities for special and targeted use. 
Local governments have substantial autonomy in issuing legislation on governance 
and management. Acts of the central government have established detailed and extensive 
standards of service and activities, rules, quality indicators (safety), etc., that are obligatory 
for everyone who is delivering or preparing to deliver these services. In the last few years, 
many of these standards were adopted in order to comply with EU requirements, causing 
considerable diﬃculties, especially at the local level.
Local (relatively conservative) Estonian culture is generally supportive of these 
standards. However, the survey revealed that these centrally established standards and 
norms cause rather important problems at the local level (mean of 4.6 on a 7-point scale). 
Two reasons can explain this dissatisfaction. First, the central government establishes 
universal standards that can be too rigid for one type of municipality and too formal 
for others, making compliance burdensome and sometimes senseless. For instance, it 
is impossible to apply the same norms and standards to large schools as to small village 
elementary schools. In localities which deliver speciﬁc services it is extremely diﬃcult to 
follow those standards. For other, smaller localities, the majority of services and standards 
are not relevant. This may explain why the smallest local governments expressed less 
trouble with those standards than the largest ones (the diﬀerence in intensity of the 
problem was 0.52). 
A second reason for dissatisfaction is that the majority of these standards are 
established by government or ministerial legislation that is frequently not only universal 
but also technically too complicated, subject to easy change, and controversial. An 
example of a technical regulation is the Law on Accounting, which local governments 
should and usually do strictly follow in their budgeting process. The Ministry of Finance 
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has established the format of an annual budget report. Problems emerge not only because 
the required format changes almost annually, but because the LG must ﬁll in all items, 
sub-items, and sub-sub-items of the budget classiﬁcation, marking “zero” on the majority 
of them. Local oﬃcials complete these forms knowing that the likelihood of them being 
analyzed with the aim of improving the process is extremely small.
2.1.1.3 Two Sides of a Coin: The Assignment and Interpretation of Roles
Estonian local governments have extensive legal autonomy, except for the two cases 
mentioned previously. This is conﬁrmed in our survey results (see Table 3.5). However, 
our survey revealed that two other basic premises of local autonomy are rather 
underdeveloped in Estonia (Table 3.5). The delegation of too many responsibilities 
without supplementary resources and capacity considerations to local authorities by 
central government was deﬁned as the most urgent problem of local governance.
Table 3.5
Local Oﬃcials’ Assessment of Intensity of Problems 
in Intergovernmental Relations (7-Point Scale*)
Problems Urgency of 
the Problem
Assessment of importance 
of the Problem
1. Too many responsibilities assigned to the municipality 
by central government, given present resources
1 5.91
2. Unclear division of responsibility between local and 
central authorities
4 4.67
3. Norms and standards imposed in connection with 
responsibilities assigned by central government are 
too restrictive
5 4.59
4. Too many restrictions on reorganization of local 
organizations
16 3.04
5. County government and regional oﬃces intervene 
into LG aﬀairs
21 2.65
6. Absence of intermediate level council between local 
and central representative authorities
22 2.51
Note: * 1—not important at all; 7—very important.
Source: LGS 2002.
Dissatisfaction with mechanisms for the assignment of competencies was not linked 
with the size or capacity of local communities; i.e., it was major problem of the LG 
system in general.
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The second general problem—fourth in terms of urgency—was the unclear division 
of tasks. Because of this, there is no common understanding of scope by diﬀerent tiers. 
What would be the reason why these aspects of genuine autonomy have not been 
developed, or why the principles of autonomy have been violated? 
In the Local Government Act, the roles of LG were deﬁned rather explicitly as a 
deﬁnitive list of areas and tasks assigned to it. Confusion in the shared interpretation of 
the roles and the legality (corresponding to Ch. 154 of the constitution) of delegating 
certain roles without consent or ﬁnancial resources emerged after central authorities 
began to assign new responsibilities to LG through special legislation. Both in the 
substance of the tasks assigned to local government and in the mechanisms for dividing 
and delegating the tasks, the principles of autonomy were neglected. 
Figure 3.2
LGs’ Rating* of the Intensity of the Problem of Too Many Responsibilities [%] 
Note: * 1—not important at all; 7—very important.
Source: LGS 2002.
2.1.1.3.1 Substance of the Tasks That Can Be Delegated
In this dimension no normatively approved and explicit criteria have yet been developed 
for the deﬁnition (identiﬁcation) and diﬀerentiation of local, but especially regional and 
central government, tasks, and roles.
At the earliest stage of LG development, local elites considered the delegation of 
responsibilities and resources as a value in itself. It was assumed that the delegation of 
responsibilities would automatically increase the power and capacity of local governments 
vis à vis central government. Therefore, they did not insist on a clear deﬁnition either 
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of central government roles or of their own. Later on, when their decreasing capacity 
to implement growing tasks became obvious, a favorable political context for initiating 
discourse on this issue did not emerge. Instead, the main eﬀorts of LG were aimed 
at negotiating as much support as possible from the central budget. Frequently, this 
involved competition with other LGs. This abstract opposition between poorly deﬁned 
local and central roles has formed the general institutional context of intergovernmental 
relations to the present day. Current practice has caused rapidly increasing diﬀerences 
in LG capacity. Consequently, diﬀerent needs and interests have emerged concerning 
capacity development. For instance, the impact of changes in the tax system would be 
extremely divergent, so the development of the revenue basis via tax reform becomes 
largely unfeasible. This makes the elaboration of a common position in negotiations 
with central government very diﬃcult and is one of the reasons for the imbalance in 
central local relations.
In this competitive political environment, power has become a decisive factor in the 
deﬁnition of tasks as either local or central. Local governments are faced with the fact 
that, by law, the central legislative body can simply delegate a particular supplementary 
task because considers it local. Moreover, even in the case of the delegation of a task 
that was mutually understood as a central government responsibility, the ﬁnancial 
support for that task has not followed, because central government considers that the 
support is covered by the general support fund, negotiated annually between tiers of 
government.
Much confusion derives from the denial of the existence of speciﬁc regional tasks 
and responsibilities of governance. The statement that regional tasks and roles do not 
exist in Estonia was one of justiﬁcations for the abolition of the second tier of local 
government. Actually, many tasks of a regional nature have remained in the competence 
of municipalities. Policy implementation at the regional level has been assigned to 
numerous central government ﬁeld agencies, which ought to be coordinated by the 
county governor. During the 1990s, the independent powers of the county governor 
were gradually diminished through the politicization of that institution and the 
implementation of regional tasks was delayed.
In sum, there have been no explicit criteria to guide the discussion of whether the 
division and delegation of tasks by the central government in special legislation are 
justiﬁed, appropriate, and feasible. It has never been clear whether particular tasks are 
assigned to the LG because they are better implemented there, or whether the central 
government simply wants to shift responsibility for the implementation of labor and 
resource intensive tasks to the local government. 
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2.1.1.3.2 Mechanisms for the Delegation of Tasks 
An eﬃcient process for negotiations between central and local authorities has not 
emerged, primarily because of the lack of a regional tier. This tier of government would 
mediate and reconcile diﬀerences in the needs and interests of local communities, and 
then condense and articulate them in negotiations with central authorities.
In the existing arrangement of vertical power, the role of mediator of LG interests was 
assigned to LG unions, organized on a voluntary basis at the regional as well as national levels. 
(There are two national unions, one for towns and another for parishes). These representative 
bodies could be a suitable means for settling disputes between LG units and in developing 
concrete cooperative projects, etc. But they have not been able to focus and articulate the joint 
interests and positions of LGs, even in annual negotiations over the scope and principles of 
the distribution of general and other support funds. Besides, LG unions have been formally 
invited to participate in the process of harmonization of legislation. But they only have a 
limited advisory role in the process, and the government cabinet has ignored the majority of 
its substantive proposals concerning the delegation of new assignments (Meinvald 2002). 
In the 1990s, a speciﬁc, semi-formal council of county governors played an eﬀective 
role in articulating joint local interests when major conﬂicts in intergovernmental 
relations emerged. From the end of the 1990s, the politicization of county governors 
substantially diminished the role of this body. But the independent regional tier of 
governance could be eﬀective, not only in neutralizing implementation problems of LGs 
with a weak capacity, but especially as balancing force in negotiations over delegation of 
reponsibilities, which is one of the crucial premises of legal autonomy. Most importantly, 
local oﬃcials did not consider the creation of a second tier as a solution to what they 
saw as a critical state of aﬀairs in local central relations (Table 3.5).
To a considerable extent, local governments either ceased to be capable of dealing 
with all the tasks that were assigned to them, or they implemented those tasks at the 
expense of (lower) quality and (limited) access. Central authorities were aware of 
that implementation gap but did not develop any accountability mechanisms for the 
implementation of assigned tasks. This was because a call for accountability and sanctions 
would trigger a discussion over the constitutional responsibility of central government 
and could force it to attach resources to delegated assignments. 
These trends are also conﬁrmed in the survey. Only one-ﬁfth (22%) of municipalities 
are currently able to handle all the assignments of LG in a more or less satisfactory way 
(Figure 3.3), and one-ﬁfth are unable to handle most tasks (25.5%).
Among smaller (fewer than 2,000 habitants) communities, the proportion of 
those who cannot manage at all was 35%–38%, whereas in larger communities this 
proportion was 16%–17%. The assessment of the capacity to completely manage assigned 
responsibilities has been controversial: the optimism of rural communities concerning 
complete management was even slightly higher than that of towns. 
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Figure 3.3
Capability of Local Governments to Implement Assigned Tasks [%] 
Source: LGS 2002.
 
At the same time, our survey revealed that 76% of LGs have ﬁnanced services and 
activities that are not formally assigned by the law, and the ﬁgure rises to 86.2% among 
mid-sized LG units. The proportion of towns with such expenditures was much lower 
(68.1%), because LG usually ﬁnances local newspapers, local museums, and the local 
churches that in larger towns are either commercial enterprises or managed by central 
(county) government. Recently, a couple of university colleges were established in 
smaller towns, and these were supported by local authorities. This practice, aimed to 
better meet the needs of local inhabitants, has caused conﬂicts with central authorities 
during the negotiation over support funds, especially investments. The latter argue that 
the LG must have ﬁnancial reserves if it could aﬀord to ﬁnance tasks not prescribed by 
the law and was able direct these funds to investments.
In this situation of vague deﬁnitions and controversial interpretations of local tasks, 
the central government position has been rather strict. It departs from the presumption 
of its own immunity in the deﬁnition of division of responsibilities. On the one hand, 
central authorities have not accepted the proposed partnership of local authorities in 
developing more user-friendly services that are formally the responsibility of central 
authorities. On the other hand, they deny the possibility of local authorities delegating 
tasks back to higher government authorities in cases where they have insuﬃcient capacity 
themselves. As the Nordic experience of autonomous local governance has shown, a 
negotiated division of assignments between tiers of local government would allow the 
kind of ﬂexibility required to solve the problem of capacity diﬀerences and would be 
more successful than the forced amalgamation of LG units.
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2.1.2 Discrepancies in the Problems, Actions, and Power of Local Authorities
A survey carried out in Estonia by the research program, “Democracy and Local Governance,”5 
analyzed the alignment between the most urgent problems in the community, the actual 
LG agenda, and LG powers to solve the diﬀerent problems (Vöörmann 2001). The survey 
results (see Table 3.6) indicate that unemployment, economic development, poverty, and 
public safety appeared to be the most urgent issues in the local community. But except for 
the problem of pollution, these issues have received only minor attention in the LG agenda 
(and budget), since they are within the competence of central government and can not be 
eﬀectively carried out by regional ﬁeld oﬃces that are largely unresponsive to local needs.
Instead, local authorities’ attention has been focused on culture, environmental 
protection, education, health, and social problems, mainly because they possess enough 
powers to deal with these. This illustrates the deep discrepancy between problems, actions, 
and responsibilities. Local governments have too few powers to solve the problems that 
are the most urgent. At the same time, other institutions that might be responsible may 
have little interest in settling those problems at the local community level, because of 
their extensive autonomy. 
Table 3.6
Community Problems Reported by Survey Respondents [%]
Problems Problem Very Serious 
in Community
Active Actions Taken by 
Authorities
Powers of Local 
Authorities to Solve 
Problems
Culture and recreation 10 32 (1) 93
Education 5 24 (2) 81
Public improvements 15 (6) 15 (6) 79
Social improvements 12 (8) 18 (5) 77
Housing 13 (7) 10 69
Pollution 15 (5) 23 (3) 68
Health 4 22 (4) 67
Ethnic relations 3 12 58
Public safety 23 (4) 13 (7) 47
Unemployment 51 (1) 5 32
Economic growth 43 (2) 7 31
Poverty 34 (3) 2 25
Source: Vöörmann 2001.
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Local governments are incapable of dealing with the most urgent problems not only 
because of insuﬃcient internal capacity, but because these problems (like public safety 
and unemployment) are by deﬁnition regional policy problems, even though they are 
delegated to local authorities. As indicated in the survey, even towns were not able to 
deal with those regional problems, so the solution would not be in the distribution of 
more resources to local authorities, but in assigning tasks to the appropriate levels. 
 
2.1.3 Fiscal Autonomy
The best surrogate indicator of local ﬁscal autonomy is the proportion of own revenues, 
and especially own tax revenues of local authorities. This indicates whether the central 
government considers it important to develop the revenue and tax basis of local 
authorities, or prefers to redistribute collected taxes via various support schemes.
The second qualitative indicator of local autonomy is government support via general 
support grants, aimed at increasing the capacity of the local community. Where the 
general grants prevail, the government considers local authorities to be arms length in 
implementing central government policy at the local level. 
The third qualitative indicator of real autonomy is the balance between having the 
possibility to develop an own revenue basis, and having discretion in the planning and 
spending of budget revenues.
If we judge by the oﬃcial statistics on local ﬁnances, Estonia is a country with 
rather independent local ﬁnances. Local government expenditures in comparison 
with government expenditures were among the highest (30.6%) of all CEE countries, 
comparable even with the expenditures (34.0%) of the two-tier Polish local government 
system. Estonia also had a rather high proportion of independent and shared revenue, 
and one of the smallest proportions of government grants in local budgets of all the 
CEE countries in 1999 (Horváth 2000).
The constitution of Estonia provides wide ranging guarantees for budget autonomy. 
As previously noted, however, this constitutional provision alone cannot guarantee real 
autonomy in the budget process. Central government may assign new responsibilities, 
partly because there is no clear agreement on what are local and what are central 
government responsibilities. This is a problem in many autonomous systems of local 
government. Estonia does not have an eﬃcient process for reaching agreement about 
the actual delegation of responsibilities. 
Besides the general indicator “own revenues,” which, as we will see later, can be 
manipulated, there should also be more complex indicators that enable us to make 
judgments about autonomy in ﬁnancial management and strategies, and also to make 
valid comparisons between countries. Support grants to autonomous local governments, 
for example, could be considerable in certain geographically speciﬁc communities or 
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local governments which implement a large number of state tasks. Departing from the 
subsidiarity principle (Vanberg 1997), a more profound criterion for assessing ﬁscal 
autonomy would be ﬁscal sustainability. Sustainable budgeting means, primarily, that 
the autonomy of a local community in the development of both its revenue base and 
its spending (social and economic) strategy is balanced. Furthermore, in the case of 
autonomous ﬁnances, the aim of central government support is the development of 
the sustainable capacity of local government via general grants. The centralizing trend, 
on the other hand, saw local government at arms length in the implementation of its 
policy at the local level. Therefore, central government prefers to deliver support via 
various types of categorical grants. 
The survey indicated that the obstacles to developing true ﬁscal autonomy are 
considerable in comparison with other problems. Low discretion to determine local 
revenue was named as the second most serious problem (with a mean of 4.8 on the 
seven-point scale, where seven indicates the greatest importance of the problem).
Table 3.7
Assessment of the Intensity of Problems in Intergovernmental Relations 
by Local Oﬃcials (7-Point Scale*)
Problems Urgency of the Problem Assessment of
Importance of the Problem
1. Too little discretion for municipal 
authorities in determining local revenue 2 4.87
2. Too little discretion in formulating 
economic strategy of municipality 10 3.77
Note: * 1—not important at all; 7—very important.
Source: LGS 2002.
The need to widen the revenue base was very urgent for smaller LGs. The urgency 
gradually decreases with the increase of the size of the LG (Figure 3.4). In the largest 
communities the problem ceases to be urgent. 
Low discretion in formulating local economic policy (mean of 3.77) was assessed as 
the tenth most important problem. Also, the correlation between these problems was 
considerable (Pierson correlation of 0.585). That is, it is expected that diﬃculties in 
determining economic strategy derive mostly from ﬁnancial restraints (in comparison 
with restraints caused by central regulations). 
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Figure 3.4
Intensity of Problems of Fiscal Autonomy of Estonian Local Governments 
According to Size of Community (7-Point Scale*)
Note: * 1—not important at all; 7—very important.
Source: LGS 2002.
As noted previously, Estonian local governments have rather wide discretion over 
spending in formal terms, but fairly serious constraints in developing own revenues, 
including borrowing. This discrepancy emerged because the principles of autonomous 
budgeting, especially the discretion to develop local policy for the structure of 
expenditures, were formulated in an earlier, “romantic” stage of LG reforms. LG revenue 
policy and government support schemes were developed much later, i.e., in tandem 
with the new taxation system in 1993–94, when Estonia was in a deep economic and 
ﬁscal crisis and when a more centralist approach was the only responsible national ﬁscal 
policy. The taxation laws were adopted at the end of 1993 and the Local Taxes Act was 
adopted as late as September 1994, more than a year after the enforcement of the Local 
Government Act. At that time, central government tried to establish as much control 
as possible over ﬁnances and over possible sources of revenue to soften the ﬁscal crisis 
at the national level. The other side of coin was the extensive delegation of roles to LG 
without assessing to what extent LG would be able to manage these tasks and without 
any preparatory stage, even at the level of social and economic forecasts. The majority of 
faulty LG loans throughout the 1990s were caused by the need to manage the explosive 
enhancement of tasks of LG after the adoption of the LGA in 1993. A proportion of 
the investments made in this period was not intended to achieve future economic gains 
and became a burden to LG budgets without much in the way of outcomes. At the same 
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time, following its general libertarian premises, the government of the day was not much 
concerned about the possible ﬁscal outcomes of LG spending policy. 
The general trend in the development of LG revenues at the beginning of the 2000s 
was a decrease in own revenues and an increase in the role of government support,6 
primarily at the expense of very speciﬁcally targeted grants. Between 2000 and 2002, 
LG budget revenues increased 1.55 times, whereas the support funds increased 2.36 
times. From 2000 to 2002, the proportion of own revenues decreased from 50.99% to 
43.87%. Furthermore, Estonian statistical methods count shared taxes as own revenues, 
although the role of local taxes in Estonia is around 1%.
The role of the government support fund increased from 15.36% to 23.47%. At 
the same time, however, responsibility for the teachers’ payroll was transferred from 
the central government budget directly to the local government budget. The general 
government grant decreased from 9.6% in 1999 to 8.7% in 2001. The use of this grant 
as a means of increasing LG general capacity is the main indicator of a policy of LG 
autonomy. Increasing the role of targeted or conditional grants, on the other hand, 
indicates that central government views local government as an agent in implementing 
its policy objectives at the local level, i.e., a centralizing tendency. 
Although the general support fund is not a very large item in total budget revenues, 
it could form the major proportion of the revenues of smaller localities. It is distributed 
according to a certain formula that takes into account the proportion of own revenues 
in the previous years. In this respect, the mechanism of redistribution supports ﬁscal 
autonomy. However, the amount of this fund is determined during the annual negotiations 
between the government delegation and the Cooperation Assembly of the Local 
Government Associations. These negotiations are an important and interesting indicator 
of local autonomy. The Assembly consists of representatives of local authorities, which 
have rather diﬀerent interests in the distribution of those funds as well as the aspects of 
LG development that ought to be discussed during these discussions. The Assembly has 
not yet been able to arrive at a common position in these negotiations, and this is the 
main reason why a mutually acceptable decision has not been made. According to the 
rules of negotiations, if a consensus is not reached, the proposal of central government 
concerning the amount of the fund is taken as the ﬁnal decision of negotiations. 
The structure and mechanisms for the allocation of investments are also rather 
interesting from the perspective of intergovernmental relations. LG investments come 
from various sources and not all of them are mirrored in the LG budgets. In 2001, 2.1% 
of all expenditures were government-earmarked supports to LG investments and 2% were 
general investment aid. The National Investment Program (NIP) made 5.5% of investments 
via ministerial budgets. Further resources were provided by various foundations or grants 
that were managed independently and have independent accountability and ﬁnancing. 
Before 2001, the distribution of resources from the NIP was made at the level of 
regional authorities, as the result of collective decision-making in which LG associations 
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played a central role. The county governor was the mediator in this process. Beginning 
in 2001, line ministries of central government started to distribute the investments 
according to a proposal from the county government. One part of those investments 
was transferred to the local government balance sheet as an in-kind contribution, and 
was not mirrored in local government budgets.
The main argument for this change was the need for better coordination of the 
investment policy at the regional level. Another reason was the relatively frequent use 
of investment money for purposes not included in the initial target, or not reﬂecting 
the priorities of the Development Plan (DP). The latter is a normative requirement of 
investments made by the NIP.
Our assessment of the changes in the distribution of investments after the NIP 
distribution leads us to conclude that the new practice of investment grants has 
achieved the main aims of the reform (Table 3.8). Investments have become much 
better targeted (+32.1) and they correspond more to the development plan (+10.1). In 
other areas the outcomes were not as good. The most negative consequence mentioned 
was the distribution of investments to those who do not need them the most (–50.0), 
an imbalance in the sectoral distribution of investments (–39.4), and the diminishing 
role of investments that have regional importance (–28,4). 
Table 3.8
Evaluation of Changes in the Distribution of Investments via the National 
Investment Program (4-Point Scale*) 
Distribution of Investments Assessment by Respondents [%]
Completely 
Satisfied
Rather 
Satisfied
 Not Very 
Satisfied
Absolutely 
Not 
Satisfied
Do not 
Know
Investments were made more in 
congruence with DP
18.9 31.7 13.2 26.9 9.3
Investments were more expedient 34.1 25.3 11.4 15.7 13.5
Investments were more cost-eﬀective; 
emergence of economy of scale
15.2 21.0 12.5 23.2 28.1
Investments were more balanced in the 
sectoral dimension
0.9 19.0 25.8 23.5 30.8
Investments were more targeted to the 
common needs of LG in the region 
8.5 21.0 28.1 29.0 13.4
Investments were received by those who 
need them most
4.0 11.9 29.6 40.3 14.2
Note: * 1—completely satisﬁed; 4—absolutely not satisﬁed.
Source: LGS 2002.
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To summarize, the research showed a rather extensive formal autonomy of LG budgets, 
but this autonomy was considerably constrained by the limited opportunity to create 
own revenues. The general trend in the development of central–local ﬁscal relations has 
been centralization. As the case of the NIP indicated, centralization can increase ﬁscal 
discipline, but it also considerably decreases the eﬀective targeting of investments.
2.1.4 Conclusion
Estonian local governments have extensive formal autonomy in the normative and ﬁscal 
spheres. But this formal framework has not been conducive to actual autonomy and, hence, 
the development of local democracy. From the late 1990s we saw extensive attempts to 
centralize and the successful promotion of this trend. The limits of further decentralization 
under the current LG system were openly recognized by leading politicians. 
On the one hand, local authorities had extensive autonomy in issuing their own 
legislation and (mainly) framework laws that directly regulate local government activities. 
On the other hand, a massive delegation of tasks to local authorities was authorized 
through special legislation. As a rule, this delegation of tasks occurs without discussion 
and without the consent of local authorities. There are two main reasons for this 
discrepancy: ﬁrst, the weakened role of county governors and the low capacity of LG 
associations as a balancing force and as a center of consolidation of local interests; and 
second, the unclear deﬁnition of central, regional, and local tasks that enables the main 
guarantees of the constitution to be by-passed. 
There is also a gradual trend away from local autonomy in ﬁscal aﬀairs. An imbalance 
between the freedom to build the revenue base and the spending of LGs was inserted into 
public budgeting and taxation from the outset. Besides the diminishing level of semi-own 
revenues, the general logic of government support favored targeted grants that are more 
appropriate to a non-autonomous system. Our analysis of the centralization of distribution 
through the National Investment Fund demonstrated that the new process is much less 
able to meet local needs than the previous, more decentralized system. Ultimately, local 
authorities are not able to solve the most pressing problems of local life. Furthermore, they 
have no recourse or process available through which they could require responsiveness 
from those public institutions that are formally responsible for those tasks.
Our survey revealed that local political elites still hold strong localist attitudes (local 
problems are their priority), although solutions to the core problems of local autonomy 
rely on the macro-level. That is, local governance and its problems are still considered 
as separate and opposite to the aims and problems of national governance. This kind 
of stance did not enable local authorities to achieve a joint position in the annual 
negotiations with central authorities. 
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An impressive percentage of councilors (34.8%) preferred a balance of priorities 
between local and national problems. Respondents from larger local communities (5,000 
inhabitants or more) were more supportive of balance (41%) than average respondents. 
However, an absolute majority expressed clear support for the priority of local problems 
(55.5%) vis à vis national ones (19.2%). 
This inclination towards localist values is not correlated with local autonomy as a 
liberal-democratic value in our survey. Right-wing politicians (councilors) supported 
the amalgamation of LG units as frequently as left-wing politicians, because of 
their ineﬃciency. But the mean support towards the idea of amalgamation diﬀered 
tremendously between representatives of smaller (2,000 or fewer inhabitants) and 
larger communities (2.67 versus 5.25). Obviously, larger communities value their own 
autonomy and are more prone to favor merging smaller units—in other words, to absorb 
the smaller units’ resources into their own community and budget. That is, with respect 
to LG amalgamation, they stood for strict centralization and an instrumental approach 
that is opposite to the values of organic local autonomy. 
Symptomatically, the other two problems of intergovernmental relations were in 
the class of “least important” ones. Local oﬃcials did not consider the intervention of 
regional government oﬃces into the management of local authorities as the meaningful 
problem. Larger communities identiﬁed it as a problem of “minor importance” (almost 3 
on a 7-point scale). The problem of the absence of regional local government, which has 
been at the core of the controversy over local autonomy in Estonia, appeared to be even 
less important for them. Thus, instead of supporting the creation of a vertical balance 
of power, Estonian local oﬃcials are still searching for solutions to the problem of local 
sustainability in the redistribution of resources at the local level. In this institutional 
context, any successful reform of local government that could solve the main problems 
of local autonomy would not be politically feasible.
2.2 Consitutional Local Government
As we have demonstrated, local autonomy would not be an unconditional basis for local 
democracy. Autonomy could play this role only if it were real, i.e., if it departed from 
the principle of subsidiarity and ensured self-sustaining development. We turn now 
to the next major aspect of local democracy: the institutional context. The following 
indicators of local democracy provide the basis for our discussion: 
 1. The ability to ensure the rule of law and rights at various levels: human, civil, 
political, and social rights; 
 2. Local government capacity and willingness to ensure access of citizens to the 
process of governance;
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 3. The existence of eﬀective control mechanisms at the local level. In this con-
nection, the ability to combat corruption would also be an indicator of local 
democracy. It is expected that autonomous local governments mostly rely on 
mechanisms of political control and participation. Therefore, we would not 
expect to see very strong evidence of eﬀective administrative control mechanisms, 
but rather, of inchanpers of local politics and local civil society;
 4. Presumably the most important indicator of local democracy—the existence of 
ﬂexible institutional checks and balances between the main power actors.
2.2.1 Civil and Political Rights
In Estonia, the issue of civil and political rights is linked with the rather complex and 
widely debated problem of citizenship. The citizenship problem dates back to 1940, 
when the Estonian state was unlawfully occupied and destroyed, but the citizenship 
of residents remained recognized de jure by international law. From this presumption, 
the principle of legal succession was adopted as the basis for the restoration of Estonian 
statehood after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Estonia also inherited basic legal norms 
from the pre-war Estonian Republic, including the law of citizenship that was restored 
with considerable amendments at the beginning of 1992. Those who came to Estonia 
after the date of occupation did not automatically acquire citizenship, because Estonia 
recognizes the “right of blood” principle of citizenship. Hence, those persons have to 
apply according to this law of citizenship. 
As a result, 20% of residents do not currently have citizenship in Estonia. It follows 
that these people do not have the political rights that citizens have, among them the right 
to vote in parliamentary elections, the right to create organizations, etc. In the 1990s, 
several parties were established by Russian-speaking citizens. The number of (primarily 
young) Russian-speaking people gradually increased from election to election. But Russian 
parties ceased to be represented in the Estonian parliament after the elections of 2003. 
At the local level, there are somewhat diﬀerent solutions to the problem of political 
rights than at national level. The two main issues have been formal legal rights and the 
language issue. Before the local elections of 1996, amendments to the Law of Local 
Elections were adopted. Residents with a permanent resident permit acquired the 
passive right to vote in local elections. Also, to participate in the elections, Estonian 
citizens must be permanent residents of certain local communities, but without any 
time qualiﬁcation. This amendment was introduced largely because of pressure from 
the OSCE. After the elections, many Russian-speaking councilors were elected. But 
in areas where Russians form a large community, they often had a weak knowledge of 
the Estonian language. In 1998, the law was amended to include the requirement of 
knowledge of the oﬃcial state language by councilors. In November 2001, because of 
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pressure from the EU, this provision was abolished and another was added. The Estonian 
language was deﬁned as the oﬃcial language of local councils, but if the majority of 
the residents and councilors spoke another language, the council could use another 
working language with the permission of the government. This provision came into 
force after the 2002 elections, and the ﬁrst applications to use Russian in Narva and 
Sillamae councils have been made. 
The other issue was the Russian-language secondary schools. In the mid-1990s, 
The Law of Gymnasiums and Basic Schools stopped the ﬁnancing of teaching in the 
Russian language at the secondary school level, but the deadline for this was postponed 
to 2007. In 2002, a new amendment delegated this decision to the local level, as in the 
previous case. According to the new law, the school council must apply for permission to 
continue teaching in Russian and the decision must be approved by the local government 
and the cabinet. 
The right to organize, including the right to form and to be involved in political 
parties and national minority organizations, is also linked with citizenship rights. In 1925, 
Estonia adopted a Law on Cultural Autonomy that was exemplary in Europe and widely 
publicized by the League of Nations. A new law on cultural autonomy was adopted in 
1993, giving cultural groups with long-term roots on Estonian soil the right to form 
autonomous organizations. Currently, the Association of Nations in Estonia includes 
24 organizations of national minorities (http://www.ngonet.ee/nationalminorities).
2.2.2 The Rule of Law
The level of compliance with the law in Estonian political culture is rather high, but our 
research revealed that the existing laws lack legitimacy among the population. While 
58% of residents agreed that the majority of Estonians respect and follow laws, 30% did 
not agree and 12% could not answer. Only 40% thought that the constitution is good 
and just and 36% disagreed with the statement (Rikmann and Lagerspetz 2002).
Estonia has conventional mechanisms for ensuring the rule of law. The highest 
judicial institution is the court, which has three levels. Estonia does not have a 
constitutional court. The higher level court—the state court—serves simultaneously as 
interpreter of legislation to ensure it conforms to the constitution. The Legal Chancellor 
exercises general supervision over the observance of constitutional rights, ensures the 
correspondence of legislation to the constitution, and supervises LG acts. The task of 
legal ex post supervision is exercised by the county governor. Both of them have only 
a supervisory role and do not act as authorities in conﬂict resolution. Thus, there is 
double system of legal supervision over the legality of LG activities. 
The legal chancellor acts also as ombudsman, but only in settling relations between 
citizens and state agencies. There is no institution of ombudsman at the local level. In 
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cases of violation of rights of residents and their organizations, application can be made 
directly to the administrative court. Residents have the additional recourse (according 
to the LGA, ch. 33) of requiring the local council and government to amend adopted 
normative documents that unlawfully restrict their rights.
The legal chancellor prepares an annual report about his or her activities in ensuring 
the correspondence of local acts to the superior legal acts. The last report was prepared in 
the autumn of 2002, and covers a one-year period (http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/index). 
In one year, the legal chancellor oversaw 56 local acts, made 24 proposals to provide 
their correspondence to superior laws, and issued nine memos about unlawful actions. 
In thirteen cases the LG amended adopted acts without any contest. One common 
reason for the noncorrespondence of LG legislation to superior acts is the gaps and 
potential for controversy in the superior acts. In ﬁlling those gaps, LG extended their 
competence in issuing legal norms. 
Other frequent discrepancies with superior laws include:
 1. issuing new or supplementary levies on residents that did not derive from the 
law; 
 2. problems deriving from insuﬃcient revenues of LG, since the insolvency of LG 
endangers the implementation of basic tasks and threatens the guarantees of 
the rights of citizens;
 3. unlawfully established user fees by LG, e.g., for licenses and permits;
 4. supplementary requirements for social aid established by LG (of 84 local 
communities analyzed by the local chancellor’s oﬃce, 22 had established such 
supplementary requirements); and
 5. problems deriving from the low professionalism of LG oﬃcials.
Local oﬃcials have very often applied to the legal chancellor’s oﬃce for legal expertise 
regarding draft acts or intended actions. In preparing regulations, local authorities 
have sometimes used the original text of the law, not taking into account the later 
amendments, or have relied on legal acts that were abolished, instead of on the new 
legislation regulating these issues. Very often, smaller LGs copy the legislation of larger 
cities without taking into account the speciﬁcs of their own LG unit. The municipal 
secretary—as head of the legal chancellery—should have a degree in legal studies (or 
be a graduate of a special training program). Some LG units still cannot meet this 
requirement. In addition, anyone who acts for the legal chancellor in his or her role 
should have a similar qualiﬁcation (there have been cases where legal acts were signed 
by the technical assistant to the head of the oﬃce). 
The legal chancellor deals mostly with the purely legal side of LG activity. As he or 
she does not have the right or obligation to act as ombudsman concerning actions of 
the local authorities, residents and their organizations go directly to the administrative 
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courts to register their complaints and challenges of unlawful LG actions. Administrative 
courts are ﬁrst level courts for the solution of disputes in the framework of public law. 
Table 3.9 presents statistics of management of cases at administrative courts.
The ﬁrst important observation was that the number of new applications was smaller 
than the number of unsettled cases from the previous year. At the beginning of the 
year, there were 1.4 times more old cases than new cases involving local government. 
The number of unresolved cases was higher at the end of the year, whereas the total 
number of cases was reduced by almost 6%. In the majority of new cases (39.4%), local 
government acts, actions, etc. were contested. The next most contested institutions at the 
administrative courts were government local ﬁeld services and the tax board and its local 
branches. A substantial majority (70%) of new court applications against LG contested 
local acts and 23% contested LG actions. Of the cases resolved by a decision of court, 
only 32.5% of the actions or acts of LG were found to be unlawful, while 64.6% of the 
challenges or complaints were not satisﬁed (i.e., there were not adequate legal grounds). 
This would conﬁrm the conclusion of the Legal Chancellor that an important reason 
for contradictions between LG acts and superior acts derives from gaps in superior acts 
that LG wishes to ﬁll. This would then create an unclear legal situation, which could 
be the reason for appeals by citizens and organizations. The trend is similar at all levels 
of government. 
The most frequent issues creating legal controversies (24.3% of all cases) were 
restoration of property rights (229) and unlawful privatization processes (212). Decisions 
and acts on building and planning caused the most frequent complaints concerning LG 
regular tasks (57). Thus, the majority of the disputes between residents and LG derived 
from problems created by the transition process.
The Judicial Procedure of the Constitutional Review Act adopted in 2002 also 
enables the constitutionality of government and Riigikogu decisions to be challenged. 
From 2001 to 2003, the decisions of these institutions were contested three times.
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2.2.3 Conclusion
The majority of problems in ensuring the rule of law derived from the transitional state 
of society. The reforms have created many legal disputes and unexpected consequences, 
as legal principles were applied in a society that did not rely on the rule of law. This has 
been especially pronounced in the cases of people who became residents of Estonia after 
the unlawful occupation of a neighbor state, then a member of the League of Nations. In 
the majority of cases, the discrepancy between central and local legal acts and actions was 
caused by the incompleteness of the legal system and the insuﬃcient capacity of LG staﬀ. 
Nevertheless, the system for the defense of legal rights and ensuring the rule of law—especially 
the constitution—works increasingly smoothly. At the very least, the process of ensuring 
the rule of law has become more transparent, as we will show in the following section. 
2.3 Transparent and Accountable Local Government
2.3.1 Transparency
Local governance in Estonia is rather transparent. This is not because Estonia is a very 
small country where the majority of municipalities report 2,000 or fewer inhabitants 
and “everybody knows everybody.” Probably the opposite is true: small autonomous 
communities tend to develop a close, corporatist, oligarchy-like government and need 
more transparency than in local governments where representative bodies promote 
political competition and mutual checks and balances. 
Two recent policy initiatives gave new impetus to the development of more 
transparent LG in Estonia. Both innovations were introduced by the Public Information 
Act, adopted by Parliament in November 2000. This act obliges all subjects of public 
law, including LG, to provide open access to oﬃcial non-classiﬁed information in 
public oﬃces, in response to the request of citizens within a limited time-frame (one 
week). At the same time, the conditions are clearly deﬁned. Any citizen can apply to the 
public oﬃce for information and the latter is obliged to deliver the information. The 
law prescribes rather detailed procedures for processing the information requests. The 
request can also be made and the answer provided via the Internet. Public organizations 
must provide access to 32 types of oﬃcial information and documents (Ch. 28, I). In 
addition, organizations must establish a digital register of documents that are issued 
or ﬁled in a public oﬃce. This register must be made available on the Internet and the 
public oﬃce must enable access to these documents. 
Information requests, i.e., requests to provide existing and ﬁled oﬃcial information, 
are distinctly diﬀerent from citizens’ complaints or proposals. The latter are applications 
198
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
that presume investigation and control of certain facts or actions that took place in the 
organization. These kinds of requests are handled according to the Act on Response to 
Requests (of citizens). The last version of this act was adopted in 1994. These requests 
are targeted to the protection of the normative rights of citizens (see Ch. 3 of the Act on 
Response to Requests) or could be considered as a channel of participation of citizens 
in governance (see Section 3.4 of this Chapter).
Secondly, all local authorities must establish their own websites to create ease of access 
to oﬃcial public information. The law does not prescribe the format of the websites or the 
information that they should present. The content of the websites has been created largely 
through the transfer of best practices from other municipalities or by the county government 
that coordinated the formation of the websites of the smallest (weakest) communities. Also, 
special legislation prescribes certain information and its format to be published on the 
website. For instance, according to the LGA, local governments have to publish eight oﬃcial 
documents during the budget cycle, as well as the development plan and the investment 
plan. Many of the innovations enforced in the new act, particularly websites, had already 
been developed among the most advanced organizations and localities. 
The LGA already contained the basic provisions of transparency in local governance. 
Chapter 3 deﬁnes transparency as one of seven principles of local governance. The law also 
deﬁnes ways to realize that principle. Ch. 23 provides that acts adopted by local council 
may be enforced only after their publication. The form of publication will be deﬁned 
by each municipality autonomously, depending upon feasibility and LG capacity. At a 
minimum, acts have to be put to the stand at the council oﬃce. The most important 
legal acts (i.e., statutes of LG) must be published in the State Gazette, an oﬃcial journal 
of government legislation. The LGA also requires the publication of and access to LG 
decrees and orders before their oﬃcial enforcement (Ch. 31). Sessions of local council 
are public, as a rule (Ch. 44, p.4). In practice, larger municipalities publish regular 
invitations to the sessions via local newspapers, with detailed agendas of upcoming 
sessions. However, meetings of the local government executive are closed and can be 
attended by non-members only by invitation. This restriction also applies to members 
of the local council. This derives from the general practice of making public only the 
decisions of the administration.
2.3.1.1 The Impact of Citizens’ Information Requests
In 2001, the Inspection of Data Protection issued its ﬁrst report on the implementation 
of the Public Information Act, where concrete cases of violations of the act were analyzed 
(The Inspection of Data Protection 2002). Our survey tried to identify the role of 
various types of information requested and the main problems in increasing the actual 
transparency through the implementation of information requests.
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The responses of top oﬃcials indicated that the inhabitants of local communities 
were almost equally interested in information for personal needs and in general 
information about the local government (Table 3.10). The inhabitants of towns were 
in some respects considerably more interested in information than those of parishes, 
especially in information about analytical surveys on the development of LG. Probably 
smaller municipalities did not have such information at all. The inabitants of smaller 
LGs are less interested in information (or smaller LGs can provide less information) for 
the solution of their individual problems than those of larger LG units.
Table 3.10
Information Requests to Local Authorities in Estonia by Size of Community [%]
Type of Request Size of Local Community by Population Medium
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000
 and More
Information about legal acts 
adopted by LG 
57.7 51.1 48.8 69.1 54.9
Information for solution to 
personal problems
52.0 47.3 61.6 69.1 57.2
Analytical surveys about LG 15.4 19.5 28.4 37.5 25.6
Statistics about LG 52.0 61.5 61.2 69.8 62.2
No clear understanding by 
residents about what kind of 
information is needed
52.2 33.0 37.5 56.9 41.3
Request for information that has 
to be delivered by another agency
70.8 54.3 53.0 78.8 60.6
Source: LGS 2002.
New practices of transparency might cause confusion during the initial stages: 
inhabitants could ask for information that cannot be provided via information requests 
or that the government agency cannot provide. This was also emphasized in the report 
of the Data Protection Agency and in the Report of the State Chancellor (2002).
Our survey results show that this confusion in addressing requests was higher 
in towns and in the largest and smallest communities. That is, the development of 
transparency requires not only that organizations have eﬀective mechanisms for delivering 
information, but also that the inhabitants have considerable experience in formulating 
and addressing requests. 
Another aspect of this issue is the impact of information requests on the overall 
eﬀectiveness of LG management, i.e., whether it is an additional burden on local 
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authorities or serves the interest of better management of local community aﬀairs. Our 
survey revealed that this innovation has both outcomes (Figure 3.5). However, oﬃcials of 
town governments were more optimistic about the advantages of information requests for 
the promotion of feedback than those at the parish governments. At the same time, the 
oﬃcials of parish governments complained somewhat more frequently about the increase in 
workload. This trend was rather natural. Oﬃcials from town governments obviously have 
less feedback and contacts with the inhabitants than oﬃcials of parishes do. Therefore, the 
added value of a supplementary channel of feedback would be assessed more positively. At 
the same time, oﬃcials at parish governments are responsible for multiple tasks and roles. 
Responding to information requests was obviously more of a burden for them than for 
town oﬃcials where special departments and staﬀ would carry out this task. 
Figure 3.5
The Impact of Information Requests on the Eﬀectiveness 
of Local Administrations [%]
 
Note: Percentages are for those representatives who stated “completely agree” and “agree more than 
not.”
Source: LGS 2002.
2.3.1.2 Impact of Websites on Local Communities
The term “community” is used intentionally here, because the best developed websites 
of localities contain a much wider range of information than strictly information about 
local government and administration. Also, in larger communities the website is targeted 
to internal needs as well as to external users, e.g., for advertising. These websites would 
be a source of information for tourists, businesspeople, researchers, etc. 
Increases the workload of administration
0 20 40 60
Enables better feedback 
about inhabitants’ problems
Directs attention towards shortage of 
info or necessity of analysis
Promotes contacts between authorities 
and inhabitants
TownParish
80 100
201
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
Although all LGs were supposed to have their own websites by March 1, 2002, 
when the survey was conducted at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, 3% of 
local oﬃcials reported that their LG did not have a website and around 10% reported 
that their websites were still in the development stage (Figure 3.6). 
The law that obliged all LG units to develop their own websites initially met with 
controversy among the local representatives. For smaller LGs, this assignment represented 
a supplementary ﬁnancial burden, as they do not have the capacity to develop and 
manage websites by themselves. This situation is a good example of the delegation of 
tasks to LGs without consultation and without the necessary resources. The solution 
was also rather instructive. The county governments oﬀered technical assistance in 
developing the LG websites. Since the public relations aspect of the website has a regional 
dimension, it obviously could not be completely assigned to the local communities. In 
this example of the websites, the problem was solved ad hoc, through informal initiative 
from both sides. But in the future, especially after membership in the EU, the absence 
of a coherent regional executive would negatively aﬀect the public relations of Estonian 
local communities. 
Figure 3.6
Proportion of Local Governments with Their Own Websites 
by Size of Community [%]
Source: LGS 2002.
What kind of information do the websites contain? As Table 4.2 demonstrates, 
the majority of the websites of diﬀerent communities contain contact information 
(with email addresses) and legal acts in almost equal proportion. The majority of 
LGs also prefer to use the Internet to publicize protocols of the council and (closed) 
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government meetings (exceptions are LGs with 1,000–1,999 inhabitants). Surprisingly, 
smaller communities did not seem to have problem with servicing websites, for they 
provide current information (protocols) equally with larger communities. Extremely 
small communities obviously have cooperative arrangements with larger communities. 
As a smaller proportion of the websites in the smallest communities contains speciﬁc 
information or links and discussion clubs, etc., the weakness of their servicing capacity 
is revealed.
Table 3.11
Information Presented on the Websites 
of Estonian Local Governments by Size of Community [%]
Type of Information on Website Size of Local Community (Population) Mean
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 and 
More
Contact information about 
councilors and government oﬃcials
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Legal acts adopted by LG 87.5 89.1 88.4 96.6 90.4
Analysis and reviews of 
LG developments
23.8 21.0 28.8 34.0 27.0
Links to other websites 22.7 45.2 39.7 54.7 43.5
Protocols of council’s sessions 87.0 58.1 80.0 84.5 74.2
Protocols of government meetings 63.6 48.3 51.2 64.3 54.2
Discussion forum 25.0 21.3 32.5 35.2 28.6
Information directed to investors 10,5 36,8 55,3 52,7 45,1
Source: LGS 2002.
There is a considerable diﬀerence between smaller and larger communities in 
advertising their local community for foreign investors. Previous research (Närep 
2003) revealed that smaller localities would like to target their public relations to 
their own inhabitants and value the improvement of community relations more than 
foreign investment. Larger communities are more instrumental and open, and put 
much emphasis on advertising investment and tourism opportunities. In some ways, 
these aims of public relations are contradictory or at least should be achieved through 
diﬀerent channels.
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2.3.1.3 Public Relations at the Local Level
Besides local media and websites, a basic tool of public relations is direct relations with 
the public and with local media. The aims of these contacts are the provision of oﬃcial, 
ﬁrst-hand information about LG activities and the development of dialogue with the 
local inhabitants. 
Active public relations were also dependent on the capacity of LG units. The majority 
of LGs (67.5%) did not have a designated staﬀ person responsible for contacts with 
journalists. At the same time, 30.5% respondents of the largest (over 5,000) communities 
reported that they have a special staﬀ member for public relations and 25.4 other staﬀ 
members for whom this is one of their oﬃcial duties. 
Figure 3.7
Proportion of Local Governments Dependent 
on the Formalization of Public Relations Tasks [%]
Source: LGS 2002.
Presumably, the availability of staﬀ members responsible for public relations 
should positively correlate with the frequency of contacts with the media. Only 4.5% 
of respondents from various localities reported the absence of contacts with journalists 
at all (Table 3.12). The diﬀerence between them concerned the regularity of meetings. 
In local governments with a special staﬀ member, contacts were as a rule regular. 
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Table 3.12
Frequency of Contact with Journalists Dependent on the Formalization
 of Staﬀ Assignment to Public Relations Tasks in Local Government [%]
Frequency of 
Contact
Form of Staff Assignment to Inform Journalists Total
Main Duty With Other Duties No Assigned Duty
Regularly 86.4 51.4 13.8 28.7
Occasionally 13.6 47.2 80.0 66.7
Never —  1.4  6.2  4.5
Total 7.6 24.9 67.5 100.0
Source: LGS 2002.
We have tried to concretize the connection between the formalization of the public 
relations task and the eﬀectiveness of public relations policy in the various localities to 
understand the extent of institutionalization of this new role at the local level, as this 
would begin to play a very important role in LG capacity-building after membership 
in the EU.
Local governments with formalized staﬀ positions in public relations often have more 
communications strategies than those without a special staﬀ member responsible for PR 
(Figure 3.8). But even more strategies were adopted in LGs that did not have specialized 
PR staﬀ, especially general PR strategies. Also, relatively more frequent contact with 
journalists would reﬂect a generally greater intensity and complexity of the work of local 
authorities. Presumably, the frequency of contact would also depend on the interest of the 
media, i.e., whether local events could reach the news threshold of media. In this context, 
smaller communities would not expect a great deal of media attention, so the development 
of such a strategy would not be a priority. But this does not mean overall passivity in 
public relations. Despite larger communities having staﬀ members who are assigned the 
task of developing contacts with journalists, this “investment” of local authorities is not 
yet mirrored in a more active general public relations strategy at the local level. 
The connection between the availability of communications staﬀ and organized 
public forums was also controversial (Table 3.13). The largest proportion of LGs in 
which forums or public hearings were not held at all was those with full-time PR staﬀ 
(26.7% versus 13.2% in LGs with no PR staﬀ. At the same time, in 26.7% of localities 
with full-time PR staﬀ, more than ten forums were held in a year, compared to 12.6% in 
LGs with no staﬀ. The latter usually held one to three forums a year, obviously because 
of their much smaller capacity. At the same time, communities with more capacity fell 
into two groups: those that prioritize one channel of communication, either media or 
forums, and those that value both channels.
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Figure 3.8
Proportion of Availability of Public Relations Strategy Dependent on Formalization 
of Public Relations Task at Local Governments [% of Local Governments]
Source: LGS 2002.
Table 3.13
Frequency of Public Hearings and Forums Organized by Local Governments 
Dependent on the Formalization of Staﬀ Assignment to Public Relations Tasks [%]
Frequency of 
Events
Staff Member to Inform Journalists
Main Duty With Other Duties No Tasks Assigned Total
0 26.7 8.1 13.2 12.7
1–3 13.3 53.2 46.0 45.8
4–9 33.3 22.6 28.2 27.1
10 and more 26.7 16.1 12.6 14.3
Source: LGS 2002.
The survey results showed a clear link between the formalization of PR tasks and 
the frequency and quality of communication between authorities and the community. 
At the same time, it should be noted that small communities with only around ten LG 
staﬀ members could not aﬀord the formalization of this function. 
However, the formalization of PR tasks does not always mean that all PR tools 
were intensively used by local governments. Having more specialized staﬀ does not 
mean that LGs develop PR policies more often in comparison with the communities 
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without any PR staﬀ at all. The formalization of PR roles does not mean its eﬀective 
institutionalization and vice versa. Why? 
One possible explanation could be the insuﬃcient professionalism of staﬀ in 
dealing with more complex, strategic PR issues. Presumably, it would be more eﬃcient 
and eﬀective for many of the local communities to contract out this complex internal 
service, and/or to develop forms of cooperation with the regional level in managing 
these functions, with a greater emphasis on the external targets of PR. For the central 
government, this PR task would be combined with the task of representing interests at 
the central level more eﬀectively.
2.3.2 Corruption in Local Government
2.3.2.1 The Legal Context 
Estonia has developed a rather comprehensive normative context for the prevention of 
corruption in the public sector. Estonia has ratiﬁed the Council of Europe Civil Law 
Convention of Corruption (2000) and the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. 
In February 2002, the government launched the preparation of a program for ﬁghting 
corruption and in June 2002 a government committee of experts was established for 
that aim.
The new Anticorruption Act adopted in January 1999, largely departs from the 
norms and traditions accepted in the EU. The Anticorruption Act regulates three 
mechanisms of corruption prevention:
 1. A mechanism for identifying conﬂicts of economic interest through declaration 
by oﬃcials of their property and sources of income. Local councilors, members 
of local government, leaders of public organizations, and members of the 
boards of private or nonproﬁt organizations in which the LG has shares (or has 
membership or acts as founder) must prepare an oﬃcial declaration of economic 
interests annually. In addition, since 2000, the personal salaries and beneﬁts 
of all government employees should be (and usually are) made public on the 
websites. This requirement does not extend to other budget organizations’ 
employees, except their higher managers;
 2. A list of restrictions on employment and activities in other roles and sectors. 
Public oﬃcials cannot act in a leadership capacity in private organizations or 
contract public services to organizations in which they have an economic interest 
(shares) or where their relatives work. Local government can adopt its own list of 
persons who are subject to the Anticorruption Act (Ch. 4–5, paragraph 19). 
 3. Actions in relation to other subjects in the public sector.
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The law also contains a Code of Public Service Ethics. The Public Services Act 
establishes restrictions (some of which are also in the Anticorruption Act) on all public 
services to prevent conﬂicts of interest.
The Public Procurement Act establishes conditions and mechanisms of various types 
of public procurement—ﬁrst of all, the purchasing of assets and the contracting out 
of services and construction works. The act establishes the minimum ﬁnancial value of 
transactions or contracts that must be subject to competitive tender. Until recently, this 
was around EUR 13,000, but the government is about to raise the threshold. Depending 
on the contract cost, there are four types of competitive tendering—from a completely 
open tender to one with special conditions allowing the selection of a certain bidder. 
The concluded contract can be and usually has been a secret deal accessible to a limited 
list of persons and institutes. This “hole” in the legislation has enabled corrupt behavior 
during the conclusion of a contract and after.
In the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index of 2001, Estonia 
was 28th with a grade of 5.6, which was the best place among CEE and post-Soviet 
countries and higher than Italy and Greece among the EU countries.
The BEEPS survey of 1999 established that 65% of companies have paid bribes at least 
once. The largest proportion was for government contracts (34.5%), to receive licenses 
(26.5%), and for customs (15.2%). But the intensity of corruption (mostly, frequently) 
was only 12%, which was the second lowest among the surveyed countries.
The government has ordered regular polls on corruption. In 2001, 83.5% of Estonian 
residents reported that they had not experienced corruption (in 1998 the percentage 
was 69.4%). Corruption is regularly a concern of 1.2% of residents. Half of those who 
gave a positive answer have experienced corrupt behavior once (http://www.jti.ee/et/
tie/korruptsioon/analyysid.html ).
Only 33% of respondents thought that public servants are not involved in 
corruption, whereas 12.5% thought that almost all of them are. There has been no 
survey speciﬁcally on corruption in local government. Estonians interpret corruption 
mainly as bribes or the use of status for personal beneﬁt. Since, in bribery cases, the 
residents who give bribes can also be prosecuted according to Estonian law, one-third of 
respondents refused to describe their cases. The most frequent cases of corruption were: 
bribes to acquire or retain jobs, to receive better medical aid, to receive documents and 
to facilitate the process, bribes to police after traﬃc violations, etc.
2.3.2.2 The Institutional Context 
Estonia has established a very liberal version of the market economy as well as extensive 
delegation of service delivery roles to independent public, nonproﬁt, and private 
organizations. All public management has been oriented to results and to economic and 
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ﬁnancial rationality. Residents with inadequate income or poor access to those services 
are partly compensated by the government. 
This institutional model of governance should diminish traditional bureaucratic 
pathologies. But the liberal model of governance requires rather eﬀective control and 
accountability systems. Otherwise, it is extremely conducive to corruption, not to speak 
of self-interested behavior. There are three main ways to develop such checks: 
 1. There should be a robust mechanism to enable public (residents’) control over 
the use of public money. The section of this chapter dealing with transparency 
demonstrated some obvious progress in that direction in Estonia. But most 
ﬁnancial decisions, especially purchases and contracts, are “blind,” either 
because of the secrecy of contracts or because of the low professional capacity 
of the public to adequately assess transactions. The main purpose behind the 
centralization of the National Investments Program was to prevent corruption 
in the contracting out of government-ﬁnanced investments. 
 2. Political control by council and factions can provide a check, and we will 
analyze this issue later in the chapter. Current institutional conﬁgurations of 
LG are not always conducive to the development of those channels of control, 
since the identities of council and the development of party politics in smaller 
communities does not enable the development of eﬀective checks. An analysis 
of the budgeting process at the local level (Sootla et al. 2002) revealed that 
horizontal and vertical balances emerge in larger communities and to some 
extent increase the eﬃciency of political control and accountability. 
 3. Channels of administrative control are another possibility. Neither the State 
Audit nor the Legal Chancellor (as ombudsman) has substantive supervisory and 
control powers over local authorities. The State Audit oﬃce can only control the 
use of resources provided by central government and the Legal Chancellor can 
only check the correspondence of LG acts to superior acts. Violations of laws 
and unlawful actions of public oﬃcials can be contested only through the court 
system. A county governor can contest an unlawful action of local authorities 
ex post in the courts, on behalf of every legal subject, i.e., citizens. Residents 
have a right to ask for reconsideration of the decisions of local authorities that 
violate their individual interests. 
The majority of LGs do not have internal administrative control structures because 
of their small size. But there are external checks such as banks (in the case of borrowing) 
and licensed auditors (in the case of the annual budget audit). These external actors 
can not directly prevent corrupt actions, but they can make the evaluation of ﬁnancial 
transactions and decisions much more transparent and neutral. In a local government 
where an internal audit exists, it exercises the same kind of control over the subordinate 
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administration as council’s audit committee. There has not been enough good analysis 
of the eﬀectiveness of internal audits. Case studies provide evidence (Sootla 2002) that 
in the case of structured and planned actions, council could play an important role in 
exerting ex ante supervision and even in analysis of the current costs and expenditures, 
as well as projects.
There were several discoveries of corruption in larger cities and towns that resulted in 
court cases. But these were often ex post discoveries initiated by the political opposition 
with the aim of dissolving a coalition. That is, the discovery of corruption comes about 
as a result of political competition and does not work in cases of collusion that are rather 
common in small communities. 
In our survey, the indicator of such control was the frequency of review of the costs 
and eﬃciency of administration by councils. The question asked was: “Over and above 
hearing the usual and mandatory reports, did the council review any of the following 
at some time last year?” Three diﬀerent targets of the scrutiny were diﬀerentiated: 
administration and administrative costs, local government services costs, and local 
institutional costs. Respondents’ answers are shown in Table 3.14.
Table 3.14
Frequency of Review of Costs and Eﬃciency of Administration by Councils [%]
Indicator Latvia Hungary Estonia
Review of administrative costs 87.1 (94.8*) 47.7 64.6
Review of institutional costs 70.6 (79.8) 66.9 71.1
Review of services costs 84.7 (88.5) 54.1 52.8
Note: * Indicator of frequency in the largest communities.
Source: LGS 2002.
We saw considerably more intense activity in Latvian councils in checking 
administrative and services costs. This is not at all surprising, because in Latvia the 
power balance between the representatives and the executive is inclined more towards 
council. We did not see a meaningful diﬀerence in the checking of LG institutional 
costs, which is the most frequently used channel of supervision in Estonia and especially 
in Hungary. In Estonia, because the politically appointed mayor plays a key role in the 
administration, it is more diﬃcult for the administration to resist council’s interest in 
analyzing administrative costs. This activity is signiﬁcantly more intensive and council 
more active in the smallest communities, in which relations between council and mayor 
are not as favorable as in the larger councils.
Hungary demonstrated signiﬁcantly less intensity in reviewing administrative 
costs. Presumably, this is because of the key role of the mayor’s oﬃce—which is to be 
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reviewed—in local government. At the same time, council was as active in Hungary as 
in Estonia in reviewing services and institutional administrative costs, because this is 
the task of the mayor’s oﬃce (which seldom resists such attempts to control).
Thus, the system of checks and balances in Estonia provides a relatively favorable 
institutional context for the development of control mechanisms over administration, 
but it is not conducive to intensive control over costs.
2.3.2.3 Actual and Perceived Corruption in Local Government
From both the generally accepted and also the oﬃcial point of view, local government 
(along with police, customs, and border guards) is the most corrupt sector of the public 
service. Estonian residents saw the public service as the most corrupt (29%), but they 
also identify politicians (24%) and police (15%) (http://www.jti.ee/et/tie/korruptsioon/
analyysid.html). Several areas or links of governance were identiﬁed, where the 
preconditions for corruption as well as actual corrupt behavior are the most developed 
(see OSI 2002, http://www.jti.ee/et/tie/korruptsioon/analyysid.html for analysis). 
Estonian property reforms relied on a very liberal and radical (fast implementation) 
conception of competitive privatization and the restitution of property rights that had 
been violated by the Soviet regime to a rather extensive circle of relatives (Lugus and 
Hachey Jr. 1995, Stark 1992). Larger enterprises were privatized by the State Privatization 
Agency, which was under the very close political control of its council. This Treuhand 
model was applied even more successfully than in East Germany (Beyer and Wieghols 
2000), i.e., in the sense of sensitivity to corruption.
However, the local or regional government handled the majority of cases of 
privatization and/or restitution of property rights, primarily involving apartments, 
but also small municipal companies. The access to inside information in exchange for 
beneﬁts was the least insigniﬁcant form of corruptive action. This was supplemented 
by falsiﬁcation of documents and creating obstacles for the lawful owners in favor of 
those who were ready to pay bribes. 
The ﬁnancing of elections has been a potential device for covert and corrupt actions 
in larger towns and cities. This potential was realized through other channels prone to 
corruption, such as procurement contests, making it rather diﬃcult to discover. 
The managing and renting of local government assets is another area vulnerable 
to corruption. The most widespread opportunity for corrupt practices has been the 
conclusion of long-term rental contracts at low prices that enable the unlawful subletting 
of real estate for up to ﬁfteen times more than the original fee. Very often these actions 
involved obligations to invest in the assets, but in reality these obligations were often 
ignored by the renters and not controlled by local authorities. The other widely used 
method of corruption was the privatization of LG government assets (apartments) 
211
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
without competition on the basis of nonmarket pricing. The existing law favored such 
transactions. According to the law, assets were transferred into the LG budget according 
to its investment or (in the case of municipalization) the nominal balance price, which, 
in larger towns and especially cities, could be up to ten times lower than the market 
price. The Estonian government cabinet has once been forced to resign over the use of 
such a scheme of privatization of apartments by the Tallinn city government. 
Since the decline in the intensity of privatization, public procurement has become one 
of the most corrupt links in local governance. A huge variety of semi-legal devices exist 
which enable individuals to meet the requirements of the rather clear rules and limitations 
on procurement, while at the same time circumventing the obvious intent of these rules. 
The intentional shortening of the period between the announcement and deadlines for 
application, or the low visibility of the advertising of the contest, are aimed at ruling out 
potential applicants in favor of a certain individual. Contracts can also be divided into 
parts, so that the cost of each part is below the threshold requiring a tender. Corrupt 
practices often resulted from “blind” contracts that were either too disadvantageous for LG 
or involved an increase in costs of the contract during the course of its implementation. 
Excess beneﬁts for oﬃcials are another form of corruption. These are usually covered 
under various legally permitted activities, such as travel to an exotic location during the best 
season for a “training course.” The purchase of cars is another legal beneﬁt, as well as the 
drawing up of employment contracts with party comrades close to elections, that include 
considerable compensation in case of resignation after the election. Rather frequently, new 
and unnecessary administrative positions were opened to provide patronage jobs.
Our survey of CAOs tried to identify the assessment of the behavior of local 
business and local civil society organizations concerning conduciveness to corruption. 
Firstly, in all dimensions the impact of local business is moderate and to some extent 
it is more intensive in the largest communities (Table 3.15). The exception was the 
selﬁsh behavior of local elites, which had relatively the same intensity in the smallest 
and largest communities. 
Our survey showed that the impact of local business and pressures from local 
enterprises on LG decisions was connected with the following convictions: 
 a) “Local elites try too much to inﬂuence decisions of LG in their own interests” 
(correlation rate of 0.343 and 0.449); and
 b) “Some local businessmen try to use local authorities to promote the interest of 
their ﬁrms” (correlation rate of 0.305 and 0.301).
The scales for the two statements were in reverse directions. At the same time, 
these statements did not correlate at all with the statement, “Local businesses try to 
assist in the solution of local problems” or other questions on LG roles in local life. 
Thus, a considerable proportion of respondents linked the impact of businesses with 
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their attempts to achieve some beneﬁts from their inﬂuence on local authorities. These 
assessments did not depend upon the size of the community. 
Table 3.15
Assessment of Local Government Susceptibility 
to Business Inﬂuence by Size of Community (7-Point Scale*)
Influence of Local Business Size of Community by Population Total
Less than
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Pressures from local enterprises 2.90 2.94 2.98 3.46 3.06
Local elites try too much to inﬂuence 
decisions of LG in their own interests
3.41 3.03 3.28 3.64 3.27
Impact of local business on LG decisions 3.21 3.05 3.60 3.88 3.41
Note: *1—do not agree at all; 7—completely agree.
Source: LGS 2002.
A second ﬁnding was that attitudes towards the activity of local civic organizations 
were overtly supportive. The election of local civic organization leaders was not seen as 
a problem in terms of possible selﬁsh interests of the organization and its target group 
(Table 3.16). 
Table 3.16
The Inﬂuence on Local Democracy of the Election 
of Leaders of Civic Organizations as Councilors [%]
Possible Influence of 
Membership in Council
Assessment
Surely Yes More Yes
than No
More No 
than Yes
Not at All Do Not 
Know
Enables better understanding of 
local residents’ needs
59.8 29.9 2.6 2.6 5.1
Increases the role of civic 
organizations in local life
44.4 40.2 2.6 4.3 8.5
Enables better communication 
with these organizations
47.0 38.5 5.1 5.1 4.3
Enables better collaboration to 
get ﬁnancing from LG budget
7.7 23.9 19.7 26.5 22.2
Eases the control over 
civic organizations
13.7 34.2 17.1 9.4 25.6
Increases the support of local 
authorities by those organizations
14.7 46.6 11.2 12.9 14.7
Source: LGS 2002.
213
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
An overwhelming majority responded positively to the ﬁrst three questions, which 
focus on the positive side of relations between authorities and civic organizations. 
Respondents’ answers to the other questions were more controversial. Firstly, the 
proportion of “don’t know” increased up to one-quarter of all of responses. Abstentions 
to certain questions (compared to others where it was rare) could be interpreted to mean 
either that the respondent did not have any experience on that issue, or that the issue 
was a sensitive one and the respondent was unwilling to express his or her opinion. To 
the direct question about the partiality of leaders of civic organizations as councilors 
(“to get ﬁnancing from local budget”), 31.6% of respondents conﬁrmed that it was a 
possibility, although only 7.7% were absolutely sure. 
The general position, therefore, seems to be that “there could be some problem, but 
exactly what it is, I do not know.” What was even more interesting is that a proportion 
of the respondents interpreted the question on control over civic organizations and 
support to council by involved organizations in clearly negative terms, even though the 
question focused on the integration of government and community relations, which is 
a premise of eﬀective democracy. Besides the negative answers, the proportion of “don’t 
know” answers was also rather large. 
That is, the local councilors in general approved of having leaders of local civic 
organizations as councilors. But they do not yet understand the roles these organizations 
could play in local democracy, nor do they completely understand the relationship 
between civic organizations and authorities. The majority of them was not sure that 
closer involvement of local community organizations—and consequently close feedback 
about and control over them—would strengthen local democracy and diminish the 
space for corruption.
2.3.3 Checks and Balances at the Local Level
2.3.3.1 The Formal Context
The institutional balance in Estonian local government is deﬁned in rather general 
terms in the LGA. Formally, Estonia has a council–mayor (cabinet) system (Svara 1990; 
Mourizen and Svara 2003), where the representative power of council is well balanced 
between the relatively independent mayor and government. Although all authority 
formally emanates from the council, it focuses on the legislative roles and ﬁscal roles 
(budget, ﬁscal obligations, and assets). The government is not only an administrative 
body, but also prepares proposals for council decisions (including legal acts) and makes 
decisions (issues acts) and acts in areas that are not within the formal competence of 
council. 
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The LGA was intentionally designed to avoid the characteristics of the committee 
system in terms of its horizontal division of labor, where council committees can play 
important roles through the direct inﬂuence on government and administration (Sootla 
1996). Thus, the politically appointed mayor formally represents the whole executive in 
relations between government (and its services) and council and its support structures. 
Hence, the council has very limited possibilities of direct intervention into government 
aﬀairs. 
The council appoints the mayor, but cannot select members of government, i.e., it 
can only approve or not approve the mayor’s appointments. When council meetings are 
public and civil servants can serve as members of council committees, the meetings of 
government are closed and the chairman of the council must have a formal invitation to 
attend government meetings. The mayor also has the sovereign authority to appoint a civil 
service, including the third most important person in the institutional framework of local 
authorities—the town or parish secretary. The mayor also appoints the leaders/managers 
of LG agencies and public organizations. Thus, the government is rather independent 
in acting and in developing legislative proposals that can be checked mainly by political 
means. In this, the status of head of government is completely diﬀerent from the status 
of local manager—the third main actor in the institutional balance at the local level 
that is absent in Estonia (Svara 1990).
A member of council can initiate an inquiry, which is a legally regulated procedure. 
Council and its members can also initiate a vote of non-conﬁdence in the mayor and the 
members of government. As soon as the mayor is appointed by the governing coalition, 
he or she can be checked by other political channels (factions or the coalition council), 
but these two devices of political control and transparency are used mainly by members 
of the opposition. Hence, the eﬀectiveness of political control depends to large extent 
on the stability and strength of the opposition and factions. 
However, the strong positions of mayor and government do not mean that the 
role of council is weak or secondary—rather, the contrary. As Estonian laws mainly 
establish a legal framework for the institution-building and management of the local 
community, local councils have developed a huge number of policy documents and 
legal acts that regulate diﬀerent institutions and play an important role in steering the 
ﬁnancial aﬀairs within the local community. Besides, as Estonian local government is also 
internally rather decentralized and many public functions are delegated to quasi-public 
and private law subjects, the council has a major role in supervision and in holding 
those organizations accountable. Hence, we could also speak about the eﬀectiveness of 
checks in the vertical dimension.
The main body responsible for supervising the work of government is the audit 
committee. This is the only committee for which the members must be members of 
council. Members of the other committees—except for their chairs—can be appointed 
from the community. Besides the main task of supervising the legality of actions of 
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government, the committee can and often does control the eﬃciency and feasibility of 
the work of government and public organizations. It can also assess the eﬀectiveness 
and feasibility of the use of assets and ﬁnances that LG has devolved to economically 
independent municipal enterprises, NGOs, and foundations. Audit committees of many 
municipalities organize this kind of substantive analysis of activities on a regular basis, 
according to previously accepted plans. The checks and balances can be weakened here, 
because the audit committee is served administratively by the mayor’s oﬃce. 
The ﬁnal audit of an LG budget is delegated (according to central law) to private 
(but certiﬁed and recognized) audit companies, whose report forms the basis of the LG 
report on budget implementation to the Ministry of Finances. This neutral external 
audit also facilitates the ﬁnancial and real estate transactions of LG, because it oﬀers 
adequate proof of available data. 
In the largest LGs, the government has also established a special unit of internal audit 
that is not feasible in communities where the staﬀ in the local administration does not 
exceed ten people and where only a few public organizations are managed by the LG (this 
describes the majority of LGs). In larger communities, the audit committee of council 
would not deal with such an extensive task as control over the units and organizations 
of the local administration. Besides, this also assumes high professional auditing skills. 
Therefore, in these communities council has less intensive regular control over the 
executive but would initiate an audit in cases of extraordinary need. At the same time, the 
division of labor between the audit committee and the internal audit unit should be more 
elaborated in management practice. Present practices revealed many gaps in managing 
the control procedures in LG (http://www.jti.ee/et/tie/korruptsioon/analyysid.html).
Figure 3.9 indicates that regular ﬁscal control outside of the regular budgeting process 
is more or less formalized in larger communities. But ﬁscal control also has a consultative 
role, to assist members of council to understand the ﬁnancial problems of organizations. 
Therefore, the extent of the actual control beyond the routine or normatively regulated 
forms of accountability has been rather intensive in Estonian local government.
The survey revealed a slightly more active stance of smaller and larger municipalities 
in reviewing their administrative costs (Table 3.17). While for the smaller communities 
the problem would be the high proportion of administrative costs in the budget (around 
18% on average), for the largest communities the trigger for a more active review would 
come from the political opposition, because the general administrative costs of these 
LGs were only 83%.
The smallest LG units revealed lower activity in reviewing the service costs of 
independent organizations, but higher activity in reviewing the service costs of their own 
administration. This is also not surprising, as smaller communities face diﬃculties in 
devolving and privatizing services because of high economic risks. The local government 
or its unit often delivers those services that were usually privatized in larger communities. 
(This is also one objective reason for higher administrative costs.)
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Figure 3.9
The Proportion of Local Governments Having Plans 
and Procedures for Control over Administration by Size of Community [%]
Source: LGS 2002.
Table 3.17
The Proportion of Local Governments Where Council Used Controls 
beyond the Normatively Regulated Forms of Accountability [%]
Form of Accountability Size of Local Community by Population Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Review of administrative costs of 
government
73.1 62.4 62.2 68.5 64.6
Review of costs of services provided by 
LG independent organization
51.9 70.3 73.6 77.8 71.1
Review of costs of services provided by 
local administration
60.7 51.0 53.9 50.0 52.8
Accountability for ﬁnished project 55.6 78.0 71.9 62.3 70.6
Accountability for the activities of LG 
organization (e.g., ﬁnancial)
71.4 70.7 70.0 75.5 71.5
Accountability for waste of money that 
was publicized by citizens or local press
25.9 17.2 18.4 31.5 21.3
Source: LGS 2002. 
Availability of plan of financial supervision
0
60
Less than 1,000
40
20
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 and more
Availability of regulation of local executives account to local council
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These results demonstrated that the role of plans and formal instructions is more 
feasible in larger communities and, in general, the actual practices of LG should not 
necessarily be so formalized. The smaller the community, the higher the role of informal, 
ad hoc practices. This is conﬁrmed in our analysis of the eﬀectiveness of project 
management in local communities, which is discussed later in this chapter.
The issue of whether or not the delegation of LG tasks, assets, and ﬁnances to 
independent public organizations and private law subjects such as municipal enterprises, 
etc., would increase the transparency and accountability, should not be considered in 
an abstract manner. Experience in Estonia has made a number of things clear about 
this (Sootla et al. 2002):
 1. The devolution and institutionalization of such activities enables the development 
of supplementary internal balances and, hence, devices of external control over 
the implementation of laws and service delivery. Control of those activities via 
bureaucratic means in small communities would be more complicated (especially 
from the viewpoint of eﬀectiveness and feasibility) because of the diﬃculty 
there in developing bureaucratic neutrality. That is, this device would reduce 
the potential conﬂict of bureaucratic roles in the exercise of control over the 
public services. 
 2. The devolution to political bodies instead of administrative decentralization 
(Pollitt et al. 1997) would considerably enhance the means of political control 
over private law subjects. In addition, the eﬀectiveness of control and prevention 
of corruption depends to a large extent on the development of political 
competition and the party system at the local level.
 3. Such devolution could facilitate a better balance between the cost of formal compli-
ance and the gains that would result from economic independence. The creation 
of organizations regulated by private law, but aﬃliated in diﬀerent ways to the 
LG, is very reasonable (although there are cautions). In this way the principles 
and values of classical public administration and budgeting could be well com-
bined with modern practices of public management, ﬁrst of all with market-type 
mechanisms. In other words, the development of a network-type structure at the 
local level permits the retention of an administrative core that would promote 
basic values of governance, i.e., democracy, equity, and reliability. 
These considerations of a general, systemic design of local governance according to 
(post)modern concepts (Bogason 2000) would outweigh the diﬃculties in establishing 
eﬀective mechanisms of control. However, any conﬁguration of politico-administrative 
relations at the local level contains a natural tension between democratic control 
and accountability on the one hand, and eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness, i.e., economic 
rationality, on the other hand.
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2.3.4 Checks and Balances in Institutional Roles
The local community in Estonia has to develop its own legal framework independently, 
according to the very general normative context established by national legislation. There-
fore, one can encounter considerable diﬀerences in governance practices in Estonia. 
Our survey made it possible to check some characteristic variations. First of all, we 
were interested in how LG oﬃcials see the actual inﬂuence of diﬀerent actors at the 
local level and, therefore, how they balance each other, which is the basic precondition 
of checks and balances. 
Figure 3.10 shows that the main actors and institutions in Estonian local government 
are balanced. The strongest position—mayor—is counterbalanced by the strong positions 
of the council’s “working” members, including the head of council and the committees. 
Naturally, members of the administration found that civil servants have more impact on 
LG decisions and policy, whereas members of council found the impact of factions and 
individual councilors to be greater. Members of the executive see the leading institutions 
of LG as stronger than the members of council. The diﬀerence in means between the 
strongest and weakest internal actors was 2.43. The latter estimated the contribution 
of all actors—especially noninstitutional actors—as more equal and comparable 
(a diﬀerence of 1.84). 
The roles of the diﬀerent institutional or noninstitutional actors vary depending 
on the size of the LG. Figure 3.10 shows both councilors’ opinions on the impact of 
government actors and government actors’ opinions on the impact of council actors 
respectively. 
The main changes in institutional balance depending on local government size were: 
 1. The mayor’s inﬂuence was weaker in the smallest municipalities (mean of 5.05). 
His/her role increased gradually in medium sized and larger municipalities, up 
to 5.52 (mean).7 The mayor’s inﬂuence in towns was only slightly higher, so 
the variable of size was decisive; 
 2. The role of the head of the local council in parishes was more or less the same, 
but considerably lower in towns; 
 3. The role of council committees increased moderately in medium sized 
municipalities and remained the same in larger municipalities and in towns; 
 4. The role of Chief Administrative Oﬃcer decreases gradually with the increase 
in the size of municipality, being highest in the smallest (mean of 4.55) and 
lowest in larger municipalities (mean of 3.89); and 
 5. The role of factions was lowest in the smallest municipalities (mean of 3.69) 
and gradually rose with the increase in size of the municipality; reaching 4.68 
in larger LGs. Towns have the highest strength of factions at council (4.82 on 
average). 
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Figure 3.10
The Impact of Diﬀerent Institutional Actors 
on Decisions of Local Government (7-Point Scale*)
Note: * 1—no inﬂuence at all; 7—very big inﬂuence.
Source: LGS 2002, LRS 2002.
Here we can observe two interrelated trends that would indicate the role of 
administrative and political capacity in balancing the institutional context and in 
developing more eﬀective checks and balances. 
Firstly, the role of mayor, council committees, and factions increased with the 
increase in size of the municipality. At the same time, the impact of civil servants on 
decisions as well as their politicization did not increase. An exception to this was found 
in the smallest communities where the politicization and the role of civil servants 
were respectively higher and more important. That is, in larger communities the 
institutional context for professional and politically balanced policymaking is more 
favorable. In smaller communities, the lack of professionalism of these bodies leads to 
a more signiﬁcant role for the CAO, while it decreases in larger communities, which 
have more professional staﬀ. Some smaller sized communities have even provided to 
the CAO the right of countersignature to the legal acts. This provision could prevent 
the enforcement of acts that contradict superior legislation and/or are incorrect from a 
normative-technical point of view. 
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Table 3.18
The Impact of Size and Type of Local Government 
(Parish, Town) on Institutional Balance (7-Point Scale*)
No. Actor Size of Local Community Type of Local Government
Less than 1,000 5,000 and More Parish Town
 1 Mayor 5.05 5.52 3.42 5.62
 2. Head of council 5.42 5.03 5.27 4.86
 3. Committees 4.52 4.71 4.80 4.67
 4. Factions 3.69 4.68 4.17 4.82
 5. Town or parish secretary 4.55 3.89 4.09 3.88
 6. Civil servants 4.05 3.79 3.90 3.77
 7. Councilors 3.58 3.42 3.61 3.42
Note: * 1—no inﬂuence at all; 7—very big inﬂuence.
Source: LGS 2002, LRS 2002.
Secondly, the role of the head of council decreased as the role of factions increased. 
The most important variable here is the parish/town cleavage, which would indicate 
a decrease of particularistic political connections and an increase in political party 
institutional arrangements. 
Table 3.19 shows that smaller local councils would like to contest proposals of 
the mayor more often. This would be explained by the weakness of the political party 
dimension of control and in the political harmonization of mutual checks. 
Table 3.19
The Role of Cooperation between the Assembly 
and the Mayor Dependent on the Size of the Community [%] 
Pattern of Cooperation Size of Local Community Medium
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Majority of council almost always 
supports positions of mayor
29.6 50.0 55.7 66.7 51.1
Support of majority depends on 
issue to be discussed
70.4 50.0 43.0 33.3 48.4
Position of mayor is rarely 
supported — — 1.3 — 0.4
Source: LGS 2002.
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2.3.5 Conclusion
During the 1990s, local government in Estonia developed a rather transparent and 
balanced institutional system. The small size of a community and the lack of party 
politicization are usually seen as providing a more favorable context for close relations 
between the state and society. It was interesting to note that this was negatively linked 
with both transparency and the ability to develop eﬀective checks and balances in 
ensuring good (eﬀective) governance. At the same time, we would not like to conclude 
that the only remedy would be to increase the size of local communities, since we did 
not study the shadow dimensions of large local communities in this analysis. 
2.4 Effective Local Government 
In the theory of modern governance (Kooiman 1993; Pierre 2002), “governability,” or 
the eﬀectiveness of governing for and with people, is deﬁned as the ability to balance 
both needs and capacities in the policy process. In the following section we examine this 
capability within diﬀerent dimensions, starting with the capacity of the local community 
and its administration. The main indicator of democratic governance in this dimension 
is self-sustained development, which includes the reproduction of the local population, 
the growth of the local revenue base, and the ability to make investments to increase 
the capacity and professionalism of the administration.
2.4.1 Capacities of the Local Community
2.4.1.1 Resource Capacity 
Previously in this chapter we analyzed the reasons why—despite constitutional 
guarantees—obstacles in developing own-source revenue emerged. The main reason was 
an imbalance between restrictions in developing own revenue and freedom in spending. 
In the following section, we would like to consider whether there are also some intrinsic 
reasons that would cause obstacles in capacity-building in LG. 
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2.4.1.1.1 The Demographic and Geographical Dimension
The amount of revenue from taxes depends on the demographic structure of localities. 
Indices of the reproduction of the workforce and of age structure are less favorable in both 
the smallest and the largest communities (Suvi 2001) (see Table 3.20). In this sense, the 
communities with between 2,000 and 10,000 inhabitants seem to have a more favorable 
demographic situation. Other variables that would inﬂuence the tax basis are the 
availability of jobs in the local community and the problem of ﬂuctuations in migration, 
sometimes referred to as “pendulum migration.” There are no national statistics for 
employment migration in Estonia, especially statistics that would diﬀerentiate between 
neighbourhood mobility and more long distance employment mobility. A selective study 
of some communities indicated that around 20% to 30% of the inhabitants of parishes 
were employed outside of their own communities.
Employment migration would not have a negative impact on local revenues, because 
taxes are collected according to place of residence. But this form of migration does harm 
and has already caused crises in family life.
The level of unemployment is equally high among all sizes of local communities 
(from 10.4 in large communities (4,000–10,000 inhabitants) to 16.1 in communities 
with populations of 1,000 to 1,999). 
Table 3.20
Age Structure of the Population and Reproduction 
of the Workforce According to Size of Local Community [%]
Index Size of Local Community by Population
Less than 
1,000
1,000–
2,000
2,001–
3,000
3,001–
4,000
4,001–
10,000
10,000 
and More
Ratio of children versus elders 0.80 0.92 1.02 1.05 1.03 0.89
Reproduction of labour force* 1.29 1.43 1.49 1.54 1.50 1.34
Total rate of population 
reproduction
1.05 1.18 1.26 1.30 1.27 1.12
Actual unemployment rate 15.5 16.1 13.8 14.4 10.4 13.1
Note: * Reproduction of population—ratio of children versus elderly; reproduction of labor force—ratio 
of those entering the labor market versus those who are close to retirement.
Source: Suvi 2001. 
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However, the actual amount of individual income tax depends on the general level 
of remuneration at jobs (which increases revenue), on the one hand, and on the general 
proportion of individual income that is not taxed (which decreases revenue), on the other 
hand. Currently, this is established at the level of 1,000 EEK (75 USD). The decision 
to increase the level of tax exemption was not only made without LG representation 
at trilateral negotiations (government, trade unions, and employers organizations), 
but—even more important by the criterion of autonomy— the central government does 
not compensate LG for these losses. The last such increase in 1999 resulted in a loss of 
around 10% of personal income tax (PIT) revenue for medium sized communities.
Actually, the most important variable for ﬁnancial capacity is remoteness from Tallinn 
and other large towns, where a substantial proportion of the residents in parishes and 
smaller towns seek employment opportunities (see Table 3.21). According to an analysis 
of L. Suvi (2001), the capacity of LG units decreases 2% for every ten kilometers of 
distance from Tallinn. Thus, the capacity of local communities near Tallinn is almost 
two times higher than those located 200 kilometers from Tallinn but similar in other 
respects. 
Table 3.21
Income Groups by Geographic Region (1998) [%]
Income per 
Capita [EEK]
Tallinn 
and North
Northeast West Central South Number of 
Municipalities
550–1,163 0.0 16.4 19.0 15.5 46.5 51
1,164–1,405 0.0 20.0 15.5 25.4 14.0 51
1,406–1,726 0.0 21.8 25.9 25.4 14.0 51
1,736–2,148 15.4 30.9 24.1 16.9 7.0 50
2,150–5,990 84.6 10.9 15.5 16.9 2.3 50
Total [%] 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 —
Total [Number] 26.0 55.0 58.0 71.0 43.0 253
Note: The tax exemption in 1998 was 800 EEK.
Source: Raus 2000.
2.4.1.1.2 Prospects for Increasing the Revenue Base
The expected strong variation in the proportion of own revenues in Estonia does not 
exist, according to oﬃcial statistics (Table 3.22). However, it should be noted that the 
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main source of own revenues is the shared or state taxes collected by the central tax 
administration and transferred to local budgets. Strictly speaking, then, those revenues 
are not own but transferred revenues. 
Own revenues of the largest communities were 25.2% higher than in the smallest 
communities. 
Table 3.22
Own Revenues as a Proportion of Total Revenues 
of Local Governments by Size [%]
Size of Local Community* Year
2000 2001 2002
Estonia 66.66 59.34 56.13
less than 1000 46.38 38.08 39.37
1000–1999 48.59 41.67 42.15
2000– 4999 52.12 45.13 45.26
5000 and more ** 59.87 51.07 49.31
Tallinn 87.54 80.08 73.17
Note: * The role of the capital, Tallinn, in the total ﬁnancial results was so large that its inclusion could 
distort the real picture. Therefore, we have excluded Tallinn from the general statistics.
  ** Excluding Tallinn and Tartu.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Agency of Statistics. 
http://gatekeeper.stat.ee:8000/px-web.2001/Database/Majandus_regionaalne/Majandus_
regionaalne.asp.
Personal income tax shows the greatest variation—75% higher in the largest 
communities than in the smallest. This means that the other sources—ﬁrst of all, land 
and resource taxes—have balanced the proportion of own revenues in communities of 
diﬀerent sizes. Own revenues were not only below 50%, but were gradually decreasing 
(Table 3.23). In the largest communities the reduction was 28% over three years. This 
is mainly because of decreasing opportunities for asset deployment and because a large 
expenditure item—the teachers’ salary payroll—was transferred to the local level as an 
earmarked grant.
The personal income tax is a shared central government tax (56% goes to the LG 
budget). The central agency could manage the transfer of this tax to the LG current 
account rather well. Last year several policy proposals were presented to make this tax a 
local tax, as was done with the land tax. This would allow local governments to determine 
local diﬀerences in the tax rate.
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Table 3.23
Proportion of Personal Income Taxes 
in Total Revenues of Local Communities by Size [%]
Size of Local 
Community
Year
2000 2001 2002
Estonia 46.54 36.16 34.87
less than 1,000 21.94 20.12 20.89
1,000–1,999 25.20 21.07 22.89
2,000–4,999 36.68 31.34 32.51
5,000 and more* 43.03 36.56 36.50
Tallinn 40.13 40.18 38.48
Note: * Without Tallinn and Tartu.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Agency of Statistics. 
http://gatekeeper.stat.ee:8000/px-web.2001/Database/Majandus_regionaalne/Majandus_
regionaalne.asp.
The data also show that there has been a decrease of loans in LG budgets. In 1996, 
the proportion of loans in LG budgets was 15.9%, whereas in 2001 it was half of that 
(6.8%). The existing system of loans has functioned rather well in Estonia and it has 
promoted local autonomy. Central government only establishes general norms for 
borrowing. For instance, payments for loans may not exceed 20% of the yearly budget. 
Loans are given by banks according to the LG business plan, which enables a thorough 
evaluation of LG ﬁnancial capacity by banks. The LG only needs to register the loan 
at the Ministry of Finance, for statistical purposes. The government usually does not 
provide any guarantee on LG loans, although the law permits guarantees of up to 15% 
of the loan. Nevertheless, the more libertarian-oriented governments started to make the 
rules for borrowing more restrictive. To spread ﬁnancial risks, the Stabilization Fund of 
LG was created at the beginning of the 2000s in order to assist local governments that 
appeared to be facing insolvency. This fund is ﬁnanced exclusively by the LGs themselves, 
as a kind of collective insurance against unpredicted developments.
There is one rather speciﬁc restraint in the realization of local autonomy in Estonian 
local government that has not received enough attention. The mutual clearance of 
accounts has become an increasing budget item. Some of this revenue is earned from 
service delivery to the residents of other (neighbouring) local communities, especially 
for oﬀering more attractive and competitive schools. Unfortunately, autonomy in this 
case works against those who can deliver better services, because clear guidelines for 
payment for these services by neighbouring communities have not yet been elaborated. 
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Governments departing from a commitment to autonomy prefer not to intervene in 
the controversial interpretation of those obligations, which often results in long court 
cases. This has not provided incentives to more capable LGs to increase their revenue 
base by widening their service delivery area to other communities.
Other revenues did not play an important role in LG budgets. Leaving aside the 
capital city of Tallinn, local taxes provide only 0.6% of total revenues. The sale of assets 
and the privatization of public resources were a rather important source of revenue in 
the 1990s, but its importance decreased substantially at the beginning of the 2000s. In 
addition, local government could not raise meaningful revenues from shares in service 
delivery companies, because the prices of services are usually established with a view to 
ensuring the widest possible access to low-income residents. Income from economic 
activities provides 3% of budget revenues.
The land tax is a state tax that is collected by the State Tax Agency, but LGs have 
the discretionary right to establishing a tax rate of 0.5%–20% of the price of the land. 
At the beginning of 2000, after intensive discussion, the price of land ceased to be 
administratively regulated. After the market price became the basis of the land tax, these 
tax revenues became a more important source of revenue. 
It is rather doubtful that most LGs could further develop their tax collecting 
capacity. There is no necessity for it, because the Estonian tax board is quite eﬃcient. 
Thus, achieving an increase in the revenue base of LGs by extending local taxes does not 
seem very promising. A redistribution of the personal income tax would also cause the 
further diﬀerentiation of revenues, because the resource base for that tax is increasingly 
diﬀerentiated among the various LGs. Hence, there is no actual way to trigger a 
mechanism for increasing the revenue base of local communities. According to a recent 
study, the revenue deﬁcit of local government was 29% (Lauritsen 2000).
2.4.1.1.3 Investments
In the section on autonomy we noted a rather strange confusion in the statistics on 
investments. The Ministry of Finance’s ﬁgures indicate that LG investments constitute 
18% of all investments in Estonia, a high number that suggests a considerable capacity 
among LGs. However, a more detailed analysis of investments did not support such 
optimism. The general numbers were distorted by Tallinn, in which investments were 
67.9% of all investments made by LG in Estonia in 2001 and 52.6% in 2002. The general 
level of investments made by other local governments has been much more modest. 
To eliminate confusing statistics we used numbers from the general accounts of 
LG expenditures that mirrored investments from LG budgets (Table 3.24). We did not 
include the numbers from the ministry budgets, which reached 5.5% of all expenditures 
of LG in 2001. The proportion that local governments direct to investments from their 
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own budgets is actually rather modest. Except for the smallest LGs, where government 
investment grants play a considerable role, the majority of local governments invest 
5–7%, which is a rather low rate of capacity development. 
Table 3.24
The Role of Investments in Local Government Expenditures 
in the General Accounts of Local Government Budgets [%]
Size of Local 
Government 
Community
Investments Direct State 
Support of 
Investments
(2001)
Percentage of Local 
Authorities Where 
Investments Were Less 
Than 1% of Expenditures 
(2000–2002)
2000 2001 2002
Estonia 11.88 12.19 9.69 2.07 33.0
less than 1,000 12.48 13.14 8.62 7.18 34.4
1,000–1,999 6.37 5.68 6.36 4.35 42.9
2,000-4,999 5.23 5.69 5.69 3.55 27.8
5,000 and more 7.69 5.39 6.86 2.47 15.1
Tallinn 24.81 22.95 14.04 0.16 —
Note: * Without Tallinn and Tartu.
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Agency of Statistics.  
http://www.stat.ee/.  
http://gatekeeper.stat.ee:8000/px-web.2001/Database/Majandus_regionaalne/Majandus_
regionaalne.asp.
Table 3.25 shows sources of investments, of which about half come from sources 
other than own income. Smaller communities as well as larger ones were rather successful 
in attracting money from or through foundations.
The other important indicator of the investment capacity of local government is the 
proportion of local communities that made no investments for three years. Among the 
smallest communities, the proportion making no investments was smaller, because they 
receive government investment grants. Among LGs with 1,000–2,000 residents (40% of all 
local communities), up to half were incapable of investing during the last several years at all! 
The analysis of investors with the largest proportion of investments in the budget revealed 
two classes of successful investors (Table 3.26). On the one hand, the majority were small 
communities, where a small amount of investments formed a very high proportion of the 
budget. These investments came from the state support fund, whereas their own income was 
considerably lower than the average of their class. The other, smaller class of investors was the 
prosperous communities near Tallinn where investment activity is particularly intensive. 
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Table 3.25
Sources of Investments of Diﬀerent Sized Local Communities (2000)
Type of settlement by number 
of inhabitants
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Parishes fewer than 1,500 27.4 9.9 0.5 0.4 49.4 11.6 0.6 100
1,500–3,000 50.9 7.4 0.5 0.0 30.7 9.9 0.6 100
3,000 and more 56.7 6.1 0.0 3.9 30.4 2.8 0.1 100
Towns fewer than 10,000 26.8 15.0 0.5 0.5 36.7 20.4 0.0 100
10,000 and more, 
excluding Tallinn
52.9 6.6 0.1 1.3 24.7 3.9 10.4 100
Source: Sootla 2002.
Table 3.26
Characteristics of Top Investors (2000–2002)
Municipality Percentage of 
Investments in 
Expenditures
Size of Local 
Community
Percentage of 
Own Revenues
Amount of Investments
[million EEK]
1 EUR=15.5 EEK
Kihnu (island) 42.6 497 20.4 3.5
Käru 42.4 727 33.9 4.8
Surju 40.4 1,029 42.0 4.9
Kõpu 38.9 842 34.3 3.6
Maidla 34.1 779 51.5 5.7
Lasva 34.0 1,783 22.5 5.8
Viimsi 29.8 8,049 77.8 24.3
Jõgeva town 25.3 6,416 38.5 15.0
Tahkuranna 24.8 2,017 41.5 3.0
Mõniste 24.7 1,070 30.3 2.3
Saue parish 24.4 7,331 76.11 12.4
Muhu 23.9 1,865 36.0 4.1
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Agency of Statistics. 
Available at: http://gatekeeper.stat.ee:8000/px-web.2001/Database/Majandus_regionaalne/
Majandus_regionaalne.asp.
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The other item of investment revenues not mirrored in the budget—investments via 
funds—could cause some trouble in the sense of transparency and strategic planning. 
The role of this item will increase with the EU accession.Will the control over direct 
investments by ﬁnancers be eﬃcient enough to avoid fraud and corruption? The highly 
bureaucratic practice of application for EU funds and control over their implementation 
does not oﬀer a clear answer to that question.
2.4.1.2 The Capacity of Local Executives
This section analyzes the variables that enable adequate assessment of the actual capacity 
of local executives and variables that hinder or contribute to more eﬀective work of 
oﬃcials in the local administration. 
2.4.1.2.1 The Size and Capacity of Local Administration
In assessing the local government and administration in Estonia in comparison with 
other countries, we should take into account some speciﬁc features of Estonia. Firstly, 
the majority of LGs are relatively small and, therefore, have rather small staﬀs (see 
Table 3.3). That is, a majority of local executives does not have a clear structure in 
the conventional sense. The term “local bureaucracy” is inadequate in Estonia, where 
organizational units normally consist of one person without subordinate staﬀ. As the size 
and structure of the government bureaucracy are deﬁned by the LG itself, the diﬀerences 
in local administrative structures are rather impressive.
Secondly, a large percentage of top LG executives is politically appointed as members 
of government. According to a survey carried out by EMIECO (2001), appointed 
members of the government executive number, on average, 4.8 members, from three 
to nine among polled units. 
Thirdly, our survey also revealed (see Table 3.27) a medium level of politicization 
of local civil servants. The size of the local community did not have an impact on the 
level of politicization. However, councilors tend to think that politicization is linked 
with incompetence (Pearson’s correlation 0.317). Our results also did not reveal an 
increasing level of competence with the increase in size of local communities (except for a 
decrease in the case of the smallest communities). But the thesis that larger communities 
command a more professional civil service has been presented as a major argument in 
legitimizing LG amalgamation. 
Fourthly, the small size of LG staﬀ is also caused by the further decentralization and 
devolution of service delivery at the local level. Even employees of public organizations 
managed by state agencies (school teachers, etc.) are not counted as civil servants of 
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administration. This practice of new public management could have a rather speciﬁc 
impact on local democracy. Leaders of government organizations and/or private 
companies (owned by local governments) might play a crucial role in managing local 
aﬀairs through democratic institutions (council and government). But they can also 
promote their organizational interests through more covert channels that would erode 
democracy at the local level. 
Recent studies of the private consultation companies EMIECO (2001) and 
Geomedia (2001) permit further analysis of local executives. A study of outcomes of 
the voluntary amalgamation of local governments by Geomedia enables more concrete 
observations about diﬀerences in administrative staﬀ in small and medium sized LGs 
from the point of view of their capacity. In smaller communities, the implementation 
of tasks is less institutionalized and allows wide discretion in interpretation by oﬃcials 
and their superiors. In small administrations only some oﬃcials focus on certain service 
delivery and law enforcement positions, such as social workers, advisors in land and 
building questions, or secretaries who are simultaneously responsible for data archives.
 
Table 3.27
The Role and Impact of the Local Civil Service 
As Assessed by Councilors (7-Point Scale*)
Role Size of Local Community Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Political partiality of local civil service 4.22 3.77 3.97 3.95 3.92
Competence of local civil service 3.85 4.60 4.62 4.23 4.41
Impact of civil service on LG decisions 3.64 3.57 3.83 3.65 3.68
Note: * 1—very low impact; 7—very high impact.
Source: LRS 2002.
The majority of administrative staﬀ members have multiple functions because of 
the small size of the administration. They pay more attention to tasks that are closer 
to their individual preferences or that are preferred by their superiors. Other tasks 
and responsibilities receive less attention and are considered of secondary importance. 
Many people, especially those with the most complex tasks, work part time. In general, 
they have more instrumental attitudes towards work. That is, despite the fact that the 
administration in small LGs is close to the citizens, the attitude of the civil service is 
more reactive towards their needs and the work of oﬃcials often seems to consist of 
putting out ﬁres (Geomedia 2000).
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In larger administrations, after amalgamation, a new type of civil servant emerges. 
Firstly, they now have responsibilities for coordination and policy analysis: specialists 
on education, culture, health, the environment, and development specialists. Secondly, 
staﬀ members’ responsibilities and accountability become concretized and also increase 
considerably. Although amalgamation did not result in the meaningful reduction of 
staﬀ, an increase in workload was reported by the majority of civil service staﬀ. This 
might tell us about the increase in eﬃciency and accountability. The third diﬀerence is 
that staﬀ members become able to focus more carefully and more frequently on their 
target groups. Although this attitude depends on the predisposition of civil servants’ 
specialization, there is an increase in professionalism that contributes above all to the 
quality of work of the oﬃcials. A fourth change can be seen in the role of analytical work 
as well as the increased involvement of civil servants in strategy elaboration.
Two changes in the LG structure were also observed. Firstly, the structures of local 
authorities became more similar and comparable with each other. This clearly makes the 
evaluation of their eﬃciency and the promotion of cooperation much easier. Secondly, 
as the general scope of tasks and ﬁnances has increased, LG has started to devolve and 
contract out more services that were previously administered by LG. Hence, increasing 
local government size has a concrete impact on the capacity of the local administration. 
But this impact is not so simple and linear as is usually assumed by politicians who insist 
in thorough amalgamation.8 In fact, our study did not conﬁrm the latter argument on 
the amalgamation of local communities and in some respects even indicated the reverse 
trends. 
Our survey results suggest some trends in the development of the capacity of local 
administrations. Only a few respondents found the number of civil servants to be too 
small (3.5%) or too large (2.8%). The majority thought that there should be some 
increase in staﬀ (63.1%) and almost 30% found the size of administration to be optimal. 
What was very interesting is that those opinions did not depend to any meaningful extent 
on the size of the LG administration or on the size of the local community. The turnover 
of civil servants was considered the least important problem at the local level (mean of 
1.89; see Figure 3.11). In local oﬃcials’ opinion, the problem of ﬁnding people with 
the appropriate qualiﬁcations for key positions was considerably more important (mean 
of 4.24). The latter is used as a central argument by supporters of the amalgamation of 
local communities: the larger the community, the better the opportunity to staﬀ the 
administration with qualiﬁed persons. Besides, the salary level of the civil service in 
larger towns is considerably higher than in government services. 
The intensity of the deﬁcit of good candidates for key positions dropped slightly in 
medium sized communities in comparison with smaller communities, but it increased 
considerably in towns (mean of 4.82), where it becomes an urgent problem. In towns 
this was identiﬁed as the third most urgent problem. Obviously, we need to take into 
consideration that there are diﬀerent reasons for this deﬁcit and diﬀerent deﬁnitions 
of “good candidate.” 
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Figure 3.11
Assessment of the Intensity of Employment Problems 
in Local Administration (7-Point Scale*)
Note: * 1—not important at all; 7—very important.
Source: LGS 2002.
One reason would be that larger local communities have more complicated tasks and 
problems to solve. Therefore, higher and probably diﬀerent qualiﬁcations are required. 
This was also evident in the more critical, if not scathing, assessment of the competence 
of councilors by oﬃcials of towns in comparison with oﬃcials of parishes, although the 
proportion of councilors with a university degree is considerably higher in towns.
 Secondly, the labor market in towns is much more competitive and “good candi-
dates” could ﬁnd attractive jobs in other organizations and sectors. Since the public 
service in parishes is one of the few and most attractive employment opportunities, LG 
could involve most of the professional members of the community. 
A third argument might be the absence of qualiﬁed and professional employees in 
small communities or the inability of parishes to pay them appropriate salaries or to 
oﬀer jobs that are challenging enough. This was also revealed in the study of outcomes 
of amalgamations referred to previously. 
Correlation analysis revealed some problems in assessing the variables in the problem 
of lack of good candidates. This problem is correlated with other general human 
resource management problems: the opposition of civil servants to change (0.411), 
problems of restrictions in hiring and ﬁring (0.378), and problems of pressures from 
employees (0.350), although the general intensity of those problems was rather low. The 
recruitment problem can also be partly explained by the general institutional inertia of 
administration and staﬀ in certain localities, which inhibits the hiring of professionals 
even when they are available.
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2.4.1.2.2 Qualiﬁcations and Employment in the Civil Service
According to the EMIECO (2001) survey, the typical head of an Estonian LG (mayor 
or municipal elder) is 46-50 years old, with 33% being even older. Thus, LG heads are 
considerably older than the top administrators in the central administration.9 The heads 
of LG are 81% male and 77% have higher education, but most of them are graduates 
of Agricultural University (59%), especially in small local governments. 
Most local government heads have a rather stable position. Only one-third were 
appointed after the election in 1999 (the survey was carried out in 2000) and 43% have 
survived three elections. 
Although the mayor is a political appointee, in smaller communities 39.3% 
of mayors were not members of parties. In other communities, mayors were more 
frequently members of parties or electoral unions, i.e., from council. Partisan involvement 
increased considerably before the elections in 1999 (see section 3.1). Almost all (94.6%) 
respondents reported that their mayor belonged to a party after the 2003 elections. In 
other words, LG heads in smaller communities were obviously the most respected leaders 
in the local community and to a lesser extent were lifted into oﬃce via their party career. 
In small communities where the choice is rather limited, even forced party membership 
could not reduce the autonomy of the mayor very much. But this, as we will show in 
the next section, does not mean that those top executives are more independent in 
decision-making at the local level. 
The Estonian civil service at the local level has a rather high level of formal education, 
with 49% having a university degree and 36% a diploma (applied higher education). But 
as only 10% of them were younger than 30 in 1999, the majority had ﬁnished their studies 
in the Soviet period (for age structure see Figure 3.12). Although Soviet education, 
especially technical education, was of acceptable quality, it did not contain studies of 
market economics and social sciences. Thus, the education of civil servants of 35 years 
and older (around 80%) is not adequate for the development of modern democratic 
governance. This trend would be neutralized by the intensive retraining of oﬃcials. 
Almost all civil servants polled by EMIECO (2001) had attended training courses the 
previous year and 24% were involved in long-term studies (Figure 3.13). This was a rather 
high proportion, demonstrating the need for better education, on the one hand, and a 
rather high motivation to acquire modern educational background, on the other. 
Unfortunately, most of this training lasts only one to three days. That is, the training 
concerns the most urgent needs in information, primarily the introduction to new acts, 
and is less connected with systematic training in basic skills. The training that is most 
required is in management. Participation in training is also more or less spontaneous 
and dependent on personal interests. Few LGs (15%) had a training plan.
Despite the extensive training that is oﬀered, LG oﬃcials have rather big constraints 
in satisfying their need for know-how. Although the law requires that 3% of payroll is 
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spent on training and – thanks to foreign aid – modern in-service training is frequently 
available, civil servants complain about several reasons why they have not participated 
in training. First and foremost among the important reasons were: lack of resources 
(mentioned by 61% of respondents), remoteness of the training institutions (22%), 
and lack of time (19%).
Figure 3.12
Structure of the Civil Service of Local Governments by Age [%]
 
Source: EMIECO 2001.
Figure 3.13
Proportion of Civil Servants Who Have Participated 
in Training by Duration of Training [%]
 
Source: EMIECO 2001.
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2.4.1.3 Conclusion
Although there has been a strong pattern of migration to towns, the general reproduction 
rate is a problem in smaller (2,000 and fewer inhabitants) communities. But regional 
diﬀerences in wealth and capacity are tremendous. Investments and jobs have been 
concentrated in towns and cities, especially in Tallinn and surrounding areas. Thus, 
behind the formal data we can expect a decrease in social capital at the local, and especially 
the rural, level that might hinder the development of democracy.
Opportunities for the developing LG capacity and achieving the threshold of self-
sustaining development have not increased. The role of own revenues has decreased 
and the role of categorical and targeted grants has increased. The role of truly own 
investments was rather small, around 4% of all expenditures, whereas the role of 
government support—direct and indirect—has been much higher and is growing. This 
means that the largest portion of LG spending goes to ﬁnance current expenditures, 
leaving inadequate resources for self-sustained development. 
The prospect for general capacity development is much more promising in another 
area—where LG is not so dependent on intergovernmental relations—the development 
of administration. Generally speaking, there are only minor problems with the civil 
service at the local level, except for two issues: the relatively high level of politicization 
(that correlates with low professionalism) and diﬃculties in ﬁnding good candidates 
for key positions. What is absolutely clear is the non-linear correlation between LG 
size and the training needs of professional oﬃcials. Presumably medium sized local 
government—as the study of amalgamation also demonstrated—can better balance 
those two variables.
2.4.2 Variables of Eﬀectiveness of Decision-making and Implementation 
In this section we analyze two interrelated processes: policymaking and implementation. 
Indicators of eﬀective policymaking are contradictory. On the one hand, the policy 
should be formed as the result of smooth political input. On the other hand, as much 
as possible it should be coherent and professional. Our focus here is on how these two 
opposing principles are balanced in Estonia.
The indicators of eﬀective implementation are planning and the ability to meet 
planned ends. The second surrogate indicator of balance between needs and capacities
—as a general indicator of democratic governance—is success in devolution and 
privatization that would enable the reduction of the workload of government without 
damaging the public’s interests.
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2.4.2.1 Variables of Decision-making Eﬀectiveness in Local Councils
Local councils in Estonia meet once in month on average. Only the largest of them 
meet more frequently. Thus, councils have more or less equal time to make decisions, 
despite the fact that the number and complexity of issues are rather diﬀerent. Hence, 
there should be variables that would increase the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of decisions 
at councils with heavier workloads.
The ﬁrst such variable was planning. The larger the local community (and, therefore, 
the more complicated its issues), the larger was the proportion of municipalities where 
council and its committees’ work was scheduled (Figure 3.14). This is the ﬁrst tool in 
decreasing the complexity problem.
Figure 3.14
The Role of Scheduling of Council 
and Committees’ Work by Size of Local Community [%]
 
Source: LGS 2002.
There were almost no cases when sessions ended because of lack of quorum in 
Estonian local councils. The majority of LGs (51.6%) did not have extraordinary 
sessions and 39.3% had one or two. No extraordinary sessions were reported by 30.8% 
of oﬃcials from the smallest councils and by 61% from councils with a population size 
of between 2,000 and 5,000. In councils in largest local communities, extraordinary 
sessions are more frequent (41%), but not as frequent as in the smallest councils. The 
scheduling of supplementary sessions would be rather normal for large councils, which 
have very long agendas and possible contingencies. 
The frequency of postponed decisions was considerably higher in the smallest 
communities, where 40.7% of local oﬃcials reported that decisions were postponed 
rarely or never, whereas the overall proportion of such councils was 53.4%. The highest 
proportion of councils (10%) where decisions were never postponed was in the largest 
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councils. Nevertheless, there was only a weak correlation between availability of schedules 
and postponed decisions. Let us examine the reasons for delay.
Oﬃcials from the smallest communities complained more than others about the 
lack of information and ill-prepared decisions, and these have been the most frequent 
reasons for delay (Table 3.28). The clearest diﬀerence between the largest and the smaller 
communities regarding the cause of delay was whether it was for a technical reason 
(information, problems in the management of discussion) or for a political reason (the 
need for elaboration of a clear position by the faction or councilor). The former has 
been the most frequent reason for smaller communities and their councils, the latter 
for larger communities. In communities with 2,000–5,000 inhabitants, the political 
reasons were reported more frequently than in the smallest (1,999 and below). So, the 
tentative conclusion from this data would be that the smaller the community, the more 
these are “talking” bodies, because of the lower quality of proposals. At councils in the 
largest communities, “working” devices of elaboration of politically targeted positions 
were much better developed. 
Table 3.28
Most Frequent Reasons for the Delay of Decisions at Local Councils [%]
Most Frequent Reasons for Delays Size of Local Community Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Lack of information; issues were 
ill-prepared
40.0 24.8 23.8 21.3 25.3
Lack of time — 1.0 1.2 — —
Some members of council tried to 
obstruct the decision
8.0 12.4 10.7 14.9 11.9
Members of council cannot come to 
joint conclusion
32.0 39.0 36.9 19.1 34.1
Some factions or councilors need time 
to form ﬁrm opinion about the issue
16.0 17.1 26.2 42.6 24.5
Other reasons 4.0 5.7 1.2 2.1 3.4
Source: LRS 2002.
We noted previously that with an increase in the size of the local community, the role 
of factions increases. In Table 3.28, factions and political mechanisms of decision-making 
appear to be important variables in the decision-making eﬃciency of councils. 
Another indicator of eﬀective coalition politics is the coalition agreement and the 
practice of forming policy according to this agreement. As the survey results show (see 
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Figure 3.15), formal coalition agreements were the rule in larger communities. Around 
one-ﬁfth of medium and smaller communities practiced this policymaking tool. At the 
same time, in communities that did not have formalized coalition politics, a considerable 
number of respondents reported the existence of an informal agreement; i.e., almost half 
of the smaller sized communities have a coalition in some form and more than 83% of 
councils in larger communities have coalitions. 
Figure 3.15
Proportion of Local Councils with Formal or Informal Coalition Agreements [%]
Source: LGS 2002.
How stable are these formal and informal coalitions? How often do they achieve a 
majority to promote their political agenda and some kind of coherent policy program? 
We observed that, simultaneously with an increase in the strength of coalitions, some 
increase in the level of conﬂict inside council (Table 3.29) occurred and increased more 
with the size of the local community and local councils. But cases where councils rely 
only on a coalition majority are rather rare, even in the largest communities. That is, 
we observe obvious trends of consensual decision-making in council’s decision-making 
behaviour, not majoritarian ‘roller’ style. 
Only in the largest communities was the frequency of coalition voting higher than 
the number of unanimous decisions. But even in the largest communities, the frequency 
of cases where the coalition–opposition cleavage was clear was not higher than the 
frequency of unanimous decisions. This means that political cleavages were rather weak 
in smaller and even in larger communities. This data would also indicate that issues in 
smaller communities are politically less divisive than in larger communities where they 
are more complicated.
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Table 3.29
Voting Behavior of Council by Size of Local Community (10-Point Scale)
Voting Behavior Population Size of Local Community Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Frequency of majority coalition 
voting together
4.79 4.37 5.73 6.10 5.20
Frequency of majority coalition 
prevailing against all others
2.58 3.20 4.01 3.63 3.49
Frequency of unanimous decisions 5.25 6.24 5.65 4.51 5.60
Source: LGS 2002.
But presumably a consensus could be achieved in diﬀerent ways. This was 
demonstrated in our previous discussion concerning the positive link between the 
eﬀectiveness of decisions and the extent of political institutionalization of decisions. A 
low political cohesion of factions is conducive to debate and discussion in council that 
is weakly grounded in professionalism. However, at the end of such discussions, the 
council does not more frequently reveal any political controversy in making the decision. 
Similarly, a more active stance in contesting mayors’ proposals (in smaller councils) 
indicates simply that council’s deliberations and debates are much less managed and 
targeted there and, hence, are less eﬃcient and eﬀective from the viewpoint of consistent 
policy than in councils where debates were politically more institutionalized. 
This rather important conclusion has implications for the argument about whether 
or not only branches of national parties should be allowed to participate in local elections 
(see Section 3.1). In our opinion, councils in small communities have objectively weaker 
political capacity. Partisan competition would hardly increase the extent of politicization 
and consistency in any faction’s policy in these communities, since they have diﬃculty 
in composing party lists for the local election, not to speak of the actual political activity 
of candidates. Is there any alternative solution? 
On the one hand, the nature of the tasks and scope of the budgets in smaller 
communities would be more conducive to purely “technical” solutions that require 
professional competence more than political will. The discussion of whether to repair 
the roof or stairs of a school is hardly a political one. On the other hand, in smaller 
communities the council has questioned the mayors’ proposals much more frequently, 
and presumably has changed them in the course of discussion. However, we have 
shown that individual councilors were rather incompetent in analyzing and making 
decisions on an individual basis and, therefore, should focus more on providing input as 
representatives of the public (see Section 3.3). Hence, councils in smaller communities 
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should focus more on their functions of control and oversight, and leave more discretion 
to the mayor in making decisions. In this way, the increase in unprofessional decisions 
could be avoided. 
In light of these circumstances, to what extent would we propose that the mayor–
council model be introduced in smaller communities? In the survey, councilors expressed 
their opinions on the proposal to have direct election of the mayor by residents, in order 
to increase council’s role in decision-making. This proposal was more strongly supported 
by representatives of smaller councils, although the mean opinion—4.22 in the smallest 
and 3.57 in the largest councils—indicates not very strong support for either version of 
the proposed mayoral elections (Figure 3.16). More importantly, the standard deviation 
of opinions concerning this proposal was unusually high in all communities, indicating 
a considerable cleavage in the opinions of councilors. The question that needs to be 
answered is whether the council and community would be able to exert eﬀective control 
over the actions of a strong executive. In the following sections we will show that we 
can not be quite sure of that.
Figure 3.16
Cleavage of Opinions on How to Appoint the Mayor [%]
 
Source: LRS 2002.
Hence, the scenario of increasing the eﬀectiveness of decision-making by strength-
ening the mayor’s legitimacy and power is rather controversial as well.
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2.4.2.2 The role of Strategy in Local Government Decision-making
The problem of linking policy decisions (i.e., on budgeting and investments) with a local 
government’s development strategy dates back to 1989, to the ﬁrst reform of LG. To get 
an oﬃcial mandate for governance and an independent budget, a local community had 
to present a Development Plan (DP). This management tool was well institutionalized 
much earlier at the local, rather than the central, level of governance. According to the 
LGA (Ch. 13) the LG DP is “the document that contains the analysis of economic and 
social processes and situations in the environment. [The document contains] a long 
term plan of actions and priorities for future development.” The DP must be prepared 
for at least three years (Ch. 37). If the LG unit has ﬁnancial or other obligations for 
a longer period, then the DP must mirror these obligations for the whole period. LG 
statutes and budgeting procedures usually contain a provision that budget priorities 
and investments should be decided according to the DP. A Development Plan is the 
precondition of government support for investments to LG. 
According to the EMIECO survey, 10 83% of localities had a DP in 2002, and 74% 
had been adopted after the previous elections in 1999 or were to be approved in the 
near future. General planning existed in 45% of localities and as many as 61% of these 
plans were relatively recently adopted. 
Our survey focused on identifying the availability of concrete programs at LG 
(Table 3.30). 
Table 3.30
Availability of Diﬀerent Types of Strategy in Local Communities by Size [%]
Adopted Strategy Size of local Community Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Long-term plan of economic 
development
39.5 55.4 64.4 80.0 61.7
Long-term plan of investments 57.1 65.7 71.3 75.0 68.5
Public sanitation or environment 
protection program
22.2 59.0 61.4 85.5 61.5
Education development program 57.1 68.0 67.4 78.9 69.0
Cultural development program 32.1 41.4 43.2 66.7 46.3
Source: LGS 2002.
How are these strategies working in real practice? Our survey results show that the 
majority of LGs have followed a DP in planning and doing investments. 
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Local governments have various interpretations of the role of the DP as a plan for 
investments. For some, the DP outlines precisely scheduled concrete investments with 
calculated amount of expenditures. The other and major portion of municipalities prefers 
to prepare the list of investments and order them according to priority (which can be 
revised) with approximate costs. The decision about investments will be made after 
concrete ﬁnances become available (usually yearly) and after an exact calculation of costs. 
These are more often medium sized communities whose budget is more dependent on 
central support funds and whose revenues are more subject to contingencies. Only 10.9% 
of respondents reported that they have made investments that were (partly) unplanned 
by the DP (Table 3.31). One-ﬁfth of investments were not made in accordance with 
the DP but by ad hoc decision of local authorities. In the smallest communities, ad 
hoc decisions on investments are as regular as investments according to the DP. Ad 
hoc decisions are also rather frequent in medium sized communities.
Our survey further indicated that planned expenditures of more than two-thirds 
(72.4%) of projects implemented by LG during last years did not exceed the planned 
level (see Table 3.32). As many as 10% of them exceeded planned costs. 
Table 3.31
Investments Made According to Development Plan by Size of Community [%] 
Investments According to 
Development Plan
Size of local Community Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
More investments than 
planned in DP 
— 7.8 6.0 13.2 7.5
Investments done exactly 
according to DP
— 9.8 3.6 18.9 8.6
Investments according to list 
of priorities 
48.1 53.9 54.8 43.4 51.5
Investments partly for other 
purposes
3.7 8.8 11.9 17.0 10.9
Investments according to ad 
hoc decision of authorities 
48.1 19.6 23.8 7.5 21.4
Source: LGS 2002.
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Table 3.32
Expected and Real Budget Costs by Size of Community [%]
Expected and Real Budget Costs Size of Local Community Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Real costs of large majority of 
projects almost as planned
69.2 77.7 71.3 65.4 72.4
Costs of approximately half projects 
as planned
15.4 11.7 21.3 25.0 17.6
Costs of small proportion as planned 15.4 10.7 7.5 9.6 10.0
Source: LGS 2002.
We could not see substantial diﬀerences in planned and real costs dependent on 
the size of the community. Larger communities did not meet expected costs even more 
frequently than smaller ones. We were interested in knowing whether the availability of a 
DP would inﬂuence ﬁnancial discipline in projects. That is, are those with a development 
or investment plan more frequently able to meet planned costs?
We do see considerably higher ﬁnancial discipline (meeting planned costs) in these 
communities that made investments exactly according to a scheduled plan. Scheduled 
planning is not very widespread: only 16% of respondents declared that this method 
was used in their community (Table 3.33). However, ﬁscal discipline in the case of 
scheduled investments that exceeded investment plans was only slightly higher than in 
cases where the DP only deﬁned priorities or even in cases where decisions on investments 
were completely ad hoc. That is, other types of decisions on investment, including ad 
hoc ones—which were more frequently made in smaller communities—could also be 
relatively well planned. The lowest share of cases where there was a correspondence 
between plans and investments was in the case of investments with other purposes, 
which was highest in largest communities.
More paradoxical results were found when the method of deciding on and planning 
investments was compared with the ability to meet deadlines and pay current operating 
costs. Those communities that made ad hoc decisions on investments were able to meet 
deadlines even more frequently than those that operated according to scheduled plans. 
Moreover, ad hoc decisions did not cause any more diﬃculties in paying for current 
operating costs (Figure 3.17) than exactly scheduled investments, and they caused much 
less trouble than investments according to planned priorities. 
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Table 3.33
The Inﬂuence of Investing According 
to a Development Plan on the Financial Discipline of Projects [%]
Investments in Relation to 
Development Plan
Expected and Real Budget Costs
Real Costs of 
a Large Majority 
of Projects Almost 
as Planned
Costs of 
Approximately 
Half the Projects 
as Planned
Costs of 
a Small 
Proportion 
as Planned
More investments than planned in DP 78.9 21.1 —
Investments done exactly according to DP 90.5 9.5 —
Investments according to list of priorities 74.0 16.0 9.9
Investments partly for other purposes 56.0 28.0 16.0
Investments according to ad hoc decision 
of authorities 
71.7 11.3 17.0
Source: LGS 2002.
Figure 3.17
Capacity to Follow Current Operating Costs Dependent 
on Techniques for Deciding on and Planning Investments [%]
 
Source: LGS 2002.
Hence, LGs have been rather successful in applying diﬀerent types of planning 
techniques from the standpoint of outputs. Exact planning is preferable, but not 
possible for all local communities, mainly because of too much ﬁnancial dependence 
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on government support and because of the contingencies of the economic environment. 
Investments that were made for other purposes than those outlined in the DPs have less 
favorable outputs than all other types of decisions on investments. That is, changing 
plans was the worst way to make investments. 
In practice, the role of the DP as a management tool and also investment practices 
are far from being uncontroversial. Firstly, the general format and techniques for DPs 
have not been approved or agreed upon and, consequently, LG oﬃcials have not yet 
received training. The DP is very often a “letter of intentions” from diﬀerent sectors 
that are merged together as chapters into the whole text. Quite often, therefore, the 
DP cannot be the basis for budgeting, especially for smaller LGs. Recently, however, 
extensive online manuals for preparing DPs were prepared and published at the website 
of the Ministry of the Interior. Many LGs have contracted out the preparation of the 
DP to private expert ﬁrms or to universities.
Secondly, development plans are subject to frequent changes, especially after 
elections. A DP can be changed as soon as new needs or an idea for some development 
ﬁnds support by councilors. While the initial DP was usually prepared by experts in 
cooperation with local government professionals after long and in-depth expert and 
political discussions, the changes are often introduced by councilors and are made on 
the basis of ad hoc political considerations. This has weakened the economic rationality 
and eﬀectiveness of DPs. 
The DP can still include many aims and targets that cannot be met in the budget. The 
applications of units and organizations for investments might exceed the budget capacity 
of local authorities by four or ﬁve times. For this reason, some LGs have established 
a rule that the applicant must demonstrate what negative consequences will occur if 
the investment is not made. Budgeting rules—LGA, Ch. 39—state that proposals to 
change a draft budget should be accompanied by a report where supplementary sources 
of ﬁnancing are deﬁned. That is, there are rather strong formal and practical devices to 
ensure the ﬁnancial discipline of investments, even in the case of ad hoc decisions.
A supplementary strategic document that deﬁnes short-term priorities and might not 
replace the DP is the coalition agreement. In larger communities, the actual management 
and current planning are to a large extent guided by that document. 
Clearly, the role of the DP as a budgeting tool will increase in the near future. The 
application for various support programs or cooperation projects in the EU requires a 
well elaborated DP.
2.4.2.3 Devolution and the Success of Privatization
The capacity of Estonian local governments cannot be precisely assessed by the size of the 
budget and the eﬀectiveness of its implementation. A general premise of LG structuring 
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in the 1990s was that local authorities should delegate to private law subjects all public 
services that could be delivered self-suﬃciently in the economic sense (i.e., that could 
cover expenses from returns). The latter could be completely private or owned by LG 
via shares. Other LG tasks were devolved to nonproﬁt organizations. These were most 
frequently established for managing culture and heritage, speciﬁc real estate, tourism, 
and housing. 
The process of devolution (privatization, contracting out) of public services has 
been successful in large and medium sized localities where there is enough demand 
for public services to reduce business risks to private ﬁrms (Figure 3.18). Smaller or 
geographically remote (disadvantaged) communities were not always able to sell their 
assets and to devolve services, because of high business risks and because the market 
value of assets is frequently several times below their investment value. Thus, smaller 
LGs are forced to manage facilities that would usually be privatized or contracted out 
in larger communities. This results in a supplementary burden to their budgets and a 
larger proportion of general administrative costs.
Figure 3.18
Privatization or Contracting out of Communal Utilities
 in the Last Five Years by Size of Local Community [% of services]
 
Source: LGS 2002.
What services were usually privatized? The most devolved sectors were communal 
utilities, transportation, and public utilities, whereas culture, social work, and education 
were partially privatized or contracted out (Table 3.34).
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Table 3.34
The Extent of Privatization and Contracting out of Services at the Local Level [%]
Sector Extent of Privatization and Contracting out
Almost Complete Partial Not at All
Communal utilities 59.7 30.9 9.4
Social work 4.0 43.2 52.8
Education 2.9 20.5 76.7
Culture 9.4 48.9 41.7
Transportation 52.0 28.6 19.4
Public utilities (parks, etc.) 29.8 44.2 26.0
Planning and land management 6.9 35.3 57.8
Source: LGS 2002.
Privatization also occurred to some extent in the core services of local government, 
such as education, culture, and social services, which form the bulk of budget 
expenditures.
As expected, the level of devolution (privatization, contracting out) was highly 
dependent on the size of the local community. Figure 3.19 demonstrates the extent of 
the devolution of public services. While in the largest communities the privatization 
and contracting out of public utilities is almost complete, in the smallest communities, 
as stated earlier, more than one-third of LGs must provide those services themselves. 
These diﬀerences in the amount of devolution did not mirror the assessment of 
outcomes of the devolution. Oﬃcials from smaller communities even expressed more 
favorable attitudes than oﬃcials from larger communities (Table 3.35). Probably they 
have the least negative experience in comparison with large communities. But in general, 
the success of privatization was assessed rather highly by our respondents. Besides, as 
in case of the amalgamation of local government units, only a minor impact (towards 
reduction) on the size of the civil service was revealed as the result of privatization.
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Figure 3.19
Privatization and/or Contracting out of Public Utilities 
in Local Governments by Size [%]
 
Source: LGS 2002.
Table 3.35
Assessment of the Outcomes of Privatization 
and Contracting out by Size of Local Community, (7-Point Scale)
Assessment of Outcomes of 
Privatization and 
Contracting out
Size of Local Community Total
Less than 
1,000
1,000–2,000 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Success of devolution 5.3 4.8 5.19 4.8 5.00
Better rate of price and quality 4.89 4.19 4.23 4.58 4.33
Better access to services 
(i.e., ability to pay)
4.22 4.13 4.43 4.47 4.33
Reduction of employees 
after devolution
2.89 1.92 2.76 3.13 2.58
Source: LGS 2002.
2.4.2.4 Conclusion
Decision-making at the local level is well institutionalized in Estonia in medium and larger 
communities. Factions and coalitions play a decisive role in policymaking, whereas the role 
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of individual councilors in making decisions is considerably weaker. This also solves the 
problem of the low professionalism and inability of individual councilors to set priorities. The 
process of institutionalization, it should be noted, can weaken the level of contact between 
councilors and their constituents. Later sections of this chapter provide some answers to this. 
In smaller communities those trends, which are also mirrored in less cooperation between 
council and the mayor, are not as strong. Our study revealed that in smaller communities, 
the direct election of the mayor would lead to a split in the local community. Presumably, 
the council–manager formula should be applied in this situation.
Our research revealed rather widespread and eﬀective use of strategic planning tools at 
the local level. In Estonia, two diﬀerent mechanisms are used in planning investments: a 
comprehensive plan and a list of priorities. We found only one advantage of the ﬁrst tool: 
smaller communities that cannot use comprehensive strategic tools can develop eﬀectiveness 
via other tools of strategic planning. We also found rather extensive privatization of public 
services, although the peak of privatization was in the mid-1990s. Even in such areas 
as planning and land management, social work, and culture, half of the communities 
indicated the private provision of those services. We found grounds for moderate optimism 
in assessments of the results of privatization and did not ﬁnd complete failure. We can 
suppose that privatization was used by local communities not only to promote eﬃciency 
but also to deal with the problem of insuﬃcient capacity. The government prefers to 
steer rather than to row. Does it also contribute to an increase in the legitimacy of local 
authorities? An analysis of this topic is the subject of the following sections.
3. REPRESENTATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
3.1 Local Elections and Referenda
3.1.1 Local Public Initiatives and Referenda
As forms of direct democracy, local public initiatives and referenda do not have sound 
traditions in Estonian political culture. Neither option is mentioned in the constitution. 
Referenda are organized mainly at the national level and are initiated by parliament. The 
procedures for referenda are described in the constitution and in the Referendum Act. 
At the local level, citizens can collect signatures to initiate a legal act, which later 
on must be approved by the municipal council. Estonian LGs have wide autonomy to 
determine the precise rules of this procedure. Local residents with voting rights can also 
initiate a referendum, but in reality both these opportunities of political activism were 
never used from 1989–2002 (Olle 2002, 107). More often, the municipal council initiates 
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local referenda itself. In cases where neighboring municipalities are going to merge, a 
public vote is obligatory, although its results are not binding on the decision-makers.
The enlargement of local self-government units is one of the main aims of 
administrative reform in Estonia; thus, such opinion polls have already been organized 
in a few municipalities. Although referendum statistics are not perfectly complete, one 
can still notice some tendencies. As seen in Table 3.36, local voters are not enthusiastic 
to use their citizens’ rights. Usually referenda are carried out on the same day as local 
council elections, but voting in the referendum is signiﬁcantly lower than the election 
turnout—around 15%–25%. A second trend, which is apparent from the voting 
statistics, is a diﬀerent attitude toward amalgamation in towns and parishes (rural 
municipalities). Rural residents are more often against enlargement; at the same time 
they are more active  participants in voting. There has been no positive change in civic 
activism for seven years, which must, beyond doubt, be regarded as a weakness of 
Estonian local democracy. 
Table 3.36
Local Referenda on the Amalgamation of Municipalities (1996–2002) [%]
1996–1999 In Favor 2002 Turnout In Favor 
PärnuJaagupi town 80 Rapla parish 24 14
Halinga parish 73 Rapla town 4 63
Abja-Paluoja town 88 Räpina parish 27 43
Abja parish 7 Räpina town 13 81
Otepää town 74 Anija parish 11 82
Pühajärve parish 48 Kehra town 8 63
Lihula town 78 Kohila parish 15 63
Lihula parish 52 Kohila town 10 91
Vihula parish 56 Loodna parish 36 30
Võsu parish 42 Märjamaa parish 4 34
Kaarma parish 61
Kuressaare parish 31
Antsla town 63
Antsla parish 57
Karksi-Nuia town 57
Karksi parish 72
Source: Ministry of Interior.
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3.1.2 The Electoral System
Municipal councils are elected in general, uniform, and direct elections by secret ballot. 
Councils are elected for a three-year term, although debates on prolonging this to four 
years are on-going. The reasons given for such an amendment have been twofold. 
Firstly, with the three-year term, local and general elections can sometimes fall in the 
same year, causing instability in governance. Secondly, as pointed out by experts from 
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, the three-year period is too 
short to realize political promises and programs, which can cause long-term ineﬃciency 
(Council of Europe 2000).
The outcomes of representative democracy depend upon the basic characteristics 
of administrative and electoral systems. One of the peculiarities of the Estonian 
administrative landscape is the heavy concentration of the urban population in just a few 
towns and cities (see Table 3.2). The capital city of Tallinn comprises almost one-third 
of the total population of Estonia, but has the same legal status as small municipalities 
with fewer than 1,000 residents. This imbalance is also reﬂected in electoral competition 
and in the composition of local councils. 
Another main tendency in the development of local elections is their growing 
similarity with the general elections. This trend becomes evident when one analyzes the 
role of political parties, campaign patterns, expenditures, and voter turnout.  
Estonia uses a proportional representation (PR) system both in general and in local 
elections. Because of their small size, the majority of municipalities has only one electoral 
district. In these cases, all seats in the municipal council are allocated proportionally 
to the votes given on the electoral lists, as long as individual candidates succeeded in 
surpassing the district’s threshold. Only those municipalities with more than 50,000 
residents have to form more electoral districts with at least three mandates in each. In 
reality, this case holds only for the three biggest towns—Tallinn, Tartu, and Narva.
Mandates are allocated according to the personal votes given to a candidate on the 
electoral list. This system of open lists decreases the possibility that elected representatives 
enjoy the support of the party top oﬃcials but not of the local voters. Another important 
feature of PR electoral systems is that “wasted” votes typical in the “ﬁrst-past-the-post” 
system are minimized. In Estonia there is no universal threshold for the electoral lists 
at local elections; thus, a broad variety of ideological platforms has a chance to be 
represented in decision-making bodies.
All procedures of local elections are regulated by the Local Government Council 
Election Act, last amended in 2002. Among other things, this legal document determines the 
minimum size of a municipal council. The exact number of local councilors is determined 
by the municipal councils themselves, basically by population size: the larger the population, 
the greater the number of councilors. As shown in Table 3.37, the resident–councilor ratio 
is sharply increasing in large urban municipalities with 20,000 or more inhabitants.
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Voting rights in local elections in Estonia are granted both to citizens and non-citizens 
who have lived permanently in that municipality for at least the last ﬁve years. Therefore, 
the national composition does not have any signiﬁcant impact on the voter–leader 
ratio. Rather, we can consider the age composition of the population as an independent 
variable. Ageing is a bigger problem for rural municipalities where dependent children 
form a smaller proportion than in urban and suburban areas. Therefore, the share of 
voters in the rural population is higher. As a result of that, the voter–leader ratio diﬀers 
between cities and villages less than the resident–leader ratio (voting age in Estonia is 
eighteen). However, Table 3.37 shows a tremendous diﬀerence between the smallest 
and the largest municipalities in voter–leader ratio.
Table 3.37
Resident–Councilor Ratio According 
to the Local Government Council Election Act
Number of Residents Minimum of 
Local Councilors
Maximum
Resident–Councilor Ratio
Voter–Leader Ratio 
(2002)
Up to 2,000 7 286 74
2,000–5,000 13 385 104
5,001–10,000 17 588 175
10,00–50,000 21 2,381 276
50,001 and more 31 13,226* 602
Note: * Figure refers to the largest municipality, the city of Tallinn (approx. 400,000 residents).
Source: Local Government Council Election Act; National Electoral Committee  
(http://www.vvk.ee).
3.1.3 Electoral Process
Elections consist of two main periods—the preelection campaign period and the post-
election period, when the results are published and the governing coalition is formed. 
In this section we analyze electoral campaign patterns in terms of ﬁnances and the 
involvement of citizens. The legal formalities concerning the formation of electoral 
districts and committees, formal approval of candidates, and the checking of the voters’ 
register are all described in detail in the LGCEA, so we have not included this aspect in 
our discussion. Our main research focus will be on the trend and the level of electoral 
competition, in which important changes have taken place in the last few years.
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3.1.3.1 Financial and Human Resources in Local Campaigns
Expenditures concerning the preparation and holding of elections are covered by the 
local budget, but the election campaigns of political parties, civil organizations, or 
individual candidates are not included. All political parties represented in the national 
parliament have the right to get proportional appropriations from the state budget, 
but most of the campaign funds are raised through donations. Political parties have to 
submit a report to the National Electoral Committee (NEC) concerning the expenses 
and the sources of funds for the election. This information is available in detail at the 
NEC website, but one cannot see which proportion is received from local and which 
from central party revenues. 
The ﬁnancing of campaigns in Estonia follows some international trends, but has its 
own peculiarities as well. Electoral campaigns are becoming more and more expensive 
in advanced democracies, and the same is happening in Estonia. An especially sharp 
rise occurred in the last elections, including the local ones. While the total cost of the 
parliamentary election campaign in 1999 was EEK 28.6 million, in 2003 it had risen 
to EEK 60 million. In 2002, the six major parties spent EEK 43 million on the local 
elections. If we add to this the expenses of the smaller parties, citizens unions, and 
individual candidates, the ﬁgure will be even higher and comes close to the expenditures 
on the general elections. 
Due to the short period in which free elections have been held, rules on ﬁnancial 
donations are still undergoing amendments. During the local elections of 2002, both 
private enterprises and individuals could donate money to political parties. Many 
candidates invested their personal savings in their election campaigns. It has become 
an interesting practice in Estonia that one company or person makes donations to 
diﬀerent political parties. On the one hand, this shows the persistence of insecurity for 
business and the unpredictability of electoral results. On the other hand, it might be an 
indication of the similarity of proposed policies and the vague ideologies of the main 
political parties. According to an amendment of the Act on Political Parties in January 
2004, only individuals and not companies can make ﬁnancial donations to parties. 
The structure of expenses presents a mixed picture. All the main media and publicity 
instruments are used, although their relative proportions diﬀer across political parties. 
Publications and ﬂyers are the most common, followed by newspaper advertisements 
and electronic media (Figure 3.20). Public events form only 7% of expenditures. This 
suggests that Estonia is moving toward an American pattern of campaigning, where 
electronic media and professional PR services play an increasing role.
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Figure 3.20
Average Expenditures of Political Parties 
on Campaign Activities in 2002 Local Elections [%]
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
Whereas the ﬁnancial resources spent on local elections are sharply increasing, the 
voluntary involvement of citizens remains at a very low level: 39.8% of respondents in 
the LRS stated that they had no volunteers in their campaign at all, while 27% had one 
to three individuals. Only 4.4% of respondents had more than twenty volunteers. The 
number of volunteers was neither dependant on the size of the community nor on the 
number of times of reelection.These ﬁndings give additional support to the hypothesis 
of Americanization of campaigns. According to B. Newmann (1999), US political 
parties usually buy campaign services from professional PR ﬁrms, whereas in the UK 
party members perform the main jobs on a voluntary basis. 
3.1.3.2 Competition in Local Elections
Remarkable changes have occurred in local campaign patterns during the 1990s, caused 
basically by the development of political parties and the party system. In the ﬁrst half of 
the 1990s, local elections did not attract main actors to the political arena. Statistically, 
this is demonstrated by the fact that the minor parties participated more actively in 
local elections than the powerful ones and had a higher number of party lists. For 
example, one of the biggest parties, the Center Party, was only in eighth place according 
to the number of party lists in 1996. The main competition in the local elections was 
between individual candidates and citizens’ electoral unions (CEU).11 The situation 
changed dramatically in 2002, when the CEU were abolished by an amendment of 
the LGCEA. Later, the Legal Chancellor protested the act and CEU were allowed to 
23%
44%
19%
7%
Ads
Public events
Miscellaneous
Publications
PR
7%
255
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
participate in the last election. Nevertheless, the number of CEU has decreased very 
sharply, and the number of party lists, on the other hand, has risen equally quickly 
(Table 6.3). It is remarkable that the total number of electoral lists has remained quite 
constant across years. The main point is the radically changed balance between CEU 
lists and party lists. To evaluate these changes correctly one must distinguish between 
two diﬀerent types of predictors. We obtained clear statistical evidence that political 
parties are becoming more powerful at the local level and, consequently, playing a bigger 
role in electoral campaigns. For example, the number of LGs where elections were held 
without the explicit participation of political parties is declining. In 1993, there were 
67% of municipalities without party lists; within ten years this ﬁgure has decreased ten 
times (6% in 2002).
On the other hand, an extremely sharp change in the balance of party lists and 
CEU lists in 2002 demonstrates that evolutionary development was signiﬁcantly pushed 
forward by the top-down legal initiative. 
Table 3.38
Trends in the Form of Competition in Local Elections (1993–2002)
Form of Competition Year
1993 1996 1999 2002
Lists in total 844 773 768 872
Party lists 106 152 198 630
CEU lists 738 621 570 242
Individual candidates 807 409 159 121
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
A second tendency, which became especially evident in the last elections, concerns 
the number of individual candidates. In 1993 they formed 9% of all candidates in 
municipal elections, but in 2002 the ﬁgure was only 0.8%. According to the LGS, 
just 7% of respondents stood as candidates on their own initiative, while 66% were 
put forward by a political party. As we will see, only a very few individual candidates 
succeeded in getting a mandate. Thus, it appears clear that local electoral campaigns 
today are entirely conducted on an organizational basis where single individuals do 
not play much of a role. Although this can be regarded as an erosion of true popular 
democracy and a strengthening of party bureaucracy, there are important positive sides 
to this as well. Municipal councils consisting mainly of representatives belonging to 
the political parties or citizens’ unions demonstrate more eﬀectiveness in organizing the 
work of council and in the developmental planning. 
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Returning to the issue of the electoral participation of political parties, a detailed 
analysis of data from the 2002 elections demonstrates the clear process of polarization. 
Weaker parties presented fewer candidates, and many of them refused to participate at all. 
Seven of nineteen registered political parties did not set up electoral lists, and three parties 
had only from one to three electoral lists across 241 LGs (Toots 2003). In comparison 
with the number of participating parties in the previous election, a permanent decline 
is evident (seventeen parties in 1996, fourteen in 1999, and twelve in 2002). 
Parallel to the decline of small parties, the bigger parties actively expanded their 
participation (Figure 3.21). This was especially true of the stronger parties, which enjoyed 
remarkable support in the parliamentary elections six months later. Consequently, local 
elections today can and must be examined in close connection with general elections.
The altered pattern of putting candidates forward had a certain impact upon the level 
of electoral competition. Generally speaking, it promoted competition and contributed 
to the harmonization of competition between urban and rural areas. In earlier local 
elections there were rural municipalities where the number of candidates did not actually 
exceed the number of seats in the local council. Today this is a rare exception; parishes 
have around three or four candidates per seat. Although the level of electoral competition 
remains higher in cities (ten candidates per seat), the overall situation has become more 
uniﬁed (Table 3.39), which means that membership in rural municipal councils becomes 
more attractive for citizens. Nevertheless, the capital city is an extreme case with 20.5 
candidates per seat, almost ﬁve times higher than the country mean. 
Figure 3.21
Number of Party Lists in Local Elections (1993–2002)
 
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
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Table 3.39
Level of Competition in the 2002 Local Elections According to Region
Region Candidates Mandates Level of Competition
Tallinn 1,292 63 20.5 (very high)
Western Estonia 2,484 682  4.6 (medium)
Northeastern Estonia 2,758 577  5.8 (high)
Central Estonia 3,135 733  5.3 (high)
Southern Estonia 2,240 492  4.6 (medium)
Northern Estonia* 3,294 726  4.4 (medium)
National average 15,203 3,273  4.6 (medium)
Note: * Excluding the city of Tallinn.
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
3.1.4 Electoral Turnout
In most countries, local elections attract fewer voters than parliamentary or presidential 
elections. Only the Scandinavian countries are an exception—bringing nearly 80% of 
citizens to the municipal polling stations. Post-communist Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries have lower voter turnout than mature democracies. In some CEE 
countries (the Czech Republic), a downward trend is evident, but in others (Hungary 
and Latvia) electoral participation is increasing (Wright 2002; Hajnal 2001).  
Election turnout rates in Estonia remain at quite a low level—below 60%. In 
previous years the general elections attracted more voters than the local elections, but 
today the turnout is almost equal. Considering the trend over ten years and comparing 
local with national elections, one can see similarities in the development of voting 
behavior in Estonia and the Czech Republic. Porecky and Prudky (2001, 77) noted a 
slight downward trend, which for local elections is less sharp and has stabilized in the 
last while. These trends, presented in Figure 3.22, can be regarded as an indication of 
the general stabilization of the political environment. Another factor that can promote 
the local turnout rate is the increasing legitimacy of local government in the eyes of the 
broader public, revealed by a longitudinal opinion poll carried out in Estonia since 1995. 
In 2002, 65% expressed their conﬁdence in local government, which is the highest rating 
in the last few years. Public trust towards parliament has been about 45% and has not 
changed signiﬁcantly since the recent general elections (Riik ja Rahvas 2002). 
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Figure 3.22
Trends in Electoral Turnout (1989–2003) [%]
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
Size of community is an important predictor of voting behavior, just as it was found 
to be an important predictor in other aspects of our study. The Local Government 
Indicators Project showed similar results in Romania (Wright 2002, 392) and Hungary 
(Hajnal 2001, 33). Like these countries, Estonia has a negative correlation between 
the size of LG and voter turnout (Table 3.40). It is interesting to note that the level of 
electoral competition is negatively correlated with that of turnout, too. The higher the 
competition the lower the participation rate. Thus, a big variety of candidates is not 
the most important motivator for voters. Their participation depends rather on the 
legitimacy of local power and the feeling of belonging. 
Table 3.40
Predictors of Turnout Rate in Local Elections (2002)
Population Voter–Leader Ratio  Turnout [%] Level of Competition
Less than 1,000 74 61.7 3.0
1,000–1,999 104 58.0 3.9
2,0004–,999 175 53.0 3.9
5,000–9,999 276 53.6 5.6
10,000–49,999 602 50.4 8.0
50,000 and more 2580 48.6 12.9
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee/r03/index.html).
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The importance of legitimacy can be further developed when we analyze the voting 
behavior of the non-Estonian population. As stated earlier, non-citizens have the right 
to vote in local elections if they live permanently in their municipality. As a limited case 
study (Toots 2001) revealed, non-citizens are less active in voting than Estonian citizens. 
In Tallinn, for example, the turnout for Estonian citizens was 51% and for non-citizens 
44%; in the border city of Narva the ﬁgures were 51% and 38% respectively. These 
statistics correspond with the opinion poll surveys on trust toward political institutions. 
Unlike Estonians, non-Estonians tend to be more skeptical about local government 
ability to solve problems. The lowest level of trust toward local government has been 
found in the northeastern cities (Narva, Sillamäe, K-Järve, and Jõhvi), which have a 
mainly Russian-speaking population (Riik & Rahvas 2002).
3.1.5 Electoral Results
Comparative analyses of votes given to the political parties at the local and national levels 
shows a general similarity (Figure 3.23). Parties with stronger support in the parliamentary 
elections and in opinion polls also had electoral victories in many municipalities. For 
example, the Center Party, with public support at the national level running about 27%-
30%, received 25.8% of total votes in the last local elections. As a rule, the party’s support 
is slightly higher in general elections, which is explained by the fact that in local elections 
political parties have to compete for votes with the CEUs. The latter are excluded from 
parliamentary elections, in which only political parties can participate in the campaign. 
Quite often statistical data and political analyses ignore the participation of CEUs 
in the local elections and deal only with the results of political parties. This approach 
cannot give a true picture, because CEUs continue to play a very important role. In 
2002, more than one-third of the total number of mandates was allocated to them 
(Figure 3.24), but in some areas CEUs won almost half of the mandates. 
Comparing the electoral results of the last elections with the earlier ones, we can 
observe two basic tendencies. On the one hand, regarding votes received by political 
parties, we see a heavy increase in the number of parliamentary parties and, inversely, 
a decrease in the number of small parties (Table 3.41). The former had 64.4% of total 
votes and the latter just 12%. As Toomla has observed, a signiﬁcant realignment of party 
support has occurred. For example, in 1993 the portion of votes the diﬀerent parties 
received varied from 0.1% to a maximum of 7.1%; in 1996 the interval was almost the 
same. All eleven parties gained less than 10% of the votes each (Toomla 1999, 285–287). 
In 2002, four stronger parties received a signiﬁcantly higher portion of votes, whereas 
small parties remained at the same level, below 1%. The second important tendency 
is the high eﬃcacy of CEUs. Although their number on the competing lists decreased 
heavily, they did not lose votes to the party lists to the same extent. 
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Figure 3.23
Voters’ Support of the Political Parties 
in the Local and National Elections (2002–2003) [%]
Source: National Electoral Committee; Factum Ltd. (opinion poll).
Figure 3.24
Division of Mandates Nationwide in the 2002 Local Elections [%]
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
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Table 3.41
Division of Mandates across the Regions in the Local Elections (2002)
Region Parliamentary 
Parties
Small 
Parties
CEU Individuals Total Ratio
Northern Estonia 516 13 198 0 727 2.61
Central Estonia 488  3 190 3 684 2.57
Western Estonia 356  5 315 4 680 1.10
Northeastern Estonia 315 14 217 3 549 1.45
Southern Estonia 303  3 184 2 492 1.65
Large cities 133  3  7 0 143 19.0
Total 2,111 41 1,111 12 3,275 1.90
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee/r03/index.html).
We turn now to the more detailed study of electoral results and analyze the data 
against some background variables such as region and municipality size. Support to 
political parties varies across the regions (Figure 3.25). In rural counties (Jõgeva, Tartu) 
the dominant party to emerge is the People’s Union, whose main target group is farmers; 
in the northeastern region the left-wing Center party is almost twice as popular as 
the average, because of the support it receives from Russian-speakers. There is no big 
diﬀerence in the composition of the top three, except in northeast and central Estonia, 
where one single party enjoys enormous popularity.
A comparison of the performance of parliamentary parties, citizens’ electoral unions, 
and individuals shows remarkable diﬀerences across the regions (Table 3.42). First of 
all, one can see how powerful the parliamentary parties are in the three largest cities. 
All seven CEUs shown in the table belong to the Narva city council, whereas in Tallinn 
and Tartu all mandates were divided between the parliamentary parties. The ratio 
showing by how many times the number of parliamentary parties’ lists exceeds that of 
the CEUs’ is ten times higher in larger cities than the national average. The deviation 
of Narva from other large cities demonstrates that amongst non-Estonian voters, the 
process of party aﬃliation is still in progress and many citizens do not yet have clear 
political preferences. Although CEUs are dominantly an urban phenomenon, there is 
not a clear cut picture. For example, western Estonia, with the highest number of CEUs, 
also includes the fourth largest city, Pärnu. 
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Figure 3.25
Votes Gained by Political Parties 
in Local Elections across the Regions (2002–2003) [%]
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
Table 3.42
The Division of Mandates across the Region in the Local Elections (2002)
 
Parliamentary 
Parties
Small 
Parties
CEU Individuals Total Ratio
Northern Estonia 516 13 198 0 727 2.61
Central Estonia 488 3 190 3 684 2.57
Western Estonia 356 5 315 4 680 1.10
Northeastern Estonia 315 14 217 3 549 1.45
Southern Estonia 303 3 184 2 492 1.65
Large cities 133 3 7 0 143 19.00
Total 2,111 41 1,111 12 3,275 1.90
Source: National Electoral Committee.
A typical feature of many electoral systems is that the share of votes diﬀers from the 
portion of mandates received by the same list or candidate. In Estonian local elections, 
this is related to the size of the LG (to be precise—to the number of voters and the 
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mandate’s threshold). In smaller rural municipalities, the threshold is signiﬁcantly lower 
than in large cities. We assume this is why those parties that are most active in rural areas 
gain more votes than those enjoying voters’ support in the cities. Table 3.43 shows this 
quite clearly. Especially notable is the diﬀerence for the CEU that received 35% of the 
mandates but only 24% of the votes. A similar pattern can be seen in the case of the 
People’s Union, which is more popular in the countryside. The Reform Party, to the 
contrary, is the biggest loser because it focused its campaign on the large cities. 
Table 3.43
The Division of Votes and Mandates between Electoral Lists 
in the Local Elections (2002) [%] 
Name of Party Share of Votes Share of Mandates
Center Party 26 18
Res Publica 15 12
Reform Party 12 6
People’s Union 11 19 ∆
Pro Patria 7 5
Moderates 4 4
CEU 24 35 ∆
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
3.1.6 Conclusion
From the previous discussion, we can conclude that electoral competition and the results 
in local elections are becoming increasingly similar to those at the national level with 
respect to electoral turnout, level of competition, balance between political parties, and 
even campaign expenses. Stronger parties become more inﬂuential and weaker ones lose 
more and more power.
At the same time, local elections still have their own peculiarities. Nonparty electoral 
lists, organized by local citizens themselves (CEUs), performed surprisingly well and 
succeeded in maintaining their position despite pressure from the big parties. These 
ﬁndings suggest that CEUs should be kept as a popular form of electoral participation.12 
This is also important because our study revealed that the legitimacy of local power and 
the feeling of belonging contribute to the high turnout more than long party lists and 
a high level of electoral competition.
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3.2 Local Parties and Factions
The Estonian political party system has developed very rapidly, and has mainly followed 
a top-down path. The ﬁrst parties were constituted at the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s, during the “Singing Revolution” and before the restoration of 
independence. In the next several years there was an explosion in the number of parties, 
but at the end of the decade the number decreased again as a result of organizational 
mergers and dissolutions. 
In 2003, eighteen political parties were registered in Estonia. Some are still very 
small and have hardly any political inﬂuence. Six political parties are represented in the 
national parliament, while others could not pass the 5% electoral threshold. For our 
purposes, only parliamentary parties will be considered, because they are stronger in 
both the organizational and ideological senses. As a rule, parties that are strong nationally 
also have more impact at the municipal level, although there is no unanimous leader 
across all the counties.
Table 3.44
The Basic Characteristics of Estonian Political Parties
Name of the 
Political Party
Members Seats in National 
Parliament
Ministers in Cabinet
Center Party 7,046 28 —
Moderates 3,104 6 —
Pro Patria Union 2,770 7 —
People’s Union 7,571 13 4
Reform Party 2,999 19 5
Res Publica 3,684 28 4
Source: Äriregister (data on membership as of 01.01.2003).
Estonia is the only CEE post-communist party where former communists did not 
succeed in returning to the political arena. Throughout the entire transition period, left-
wing parties have been weaker than centrists and the right-wing parties. The Estonian 
party system is modestly polarized; no one is strong enough to act as a single player 
(Table 3.44). However, in the early 2000s the ideological center began to weaken and 
the cleavage between the left and the right has become sharper.
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3.2.1 Political Parties at the Local Level
In local politics, parties emerged as real players only very recently, mainly since the local 
elections of 2002. This development was supported or even pushed forward by the 
enactment of pertinent legal rules and norms. The most important legal amendments 
regulate the membership (including the size) of political parties, their organizational 
structure, ﬁnancing, donations, and forms of electoral participation. The latter changes 
had the biggest impact on local politics and local elections. One of the signiﬁcant results 
of these formal changes was an increase in the portion of councilors elected from political 
party lists and of party-nominated mayors. In 1996, political parties received 37.7% of 
all votes in the municipal elections (Toomla 1999, 287); by 2002 this ﬁgure had already 
increased to 75.4%. According to our survey, nearly half (48%) of the councilors are 
party members; for mayors the ﬁgure is much higher—81.3% (including members of 
CEUs). The role of political parties in elections and in the nomination process is heavily 
dependant on municipality size (Table 3.45). The bigger the municipality, the higher the 
percentage of politicians belonging to a political party. Somewhat surprisingly, the share 
of political party members in the micro-municipalities’ councils is also very high. 
Table 3.45
Party Membership of Local Representatives and Mayors [%]
Size of Local Community 
by Population
Councilors Belonging 
to Political Parties
Mayors Belonging 
to Political Parties
Less than 1,000 45.9 60.7
1,000–1,999 43.5 82.9
2,000–4,999 43.8 77.4
5,000–9,999 51.5 97.4
10,000–49,999 52.3 81.8
50,000 and more 91.4 100.0
Average 48.9 81.3
Source: LRS, LGS 2002.
The assumption that political parties have more control over the electoral process in 
larger towns becomes even more evident when one analyzes the nomination of candidates 
in parishes and towns. In municipalities with fewer than 5,000 residents, the nomination 
process is more open and free from organizational biases (Table 3.46). As our survey data 
demonstrate, the respondent’s own party, the party in which the respondent was not 
a member, and the CEUs almost equally participated in putting forward candidates. 
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In only a very few cases were candidates nominated individually. In cities with a 
population of 10,000 or more, another situation presents itself, with political parties 
nominating the majority of the candidates from their own membership. 
Table 3.46
“What Kind of Organization Nominated You
 in the Last Election Campaign?” (Number of Cases)
Municipality Size 
by Population
My Party Another Party Citizens’ Electoral 
Union
Myself
Less than 1,000 9 12 14 3
1,000–1,999 82 62 71 23
2,000–4,999 94 66 84 12
5,000–9,999 118 90 60 27
10,000–49,999 54 25 38 5
50,000 and more 31 3 1 2
Average (cases) 388 258 268 72
Average (%) 42.0 27.9 29.0 7.9
Source: LRS 2002.
3.2.2 Party Activity
The organizational structure of political parties is determined by their statutes, which 
are derived from the Act on Political Parties and the Act on Nonproﬁt Associations. 
The basic principles and subdivisions are very similar for all Estonian political parties. 
The organizational structure usually includes regional or county organizations and local 
organizations (branches). Because Estonia has a one-tier local government system and 
there is no elected body at the county level, regional party organizations only play a 
minor role. Local organizations can be formed in every municipality, but no more than 
one branch per municipality is allowed for a single party. The minimum number of 
members required to constitute a local branch varies from three to ten across parties. 
The exact number of local branches is hard to deﬁne, due to the lack of reliable statistics. 
There is also a wide variety in membership, resources, and the level of activity of local 
organizations. 
Local branches of Estonian political parties enjoy signiﬁcant autonomy according to 
their statutes. They develop and execute party politics at the local level. Although local 
branches must follow the program and basic documents of their party, they are free to 
267
R E P O R T  O N  T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  E S T O N I A
compose their own action plans and select political partners. In some municipalities, 
parties that are in a coalition stand in opposition in others.
Participation in local elections and coordination of the work in legislative bodies 
form the major focus of local party activities. This can also be seen from the list of rights 
and responsibilities of local branches stated in the statutes of all parties:
 1. To approve the electoral program for local elections;
 2. To nominate candidates for local elections;
 3. To organize the electoral campaign in their municipality;
 4. To declare coalition partners in the municipal council and government; and
 5. To assess at least once per year the work done by the party faction in the municipal 
council.
The importance of engagement in the municipal legislature is stressed by the 
formalization of relations between elected representatives and local party organizations. 
The local branches have their own internal structure, which controls the activities of 
representatives in the municipal council. Every local branch has its board, which proposes 
an electoral platform and a list of candidates to the assembly for approval. In some stronger 
party organizations (Res Publica and the Center Party) a system of primaries also exists. Party 
representatives in the municipal council, in turn, have to report on their activities to the 
party branch. However, survey data reveal that these hearings are only formalities, in which 
rank-and-ﬁle members play the role of passive audience. It is remarkable that, on the survey, 
local councilors who are not members of any political party attached greater importance to 
the local branch in decision-making than to party members themselves (ratings of 3.7 and 
3.0 on the 7-point scale respectively). The former also believe that the party branch can 
be an important source of information (4.7), while the latter did not share this optimism 
(mean of 3.1). The impact of the party factions, in contrast, received higher ratings by the 
party members than by councilors without a party aﬃliation (4.2 against 3.8). 
These data suggest that councilors who are not members of any political party cannot 
distinguish between the local branch and the party faction, whereas for party members 
themselves, these organizational forms have clearly diﬀerent powers. The performance 
of political parties in local councils is the subject of further analysis in the next section; 
here, we turn to the broad spectrum of activities focused on the general public. 
The survey data show a wide variance in local party activities, so the task of presenting 
a complete overview on this issue is rather complicated. Of the CAOs responding to the 
survey, 48% reported the existence of at least one party branch in their municipality. 
In municipalities with 5,000 and more constituents the ﬁgure was 74.8%, whereas in 
smaller LGs (1,000–5,000), party branches were reported in only 39%–41% of cases. 
Because of the high percentage of missing values, one must exercise caution in 
analyzing the given estimates of party activities. Still, survey data correspond with 
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electoral statistics and opinion polls in their basic features. The two largest political 
parties—the agrarian People’s Union and the leftist Center Party—surpass others in 
terms of active presence in local politics. Moderate parties that are weak at the national 
level are at the bottom of the ranking in local activities as well (Table 3.47). 
Table 3.47
Passive and Active Presence of Political Parties at the Local Level [%]
Name of Party Branch Exists
in the Municipality
Branch Organized a 
Public Event Last Year
Share of Active 
Local Branches
People’s Union 29.6 17.5 59.1
Center Party 23.4 16.8 71.8
Res Publica 18.2 11.4 62.6
Reform Party 16.8 11.3 67.2
Pro Patria 13.4 10.0 74.6
Moderates 7.9 5.2 68.4
Source: LGS 2002.
The share of active branches does not necessarily correspond with the number of local 
organizations. As Table 3.47 illustrates, the diﬀerence in the level of activities among the 
parties is less than the variance in the formal existence of local organizations. The Pro Patria 
Union, which has the highest ratio of active organizations, does not have a large network 
of branches. The latter indicator is related to the total membership in a political party. Two 
leaders in level of activity—the People’s Union and the Center Party—have more than 7,000 
members, which is much higher than the membership in other parties (see Table 3.44).
Because our survey was carried out in the same year as the local elections, we asked 
how many public events were organized as part of the electoral campaign. Somewhat 
surprisingly, parties organized a variety of events, not only ones aimed at gaining votes in 
the upcoming elections. There was no variance in this matter among political parties. 
Another striking ﬁnding of the CAO survey was the diversity of organizers of local 
public events (Table 3.48). Political parties are far from playing the most active role. 
Instead, NGOs, foundations, and local ﬁrms often take the lead in empowering citizens. 
The most frequently mentioned were individual citizens who had organized a meeting, 
demonstration, or signing of a petition on local issues. However, these ﬁgures cannot be 
interpreted as an explicit indicator of the weakness of political parties. According to P. Mair, 
modern political parties, which he calls cartel parties, are much less interested in working 
with the broad public. Instead, political deal-making and the eﬃcacy of governance is their 
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focus (1997). This theory seems to be valid for the Estonian situation. In unconventional 
forms of political participation like protest meetings, collecting signatures for a petition, 
challenges to municipal government decisions, etc., political parties rarely take the initiative. 
Probably this is because unconventional forms of activity call for noninstitutionalized 
actors. 
Table 3.48
Organizations That Played the Most Important Role 
in Unconventional Actions* [%]
Organizers of Unconventional Forms of Public Participation % of Cases
Individual citizens 70.4
Civil society organizations 36.6
Local branch of a political party 22.0
Representatives of local ﬁrms or institutions 18.4
Groups or organizations outside the municipality 18.2
Local businesspeople 8.2
Note: * For example, demonstrations, signing of petitions, and challenges to government decisions.
Source: LGS 2002.
3.2.3 Factions
Given the proportional representation system, the composition of local councils in 
Estonia usually involves more than two—as a rule three or four— diﬀerent political 
forces. In these circumstances, factions play an important role in organizing business; 
they have the right to initiate legal acts and amendments, to nominate candidates for 
elected posts, and to make enquiries to the mayor and municipal government members. 
A faction can be formed on the basis of representatives elected from one single list; each 
person can only belong to one faction. Every municipality sets the minimum number 
of representatives needed to form a faction.  
Because Estonia still has Citizens’ Electoral Unions in addition to political parties, 
factions can be formed by CEUs as well. This has been heavily criticized by the big 
parties, who claim that a faction without a permanent organization behind it is unable 
to keep its promises or act as a stable partner. As is apparent from the electoral results in 
the previous section, CEUs account for a large portion of the seats in municipal councils. 
Unfortunately, information about the internal rules of CEU factions is almost entirely 
unavailable, so we must rely exclusively on the LGS and LRS data for our analysis. 
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More information is available concerning the activities of political parties in local 
councils. The position and competencies of political party factions are clearly deﬁned 
in all party statutes, and one can observe here that factions have formally less autonomy 
than the local branches themselves. The former have to act in accordance with decisions 
and documents approved at all organizational levels. Factions must negotiate with their 
party organizations all political agreements and coalitions made in the municipal council. 
Party members who are elected into local councils are obliged to join a faction (typical 
for all parties) and to vote as decided collectively (only applies to the Center Party). 
Furthermore, if a party member leaves the faction, he or she will be excluded from the 
political party (only applies to the People’s Union). 
Moving from the formal rules and legal documents to real faction politics at the 
local level, one discovers a more complicated and diverse picture. 
Our analysis of voting patterns revealed that in hot debates on controversial matters, 
the majority of representatives tend to follow mainstream opinion. The behavior pattern 
of councilors does not depend on the number of times they have been reelected, but on 
the body that nominated them for election. Councilors nominated by the CEUs tend to 
be the most loyal and nominees of their own party the least loyal to the majority view on 
council. Factions and political leaders have greater inﬂuence on councilors than the general 
majority. There is only a slight diﬀerence in the responses of those elected from party lists 
and those elected from the CEU lists (see Table 3.49). Consequently, the opinion that 
CEUs are too weak to lead the voting behavior of their members turned out to be invalid 
according to the LRS ﬁndings. Both CEU factions and own political party factions tend to 
have a similar inﬂuence. In the third case, when a councilor has been nominated by a party 
of which he/she is not a member, there is a weaker impact on personal voting behavior. 
The development of factions in municipal councils is generally inﬂuenced by two 
fundamental factors. Firstly, until the amalgamation of small LGs takes place as planned 
in the administrative reform, the size of representative bodies makes the formation of 
mature faction politics impossible in most Estonian municipalities, because of their small 
size. An average local council today has ten to ﬁfteen elected representatives, and in only 
ﬁve cities is the number is greater than thirty. A second factor concerns the development 
of political parties and changes in the Electoral Acts. Until the local elections in the fall of 
2002, Estonia had a signiﬁcant portion of independent candidates and nonparty electoral 
lists. Today, the share of individual candidates is below 1%. There are currently very few 
municipalities (6%) in which elections were held without the participation of political 
parties. Although the total number of party lists has risen, the smaller parties opted 
out of electoral competition. Even if they did participate, very few of their candidates 
were elected. The strengthening of political parties also forced citizens’ unions toward 
consolidation, which in most cases led to the formation of a faction. 
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Table 3.49
Inﬂuence of Faction and Political Leaders 
on the Formation of Councilors’ Personal Opinions Dependent 
on Nominating Body (7-Point Scale)
Nominating Body Count Influence of My Faction Influence of My Party/ 
Organization’s Leader
My political party 393 5.53 4.81
Another political party 267 5.16 4.15
CEU 271 5.35 4.29
Source: LRS 2002.
These changes certainly inﬂuenced the composition and level of fragmentation 
of local representative bodies. One would assume that, because of the trend toward 
organizational consolidation in electoral politics, the fragmentation of councils would 
decrease as well. The ﬁrst impact of these changes can be analyzed on the basis of LGS 
and LRS data. Patterns of fragmentation can be studied in two ways: the number and 
size of factions and the terms of coalition–opposition relations. 
Municipalities with populations below 5,000 residents and with councils below 
sixteen representatives form the largest group—83% of all local councils in Estonia. 
Thus, the average number of factions per council is rather low—1.98 factions. In towns 
with 10,000–50,000 residents there are 3.27 factions on average and 3.63 in the three 
largest cities. To speak about two to three factions as a general rule would not be correct, 
since 19.6% of respondents in the LGS reported that factions do not exist at all in their 
municipal council. 
Given the varying strength of the diﬀerent political parties, one might expect that 
stronger parties would have more factions and they would be larger in size. Although the 
LGS data presented a very diverse and incomplete picture on this issue, some conclusions 
may be drawn. The parties that are active nation-wide and not only in the large cities 
tend to have more factions and a higher mean size. This holds for the Center Party, the 
People’s Union, and the Citizens’ Unions. The maximum size of factions is very high. 
Keeping in mind the data on the average size of city councils (Table 3.50), this can be 
regarded as evidence of the decreasing fragmentation of councils. Thus, the largest faction 
of the Center party has 32 members, which is 50.7% of seats in the capital. Factions 
with 17 or 23 members can also control a majority in the city councils.
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Table 3.50
Characteristics of Local Council Factions across Political Parties
Name of Party Share of 
Mandates
No Faction 
[%]
Mean Size of 
Faction
SE of Mean Maximum Size 
of Faction
Center party 18 37.8 5.52 0.62 32
Reform party 6 44.3 1.50 0.23 23
Res Publica 12 41.6 1.53 0.21 17
Pro Patria 5 39.9 1.29 0.17 9
Moderates 4 44.3 0.83 0.16 12
People’s Union 19 37.1 2.67 0.27 17
CEU 35 7.2 3.91 0.41 14
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee); LGS 2002.
Relations between factions and coalition partners are quite formalized at the national 
level. For example, the coalition agreement of central government, which is made 
available on the web site, is one of the most important documents in decision-making 
and draws regular attention from the media. Lobbying and voting behavior in the 
national parliament also have stable traditions, although not as formal and transparent 
as in Western democracies.
At the local level the situation is much vaguer, with 69.5% of the LGS respondents 
declaring that no written coalition agreement exists in their municipal council. In 
councils without formal agreements, factions sometimes coordinate their actions 
informally before voting. In 44.4% of councils coordinated action around voting occurs 
without a written agreement.
As might be expected, written agreements are common in larger municipalities, 
while in smaller LGs the picture is quite mixed. 
Formalization of interparty contacts in municipal councils can also be dependant 
upon the strength of the party organization. When comparing cases where political 
parties in coalitions also have a written coalition contract, one can see a remarkable 
variance between parties. The Reform Party and Res Publica have the highest level of 
formalization of political cooperation. They have public coalition agreements in 68.8% 
and 62.9% of the situations, respectively. Still, we should be cautious in interpreting 
these ﬁndings as an indicator of organizational strength. The two parties in question 
form coalitions mostly in city municipalities where, as mentioned earlier, interparty 
relations are more formalized. This urban–rural nexus is supported also by the fact that 
the People’s Union, which most indicators would suggest is a strong party organization, 
has a lower percentage of written agreements than other parties.
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Table 3.51
Formalization of Interparty Relations in Local Councils
Size of 
Municipality
Informal 
Agreements
[Number]
Informal 
Agreements 
[%]
Written 
Agreements 
[Number]
Written 
Agreements 
[%]
Fewer than 1,000 7 36.8 4 14.8
1,000–1,999 30 38.5 21 20.8
2,000–4,999 29 50 20 23.5
5,000–9,999 10 76.9 25 67.6
10,000–49,999 0 — 8 72.7
More than 50,000 0 — 3 100.0
Total/average 76 44.4 81 30.5
Source: LGS 2002.
3.2.4 Conclusion
Our examination of party activities at local level conﬁrmed the ﬁndings on electoral 
participation. The Center Party and the People’s Union, which had the best electoral 
performance, turned out to be the strongest in the organizational sense as well. The 
strength of political parties is determined by two kinds of factors. Firstly, the small size 
of local councils has a signiﬁcant impact on political work at the local level because 
the small number of representatives causes a small number of factions. The majority 
of local councils has two or three factions with a very limited membership and vague 
internal rules. In larger cities, interparty relations are more formalized and based on 
written coalition agreements. Secondly, the organizational discipline of political parties 
also seems to play a role in establishing faction politics. Nevertheless, the impact of this 
factor is far less than the inﬂuence of municipality (and council) size.
Our study revealed that citizens’ electoral unions continue to play an important 
role in local politics. Despite widespread criticism, they are not particularly vague and 
often form factions like political parties. The impact of both types of factions on the 
formation of councilors’ opinions and on their decision-making also shows a fairly 
similar pattern. 
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3.3 Local Representatives
3.3.1 Social Background 
The sociodemographic characteristics of local representatives reveal a surprisingly uniform 
picture across the country. The average age of candidates in the last local elections was 
44.8 years and the age interval did not exceed two years in the county means comparison. 
The generations are not equally represented in local bodies—young people below 33 
and the elderly over 63 are heavily underrepresented. 
The average age of elected representatives was slightly higher than that of candidates, 
at 46.4 years (see Figure 3.26). According to the statistics, local representatives are just 
a year younger than members of the national parliament. It is interesting to note that 
the average age of members of parliament has been decreasing, but the average age of 
local councilors is increasing, so they are currently almost at the same level. 
Figure 3.26
The Age Structure of Local Representatives (2002)
Source: LRS 2002.
The share of women among candidates and local councilors has modestly increased 
during the ten years of free elections. In the two latest elections, women comprised 
28.4% of local councilors, which is still very low compared to the neighboring Nordic 
countries. Women also did not fare as well as men in electoral campaigns. The share of 
female candidates in 2002 was 37.7%, but amongst councilors women accounted for 
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28.3% (Table 3.52). It is worth stressing that women’s success in getting seats is even 
decreasing. Although the portion of women among candidates today is higher than 
in previous elections, the gender balance amongst representatives has not improved. 
According to the Raitviir, one reason is the increasing level of competition. The higher 
the competition, the lower is the change in the direction of more female candidates. For 
example, women comprise 23.8% of Tallinn city councilors, which is lower than the 
national average and also less than their share after the elections in 1999. At the level 
of local council speakers, the situation is even worse. In 2003, only 12.3% of speakers’ 
positions in rural municipalities and 15% in towns were occupied by women (Raitviir 
2003). Thus, women are heavily underrepresented in Estonian local politics.
Table 3.52
Gender Representation by Region (2002) [%]
Estonian Regions Counties Included Women among 
Candidates 
Women among 
Elected Councilors
Western Hiiu, Saare, Lääne, Pärnu 38.5 28.3
Northeastern Lääne-Viru, Ida-Viru 40.6 32.5
Northern Harju, Rapla, Järva 37.7 26.8
Central Jõgeva, Viljandi, Tartu 38.7 28.7
Southern Valga, Põlva, Võru 35.8 25.3
Total All 15 37.7 28.3
Source: National Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee).
The majority of the local councilors have lived a long time in the municipality where 
they are representatives. Of the respondents to the LRS, 84.3% have resided in their 
current location for more than ﬁfteen years and 14.2% have been there from four to 
fourteen years. This shows that voters prefer candidates who are familiar with the local 
situation and problems. Only 1.4% of the councilors in our survey are recent newcomers 
who have lived in the municipality less than three years. A strong attachment to local 
life is also reﬂected in the self-identiﬁcation of local councilors. They feel the closest 
ties with the localities (mean of 6.0 on a 7-point scale) and municipalities (5.7) where 
they currently live, whereas Estonia and Europe are less valued. Somewhat surprisingly, 
our study revealed that local identities are even more important for non-Estonian 
councilors, while in attitudes toward the country and Europe, no diﬀerences between 
ethnic groups became apparent. 
In terms of education, people with university degrees are overrepresented in the 
local councils, but those with vocational education comprise only 10% and persons with 
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basic education 1.4% of local councilors (Table 3.53). In self-administered surveys like 
the LRS, more educated respondents tend to be overrepresented, so the actual situation 
may be more balanced.
Table 3.53
Education of Representatives and the Electorate [%]
Education Population Aged 15–74 Local Representatives Difference
Basic or vocational 24.3 11.5 –12.8
Upper secondary 51.5 31.6 –19.9
University 24.2 53.6 +29.4
Source: ESO; LRS 2002.
Due to their high level of education, the majority of local councilors can 
communicate in foreign languages and use e-mail and the Internet. The share of Internet 
users among local politicians is almost double the national average. While 40% of the 
Estonian population between the ages of 14 and 75 uses the Internet regularly, the same 
indicator for local councilors is 73.7%. There is no gender diﬀerence in communication 
and language skills, but urbanization is an important predictor of communication 
behavior. The share of Internet users increases in proportion with the size of the 
municipality (Table 3.54). In the capital city of Tallinn, nearly every local representative 
seeks information on the web and writes e-mails regularly. In small rural municipalities, 
e-mailing is half as common and only 62% of councilors uses the Internet. 
One-third of councilors have obtained training in public administration, politics, 
or public relations. As a previous survey revealed, the training depends signiﬁcantly 
on available resources and on the size of the municipality. Larger municipalities have 
more human and ﬁnancial resources to carry out training courses (Eesti Linnade Liit 
et al. 1998). Our LRS study conﬁrmed this ﬁnding. In micro-municipalities with 
populations below 1,000, only 13.5% of councilors have had relevant training. In LGs 
with a population of 1,000–10,000, this ﬁgure was 30.8% and in town municipalities 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants it was 55.4%. 
Certain personal obstacles also hinder the participation of councilors in political 
training. A long distance to the training school and lack of time are the most often 
mentioned reasons for staying out (Eesti Linnade Liit et al. 1998). 
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Table 3.54
Communication Skills of Local Representatives [%]
Size of Local Community Local Councilors
Foreign Language Users E-mail Users Internet Users
Less than 1,000 32.4 40.5 62.2
1,000–1,999 33.6 50.0 69.5
2,000–4,999 31.8 54.8 72.1
5,000–9,999 45.9 67.0 77.2
10,000–49,999 54.1 66.4 79.3
50,000–99,999 25.0 62.5 87.5
100,000 and more 71.4 89.3 96.4
Source: LRS 2002.
Being a representative in the local council in Estonia does not usually mean having to 
give up one’s former job. Most representatives try to combine professional and political 
careers. The average age of councilors noted previously is an additional explanation for 
this situation: these councilors have family obligations and remarkable professional 
capital. In their employment, 69.1% work full-time and 13.8% are self-employed. 
They enjoy quite a high position in the occupational structure—34.5% are owners or 
co-owners of their ﬁrms and 39.2% supervise co-workers from time to time. Taking 
into account the councilors that are self-employed (14.5%) one can see that only a small 
minority of representatives does not have decision-making or leadership experience in 
their daily workplace. 
According to longitudinal surveys (Monitoring 2002), Estonians and non-Estonians 
possess diﬀerent status in the labor market. There are more Estonians in management 
positions and in human services, while the Russian-speaking population is still mainly 
occupied in large industry. Our study showed that these general trends apply to the local 
councilors as well. Non-Estonian councilors are signiﬁcantly more often employed as 
workers without management responsibilities; they reported self-employment as a form of 
occupation in only a couple of cases. This discrepancy has its roots in Soviet labor policy 
and has demonstrated extreme rigidity in the transition to the market economy. The 
current survey ﬁndings have given us an initial description of the situation, but further 
analysis is needed to estimate the impact of occupation on councilors’ political work. 
For one-quarter of respondents, being an elected representative has been a family 
tradition, with their mother or father holding this position as well.
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3.3.2 Political Background
The collapse of the communist regime at the beginning of the 1990s fundamentally 
changed the political career of many people. In the Soviet period, membership in 
the communist party was a prerequisite for becoming a representative in the council 
or obtaining a high position in an executive body. Today, near half (48%) of local 
representatives belong to a political party, but only 3.6% of them were aﬃliated with 
the communist party before 1992. The latter ﬁgure must be treated with some caution, 
because even today public opinion regards membership in the communist party as 
something shameful, so some respondents may have refused to answer this question. 
More continuity can be found in representatives’ political careers, with 13.6% of 
respondents indicating they were members of a local council before the restoration of 
democracy in Estonia. In the 2002 local elections, approximately one-third (34.6%) 
were elected for the ﬁrst time, whereas a signiﬁcant portion of representatives regained 
their position for a second (25.3%), a third (21.8%), or a fourth (12.6%) time. 
The main political experience of representatives is related to the municipal council. 
The functions of committee chair, committee member, and speaker of the council are 
most often mentioned as positions held before the last local elections and currently as well. 
Very few local councilors have experience in politics at the national level (Table 3.55).
That councilors have a local orientation towards their own career planning is also 
conﬁrmed by the fact that the most appealing future for them is related to public 
positions at the municipal level. In identifying their preferred position ten years from 
today, 37.6% would like to be in the same position, 10.1% would improve their position 
in local politics, and only 6.5% see themselves in higher positions at the national level. 
More than half (55.6%) think they will stand as candidates in the next local elections 
as well. 
Table 3.55
Political Positions Most Often Held by Local Representatives [%]
Positions Held Before Last Elections Currently
Head of council 9.6 8.6
Committee chair 32.1 38.7
Member of parliament 1.4 0.8
Oﬃcer in a CSO or member of the LG Union 9.2 1.7
Source: LRS tested in 2002.
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3.3.3 The Social Capital of Local Political Leaders
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are still not common in Estonia. Therefore, not many 
kinds or types of these organizations are part of the environment of local political leaders. 
They spend spare time with their families and friends more often than in charitable or 
religious organizations. Most (79.5%) local representatives spend no time with church 
members and 46.1% are never engaged in charity. Generally speaking, council members 
seem to lack spare time for leisure activities. Only one-third can undertake activities with 
their families every week or nearly every week, while for most of them, this is possible 
only once or twice a month. 
Membership in civic organizations (mostly in just one) was declared by 25% 
of the LRS respondents. Associations and unions (except trade unions) are more 
common organizational forms, corresponding with the general statistics on civil society 
organizations in Estonia. Estonian CSOs are not large in size; therefore, it is not a 
surprise that 44% of local representatives belong to a CSO with fewer than ﬁve members. 
Another typical feature of civil organizations is the local nature of their activities. This 
is conﬁrmed by LRS ﬁndings: 41.3% of the CSOs to which councilors belong are 
active in one municipality only. They often discuss local public issues (347%), represent 
diﬀerent social groups in the municipality (28.5%), and some of them cooperate closely 
with the municipal government (14.1%) and enjoy tangible support from the local 
government (16.1%). 
Those who declared that they are members of a CSO are usually more active than 
rank-and-ﬁle citizens. One-third of respondents mentioned diﬀerent leading functions 
in these organizations. Some of them regard civic activism as a political stepping stone 
in their public careers (Table 3.56). 
Table 3.56
The Main Forms of Engagement 
of Local Representatives in Civic Organizations [%]
Forms of Membership Activities Agreed
I was one of the founders of the NGO 35.6
I am the local leader of the NGO 30.6
I have organized events during last three months 36.3
 I devote more than ten hours per month to organizational activities 25.7
When joining an NGO, I knew that it would promote my public career 19.6
Source: LRS 2002.
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Although only a minority of local politicians is involved in civil society activities, 
this small minority is using civil society potential consciously and is trying to make 
a connection to their work in the municipal council. CSOs can also serve as meeting 
opportunities for discussing political issues, since 13.4% of councilors reported that 
they belong to a CSO where some other council members are similarly involved.
Engagement in civil society organizations depends on the size of the municipality, 
but there is no linear correlation. Both in small rural communities and in large cities 
(above 50,000 residents), councilors are less eager to participate in CSOs. The highest 
portion of socially active councilors (45.3%) can be found in medium sized municipalities 
with 10,000 to 50,000 residents. 
A comparison of Estonian survey data with the results of the same survey performed 
in four CEE countries in 2001 reveals increasing civic activism. Estonia has the highest 
portion (24.9%) of councilors who also hold a leading position in a social organization. 
The same ﬁgure for Poland was 22.7%, for Hungary 15.9%, for Latvia 5.4%, and 
for Romania 1.4% (Wright 2002, 394). Of course, not only the time factor but also 
national features of civil society must be taken into account in such international 
comparisons.
3.3.4 The Political Culture of Local Representatives
The attitudes of local representatives can serve as an important indicator in identifying 
the state of democracy. Their support for the basic democratic values like citizens’ 
involvement, interest mediation and conﬂict resolution, transparency, and the rule of 
law can enhance local democracy. In addition, representatives’ attitudes toward the 
socioeconomic responsibilities of government can inﬂuence council’s decisions in public 
policy. We asked local councilors to indicate their attitudes toward diﬀerent political and 
socioeconomic statements on a 7-point scale. A diverse and in some respects controversial 
picture emerged from this. Three statements of eleven received an extreme value of 
“1” as the mode, meaning that the majority of representatives believes that equal 
rights must be guaranteed to everyone in democracy, that competition is a good thing 
because it stimulates hard work, and that government should carry more responsibility 
to ensure normal living standards for everyone (Table 3.57). The two latter statements 
represent diﬀerent ideologies, but both of them were equally supported by the 
respondents. 
 When comparing the Estonian survey ﬁndings to those received a year earlier in 
Hungary (Soós and Kalman 2002, 69), one sees a similar picture. Both Estonian and 
Hungarian representatives support social equality, but their views on the means to 
achieve it are rather mixed and vague.
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Table 3.57
Statements Receiving the Most Support by Local Councilors (7-Point Scale*) 
Statement Support Given [%]
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard. 74.0
The government should take more responsibility to ensure 
that everyone is provided for.
45.5
If everyone participates, people’s needs and wants are easier to 
meet through public decisions. 
62.4
In a democracy, everyone should have exactly the same rights. 45.6
Note: * Answers at points 1–3 or 5–7.
Source: LRS 2002.
Another striking ﬁnding was that in statements on income equality and on 
privatization of industry, preferences were spread over the whole scale and the mode 
fell at point “4”, i.e., in the middle of the scale. Thus, we cannot conclude that local 
councilors support a clear ideological orientation. Rather, their attitudes depend on 
certain burning social issues (deepening income cleavage, too minimalist state, double 
legal standards for top politicians and citizens, etc.). One can also notice the impact of 
certain popular ideological discourses in Estonian political thinking. Statements derived 
from the policy talk of New Public Management received the support of local councilors 
regardless of municipality size (Table 3.58).
Table 3.58
Local Councilors’ Support of New Public Management Ideas 
by Size of Local Government (7-Point Scale)
Statements Less 
than 1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Average
The public sector in 
Estonia is too large
4.12 4.43 4.53 4.49 4.47
The private sector is 
more eﬃcient
4.36 4.80 4.78 4.95 4.85
My views on 
left–right scale 
(1–left; 7–right)
4.31 4.59 4.58 4.66 4.61
Source: LRS 2002.
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 Uncertainty in personal political orientations also becomes evident when one looks 
at another 7-point scale. Respondents were asked to identify whether they support left- 
or right-wing values. Of the total respondents, 18% refused to answer and 27% placed 
themselves in the middle of the scale (Figure 3.27).
Figure 3.27
The Self-perceived Ideological Orientation 
of Local Representatives (7-Point Scale*)
Note: * 1—left-wing orientation; 7—right-wing orientation.
Source: LRS 2002.
The ideological orientations of local representatives correspond to the average state of 
public attitudes. Diﬀerent studies revealed a slight preference toward right-wing orientations 
during the entire decade of the 1990s; the share of voters identifying themselves as centrists 
was permanently around one-third (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997).
The similarity of the party preferences of councilors and voters can also be analyzed 
by comparing their support for the diﬀerent political parties. Ratings given by LRS 
respondents and the share of votes given in the last local elections conﬁrm that the 
agrarian People’s Union is more popular in parishes, whereas right-wing parties (the 
Reform Party and Res Publica) gain more support in cities (Table 3.59; see also the 
voting statistics in Figure 3.25). Councilors in larger LGs do not support parties that are 
currently weak and stay in opposition at the national level (Moderates, Pro Patria), which 
can be explained by the closer link between central government and local government 
in the main cities. (It is legal in Estonia for one person to be a representative in the 
national parliament and in the municipal council at the same time. This practice is quite 
common in the capital city.) 
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Table 3.59
Local Councilors’ Support for Political Parties (7-Point Scale*)
Size of Local 
Community
Party
People’s 
Union
Pro Patria 
Union
Center 
Party
Moderates Reform 
Party
Res 
Publica
Less than 1,000 4.96 2.79 4.25 3.15 3.29 3.77
1,000–1,999 4.14 3.10 3.45 3.58 3.88 3.85
2,000–4,999 4.27 2.89 3.38 3.36 3.72 3.74
5,000–9,999 4.09 3.22 3.47 3.57 3.86 3.80
10,000–49,999 3.62 3.37 3.18 3.45 3.85 3.77
50,000 and more 3.00 2.82 3.35 2.53 4.35 4.38
Total 4.08 3.09 3.43 3.44 3.82 3.81
Note: * 1 – lowest support; 7 – highest support.
Source: LRS 2002.
Trust is an important indicator for measuring the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions and the strength of social capital. The latter problem has not been very deeply 
studied in Estonia, but the level of institutional trust has been surveyed since 1995. When 
comparing the trust of local representatives toward the main democratic institutions 
with that of the general public, one see similarities in the ranking. Both categories of 
respondents trust the president most and political parties least. Local representatives are 
more critical than citizens; this especially pertains to central government institutions—the 
national parliament and cabinet of ministers, and the media (Table 3.60). Respondents 
who have been elected representatives for a longer time have more critical attitudes, 
especially toward executive bodies, courts, police, and political parties. 
In addition to the number of times the respondent has been reelected, the level of 
trust depends on the size of the LG and the respondent’s income. Respondents with a 
higher income have more trust toward democratic institutions. The same correlation 
was found in a public opinion survey, “The State and the People” (Saar and Rentel 
2000). Although we can expect that small LGs are less wealthy and thus lack trust, 
this interaction did not turn out to be a linear one (Table 3.61). Central government 
institutions and political parties are more trusted in large LGs. The president and the 
police, on the contrary, receive higher ranks in parishes. 
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Table 3.60
Share of Respondents Who “Completely” and “Rather” Trust Listed Institutions [%]
Institution Local Councilors General Public
President 73.1 79
Courts of law 47.5 47
County government 47.1 65* 
Police 40.7 50
Central government 34.8 51
Parliament 24.4 45
Media 23.2 44
Political parties 12.3 22
Note: * Municipal government.
Source: LRS 2002; Eesti ühiskond, tested in May–June 2002.
Table 3.61
Trust toward Political Institutions by Size of Municipality (7-Point Scale*)
Institution Size of Local Community
Less 
than 1,000
1,000–
1,999
2,000–
4,999
5,000–
9,999
10,000–
49,999
50,000 
and More
Total
Parliament 3.31 3.62 3.54 3.65 3.66 4.14 3.62
President 5.33 5.23 5.16 5.17 5.10 4.75 5.16
Central government 3.53 4.01 3.86 3.97 4.02 4.08 3.94
Regional government 3.56 4.21 4.23 3.92 4.04 3.83 4.07
County government 4.44 4.42 4.42 4.02 3.93 3.94 4.23
Courts of law 3.89 4.25 4.09 4.07 4.34 4.58 4.16
Police 4.31 4.15 4.04 3.95 4.15 3.92 4.06
Media 3.36 3.57 3.49 3.52 3.63 3.39 3.53
Political parties 2.22 3.02 2.93 2.97 3.16 3.67 2.99
Note: * 1—do not trust at all; 7—completely trust.
Source: LRS 2002.
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Another dimension of trust—toward fellow politicians and citizens—was measured 
in the LRS by three items. Of all respondents, 66.7% believe that most people can be 
trusted and that only rare people try to misuse trustful relations. Regarding interpersonal 
trust amongst local citizens, councilors express more skepticism. The mean value on the 
7-point scale was lower (3.69) than the scale median (4.0). Analysis of the data revealed 
that political party members and Russians believe less in mutual trust between fellow 
citizens (means of 3.47 and 3.03 respectively). 
Concerning good relations with colleagues in the local council, representatives 
tended to be quite positive. They believe that the promises given by members of their 
own faction can usually be trusted (mean of 5.2). They are not quite as certain (mean 
of 3.5) about members of other factions. Gender, educational level, or times reelected 
did not play any remarkable role in these opinions, but once again non-Estonian 
representatives tend to express less trust toward factions and fellow councilors. One 
possible explanation for this may be the quarrels and organizational splits in Russian 
political parties, which have eroded positive attitudes.
3.3.5 Local Representatives’ Attitudes towards Representation
In the policymaking process, the mediation of diﬀerent social interests gains special 
importance. In the ideal model of pluralist democracy all interest groups have rather equal 
inﬂuence on the policy process. But what is the situation in reality? Which groups do local 
councilors regard as important enough that their opinions should be taken into account? 
According to the survey data, local representatives pay a lot of attention to the 
opinions of their constituents. Partial interest groups’ views (their own political parties 
or diﬀerent social groups) are not so meaningful (Table 3.62). Other categories that were 
ranked as important on the scale were all residents in the municipality and citizens who 
voted for the respondent. Central government agencies and ethnic groups received the 
lowest ranking. A detailed analysis revealed that voters and residents are most important 
for all respondents regardless of their party membership, number of times of reelected, 
ethnicity, or municipality size. Particular interests (ethnic minorities, political parties, 
and occupational groups) were ranked diﬀerently by various categories of councilors. 
As would be expected, party members give more value to their own party organization 
and also, somewhat surprisingly, to the central government agencies. The latter attitude 
could be explained by the existence of “pork barrel” politics (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 
1992), where central government resources are distributed to the local level via lobbying 
by top members of political parties. 
Non-Estonians formed another category of respondents who paid more attention 
to the central authorities, but this is probably related to the fact that it is common for 
Russians to believe in the eﬃcacy of central government. 
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Table 3.62
Social Groups Considered by Local Representatives 
in Decision-making (7-Point Scale)
Considered
Social Groups
Party 
Members
Non-
Members
Estonians Non-
Estonians
Average
All residents 5.87 5.84 5.84 6.08 5.86
My voters 5.27 5.06 5.13 5.67 5.17
My party 4.76 4.04 4.38 4.89 4.41
Occupational groups 3.49 3.33 3.38 3.81 3.41
Central government 3.19 2.90 3.00 3.42 3.03
Ethnic groups 3.06 2.83 2.92 3.33 2.94
Source: LRS 2002.
The most discouraging ﬁnding in councilors’ attitudes toward representation was 
the negative correlation between the assigned importance and the number of times the 
councilor had been reelected. Councilors reelected three or more times demonstrated 
less interest in the opinions of all the mentioned social actors. This seems to show some 
tendency toward political alienation amongst long-term local politicians. 
The municipal councils are not simply representative bodies; they also have to make 
regular political decisions. This raises the question: What is the balance between the 
mediation of interests as discussed above and actually bringing these interests into formal 
norms? For the purposes of analysis, councilors were asked to indicate the impact of 
twelve diﬀerent persons, institutions, or interest groups on their personal decisions and 
on the decisions of LG. It turned out that the most inﬂuential actors are local ones—the 
mayor was rated at 5.4 and own faction at 4.6, while civil society organizations and 
associations were seen to have only a minor inﬂuence on LG decisions. The media had 
the lowest rating of the twelve actors. 
When comparing the impact of these same actors or institutions on councilors’ 
personal decisions, one can discern some issues worth noting. The biggest disparity 
concerns the role of citizens in the decision-making process. Local citizens are thought to 
be very inﬂuential on councilors’ personal judgments, but the councilors do not believe 
that citizens can inﬂuence LG decisions. Consequently, there is a missing link between 
voters’ representation and policy outcomes. On the one hand, councilors do seem to 
understand their main political role—to represent citizens, but they feel themselves 
unable to carry these public interests into local government decisions. 
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Table 3.63
Actors Having Main Inﬂuence on the Decision-making 
of Councilors (7-Point Scale)
Impact on LG Decisions Impact on Councilors’ 
Personal Decisions
Local citizens 3.5 5.5
Members of my faction 4.6 5.4
My party organization 3.5 4.8
The mayor 5.4 4.6
Civil organizations 3.3 4.1
Local businessmen 4.0 3.9
The media 3.3 3.0
Source: LRS 2002.
The signiﬁcance of local residents for councilors becomes clear when analyzing the 
sources of information they use in decision-making. Personal contacts with citizens are 
mentioned as the most important source of information when making decisions in the 
local council (Table 3.64). The municipal government, friends, and local media are in 
second place. When testing the role of citizens against background variables such as 
municipality size, times reelected, and party membership, we ﬁnd once again that size 
of municipality is the strongest predictor for all LGs. 
The roles of the workplace and of the party branch as information sources 
vary signiﬁcantly. Both are much more meaningful in large municipalities, while 
communication between the representative and executive branches is more of a factor 
in smaller municipalities. Some sources like NGOs, the media, oﬃce hours, and letters 
from citizens were ranked independently from municipality size. Neither the number 
of times reelected nor party aﬃliation shows a correlation in the local representatives’ 
estimates on information sources. 
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Table 3.64
Importance of Feedback Channels of Local Representatives 
by Size of Local Community (7-Point Scale*) 
Size of 
Local Community
Information Source
Meetings Personal 
Contacts 
with Citizens
Administration Work Place Party Branch
Less than 1,000 4.91 6.46 5.23 3.90 2.71
1,000–1,999 4.97 6.06 5.47 4.66 3.85
2,000–4,999 4.79 6.07 5.47 4.78 4.03
5,000–9,999 4.72 6.01 5.11 4.73 4.12
10,000–49,999 4.49 6.05 5.11 5.11 4.48
50,000 and more 4.12 5.86 5.00 5.15 4.89
Average 4.76 6.05 5.30 4.76 4.07
Note: * 1—not very important; 7—very important.
Source: LRS 2002.
3.3.6 Conclusion
Local political leaders in Estonia seem to possess basic democratic values and attitudes. 
They strongly believe that everyone must have the same democratic rights and that 
people’s opinions must be heard in the decision-making process. Local representatives’ 
attitudes reﬂect the both the general state of public opinion and the public ratings given 
to the political parties. Also, councilors that have been in power for a longer period have 
become more critical toward political institutions. 
Ideologically, there is a slight inclination toward right-wing views, although 
deeper analyses revealed many contradictions and misconceptions in the views of local 
representatives. They identify themselves ﬁrst and foremost as representatives of local 
residents and are willing to bring the citizens’ voice into LG decisions; at the same time, 
they ﬁnd the mayor and top civil servants to be the most inﬂuential bodies in local 
politics. The majority of councilors pay a lot of attention to the views of residents, but 
do not see any strong reason to deal with the special interests of professional, ethnic, or 
religious groups. Thus, local representatives’ perception of democracy is rather idealistic 
and not based on competing interests, although they recognize that the actual decision-
making process often does not reﬂect this popular ideal.
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3.4 Responsiveness
How and to what extent are LG decisions inﬂuenced by external actors? That is, to 
what extent do external actors create supplementary political input to inﬂuence local 
authorities to heed their needs and interests? In addressing this question we will ﬁrst 
look at the issue of participation, i.e., how institutional actors involve residents and their 
organizations in the decision-making process. Secondly, we will analyze how well the 
provision of services by local authorities has met local community members’ expectations 
and how the local residents assess these eﬀorts.
3.4.1 Policy Input from External Constituents
Local councilors’ and oﬃcials’ attitudes towards the participation of external groups 
were rather favorable (Table 3.65). Only 3.3% of oﬃcials did not accept the feasibility 
of the participation of civil society organizations in decision-making.
Table 3.65
Local Councilors’ Attitudes towards the Participation 
of External Actors (7-Point Scale)
Intensity Size of Local Community Total
Less 
than 1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Intensity of support for the 
participation of external 
actors 
4.92 5.24 4.78 4.86 4.30
Source: LRS 2002.
But their assessment of residents’ and other constituents’ inﬂuence on LG decisions 
and policy was rather contradictory. On the one hand, they were moderately (4.4–4.5 
on the seven-point scale) concerned about the passive stance of local residents in 
articulating their interest at the local level (Table 3.66). This concern was weaker in the 
largest communities (3.9), which contradicts the expectation that smaller communities 
are more conducive to self-government because authorities are closer to residents. 
On the other hand, there was equal concern in larger communities about external 
pressures from residents concerning user fees and general expectations about services. 
How can this apparent dualism in the interpretation of policy input from the local 
community be explained? One explanation would be that some local oﬃcials have more 
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authoritarian attitudes. In our survey, all type of concerns about pressure correlated 
signiﬁcantly (from 323. to 400.), and among them was a concern about pressure from 
local civic organizations. No correlation was observed, however, between concern 
about passivity and the size of the municipality. Only in the case of pressure from civic 
organizations was a weak correlation identiﬁed: the larger the community the more 
oﬃcials consider this pressure to be a problem. That is, some local oﬃcials consider 
these pressures not as supplementary input, but as a disturbing factor in organizing 
local life. 
The other explanation would be that oﬃcials accept one type of input, but do not 
approve of the other. In the case of pressure from organized groups, only the pressure 
of business in the largest communities was considered a problem. But in the case of 
residents’ unorganized pressure— especially to limit user fees—concern became rather 
deep in the larger communities. It is diﬃcult to believe that local oﬃcials consider 
unorganized pressure as a more signiﬁcant challenge to their decision-making authority 
than organized pressure. Obviously, the latter would be a much more eﬀective means of 
exerting inﬂuence and also of challenging authority in the case of conﬂict. Presumably, 
oﬃcials were concerned with the passive dissatisfaction of residents with local service 
quality and prices. This could be interpreted as a concern about general dissatisfaction 
that is not well channeled and negotiated and, thus, that could decrease the legitimacy 
of local authorities.
Table 3.66
The Impact of External Constituents on Local Government Decisions 
and the Decision-making Process (7-Point Scale*)
Intensity of Problems of 
Local Democracy
Size of Local Community Total
Less 
than 1,000
1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000 
and More
Local citizens are too passive 4.48 4.43 4.46 3.98 4.35
Local inhabitants insist on 
limiting user charges
3. 66 3.81 4.02 4.31 3.96
Local inhabitants have too high 
expectations concerning services
3.48 3.41 3.39 3.83 3.50
Pressures from local enterprises 2.90 2.94 2.99 3.46 3.05
Pressures from local civil 
organizations
1.93 2.64 3.14 3.17 2.84
Note: * 1—not important at all; 7—very important.
Source: LGS 2002.
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In our survey, both local councilors and oﬃcials assessed the impact of external actors 
on the decisions of local authorities (Figure 3.28). Their assessments were diﬀerent, 
to some extent. If we assume that the assessments mirrored the actual intensity of 
impacts rather than subjective preferences, then these two institutions have somewhat 
diﬀerent channels of input. Firstly, the councilors felt (more than the oﬃcials) that the 
central and regional authorities, as well as business, had a relatively greater impact on 
decisions, especially in comparison with other local institutions such as the mayor or 
the civil service. Secondly, they felt that the impact of media and (naturally) the political 
branches of parties was important, whereas those channels were not a signiﬁcant channel 
of impact for the oﬃcials. That is, local councilors are more open to the inﬂuence of 
external actors and institutions than local oﬃcials and we would expect that they feel 
more responsive to those actors or institutions than local oﬃcials do.
Figure 3.28
The Impact of External Actors on Local Government Decisions (7-Point Scale*) 
Note: * 1—very low impact; 7—very high impact.
Source: LSG 2002, LRS 2002.
3.4.2 Variables of Responsiveness of Local Authorities
To determine whether local inhabitants are satisﬁed with the services that LG or local 
organizations provide, we need to establish what kind of variables could inﬂuence the 
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level of satisfaction. Since our own survey did not focus on the issue of responsiveness, 
we rely here on the study, “Local Governance and Citizens’ Initiatives,” carried out in 
Estonia in 2000. 
In general, more residents were satisﬁed (40%) than not satisﬁed (27%) with LG 
service delivery, although a substantial minority (33%) did not take a clear position. 
Previously in this chapter, we noted that local authorities focus on the tasks that they 
have the ability to deal with and that this attention is not dependent on the urgency of 
these problems in the local community. This discrepancy in attention to issues (Parsons 
1995) is also mirrored in citizens’ satisfaction with various kinds of services provided at 
the local level (Table 3.66). Services that were provided by local authorities were assessed 
positively, and this even applied to recreation, although authorities in rural areas and 
small towns cannot provide a similar quality of recreation as large towns and cities can. 
Local residents were much less satisﬁed with services that are regional by deﬁnition or 
that are too complex to be delivered at the municipal level. Thus, the problem with 
division of competence was quite clearly mirrored in the satisfaction of local residents 
with those services. 
In response to the question of why local authorities could not oﬀer services at an 
appropriate level, 27% answered that civil servants did not work well and 25% that 
they do not have enough capacity to do their work better. Another 18% thought that 
civil servants were so overloaded with work that they did not have enough time and 
capacity to do better. Answers to another question indicated that residents who were 
more satisﬁed with the local authorities in general were also more satisﬁed with the 
quantity of services LG provides. 
Other questions in this survey enabled a more precise evaluation of the independent 
variables of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. One of them was the frequency of contacts 
with local authorities (Table 3.68). In the course of one year, 32% of local residents did 
not have any contact with local authorities and 43% had only one or two contacts; 15% 
had three to ﬁve contacts and 10% had six or more. In smaller communities (parishes 
and small towns), 40% and 30% of residents respectively had more frequent contacts 
(more than three times) with local authorities. Those who had more contact with local 
authorities assessed the quality of their service delivery more critically. 
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Table 3.67
Local Residents’ Satisfaction with Public Service Delivery by Department
Public Service Mean on 
4–Point 
Scale
Assessment Balance [%]
Satisfied 
[%]
Not 
Satisfied [%]
Libraries, public internet connection 3.52 54 12 +42
Medical aid and health care 3.45 64 22 +42
Education, school management 3.35 50 16 +34
Information about local government 
decisions
3.05 40 31 +9
Recreational opportunities 2.97 39 37 +2
Social aid (social work, ﬁnancial aid) 2.94 29 29 0
Counseling of private entrepreneurs 2.82 9 19 –10
Organization of legal aid 2.82 14 23 –9
Information about plans to revise 
legislation in parliament or government
2.81 27 36 –9
Adult training (i.e., unemployment 
prevention)
2,78 14 27 –13
Roads and traﬃc organization 2.81 37 49 –12
Public safety 2.69 32 49 –17
Source: Local Governance and Citizens’ Initiatives 2000. 
Table 3.68
Local Residents’ Satisfaction with the Extent 
of Services Provided by Local Government [%]
Assessment of Extent of Services Assessment
Satisfied with LG Not satisfied with LG 
Too few services 26.0 44.0
Enough services 38.0 16.0
Some services unnecessary 6.0 9.0
Source: Local Governance and Citizens’ Initiatives 2000.
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Table 3.69
Assessment of Quality of Work of Authorities 
by Frequency of Residents’ Contact [%]
Frequency with Which Local 
Resident Met Unsatisfactory Service
Frequency of Local Residents’ Contact with Authorities Total
No Contact One or Two 
Contacts
Three and 
More Contacts
Government 
service
Never 60 34 23 39
Rarely 27 45 44 39
Frequently 12 21 33 21
Local 
authorities
Never 63 29 23 —
Rarely 24 47 46 40
Frequent 9 23 31 20
Source: Local Government and Citizens’ Initiatives 2000. 
We cannot ascertain from this survey whether some inhabitants contact public 
authorities more frequently because they are dissatisﬁed with the services, or the 
dissatisfaction develops as the frequency of contacts increases. However, local service 
delivery looks more attractive from a distance, i.e., residents who have no contacts with 
local authorities give a more positive assessment of service delivery quality than those 
who deal frequently with local authorities. 
One more tendency was observed in the surveys that might be used as an explanatory 
variable. Local residents’ opinions on the services provided by local government and 
its organizations, on the one hand, and state ﬁeld oﬃces at the local and regional level, 
on the other hand, did not diﬀer much. Their opinions about problems and services 
that are within the competence of the regional government may inﬂuence their overall 
assessment of local authorities. This would then inﬂuence the satisfaction of citizens 
and their assessment of the responsiveness of local authorities.
3.4.3 Conclusion
Our study was not intended to provide conclusive judgments about the extent of 
responsiveness of Estonian local authorities, but rather to analyze the variables that would 
determine the opinion of citizens on that complex issue. Firstly, we identiﬁed that the 
current of division of competence in the framework of the autonomous model adopted 
in Estonia has created considerable obstacles to developing a clear sense of responsive 
LG among the inhabitants. Nevertheless, residents oﬀered a very positive assessment 
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of those services that local authorities are capable of delivering. But satisfaction with 
local government services tends to depend on overall satisfaction with local authorities, 
which could be inﬂuenced in turn by other variables than the responsive actions of local 
authorities. That is, those other variables would be, and in fact are, out of reach of LG 
powers. Thus, opinions about responsiveness can not be measured simply as the level 
of satisfaction of local inhabitants with the services provided. Responsiveness is a more 
systemic trait and indicators for measuring responsiveness must be more complex.
4. LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY
4.1 Media and Local Government
4.1.1 The Impact of the Post-communist Transition on the Media
Access to information, membership in civil associations, shared discursive ﬁelds, etc., 
are complementary structural conditions that together form the backbone of modern 
and postmodern democratic self-government. In Estonia, the development of the media 
and public space has post-communist and postcolonial features. For example, as in all 
post-communist countries, the centrally controlled media system has ceased to exist. In 
the postcolonial period the imperial language typically loses its hegemony. In Estonia, 
however, the Russian language media was never hegemonic despite its higher status. 
National media (print and electronic) existed in the Estonian language, although it 
generated little interest among non-Estonians (one-third of the population has only a 
limited command of the Estonian language). So the model that existed in the Soviet 
era, which operated only in the two main languages, continues to operate, but with the 
language positions reversed in terms of status.
The main media trends in post-communist Estonia reproduced many of the features 
shared by the post-communist transition in CEE (Jakuboviz 1997). Media development 
in Estonia from 1995 to 2000 included the following features: 
 1. Continued diversiﬁcation and fragmentation of the media system, the launching 
of new magazines, the establishment of new radio and TV channels, and growth 
in the duration of broadcasts; and
 2. Privatization and commercialization of the media. 
There was a lot of confusion around the privatization of local Estonian newspapers. 
Some were privatized quite soon after the ﬁnal collapse of the Soviet regime, and the rest 
were given by the state to the local governments. From 1992 to 1996, the municipalities 
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privatized all newspapers. All but one of the national newspapers and many local papers 
were originally privatized to their editorial staﬀ members. A feature of this process that 
was typical to Estonia was that neither banks nor large industrial corporations participated 
in the privatization and are not featured among newspaper owners. The original owners 
of the local press—the municipalities until the middle of the 1990s—had a habit of 
meddling very actively in the newspapers’ activities. Thus, some municipalities maintained 
control over the local media, although not for long. In some cases a new editor-in-chief 
was appointed amongst the local power-elites (Saks 2002, 192). In the second half of 
the 1990s, privatized newspapers were usually sold (for economic reasons) to business-
oriented owners, usually large media enterprises, with the participation of foreign capital. 
Some big local newspapers were also privatized to foreigners (Saks 2002, 199). As result, 
a basic principle in the operation of regional and local media became proﬁt-making. 
Compared to the printed media, the privatization of electronic media began later, 
in 1991. By the beginning of 2001, thirty-three radio programs functioned in Estonia. 
National Estonian Radio had four programs and various other licensed legal entities 
broadcasted twenty-nine programs. With respect to coverage, these can be divided into 
six national, ﬁfteen regional, and twelve local programs. The local stations are mainly 
situated in Tallinn and Tartu. Only some regions (Saaremaa, Virumaa, and Lõuna-Eesti) 
or smaller towns (Saaremaa, Pärnu, Rakvere, Põlva, Põltsmaa and Viljandi) have their own 
stations, which constitute a “chain.” Three commercial TV stations, a growing network 
of cable services, and the rapid penetration of society by the Internet transformed the 
Estonian media landscape at the end of the1990s from a print-dominated one into the 
electronic age.
Between 1990 and 1999, the number of newspapers increased by 38% and the 
number of magazines by 33%. Instead of two programs on state radio in 1990, 27 were 
broadcasted in 2000 (four public and 23 private); instead of one state television station, 
there were four nationwide stations (one public and three commercial) (Lauristin and 
Vihalemm 2002, 37).
Continued commercialization has changed the media into a market-driven industry 
and there has been a steady increase in television viewing. The increased competition 
in the advertising market has resulted in a concentration of the media. The importance 
of the entertainment function of the media has increased signiﬁcantly, along with the 
increasing role of the electronic media. The average television viewing time was two 
hours per day in 1985, three hours in January 1994, and four hours forty minutes in 
January 2000 (data from Baltic Media Facts). Despite concentration, there has been no 
large reduction in the number of media channels. Diversiﬁcation of the Estonian media, 
especially in the area of magazines, looks likely to continue in the years to come, with 
both concentration and diversiﬁcation taking place simultaneously. 
The impact of the post-communist transition on the media was a two-fold process. 
Along with democratization, it opened access to the modern technologies of print and 
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electronic media. At the same time, the national public space was becoming deeply 
fragmented—commercialization, regionalization, and ethnic diﬀerentiation of the media 
contributed to the disintegration of society. The collapse of Soviet-type political structures 
and production units, the disbanding of collective farms, poor conditions of traﬃc, 
etc., also greatly aﬀected the public sphere in Estonia. The new social subjects (classes, 
minorities, and territorial units) were not equally successful in building supportive 
“organs.” In terms of electronic public space, ethnocultural enclaves of Russophones 
emerged. On average, 80% of Russian speakers watch Russian television channels 
(broadcast from Russia) each day and only 25% of them have some interest in Estonian 
television on a daily basis (Jakobson 2002). As a result, Russophone Estonians are much 
better informed about events in Russia than those in their resident country. 
New communication technologies are rapidly pervading the media and everyday 
life in Estonia due to the computerization of schools and workplaces and an aﬃliation 
with the global networks. By December 1999, sixteen electronic news services were 
functioning in Estonia (among them four portals in Estonian); 31 Estonian newspapers 
and 50 magazines were distributing electronic versions of their publications, and seven 
radio stations functioned in the real-time regime of the Internet (Baltic Media Book 2000, 
200-206). In the autumn of 2000, around 35% of Estonia’s adult population—among 
them 40% of Estonian and 21% of Russian speakers—used the Internet (Jakobson 
2002, 20). There were 238 Internet-connected hosts per 10,000 inhabitants, the same 
level as France and Germany. Computerized workplaces were the norm for 95% of 
public employees and 19% of the population owned a computer at home, of which 
53% had an Internet connection. By the end of 2003, 47% of Estonian residents used 
the Internet. 
Data on the regionalization of Internet use are scarce, but a much lower proportion 
of Russian-speakers among Internet users shows that residents of the north-eastern region 
have much more limited access to the Internet. Also, libraries in the regions inhabited 
mainly by non-Estonians have fewer public Internet stations at their disposal. Estonian 
media researchers are quite alarmed about the impact of commercialization and the social 
polarization in society. There has been a visible impact on the quality and structure of 
the media, on the social polarization of audiences, and on the cultural polarization of 
media contents. The commercial interests of a privatized media have become separated 
from the public interest to such a degree that it has prevented the fair representation of 
all publicly relevant issues in the Estonian media (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2002, 37).
There is not much data available about the regionalization of Estonia in terms of 
access to media and there is also little information about the state of media systems—the 
structuring of local, regional, and national media (which would provide important 
background to our study). Along with marketization and the emergence of “two Estonias” 
(poor and “ﬁlthy rich”), media consumption has also been restructured and reduced. The 
average number of regularly read newspapers has dropped over the decade, as have press 
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subscriptions. Nevertheless, media consumption in Estonia is high. The average number 
of newspapers regularly read by Estonians in 1999 was 3.1 and the average number of 
subscriptions was 1.9 per individual. An average non-Estonian consumes much less 
media: a non-Estonian resident reads 0.6 newspapers and subscribes to 0.3 newspapers, 
while 3% of Estonians and 12% of non-Estonians do not read any newspapers at all 
(ibid., 41). The share of non-Estonians who read one copy is approximately twice as 
high (around 80%) as the share of Estonians who do (ibid., 283).There are economic 
and social reasons that limit the access of Russians to print media and cause them to 
prioritize electronic media. 
The consumption of electronic media has gone up. The average Estonian watches 
3.7 television channels (non-Estonians watch 4.1 channels) and listens to 3.2 radio 
stations (non-Estonians tune into three stations). Considering the signiﬁcant role of 
local print media as a source of information for non-Estonians and their attachment to 
Russian radio and television, there are good grounds for saying that non-Estonians are 
much more isolated from the regional (county) and local (parish) level public sphere, 
as far as it operates in the media.
There is no exact data about the consumption of regional (county) media. But it is 
symptomatic that the circulation of non-daily newspapers has gone down more rapidly 
than that of dailies (from 709,000 copies in 1990 to 231,000 copies in 2000). This type 
of newspaper primarily represents regional and local media, which got a new push at the 
beginning of the 1990s, when local governments were established. All Estonian counties 
(except Järvamaa and Põlvamaa) now have their own newspapers. But only 25 to 30 of the 
smaller areas—regional towns and parishes—have their own newspapers or newsletters. 
Most of these newspapers cover parishes in the northern part of Estonia and in some 
cases they are established in historical-cultural centers (the parishes of Tori, Suure-Jaani, 
and Alatskivi), which are situated in the central or western regions. There is no report 
on parish-level newspapers in southern Estonia. The huge economic gap between the 
north and south, the polarization of rural parishes and towns in terms of economic 
welfare, and the fact that north-eastern Estonia is populated by non-Estonians are some 
of the reasons why Estonia is heavily segmented in terms of access to and consumption 
of printed media. Economic conditions have a cumulative eﬀect on the spreading of 
local media, since advertising is an essential part of the budget of newspapers. Tallinn, 
the bigger cities like Tartu, and the northern coast around Tallinn constitute the most 
privileged areas in the sense that the national and local press overlap there. 
The data show that only 33% of non-Estonians regularly read national (Estonian) 
Russian language dailies and 56% read them as seldom as once per week (ibid., 283). 
While 70% of Estonians regularly read a national daily, for non-Estonians the ﬁgure is half 
of that. Compared to the high percentage (73%) of regular readers of local newspapers 
among Estonians—i.e., regional papers from the county, a bigger town, or a local parish 
paper—among non-Estonians the share is 43% of residents. According to another study, 
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the ﬁgure was even lower—31% (ibid., 280). The share of non-Estonians among readers of 
all types of printed regional, local, and national media is many times lower than their share 
in the population. There are two explanations for this fact: the scarce economic resources 
of Russophone people (Estonians are relatively better oﬀ) and the more developed cultural 
tradition of Estonians to consume print media. The segmentation of Estonian consumers 
of media in terms of ethnicity reﬂects regional segmentation as well, in north-eastern 
Estonia and in the ethnically deﬁned regions of Tallinn (Lasnamäe).
4.1.2 Local Oﬃcials (Councilors and Civil Servants) and Media
According to our study, the main owners of the local and regional print media are LG 
(38%) and business (34%). The share of nonproﬁt associations among owners is very 
small and they have some role as owners only in the smaller municipalities. Local 
government plays a role at the parish and small city level. The role of LG as (co)sponsor 
of the print media was seen as essential by one-third of respondents and is important 
in the medium sized municipalities. Business was seen as the most important player 
in the bigger municipalities, and also as the supplier of advertisements, commercials, etc. 
From this perspective, the fact that local media are not institutionalized at the primary 
level—ﬁrst of all in the parishes—tells us something about the low economic capacity 
of municipalities. 
The overall impact of media on the activities of LG is relatively small in medium 
sized municipalities and not very visible in smaller ones (at the rural parish level). 
Only churches and trade unions have less inﬂuence: the principal media were seen as 
an inﬂuential institution by 17.5% of oﬃcials, local party branches by 15.1%, and 
civil associations by 26%. This explains why public oﬃcials identiﬁed journalists and 
civic associations last among the local government partners that should participate 
in discussions on the budget. Only 10% of them considered it important to involve 
journalists in the discussions. This number was higher in the bigger municipalities 
and townships (with 10,000 to 49,999 inhabitants), where one-third of respondents 
considered it important to involve journalists. Although journalists were discounted as 
main actors, 28.6% of oﬃcials still reported that they have regular contacts with them. 
In the medium sized and bigger municipalities, about half of the respondents reported 
regular contact with journalists for the purpose of informing them about the activities 
of the local government. But only 7.6% of local governments have a public servant 
whose main task is public relations. In 25% of the municipalities, the task of keeping 
journalists informed is one among a number of other duties. 
Our study showed that municipalities are generally too small to pay special attention 
to contacts with the media. But on the other side, journalists and the local media in 
general, in so far as they exist, are not very devoted to local matters. 
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The local government survey shows that, in almost all municipalities, the main 
source of printed information on local matters is newspapers that are published two 
to ﬁve times a week or weeklies. In other words, the delivery of information at the 
municipal level is dependent on periodicals, which are at best produced mainly in the 
county centers. In towns with a population of 100,000 and more inhabitants (Tallinn), 
dailies were also the most important source of information on local matters. In Tallinn 
and Tartu, the dailies regularly publish special pages delivered only to the subscribers 
of the region. In Tallinn, which was divided into independent municipalities, every 
locality has a newsletter. 
The civil servants who responded to the survey estimated that about 55% of residents 
read newspapers, which they also quite regularly perceived to be important. They were 
even more optimistic with respect to the reading habits of the residents of the bigger 
towns (with between 10,000 and 49,999 residents) and expected the percentage of 
regular newspaper readers to be as high as about 80% of residents. These estimations 
about people’s attachment to the media ﬁt with the general reports of scholars working 
in media studies (Vihalemm, 2002, 283).
In the larger municipalities, regional and national media often overlap, which might 
explain why the national media scored highest. Local newspapers are the most popular 
source of information in municipalities with 5,000 to 9,999 residents (i.e., residents 
of the smaller towns enjoy their county newspaper (Table 3.70). Many of the local 
newspapers that have assumed the role of main provider of information operate in the 
medium sized towns. Regional newspapers play this role in the smaller places and in 
rural municipalities that do not have the resources to publish their own papers. In the 
biggest municipalities (Tallinn, Tartu), the main source of information is a national 
newspaper. In the smallest municipalities, which seldom have a regular local newspaper, 
newsletters of various kinds appear to be an important source of information. Irregular 
newsletters of this sort are delivered in many parishes. Paradoxically, a fairly large share 
of residents of the smallest municipalities perceives the national newspapers as a source 
of information.
As expected, the “second” source of information does not cover the information 
needs very well. However, there is not an observable dominance of the ﬁrst “source” in 
terms of quality of information—information about alternative proposals, presentation 
of arguments, etc. The essential characteristics of good journalism—to facilitate dialogue 
and support the eﬀective participation of citizens by reporting in depth on debated 
issues—are less evident in the smaller municipalities. There is no clear division of 
functions in this respect, or hierarchy of printed sources according to their content or 
orientation. 
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Table 3.70
Share of Local, Regional, and National Print Media in Media Consumption [%]
Size of Local Community Local Newspaper Regional Newspaper National Newspaper
0–1,000 29.2 58.3 12.5
1,000–1,999 36.2 58.1 5.7
2,000–4,999 35.5 61.3 3.2
5,000–9,999 52.5 40.5 2.5
10,000–49,999 36.4 54.5 9.1
100,000 and more 16.7 16.7 66.7
Total 37.3 56.3 6.5
Source: LGS 2002.
As for coverage of the issues, the study shows (as would be expected) that the smaller 
the self-government unit the more problematic the coverage of its problems in the 
printed media (Table 3.71). Sessions of the LG of the smaller municipalities are often 
not reported at all. Interviews are the most popular (and least focused) journalistic genre 
for dealing with LG leaders, and the issue of journalist standards, which frames the access 
to the top local leaders, is not very transparent. There is little information about the 
interview process (who initiates the interview, how professional the journalist is, etc.). 
But the personalized approach clearly puts leaders in small communities in a privileged 
position and allows the political opposition to be relegated to the role of observer. 
Supplying information about alternative proposals and the content of debates is 
extremely important for maintaining a balanced political process and democratic public 
discourse. Rationality and transparency of the political process, which are fundamental 
attributes of deliberative democracy and the modern public sphere, have not yet become 
common, although they are more prevalent in bigger administrative units. 
In the terms of the promotion of local democracy, it is the medium sized 
municipalities that are in the most favorable position. This is because these small 
townships and centers of counties (with between 5,000 and 9,999 residents) have a 
relatively well developed network of civil associations and also relatively “thick” media 
coverage (Kuressaare, Põlva, Jõgeva, etc.). 
Nevertheless, the respondents to the survey showed very little diﬀerence (by size 
of municipality) in their attitudes to the print media. In municipalities with 0–9,999, 
2000–4999, and 5,000–9999 residents respectively, 37%, 32.9%, and 37.5% of civil 
servants are of the view that local life has been covered relatively well in the media (Table 
3.71). Only 10–15% complained about serious ﬂaws in coverage by the print media.
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Table 3.71
Coverage of the Activities of Local Government in the Print Media [%] 
Size of 
Local Community
Reports on 
LG Sessions
Information 
about Alternative 
Proposals
Information on 
Arguments 
Presented
Interviews 
with Leaders
I II I II I II I II
0–1,000 61.5 60.0 29.6 20.5 46. 2 35.5 92.3 85.5
1,000–1,999 82.9 66.3 40.8 37.6 37. 9 44.0 94.3 82.8
2,000–4,999 88.2 67.1 59.3 29.0 68. 5 49.4 91. 3 76.5
5,000–9,999 97.5 67.5 77.7 48.7 80. 0 51.3 95.0 82.1
10,000–49,999 100.0 37.5 54.5 22.2 72.2 — 100.0 55.6
100,000 and more 100.0 83.3 83.3 66.7 66.8 60.0 100.0 100.0
Total 85. 8 65.7 52.3 37.5 56.8 44.9 93.6 80.2
Source: LGS 2002.
Table 3.72
Evaluation of Coverage of Local Issues 
in the Print Media by Size of Municipality [%] 
Size of 
Local Community
Assessment of Coverage by Local Officials
Dissatisfied Visible Deficit in 
Coverage
Enough Coverage Hard to Say
0–1,000 15.6 40.0 30.5 10.0
1,000–1,999 5.4 33.3 46.2 15.1
2,000–4,999 13.4 36.6 32.9 17.1
5,000–9,999 10.0 40.0 37.5 12.5
10,000–49,999 26.8 28.6 14.3 28.6
100,000 and more — 16.7 66.7 16.7
Total 10.1 35.5 39.1 15.3
Source: LGS 2002.
Civil servants in the medium sized and bigger municipalities are less satisﬁed with 
coverage in the print media. This is an interesting result, because the media of the larger 
municipalities were perceived as more adequate and qualiﬁed both in terms of the supply 
of information and the quality of reporting (description of alternatives, arguments, 
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etc.). Possible explanations for this apparent contradiction are twofold: the problems 
that emerge in the bigger municipalities are more complex and the local oﬃcials are 
more professional and demanding in their expectations of the media’s role in this more 
sophisticated environment.
Compared to the complicated structure of the print media system, the electronic 
media operates mainly on the regional and national level. Of all consumed media assessed 
by the respondents as having primary importance, the local level electronic media made 
up 44.9% and the national level media 53.5%.
Media that are oriented more to the national level were rated second in importance 
by local oﬃcials. In very rare instances, radio stations are owned by LG or civil society 
structures. However, the majority of stations belong to private citizens, corporations, or 
are sponsored to a degree by the county government. According to the respondents, the 
level of ﬁnancial contribution or support given to the electronic media by LG is very 
small (around 2% enjoy signiﬁcant or essential LG support). Civil servants in medium 
sized municipalities considered such support to be essential. 
Fewer than half (42%) of the residents are expected to be regular audiences of radio 
and television broadcasts. The bigger the municipality, the bigger is the expected share 
of regular listeners and viewers of radio and television stations. The amount of attention 
paid to local matters in the electronic media is in general very low and primarily concerns 
smaller municipalities. In terms of the frequency of reporting by electronic media on local 
matters, there is a large gap between the biggest and the other municipalities. While the 
events in the smaller ones receive attention once or twice a month on average, the aﬀairs 
of the biggest municipalities are reported about every week or even more frequently 
(general matters rather than matters speciﬁcally related to LG).
Municipalities are more polarized by the coverage they receive on issues in the 
electronic media than in the print media. Radio stations, for example, give much less 
attention to local or regional matters than local newspapers do. The sessions of local 
councils are usually not reviewed or translated except in the largest municipalities 
(Table 3.72). Even reporting on decisions on local matters is very irregular in smaller 
communities. One trend that can be observed with respect to the print media is that 
there is a higher probability in larger municipalities that matters will be reported in 
detail (alternative proposals are presented, arguments are included, etc.). The quality of 
radio reporting on local matters, according to the reports of local oﬃcials, is generally 
very low or consists merely of formal announcements. Only in the bigger municipalities 
are real political debates reﬂected and the various positions presented.
The electronic media appear to play a very limited role in informing people about 
important issues at the local level. As Table 3.72 shows, municipalities of all sizes have 
a rather large share civil servants who are not very content with the electronic media in 
this respect, leading us to conclude that, compared to the print media, the contribution 
of electronic media to community-building is rather limited. 
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Table 3.73
Coverage of Local Government Activities 
in the Electronic Media by Size of Municipality [%]
Size of 
Local Community
Type of Reporting 
Reports and 
Reviews on 
Sessions
Information 
about 
Decisions
Information on 
the Different 
Proposals
Information 
on Arguments 
Presented
Interviews 
with the 
Leaders
0–1,000 14.3 28.6 14.3 14.3 66.7
1,000–1,999 14.5 51.6 11.3 25.4 66.7
2,000–4,999 5.8 44.9 13.0 26.5 70.5
5,000–9,999 19.4 61.3 32.3 35.5 75.5
10,000–49,999 — 80.0 50.0 30.0 57.1
On average 13.2 51.6 18.8 28. 4 74.4
Source: LGS 2002.
Table 3.74
Evaluation of the Coverage of Local Issues by the Electronic Media [%]
Size of 
Local Community
Assessment of Coverage by Local Officials
Dissatisfied Visible Deficit 
in Coverage
Enough Coverage Hard to Say
0–1,000 50.0 44.4 42.9 55.6 7.1 — — —
1,000–1,999 21.5 20.0 41.5 48.0 24.6 24.0 12.3 8.0
2,000–4,999 20.3 23.3 56.5 60.5 14.5 7.0 8.7 9.3
5,000–9,999 41.9 35.0 38.7 45.0 12.9 15.0 6.5 5.0
10,000–49,999 20.0 57.1 50.0 28.6 20.0 — 10.0 14.3
100,000 and more — — — — 100 100 — —
On average 25.9 27.8 19.2 50.0 19.2 14.8 8.8 7.4
Source: LGS 2002.
Comparing the role of the electronic and print media from the perspective of 
supporting the public sphere at the level of local government, we can see that these 
institutions had very diﬀerent starting points in the post-Soviet environment and 
developed in diﬀerent directions. At the same time, in recent years they have become 
quite similar in terms of their attention to local matters. During the Soviet occupation, 
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Estonia maintained a rich tradition of local media that supported people’s reading habits, 
in spite of indoctrination. In 1986, twelve local newspapers (one in each county) were 
distributed. On average, around 285 copies of local newspapers per 1,000 residents were 
distributed. Diﬀerences between the counties in terms of distribution and popularity 
of the local media were visible but not very dramatic (between 192 and 380 copies per 
1,000 inhabitants) (Lauristin et al. 1987, 96). With perestroika came a new push for 
democratization and the emergence of genuine interest in the development of local 
media. Commercialization of local print media combined with economic depression had 
a devastating eﬀect on the printing of the local newspapers in many regions (especially 
in rural areas). Over the last decade, the size of distribution and the role of newspapers 
have signiﬁcantly decreased all over the country.
At the same time, the collapse of the Soviet regime opened the access to modern 
technology and also opened a “space” for electronic broadcasting with the development of 
regional and local radio. A common feature of both types of media today is their business 
ownership (largely Nordic), which deﬁnes the logic of development. Both print and 
electronic media operate today as proﬁt-oriented institutions that are almost completely 
independent of the local government. Local matters are not of much interest to them. 
4.1.3 Conclusion
The main conclusions that can be drawn from our observations on media and LG 
relations are the following:
 1. Privatized print media primarily serve the interests of the owners—the business 
people. The scope of the public electronic media (television) operating on the 
national level mostly concerns the regions around Tallinn;
 2. In terms of ownership and economic support, the impact of civil associations 
and LG on media coverage is very limited. Because of certain instrumental 
factors, the print media are better positioned for cooperation with the LG; 
 3. The development of the regional and local public sphere is very sensitive to 
the number of residents in the area, unlike the logic behind the growth of civil 
structures. The smaller the parish or village the less capacity it has to create its 
own media and the less visible it is in the local or regional media;
 4. Information on municipal aﬀairs is unbalanced in the sense of supplying adequate 
information on the alternatives discussed and the arguments presented;
 5. One would expect that, because of the complicated economic situation, the 
ethnic composition of regions, etc., there would be regional diﬀerences in 
the development of the modern public sphere (i.e., deliberative democracy). 
However, the data supplied by the current study did not supply enough material 
for a detailed analysis; and
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 6. The resources of most local governments are too limited for maintaining contact 
with the media. Only a small share of local governments has a person whose 
main job is to handle media contacts. 
From a very general perspective, the available data suggest that the media are capable 
of fulﬁlling their informative function. Despite the fairly weak media coverage of local 
matters in institutional terms (e.g., the number of the local newspapers operating at 
the parish level is relatively small), there is no dramatic democratic deﬁcit revealed in 
terms of complaints. This can be explained by the relatively minor role of the smaller 
local governments, which keeps public expectations about coverage related to their 
activities low. Also, there are alternative, non-institutionalized networks that can ﬁll 
the information gap.
However, there are not much data about the other functions of local media 
(mobilization, education, local identity-building, etc.). The main problems do not seem 
to be related so much to disinterest or ignorance but to structural and institutional 
problems. The very diﬀuse structure of local governments does not ﬁt well with the 
logic of the media ﬁeld (the media system), which requires an auditory scope to make 
the operation of any channel or level technically reasonable. One response to the deﬁcit 
is the development of cooperation among smaller local governments, which will also 
facilitate the restructuring (unifying) of local governments. Progress in this area will 
support better institutionalization of local government relations with the media, by 
making possible the designation of staﬀ whose main functions are related to contacts 
with the press.
4.2 Local Civil Society Organizations
4.2.1 The Legal Status of Civic Organizations
Civil society as a sphere independent from the state was profoundly damaged during 
the Soviet occupation, more so than occurred in those states that became satellites of 
the Soviet Union. It made the restoration of civil society, as a substantial part of the 
social organization of the community, a much more demanding task in the annexed 
Baltic States than it was in the Central and East European countries. 
During the last decade there have been serious debates on the nature of civil society 
in Estonia (Laius 2002; Haamer 2003). Scholars who are interested in expanding the role 
of local governments have made attempts to utilize ideas related to Estonia’s historical 
“cooperative societies movement.” These ideas are inspired by the “social economy model” 
as a comprehensive model of community building” (Ginter 1996). According to this 
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understanding, proﬁt and nonproﬁt associations comprise a common “social sphere” 
of nongovernmental civic activism, which is able to face the pressure of market forces 
(monopolies) and to cooperate eﬀectively with the state (Leetsaar 2002). 
A minimal legal basis for the emergence of a genuine civil society (autonomous from 
the CPSU) was already established before the restoration of national independence in 
the years between 1988 and 1991. But the restoration of the national state provided a 
foundation for the development of a modern legal system (Kõve 1996). Today, a solid 
legal framework for civil society organizations (CSOs) has been established. There have 
been two main laws dealing with CSOs in Estonia since 1996: the Nonproﬁt Associations 
Act and the Foundations Act. In addition, there are separate laws for political parties, 
trade unions, churches and religious congregations, housing associations, and nonproﬁt 
organizations founded by the state. Nonproﬁt associations can be founded by any 
group consisting of at least two people; for foundations only one person is required. 
The legislation does not set limits on the scope of activities of CSOs. The accounting 
system (for civil associations) which is mainly used in Estonia today and which serves 
as a starting point for the collection of statistics originates in the demands of the 
System of National Accounts (SNA) and the European System of Accounts (ESA) 
rather than in the cognitive needs of Estonian society. The conceptualization of civil 
society organizations in local academic research is closer to the structural-functionalist 
approach, which emphasizes the type of activity and is not as interested in the structure 
of ﬁnancing as is typical of the SNA and the ESA (Lepp 2003). The concept of “third 
sector” sometimes makes it very diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate the nonproﬁt-oriented sector 
from the proﬁt associations (social economy).
Today three main types of organization comprise the bulk of civil society in Estonia: 
nonproﬁt associations, foundations, and nonproﬁt partnerships. Nonproﬁt partnerships 
are informal associations and do not have to be registered. The absence of formal legal 
status simpliﬁes their operation but limits their access to resources, their cooperation 
with other institutions, and makes them invisible for statistical purposes. Some legal 
scholars believe that to require registration in order to be a “true” association is a relic 
of the Soviet period, which exaggerated the institution of “legal persons.” However, this 
is not correct. In the Soviet period, various kinds of associations lacking formal status 
ﬂourished. From the perspective of our study, they are important because in the rural 
areas they contribute signiﬁcantly to building communal ties. 
The cooperative societies for apartments (condominiums) are quite a speciﬁc form of 
association. Their private and cooperative status makes them similar to CSOs, but with 
speciﬁc characteristics. The foundation of a condominium cooperative is not voluntary 
in the traditional sense, but is decided by a general meeting. Members of the society 
are owners of the real estate and the associations are designed to deal with actual living 
conditions and economic needs, as deﬁned by speciﬁc regulations.
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There are no oﬃcial limits on the establishment of Estonian CSOs. But Estonian 
legislators have never been especially in favor of supporting of NGOs or of creating favorable 
conditions for their operation—favoring donations, training activists, etc. (Hellam and Aru 
1996). National legislation is still undergoing a transformation with respect to utilizing 
the framework provided by local government and business. The Overview of the Status of 
Human Rights in Estonia (1999) indicates that the provisions and the implementation of 
the Nonproﬁt Associations Act prescribe bureaucratic and restrictive requirements on the 
registration and activities of CSOs that many associations are incapable of fulﬁlling. The 
NGO Sustainability Index of Estonia (2002) states that the Nonproﬁt Associations Act and 
the Foundations Act have been improved enough, since they set a clear and easy framework 
for operation and CSO registration in Estonia is uncomplicated (Stuart 2002). Nevertheless, 
it has been argued by third sector activists that registering an organization can be a diﬃcult 
task for organizations going through the process for the ﬁrst time, since there is not enough 
information available on the appropriate proceedings (Lagerspetz et al. 2003).
According to the Estonian Income Tax Act, which came into force on January 1, 
2000, nonproﬁt associations and foundations do not pay any taxes on their income. 
However, they are expected to present annual income declarations to the Tax Oﬃce and 
to pay tax for salaries and in-kind beneﬁts they oﬀer to their members or workers. 
A corporate body can make tax-exempt gifts and donations to public interest 
CSOs listed by the government in an amount not exceeding 2% of the total amount 
of the payments subject to social tax (except fringe beneﬁts). The abrogation of the 
enterprises’ income tax from January 2000 inhibits businesses from donating money 
to CSOs (Naaber and Haav 2000, 1). The maximum amount of tax-free donations has 
decreased several times, since it is now connected with the wage system instead of the 
percentage of income (Ojakivi 2001).
The list of CSOs acting in the public interest is reviewed twice a year. CSOs meeting 
the criteria can apply to be placed on it. The procedure, however, is too complicated: 
the only CSOs that are permitted on the list are those that oﬀer charitable support of 
science, culture, education, sport, health care, social welfare, environmental protection, 
the cultural autonomy of a national minority, churches, congregations, or religious 
societies in the public interest. The list does not include CSOs acting for the mutual 
beneﬁt of their members. In February 2000, the list included 840 nonproﬁt organizations 
(Siplane, Kasemets 2001).
In addition, the tax exemptions for gifts and donations do not encourage 
philanthropy, because the abrogation of the enterprises’ income tax since January 2000 
has signiﬁcantly decreased the maximum amount of tax-free donations. The majority 
of the CSOs questioned in 2002 did not mention support from Estonian companies 
or individuals as an important funding source (Lagerpetz et al. 2003).
An individual has the right to deduct gifts and donations made to listed CSOs 
during a period of taxation, to a maximum of 5% of the taxpayer’s income during that 
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period (after the allowed deductions). The changes in the Income Tax Act of January 
2002 added one more restriction to the deductions allowed on an individual’s income, 
which can inhibit individuals from donating to CSOs. Deductions connected with 
the interest on housing loans, training expenses, gifts, donations, and entrance and 
membership fees cannot exceed 100,000 EEK in total (Income Tax Act, Ch. 27 and 
Ch. 28). Also, about half of the CSOs questioned last year consider the tax exemptions 
as unfavorable to donors. However, it is important to add that many CSOs are badly 
informed about the details of the Income Tax Act. 
Late in 1999, a new initiative to create more carefully articulated legal and political 
grounds for the development of cooperation on the local level was launched by the 
NGO Center and supported by the Baltic-American Partnership Program (BAPP). The 
document, called “The Estonian Civil Society Development Conception” (2002), was 
enforced as an act on December 12, 2002. This act is expected to supply an important 
framework for developing cooperation between the state and CSOs and has produced 
a legal groundwork for the promotion of dialogue. 
Visible progress was expected after the launching of the local governmental reform 
and especially after Estonia became a member of the EU. The potential of the EU as an 
advocate for more intensive involvement of civil associations as partners and suppliers 
of ﬁnancial resources was seen as signiﬁcant and was expected to strengthen civil society 
(Raik 2002). Some initiatives have already been taken in this respect. For instance, 
areas in the periphery have enjoyed support from the regional programs of the EU. 
But there has been little interest speciﬁcally in promoting civil society. EU norms have 
encouraged the growth of trade unions and international cooperation has given more 
weight to environmental and minority associations. Unfortunately, local government 
reforms have not yet made enough progress to have a visible impact on community 
building. Attempts to promote civil society have faced deepening social polarization 
and alienation in Estonian society.
4.2.2 Density and Distribution of Civil Society Organizations
According to oﬃcial statistics, on January 1, 2003, there were 17,774 nonproﬁt 
organizations and 502 foundations operating in Estonia. According to the other source 
of data, 17,632 associations and 477 foundations were registered (ESA 2003, 268–270). 
This relatively large number also includes 9,307 cooperative societies of apartments and 
condominiums, which is around 55%–60% of all registered associations. On January 1, 
2003, around 7,900 associations (including religious congregations) were operating in 
Estonia. In terms of the distribution of associations, Estonian oﬃcial statistics are quite 
ﬂawed. More detailed data have been collected from diﬀerent statistical and Internet 
sources, but they should not be perceived as exact (Table 3.75). For the last few years, 
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there have been around 2,000 nonproﬁt associations per year. But a closer look indicates 
that behind this label of “nonproﬁt association” we can ﬁnd some with a very diﬀerent 
substance (Siplane 2002). 
Table 3.75
Nonproﬁt Associations Registered in the Business Register* 
by County and Number of Residents per Association (1994–2001)
Country/Year 1993 1998 2001
Number of 
Associations
Persons per 
Association 
Number of 
Associations
Persons per 
Association
Number of 
Associations
Persons per 
Association
Harjumaa 1,630 76 2,492 50 1,399 89
Hiiumaa 61 171 69 158 153 66
Ida-Virumaa 419 432 972 184 1,489 119
Jõgevamaa 80 501 161 237 162 230
Järvamaa 96 410 117 359 188 205
Läänemaa 116 263 264 113 470 61
Lääne-Virumaa 88 806 301 225 302 218
Põlvamaa 70 486 110 302 222 144
Pärnumaa 362 249 571 158 889 109
Raplamaa 114 342 286 132 123 303
Saaremaa 157 248 234 158 399 90
Tartumaa 626 242 841 178 1,480 106
Valgamaa 141 262 225 160 203 172
Viljandimaa 215 288 294 277 419 137
Võrumaa 66 621 140 285 344 106
Tallinn 933 431 1,734 230 4,755 83
All together 5,174 276 8,811 158 12,997 104
Note: The register of nonproﬁt associations and foundations began operations on October 1, 1996. The 
Central Business Register was formed in 1995 as a combined register of the business, nonproﬁt 
associations, and foundations registers. The register is maintained by the registry departments 
with the courts. 
Source: Eesti Maakonnad arvudes 1993–1998. Statistikaamet: Tallinn, 1998; Eesti Statistika 1999, Eesti 
Statistika, No. 6, Eesti Statistika 2002, No. 6.
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All the post-socialist states have trouble collecting relevant information on civil 
society, which in principal is rather “ﬂuid”compared to the much better institutionalized 
public and economic spheres. Estonia is no exception to this. Instead of data we have 
only a variety of expert sources from the diﬀerent years to be compared. According to 
a study conducted in 1998, there were approximately 1,500 active associations at that 
time (Lagerspetz et al. 2003) and currently, according to data from various studies, 
their general number is the same or has slightly decreased. In this study, the local civil 
servants were in the role of expert in many important respects. This “expertise“ of our 
civil servant respondents (LGS 2002) told us less about the objective number of operating 
associations in the region than about the general state of civil society. According to them, 
civil associations’ contact with LG, their “visibility,”and their performance are relatively 
or even very low. The ﬁndings indicated that the number of active and visible associations 
(i.e., associations mentioned by the respondents) is many times smaller than the number 
of registered ones (not including the cooperative societies of apartment owners). Among 
the 56 municipalities (of a total of 241) in which civil servants were not able to respond 
to the question about associations operating in their area, the respondents from 34 
municipalities (i.e., 8% of the total) denied that any active civil associations operated 
in their community. The very low number of reported active associations (around six 
per municipality) shows the marginal state of civil society. There are no relevant data 
about the number and distribution of associations per parish, although we have such 
data at the county level. 
The most transparent picture of the state of civil society as it operates through 
community-based partnerships (which remain “invisible”) can be constructed using 
Internet sources. Table 3.76 presents information about the most active and resourceful 
part of civil society.
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Table 3.76
Distribution of Associations in Diﬀerent Fields of Activity
Field of Activities and 
Approximate Number of Groups
Umbrella Associations and Superstructures
110 environmental protection 
societies
Estonian Green Movement (ﬁfteen associations) 
http://www.roheline.ee/
230 health-support 
associations 
Union of Estonian Hospitals, Union of Estonian Nurses, Union of 
Estonian Doctors
30 associations in the 
corporate sector 
Estonian Business Association, Estonian Association of Small and 
Medium Business, Estonian Association of Taxpayers 
280 education and training 
associations
Estonian Informal Adult Education Association (76 associations) 
Available at: http://www.ngonet.ee/vhl/ 
Estonian Teachers Union
Available at: http://www.ngonet.ee/db/qsel?f=042&q=3
730 leisure and hobby 
associations 
Estonian Shoot, Union of Estonian Scouts (8 associations), 
Union of Estonian Guides (6 associations)
290 philanthropic 
associations (with local clubs)
Estonian Rotary Clubs (11 clubs)
Available at: http://www.rotary.ee/teataja.gif
Estonian Red Cross (18 associations) 
Available at: http://www.redcross.ee/
Estonian Lions Clubs (40 club)
Available at: http://www.lions.ee/start.htm
160 academic and research 
associations 
Union of Estonian Lawyers Council (5 associations)
Estonian Academy of Sciences (6 associations)
Available at: http://www.aca.ee/
750 professional associations 
and trade unions 
Central Union of Estonian Trade Unions (24 Central Unions) 
Union of Estonian Fire-ﬁghters (36 associations)
100 student organizations Union of Estonian Student Bodies (26 student and university 
associations). Available at: http://www.eyl.ee/banner1.htm 
130 associations of senior 
citizens, war veterans, and 
unions of oppressed people 
Network of Estonian Senior Citizens’ Unions (41associations), 
Union of Estonian Freedom Fighters (17 assocations), Union 
Memento (12 associations), ER Union of Veterans’ Organizations 
35 political associations 
200 ethnocultural associations Estonian Union of National Minorities (28 associations)
Union of Slavonic Educational and Charitable Associations in 
Estonia (42 societies and 33 collectives)
450 religious associations Estonian Council of Churches (8 Churches), Union of Ev 
Christian and Baptist Associations (21 associations) 
 65 legal order and legal 
defence associations
Estonian Consumers’ Associations (18 associations), Estonian 
Neighbourhood Watch (21 associations), 
Children Rights Defence Union (11 associations) 
Source: Data collected from diﬀerent statistical and Internet sources (Siplane 2002).
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4.2.3 Ethnic Minority Associations 
The portion of associations that focuses on ethnic minority issues is relatively small 
and almost all of the larger minorities residing in Estonia (sometimes only a hundred 
people) have their own societies. Coordinating centers or unions of ethnically-oriented 
associations mediate between state and the interests of the minorities. A speciﬁc feature 
of postcolonial Estonia is that the associations of minorities are divided into two distinct 
groups. One consists of associations of the dominant minority group—Russians and 
other Slavs. The other network of associations supports the sustainability of smaller 
minorities, which have their own small societies. Diﬀerences in the focus and role 
of associations depend on the problems the minorities face. Since the Soviet period, 
Russians have maintained a developed cultural institutional infrastructure of schools, 
theatres, etc., in their own language. This infrastructure, which was installed for “civil 
garrison” purposes, was artiﬁcially created by the regime and it continues to operate 
and is supported by the Estonian state. This speciﬁc and privileged status of the Russian 
minority explains why the number of their cultural and educational associations is 
relatively small compared to the total number of ethnic Russians—350,000. The 
main advocates of the cultural and social interests of the smaller ethnic minorities 
are cultural societies. All associations of ethnic minorities came into being after the 
collapse of the Soviet regime. (During the Soviet period, organizing along ethnic lines 
was forbidden.) 
There are all together around 150 ethnic cultural societies, foundations, and clubs 
operating in Estonia. Associations of Russophones make up a quarter of them, and the 
rest cover the needs of the smaller minorities (Ukrainians, Tatars, Finns, etc.) (http://
www.meis.ee).
According to some other research, ethnic cultural societies belong to four diﬀerent 
federations and associations of ethnic cultural societies. For instance, 31 societies belong 
to the Estonian Federation of Associations of Ethnic Cultural Societies “Lüüra;” 22 
are in the Association of Estonian National Minorities; 42 societies and 33 collectives 
belong to the Slavic Educational and Charitable Federation in Estonia; and eighteen 
societies are in the Round Table of Ethnic Cultural Societies of Ida-Viru County, 
which is an umbrella organization for the ethnic cultural societies operating in Ida-Viru 
County. Apart from these associations and federations, around ten other ethnic cultural 
societies operate in Estonia. Several ethnic groups have three or four parallel societies 
(Byelorussians, Koreans, Tatars, etc.) (Ruutsoo and Mätlik 2001).
The identity of Estonia’s Ukrainians is reinforced by the Tallinn congregation 
of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which has 300 members. Roughly one 
thousand Armenians are united by the Estonian Saint Gregory Congregation of the 
Armenian Apostolic Church (founded in 1993). Estonian Muslims—predominantly 
Tatars, Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks—have gathered to form a united Estonian 
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Islamic Congregation, with around 1,400 members. Jews (Jews as an ethnic group are 
deﬁned on a religious basis) are divided into three congregations: the Estonian Jewish 
Congregation (with 80 families), the Tallinn Progressive Jewish Congregation (roughly 
twenty members), and the Narva Progressive Jewish Congregation (50 members). The 
Catholic Church oﬀers cultural support largely to Poles and Lithuanians residing in 
Estonia and services are held in those languages in addition to Estonian (Ruutsoo and 
Mätlik 2000).
Ethnic associations can be found in the regions, where minorities make up a 
signiﬁcant portion of the population. A very large majority of non-Estonians—around 
98%, excluding the historical religious sect of Orthodox Old-believers— reside in urban 
areas, in the capital, Tallinn, in the north-eastern towns of Narva, Sillamäe, Jõhvi, Kohtla-
Järve, and also in Tartu. Almost 95% of all associations and clubs of ethnic minorities 
and almost all non-Russian minorities are located here. Only a small number of the 
cultural associations and clubs of minorities (mainly Russian) are registered in Narva-
Jõesuu, Pärnu, Haapsalu and Valga, Tapa, and Oru. Small cultural clubs operate in Keila, 
Kallaste, and Kuressaare. The center of the ethnic association movement is Tallinn, which 
is also the headquarters for association networks. The scope of the associations of the 
Russian minority is much larger, and includes choruses, sports clubs, ensembles, student 
and professional associations, etc.). The smaller minorities have focused their activities 
on restoring their native language competencies and establishing Sunday schools for 
the younger generation. The number of minority Sunday schools is close to 50, half of 
which operate in north-eastern Estonia (Smolkova 2003).
4.2.4 Density and Scope of the Activity of Associations
Many CSOs, although belonging to umbrella organizations, nonetheless have quite 
weak links with them in practice. Only a quarter of the CSO activists interviewed 
in 2001 stated that the umbrella organizations they belonged to actively encouraged 
membership and participation and were successful in representing the interests of their 
member organizations (Lagerspetz et al. 2002).
Our study focused primarily on the experience of civil servants in terms of 
cooperation with civil associations. Their impression indicates a real position and role 
for civil associations, particularly ones that are active locally and, consequently, have a 
closer relationship with the local government. In this respect, the study shows that there 
is a role for local government in the building of the local civil community. 
The research supports the more general observation that the development of civil 
society in post-communist Estonia has been quite heavily segmented in terms of density 
of associations both at the regional and municipal levels (number of associations per 
municipality) and the level of aggregation of associations.
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Table 3.77
Division of Municipalities according to the Density of Associations [%] 
Number of Effective 
Associations per Municipality
Operating in the Municipality Operating Beyond the Borders 
of the Municipality
0 14.3 35.0
1–3 42.4 47.5
4–10 34.1 15.8
11–20 6.4 0.9
21–100 2.4 0.8 
100 and more 0.4 0.0
Source: LGS 2002.
The largest group (42.4%) is the municipalities having only one to three active civil 
associations that cooperate with local government (Table 3.77). One-third of all muni-
cipalities have between four and ten eﬀective associations. A quite special group of around 
twenty local governments (6.4%) has a relatively sophisticated network of associations. This 
type is composed mainly of smaller towns with 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants.
The share of municipalities with a relatively high density of associations (21–100) 
is much smaller (2.4%) and consists of the bigger towns. The most signiﬁcant density 
of associations is found in the towns with 10,000 or more inhabitants (Tallinn, Pärnu, 
Tartu, Narva, and Viljandi). 
Approximately one-ﬁfth of the total number of associations of all types is reported 
as active outside of the borders of the particular municipality. These data ﬁt with the 
results of some other studies, according to which approximately 80% of all associations 
were locally focused (Lagerspetz et al. 2003). 
The distribution of associations operating across a number of municipalities is very 
unequal, and the picture seems to be much more polarized and segmented than the 
distribution of municipalities according to the share of associations per municipality. 
First of all, only the bigger municipalities (towns) reported having a signiﬁcant number 
(between ten and twenty) of transmunicipal associations. The shared or multilevel 
civil community (in term of networks of unions, umbrella associations, etc.) is to 
some extent developed only in the northern regions of Estonia (mainly in Harjumaa 
county). A majority of the municipalities are quite isolated from each other in terms 
of civil networks and links. The development of state administration, especially on the 
county level, does not correspond with the integration of Estonia as a functioning civil 
society or a “citizens’ Estonia.” The development of administrative structures and local 
government has not contributed to the development of citizens’ associations. 
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When Estonian civil society is mapped in terms of density and the diﬀerent scope 
of networks of the organizations, it appears to be divided geographically into distinct 
territories or segments. The emptiest segments in both dimensions (the general number 
of associations and the share of transmunicipal associations) are located in north-eastern 
Estonia (Ida-Virumaa county). The explanation for this relies to some extent on the 
historical-cultural background of the regions. The north-eastern area is mainly populated 
by recent immigrants from Russia, so any historical connections to pre-war Estonian 
civil traditions have been almost totally broken. In southern Estonia, there are many 
municipalities that are fairly well integrated and civically developed, having a relatively 
large number of associations (e.g., Põlvamaa). But the municipalities in southern and 
central Estonia are isolated from the national civil community in terms of the absence 
of “aggregating ties”—i.e., they do not have access to the resources (organizational and 
ﬁnancial) beyond the borders of the local community. Southern Estonia (with some 
exceptions like Võrumaa, because of regional policy) tends to be a kind of “archipelago 
of civil islands” (an archipelago of municipalities with relatively numerous but isolated 
associations). This phenomenon has its roots in the impact of the civil society restoration 
strategy in the postcolonial environment. Local municipalities had been important 
centers for the organization of social life by long historical tradition and also in pre-war 
Estonia. The emergence of a big share of local associations at that level is very much 
the result of the more general “project of restitution,” which attempted to restore these 
local civil structures (associations, unions) that had been disbanded by the Soviets in the 
1940s. Quite a large portion of the associations that were organized at the parish level 
were run by senior citizens who had maintained an aﬃliation to civil society because 
of their experiences from the past. 
Restoring civil society was an important part of the project of “restitution.” But 
restoration of the whole structure of sophisticated networks was too demanding in terms 
of resources and also the amount of time that had passed. Anti-communist mobilizations 
gave birth to many initiatives, but soon after national independence was regained, and 
especially after the disbanding of kolkhozes, the state-administered agrarian sector 
collapsed. Economic depression, out-migration of the most active people, and the poor 
social and organizational skills of people in the countryside had a devastating eﬀect on 
civil society. The economic and social structures that are the foundation of a historical 
civil society—private farming, consumers unions, the cooperative movement, etc.—were 
only partially successful.
Another feature of the dynamic of civil society development is the obvious diﬀerence 
that can be seen in the regions populated mainly by Estonians. The emergence of 
associations in the northern, urbanized part of Estonia was more “hegemonic.” Progress 
here was closely related to political and economic development, which was accompanied 
by a struggle over control of society or the selling of services. A higher proportion of the 
associations operate across municipal borders; thus, they are more connected to the most 
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resourceful associations in Tallinn and the vicinity of Tallinn. Civil associations in this 
area are sponsored or have access to money delivered by the international foundations 
and partner associations (Lagerspetz et al. 2002). Along with the partnerships that some 
associations have with the local government, a lot of associations within a 50–kilometer 
radius of Tallinn operate as branches of international associations. Progress in this region 
in the development of civil society is largely top-down in character.
4.2.5 Civil Society and Access to Resources
During the last decade of transition in Estonia, a deepening polarization of communities 
has occurred and the cumulative eﬀect of this is being felt. The main factors shaping 
the development of civil society have been the following:
 1. Geographical location, with the desirable areas being closer to the northern 
coast and to the Tallinn metropolitan area and the less desirable being the 
south-eastern region, bordering on Russia;
 2. Access to a developed infrastructure (railroads, highways);
 3. Size of the local community, i.e., its human capital and economic capacity; and 
 4. Demographic structure (the share of younger and older age cohorts). 
The factors that support or hinder the development of local civil society overlap to 
a fair degree. Associations operating in the most economically developed areas enjoy 
the support of local sponsors and also have better access to international donors. In 
addition, the human and social capital (networks) that are needed for active civil life are 
both available in the economically active areas. Together these factors are the eﬀective 
“driver” of civil society and, from this perspective, the external actors (context) are more 
important than the policies exercised by local government. But some studies have shown 
that occasional factors such as highly energetic individuals can decisively contribute to 
the development of community (Raagma 1996).
Civil society in Estonia is most developed (numerous, resourceful) in the most 
resourceful areas, i.e., in the territories surrounding Tallinn, Harjumaa (Harju county), 
and Tartumaa (Tartu county). Towns and counties on the coast—Läänemaa, Saaremaa, 
Pärnumaa, and Hiiumaa counties—also have better access to international donors, 
foundations, partnerships between counties, friendship parishes, partnerships between 
religious congregations, etc., whose role in recovering civil society has been very 
important. The most marginalized areas in terms of civil society are the economically 
disadvantaged north-eastern region (including the towns of Narva, Sillamäe, and Maardu) 
and the southern region (Valgamaa, Jõgevamaa, Järvamaa, and Võrumaa counties). In 
the north-eastern region and especially in the bigger towns with scarce social capital 
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(trust, networks, and cooperation between administration and the residents) a kind of 
ghetto phenomenon has developed. 
The other areas where the local community appears to be the most disintegrated 
are the small self-government units around isolated historical rural centers and parishes 
(Table 3.78). In these communities, the most important funding sources for activities 
are membership fees and local government support. It is a paradox that in the rural 
parishes, where salaries are many times lower than in the bigger towns, the associations 
are mainly self-supported through membership fees. The explanation is quite trivial: in 
small parishes the associations are also too small for eﬀective cooperation with the local 
government and the parishes themselves have limited resources. In the towns, where 
associations are better organized (with more human resources and skilled workers for 
bookkeeping), the main partners of the associations are the local governments.
Table 3.78
Ranked Funding Sources of Civil Society Organizations by Type of Settlement
Ranking of 
the Funding 
Source
Type of Settlement Total
Big Towns Small Towns Parishes
1. Membership fees Local administration Membership fees Membership fees
2. Foreign funding Membership fees Local administration Local administration
3. Direct support 
from state
State foundation State foundation State foundation
4. Estonian business Other Estonian business Estonian business 
and foreign funding
5. Local 
administration
Sales income and 
Estonian business 
income
Other Direct support 
from state
Source: Lagerspetz, Ruutsoo, and Rikmann (2000).
 
When a county center is also the regional center and is quite resourceful (e.g., the 
southern Estonian university town of Tartu), it has an eﬀect on the general state of the 
county. Tartumaa county is relatively much better oﬀ than its neighboring counties. 
In Saaremaa, Hiiumaa, and Pärnumaa counties, which have active centers wide open 
to international contacts, tourists, and visitors looking for cheap services, the centers 
operate as pumps of resources. Networks of NGOs around the centers provide services 
to the tourists and clients from the Nordic countries, which supply important resources 
for the development of a third sector. For associations operating in the big towns, the 
local administration is the least important contributor. 
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The total number of reported cases of ﬁnancial support to associations provided by the 
municipalities was 529—a relatively small number, since it amounts to two associations 
per municipality, on average, enjoying the ﬁnancial support of local government. The 
most privileged municipalities in this respect were those with 1,000 to 4,999 residents, 
where the number per 1,000 residents was twice as high as the average. According to 
the other research, LGs are among the most important providers of ﬁnancial support, 
especially in the countryside. In small parishes without local business, the development 
of civil associations is almost entirely dependent on fees and LG support (Lagerspetz, 
Rikman, and Ruutsoo 2002). The majority of civil servants (59.8%) felt that the amount 
of ﬁnancial support supplied by oﬃcials to the civil associations was not suﬃcient and 
only 24% believed that the support was greater than the real needs. These data reveal 
a degree of ignorance in a certain portion of civil servants about the real needs of civil 
organizations and reﬂect the same general attitude of civil servants towards civil society 
that was revealed in our previous studies.
The number of CSOs providing support to the local community was not very big—
36.3% of the municipalities reported some contribution of societies in terms of either 
money or voluntary work. Given the ﬁnancial state of the associations, it can be assumed 
that voluntary work was the dominant form of assistance. A majority (around 70%) of 
the civil servants who responded felt that the support was small or negligible.
The role of civil society organizations in the provision of local services was very small. 
Civil society as a “third sector,” i.e., as a provider of services, is yet not developed. This 
explains the very small number of associations—127—that acted as contract service 
providers. Less than 5% of all services contracted out were provided by CSOs selected 
from two or more applicants. 
4.2.6 Civic Culture and Civil Society
Civic culture is a complex phenomenon that can be characterized by citizens’ accept-
ance of the authority of the state together with a general belief in the importance of 
participation in civic duties. Progress made in the development of political and civic 
culture on the national level (transparency of procedures, accountability, etc.) provides 
a general context for the development of local civic culture, since an eﬀective civic 
culture relies to an important degree on social capital (mutual trust and networks). 
Problems related to local representatives’ trust in the main national institutions has 
been discussed previously (see Table 3.60). Regional (county level) administrations 
and specialized ministries of the central administration (e.g., environmental protection, 
regional development, etc.) are ranked among those institutions that are generally 
trusted. Almost half of the members of elected bodies perceived them as trustworthy 
(only the president and courts were ranked higher). At the same time, the media and 
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political parties received low trust—23.2% and 12.3% of local representatives trusted 
them respectively. Thus, while progress has been made in the administrative culture 
in the post-Soviet environment, civil polity and civil society (the public sphere) have 
gained much less credit. 
However, there is a relatively good outlook for the development of local level 
cooperation in terms of civic culture. Local administrators and the members of 
elected bodies in general tend to trust people or believe that they can be trusted. Local 
government oﬃcials’ trust towards fellow politicians and citizens has been discussed 
previously. It was noted that 66.7% of respondents believed that most people can be 
trusted and that only in rare cases (5.2%) will people try to misuse trustful relations. 
Members of the elected bodies of the local government were less optimistic in this respect. 
However, this general attitude was not considered a black and white issue: almost 48% 
believed that abuses of trust must be discussed “case by case.” Our general impression 
is that there is a lot of potential for the development of civic culture, in terms of trust 
as a resource for successful cooperation between citizens and municipal leaders. Certain 
indicators presented in Table 3.78 (respect for the law, mutual trust between people, 
the level of conﬂict, and the ability to cooperate) have a fundamental importance for 
the building of civil society. 
As a general impression, it appears that relations between individuals at the local 
level are more friendly and cooperative than unfriendly. But a relatively low level of 
tension in the community does not contribute automatically to the level of trust. Local 
councilors have more of a tendency to distrust than to trust other people, although we 
have no detailed information about the components of trust (Table 3.79). The level of 
trust does not correlate with friendliness or with the level of respect for the law. There is 
a quite an obvious contradiction between the high level of “general” declared trust and 
trust as it is operationalized on the local level. It would seem that at the municipal level 
civic culture (a general belief in participation in civic duties) is not a matter of general 
belief but a matter of practices, i.e., case-by-case personal experiences are the basis for 
assessing the abilities of individual citizens and their organizations.
The belief expressed by almost half of the members of local councils (54.5%) that 
civil associations are reliable partners is very important information. It reveals that the 
local bodies and civil associations already have some experience of successful cooperation. 
Organized citizens are much easier partners for the civil servants than unorganized 
citizens and they have already demonstrated through their service that they can be 
trusted. This observation supports the idea that progress made in the building of civil 
society contributes to civic culture. Civil society contributes to the accumulation of 
social capital (Stolle 1998).
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Table 3.79
Local Councilors’ Views on Trust, Cooperation, and Conﬂict [%] 
The Share of Local Councilors Who … Share with the Opposite View
… perceive relations as predominantly unfriendly 20. 3 45.7
… believe that people do not respect the law 33.5 33.7
… believe that there is not trust between people 31.1 22.2
…believe that local government cannot count on the
 support of associations for its initiatives 25.9 40.7
…believe that local government cannot count on the
 support of citizens for its initiatives 54.5 19.3
Source: LRS 2002.
4.2.7 Local Governments: Partners in Dialogue with Civil Associations
Increasing the repertoire of methods or processes for “channelling” problems, enhancing 
the role of civil society, and developing cooperation through open dialogue are all 
important aspects of the democratization of Estonian society and local government. 
In this regard, civil associations have a role to play in local government–community 
relations. Our study has supplied information on:
 1. Institutionalized initiatives, i.e., regular contacts that occur in the framework 
of established structures and that are cooperative in nature; and
 2. Spontaneous and noninstitutionalized interactions (demonstrations, public 
actions, and legal claims). 
Partnerships or forms of contact that are informal or noninstitutionalized play a role 
in civic culture in the sense that they contribute to a “culture of social activism.” That 
is, regular public dialogue and the practices of advocacy and protest are an important 
part of social communication and community life. 
The civil initiatives reported by the respondents were described as emerging in 335 
diﬀerent forms. (The number of substantial civil initiatives was smaller because a lot of 
them were “complex” in terms of utilizing diﬀerent methods).
The number of public actions reported was quite small—27 demonstrations and 91 
petitions. Collecting signatures was popular in the medium sized municipalities (more 
than half were reported in municipalities with between 2,000 and 4,999 residents). There 
were 68 public challenges of LG decisions and 92 cases of interest groups contacting 
local leaders to discuss burning issues. About one-third of all initiatives involved the use 
of cooperative means to address issues and around 60% involved open challenges. In 31 
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cases citizens challenged LG decisions in the courts. A relatively big share of initiatives 
(about 25%) took the form of public protest actions. It should be noted that in Estonia 
there is no tradition of powerful civil action or of orchestrated talks to resolve issues. 
The data collected suggested that the relationship between the LGs and civil society 
was quite fragile and consisted of an unsystematic set of occasional initiatives. Only in 
a few cases can we assume that a larger process of dialogue was launched. Some eﬀorts 
were made to institutionalize and regularize opportunities for dialogue, but mainly it 
took the form of an occasional set of events. The most socially institutionalized form 
of addressing issues was petitioning (as a public, organized, collective activity). Using 
data collected from newspapers, we can conclude that the majority of initiatives was ad 
hoc in character and developed on a case-by-case basis. 
The fact that popular, spontaneous, civil initiatives were launched along with ones 
that followed more or less formal procedures informs us about the problems faced in the 
building of local democracy. But the fact that quite a large share of issues came before 
the courts is evidence of the progress that has been made in local political culture.
Local government oﬃcials’ assessment of the relation between civil society 
associations and local government is illuminating. According to the civil servants, the 
number of issues brought forward by civil initiatives to inﬂuence the decisions of local 
government was not signiﬁcant (see Table 3.66). With respect to institutionalized 
and noninstitutionalized techniques for expressing the interests of citizens, the more 
formalized, institutionalized ones prevailed in the repertoire of activities of citizens (the 
diﬀerent ways of having contact). 
Among the range of public and noninstitutionalized challenges of LG (by 
demonstrations, petitions, etc.), applying to civil associations or alerting the media 
were not the most popular means to make an impact on the performance of the LG. 
Participating in the sessions and applying to factions were also not popular activities. In 
terms of dominant methods or approaches, there was not a big diﬀerence between towns 
and parishes. In the towns (both larger and smaller ones) a more frequent method was 
to approach the media, which indicates that in these municipalities the public sphere 
is more closely integrated with local aﬀairs. But civil associations are not perceived as a 
resource (organizational capital) that could be used for raising issues. One explanation 
for this is that public interest-oriented civil associations, which are the ones that could 
serve this purpose, are rarely available.
A small number reported that challenges to the decisions of LG cannot be interpreted 
as a problem of the regime, but are simply matters of civic culture. Along with the 
weakness of the side of civil society that advocates on issues related to the environment, 
unemployment, and citizens’ and minority rights, is the negative attitude of the Estonian 
right-wing mainstream media towards popular protest. These media express the view 
that in “developed” or modern democracy there is no need for extra-institutional 
activities. Popular actions are usually stigmatized by the press as unconstructive or 
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not socially representative. The marginal position of associations as organizers of these 
actions—only 15% of actions were organized by civil associations and 11% by groups of 
citizens—signals that the role of “established” civil society in initiating civil initiatives is 
marginal. According to the study, in one-third of all actions (84 cases) private individuals 
were the main initiators.
Civil servants in general are not in favor of spontaneous (noninstitutionalized) public 
civil actions and perceive them to be only partly eﬀective in terms of promoting the shared 
interests of the community. The civil servants are least positive about demonstrations—
only 22.5% say that demonstrations are to some extent a productive method. They are 
more positive about collecting signatures (60.1%) and making contacts with LG leaders 
(93.8%). That is, they prefer the least public way of raising issues, which leaves them 
in a privileged position as the dominant player. Therefore, raising issues publicly in a 
“noisy” way can be interpreted as an extra resource of citizens. 
Civil servants are also not in favor of legal challenges to LG in the courts and 62% 
think such challenges produce more damage than contribute to development. This 
kind of attitude could have two sources. Firstly, all legal procedures consume time and 
energy and tend to harm the eﬃcacy of any institution. Secondly, the negative attitude 
toward legal claims may be a carry-over from the mentality of the Soviet period, when 
resorting to legal means was not considered a proper solution. 
Civil servants’ general opinion of contacts between LG and civil society organizations 
is quite positive. Almost half of them (46%) believe that the developed organizational 
capital contributes to the positive role of civil associations, 50% think that commu-
nication with the associations is easier, and 65% say it helps them to understand local 
needs. The share of civil servants who strongly believe that civil initiatives and contacts 
also help in the assessment of LG performance was smaller, but the share with a generally 
positive view was large (49%). They were positive about the contribution of shared 
belonging with respect to ﬁnancing of associations (60.2%), but remained rather sceptical 
about the strategy to develop the “third sector,”i.e., paying associations from the local 
budget to provide services. Only 29.5% of respondents shared this vision.
4.2.8 The Impact of Civil Society in Shaping the Decisions 
  of Local Government Institutions
From the perspective of local public life, it is obvious that the master of the local 
municipality is its body and administration. Their role as the key elements in decision-
making was taken as fact by the civil servants. Both the civil servants and the local 
councilors considered the role of other public actors to be much less signiﬁcant.
 Figure 3.28 indicates that, despite the diﬀerences in the vision of civil servants 
and local councilors, their perceptions are very similar. In total terms, all civil actors 
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selected on the list had medium success in shaping local policies. Although it is diﬃcult 
to point to an obvious dominant actor among the public actors, business and political 
organizations are seen as the most inﬂuential. 
The most eﬀective actors on the parish level—passionaires—were the individual 
citizens and business. In cities the most eﬀective actor was business, but the role of the 
trade unions and media cannot be ignored. The biggest diﬀerences between countryside 
and towns were in the impact of business and political party branches, but also of 
interested citizens. Business is marginal on the parish level, but local party branches 
are relatively more eﬀective in the urban environment. The church has almost lost the 
authoritative role it had at the beginning of the 1990s; it had not been a key element of 
civil society previously and the increase in its importance was exceptional. In general, the 
structures that build civil society (the church, trade unions, and voluntary associations) 
made some impact in towns and played a much more marginal role in the countryside. 
In local community life they are in the background.
We discussed the impact of external constituents on LG decisions and the decision-
making process previously in this chapter. When asked about problems, civil servants did 
not so much identify pressures from “outside” (from enterprises and civil organizations, 
i.e., organized pressure), but rather the passivity of local residents in advancing their 
own interest at the local level (mean of 4.35; see Table 3.66). In the towns, business, the 
elite, and associations were many times more active. But in very general terms there is 
no single actor that could be identiﬁed as “hegemonic.” Civil society associations were 
the most passive as a pressure group, which is explained by the small proportion of 
interest-oriented associations among associations (Lagerspetz et al. 2003). 
The most inﬂuential actors in municipalities were mayors, committees, and factions 
of LG (see Figure 3.10). In towns, the relative importance of the factions was considerably 
higher (49% of civil servants shared this view). In the countryside, the head of LG was 
considered a main “mover” (53.8% of servants shared this view). But the most inﬂuential 
actor/authority in both cities and parishes was perceived to be the mayor.
From this perspective, LG in Estonia is not yet developed as a modern institution—the 
public sphere and civil society are not “partners” of the municipality. The administration of 
municipalities is relatively impervious to inﬂuence and public servants dominate local life. 
One of the normative preconditions for more eﬀective cooperation between civil 
societies and LG is that certain rules and procedures for involvement are developed. 
On the procedural level, civil society organizations were involved only occasionally. In 
39.9% of LGs (mainly parishes), civil associations did not participate as experts in the 
preparation of decisions and in more than in two-thirds of LGs, no written proposals 
were submitted by civil associations to the local administration. Representatives of civil 
society were reported to be actively involved in decision-making in 183 cases. 
Discussions of the local budget are an area where civil society appears to have a limited 
involvement in public matters. Less than one-third (29%) of respondents mentioned 
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that representatives of civil associations were attracted to the discussion on the budget 
(see Figure 9.3). Although this number is very low, it may inform us as much about 
the openness of local governments as about the capacity of civil society. The question 
focussed on the inclination of local governments to involve NGOs. Public hearings 
on the budget were organized by only 14.6% of local governments and almost 90% 
of respondents mentioned the participation of interested persons in these discussions. 
Questions remain about the deﬁnition of “interested persons,” but the results indicate 
that there was public access to the decision-making of the local administration. 
Despite their limited experience with such involvement, civil servants were almost 
positive about the contribution of civil associations to the work of LG—19.3% were 
very positive, 29% less positive (oﬀering conditional approval of participation), and 
23.2% were selectively positive. A very small group of civil servants, 3.1% all together, 
did not welcome the participation of civil associations. 
The results of our study lead to the following observations on the relationship of 
civil society and LG: 
 1. Modern civil society as a real actor and partner of LG is not yet ﬁrmly established 
in Estonia. Only in some economically and politically more modernized regions 
(the northern regions) are associations numerous and resourceful enough to be 
perceived as potential partners or challengers to LG;
 2. LG has not demonstrated a substantial interest in cooperation with associations 
and any cooperation that does exist has remained casual and occasional. 
Procedures have not been established to facilitate contact and cooperation 
between civil associations and LG. 
 3. The important potential of civil society, as public interest associations and 
the “third sector” to which LG could contract out services, is still relatively 
unrealized.
The economic and social development of Estonia has been based on the minimal 
state model, in which civil society is primarily a provider of services. However, the 
integration of the Baltic states into EU structures will raise questions about the adequacy 
of this model for a modern democracy. 
4.2.9 Conclusion
Relations between community and LG in post-communist Estonia have been shaped by 
policy predominantly inﬂuenced by a neoliberal discourse that links successful transition 
to free market forces and a decrease in the role of the state and local government. In the 
general design of nation-building and community-building, support for the promotion 
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of civil society has been minimal. The elitist democratic model, which utilized ideas 
about an “exceptional period” in the transition, did not perceive trade unions and civil 
society as partners. A temporary rise in the authority of the Church was a politically 
motivated move—religious feelings were mobilized as part of the anti-communist 
revolution. Civil society was deﬁned by ruling parties in terms of its value as a “third 
sector,” i.e., as a service-selling sector, intended to replace services previously delivered 
by a welfare state. Eﬀorts to restore the historical system of local governments came into 
conﬂict with the logic of an administrative system that had been developed during the 
years of Soviet occupation. 
The capacity of almost every local civil association and the role of media was largely 
shaped by the macro-level environment, including factors such as the type of local 
community (urban or rural), available human capital and social stratiﬁcation (economic 
development), regional belonging, openness to the richer Nordic neighbours, proximity 
to Tallinn, and ethnic composition. Estonia’s “centre” and “periphery” are deﬁned not 
only by geographic factors (regions), but also in terms of ethnicity and the urban/rural 
divide. The overall capacity of local governments has been diminished by the division 
of Estonia into the metropolitan center (Tallinn and the surrounding Harju county) 
and the marginalized peripheral regions. In terms of a shared national civil society, this 
division has been accompanied by the substantial political exclusion of municipalities 
from the policymaking process, which takes place predominantly in Tallinn and within 
the close circles of governing political parties and leaders of large economic corporations. 
The residents of peripheral communities and especially small rural communities are 
much less organized than business groups (active trade unions in the periphery are rare 
exceptions). The potential for them to inﬂuence the self-government of municipalities 
is limited by the habit of rural associations to act mainly locally, the limited scope of 
their links to the center, the poor public space, and the scarce access to national and 
supranational civil structures and organizational resources. 
A second major impact on the performance of LG, especially in the countryside 
(where a huge majority of municipalities is situated), has been the fragmentation of 
residents into a loose assembly of actors (businesses, civil associations, and political 
parties) without the development of an eﬀective, integrative set of civil, communicative 
(public sphere), and political networks. In economic and organizational terms, rural LGs 
are often almost entirely without resources. Local government interest in cooperating 
with civil associations has been restricted by ignorance on the part of civil servants. But 
the latter, lacking both appropriate training and ﬁnancial support, have not been able 
to rebuild strategies and acquire new skills. In addition, associations have lost much 
human capital to the larger centers in the last ten years. 
Thirdly, while a strong middle class is the necessary backdrop for a strong civil 
society, Estonia displays an imbalance among its main social strata. The economically 
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well-oﬀ minority (business people, big farmers, and commercial entrepreneurs), together 
with the comparatively secure employees of state and public services organizations, 
have built an eﬀective network of “producers clubs,” taxpayers associations, etc., which 
also operate at the national level. By contrast, 20% to 25% of the population—casual 
laborers, low-paid agricultural and forestry sector workers, small subsistence farmers, 
and the rural unemployed—is systematically discouraged by economic deprivation and 
social isolation from building trade unions or advocacy associations (environmental, 
minority, consumer protection, etc.).
The division of residents into strong and weak actors (“winners” and “losers”) became 
dramatic by the turn of the millennium. While strong actors have both the resources 
and the established organizations needed to promote their interests at the LG level, the 
weak actors usually lack comparable organizational and intellectual resources. They lack 
social connections and are excluded from political participation. The leading political 
parties promote ultra-liberal or liberal ideas and it is relatively easy to ignore the claims 
of weak associations with no political “advocates” and weak grounds for support in the 
context of the mainstream approach, according to which civil associations must ﬁnance 
their activities themselves. 
Fourthly, the understanding of civil society as primarily a service-selling “third 
sector” has little meaning in the non-urban areas that lack a developed market with 
qualiﬁed sellers and enough wealthy buyers of services. A speciﬁc form of this “two-
tiered Estonia” also operates at the local government level, when urban people take 
up residence in the countryside and commute to work in neighbouring cities, buying 
services there, communicating internally, and constituting an extraterritorial elite that 
inﬂuences local authority decisions. This has been occuring particularly in the regions 
around Tallinn and some coastal areas. Although these people live within the territory 
of a local government, they have limited contact with the local communities. Their 
interests are mainly residential-oriented and it is diﬃcult at this point to assess the 
impact they may have on local life. 
With the turn of the millennium, changes in the nature of public discourse 
have become apparent. The new “rhetoric” envisages the participatory involvement 
of communities, NGOs, and local action groups in the process of designing and 
implementing various development strategies, plans, projects, and interventions. There 
is national agreement that civil society should have an active role in promoting local 
development, tackling social problems, alleviating poverty, promoting social integration, 
and engaging citizens in territorial planning. The innovative nature of public debate and 
discussion around these issues is evidenced by the emergence of two parallel discourses: 
that of citizen engagement and participation in the development of the third sector and 
the discourse of partnerships.
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4.3 Political Culture and the Shaping of Modern Citizenship
“Citizenship,” considered as membership in a modern society, also refers to the complex 
quality of individuals. In the newly free Baltic states, citizenship was primarily regarded 
as a legal construct deﬁning a person’s political membership, i.e., nationality. This “thin” 
conceptualization of citizenship (linked to the representative democracy model) ignores 
the more complex interpretation associated with a strong democracy model (Bader 1995, 
211), and it has a number of historical roots.
First, despite their anti-communist stance, Estonian nationalists inherited from 
Marxist doctrine a romantic idea—fed by the vision of national identity—that political 
activism and social commitment are natural attributes of the individual. They believed 
that these qualities had merely been temporarily suppressed by the bureaucratic state-
socialist system (in the Baltic case exercised by the occupation regime).
Second, post-communist political philosophy followed Rousseau’s lead in abstracting 
the classical civil ethos from the practical perquisites of the criterion of good citizenship. 
In its obsession with the status of citizenship, it characteristically neglected the positive 
social construction of the persona of the citizen, both as an historical process and as 
social fact. 
Third, the restitution project to rebuild the nation focused on political citizenship, 
which excluded those immigrants who had arrived during the Soviet period. The potential 
damage that this form of exclusion would cause to the socialization, identity-building, 
and self-esteem of noncitizens was not considered important compared to the political 
gains that were the real priority. 
Fourth, the idea of a citizens’ state, which had constitutive value for the promoters 
of the minimal state concept, underlined values related to “negative freedom” and 
collectivist attitudes that had fallen into disfavor.
The concept of a citizens’ state, which mitigated the more communitarian civil 
society approach, became the dominant or mainstream discourse for a decade. Social 
citizenship was largely compromised by its links to communism and the mode of 
collective consumption. 
Consequently, the institutionalization of community membership faced serious 
problems, as it was imagined that merely establishing the legal and administrative 
framework would be suﬃcient. Not surprisingly, civil and political disengagement, 
reﬂected in low participation rates in elections and a general disinterest in public aﬀairs, 
is increasing. 
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4.3.1 Political Interest and Knowledge
Community-building at the municipal level is an essential laboratory for the development 
of civic culture and the emergence of a modern type of citizenship. In the post-Soviet 
environment and in the Baltic context, Estonia is becoming a socially and culturally 
distinct entity, which, in many aspects of its political and cultural development, is 
somewhere between Central and Eastern Europe and Scandinavia (Lauristin 1997, 
25–40). The “Singing Revolution” (1988–1991) produced a speciﬁc kind of citizenship 
typical of the post-socialist “elite democracy,” in which politics was highly ideological 
and mythologized. The restoration of independence began the process of shaping a 
new modern citizenship. But Estonia’s national and liberal state project rejects the 
development of a regime in which all former Soviet subjects could become citizens. 
One-third of Estonian residents today are citizens of Russia or have “alien” passports. 
The idea of developing a framework in which the intellectual and political elites 
would no longer be the sole political actors was replaced by the hegemonization of the 
economic elite, which has made networks of managers and so-called “taxpayers clubs” 
the main polity. The ultraliberal, Friedman-minded economic elite rejected the notion 
that political citizenship should be extended to the entire nation. Elitist citizenship that 
oﬀers privileged access to education and resources has made progress and the share of 
Estonians who enjoy participatory citizenship has been diminished. 
In terms of perceived citizenship, it is hard to describe Estonia as a homogeneous 
space. Historically, Estonia was a peasant nation and those who reside in the countryside 
share a “peasant citizenship” and a particular sense of identity. In these areas, the 
disposition towards self-government and parliamentarism is more republican than in the 
part of Estonia that is relatively more sovietized and dominated by the Russian-speaking, 
working class minority. New layers of modern or quasi-modern civil servants have been 
trained and even dominate already in some levels of self-government in Tallinn and in 
some towns on the western coast (Kuressaare, Pärnu). Some areas, such as north-eastern 
Estonia, are dominated by non-Estonians and governed in a manner that was shaped by 
the “hardboiled” administrators in the Soviet garrison-towns (Sillamäe, Paldiski), who 
had been strongly instructed in “Soviet citizenship.” Cadres here are shaped by party 
workers and retired military personnel from the Soviet era, who have found partners 
in corrupt local managers.
The general situation and processes at the national level form the background to 
the shaping of local or regional citizenship at the parish, town, or county level. Thus, 
the following features can be observed:
 1. Declining trust in political institutions and traditional forms of politics, e.g., 
elections and political parties;
 2. Declining identiﬁcation with localities and the redeﬁning of region and nation 
in a postimperial context; 
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 3. The fragmentation of many traditional communities (townships, villages); and
 4. The increasing social and economic polarization of society.
Governance is about reshaping institutions to be more responsive and open; at the 
same time, a key aim of recent reform policy in Estonia (municipal reform and eﬀorts to 
promote and strengthen civil society) has been to “remoralize” citizens, i.e., to convince 
them to take a more active and socially responsible attitude as citizens. This underlies 
much welfare reform, which is designed to encourage a much more participative 
approach. It is focused on regenerating community spirit through community 
development, neighborhood renewal, more voluntary participation, and so forth. This 
aspect is particularly directed at the problems of social exclusion. But active citizenship 
is also sought in politics, with more positive participation in political institutions (old 
and new, at the European, national, and local levels), and so forth.
4.3.2 Political Eﬃcacy
A central task of local government reform was the reconstruction of Estonian society 
from below. Local government is not only an arena where civil society seeks to construct 
organs of the self-governing republic, but it also is the focus of a fundamental shift in 
the center of gravity of social life. The aim was to transfer the organization and focus 
of everyday life from the workplace or business to the residential milieu. If, in the ﬁrst 
part of the last decade, it was essential to break with the fundamental characteristic of 
“real socialism” (the separation of the public and private spheres), today the important 
task is the emancipation of individuals from fetishized market forces. 
In the context of local government (national-level politics have more abstract, 
ideological forms), citizenship formation takes place as an “instituted process,” i.e., 
citizenship is displayed as a set of institutionally embedded social practices (Somers 1993, 
589) in the local political context. These practices are contingent upon and constituted 
by networks of relationships and political idioms that stress membership and universal 
rights and duties in the national and local communities. 
Grappling with the problem of how citizenship can be constituted as an instituted 
process requires us to ask questions such as: To what degree do citizens feel they are able 
to understand local political issues? To what extent do citizens share the feeling that 
they can have an inﬂuence on local political issues? It is hard to answer these questions 
using the data produced in the framework of the ﬁeld research (survey). Therefore, we 
will use collected material and data from diﬀerent sources for this purpose. 
In the autumn of 2001, the Estonian government conducted a survey in which people 
were asked about their feelings towards the authorities (N=1450). The results showed 
that they felt much more conﬁdent and optimistic with respect to the local government 
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than the national government. They also felt more optimistic about their capacity to 
aﬀect the running of local matters and to have an inﬂuence on local government and 
on local administration. 
Table 3.80
Citizens’ Beliefs about Their Capacity to Inﬂuence Political Issues [%]
Level To What Extent Estonians Non-Estonians All
Activities of local 
administration 
(at the town and parish level)
Very much 1 1 1
Somewhat 39 24 33
Not at all 60 75 66
Activities of local government 
(at the town and parish level)
Very much 1 1 1
Somewhat 35 20 29
Not at all 64 79 70
Activities of government at 
the national level
Very much 0 1 1
Somewhat 12 6 10
Not at all 88 93 90
Activities of parliament Very much 1 1 1
Somewhat 8 5 7
Not at all  91 95 92
Source: Saarts 2002, 96.
The survey results conﬁrm the logistical challenges to citizen engagement posed by 
distance and number. Both the national and local level bodies are democratically created 
and open to the public criticism. Since access to the local administration is an important 
element of participatory democracy at the community level, it has a signiﬁcant role to 
play in legitimating the regime. Improving citizens’ conﬁdence in the institutions is 
essential in the struggle against alienation and, from this perspective, the planned reform 
of local government, which aims to merge small parishes to a substantial extent, may 
endanger political stability in Estonia. 
Compared to the old consolidated democracies (e.g., the Nordic countries), 
Estonia has a very low level of citizens’ conﬁdence in their own capacity to inﬂuence 
local government and its institutions—only 10% believe they can aﬀect policymaking 
at the national level. Unlike in the consolidated democracies, a large gap exists in the 
relative accessibility of Estonian LG and the national government or parliament to 
ordinary citizens. It is true that the old democracies face similar challenges of geography 
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and population. But there appears to be a missing link in the articulation of Estonian 
society and its structures. Woolcock (1998) has noted that an important ingredient of 
social capital is the “links” that add cohesion to civil organizations and facilitate the 
development of “subsidiary institutions.” The presence of subsidiary institutions—
“complex network[s] of voluntary organizations that function on a local level to meet the 
material participatory needs of citizens” (Le Roy 1995, 298)—is essential as a means of 
articulating the policy interests and opinions of citizens as actors in the decision-making 
process and of integrating the larger political units into their respective constituencies. 
The local element of these institutions helps to tie national organizations to their local 
constituency. In many countries, especially in the Nordic countries, organizations such 
as labor unions, churches, agricultural cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, business 
organizations, environment protection associations, etc., have a local responsibility to 
their members in addition to an interest in national politics. In Estonia, only taxpayers’ 
associations are eﬀective in this way; other organizations do not have the capacity to 
fulﬁll their subsidiary function. 
The poor performance of civil society compared to the public and business sectors 
has provoked some Estonian scholars to advocate for the development of a kind of 
“corporative democracy,” with subsidiary organizations creating the necessary “links” 
(Leetsaar 2003). Historically, such associations or organizations have provided for 
collective needs in the workplace and marketplace, while articulating their policy 
demands through corporatist channels. But as Leroy notes: “To interpret these subsidiary 
organizations’ social function mainly in terms of corporatist activity in nationalist 
politics overlooks their complex role in civil society as agents of democratic participation, 
education, mobilization, and obligation at the grassroots level” (1995, 299). There are 
good grounds for believing that subsidiary organizations may contribute to democratic 
citizenship in countries with a strong political culture, but in the post-communist 
countries with a weak political culture the corporative element will take the upper hand 
over the grassroots level. 
The notable diﬀerence between Estonians and non-Estonians in their expectations 
about their aﬀect on policymaking at the national level that was revealed in this study 
has its roots in the postimperial citizenship policy of the nationalizing state. But at the 
local level these diﬀerences can be only partly connected with formal rights, since all 
permanent residents are eligible to vote at the local government level. A more appropriate 
explanation lies in the much weaker civil organization of the non-Estonian ethnic 
groups.
Non-Estonians report more frequently on their limited access to the oﬃcials and 
public structures, which hinders them from promoting civil initiatives. Extending the 
right to vote to noncitizens (permanent residents), which is exceptional in the context of 
international practice, encouraged them to participate in their work via institutionalized 
forms of performance. Thus, 64% of Estonian and 46% of non-Estonian local oﬃcials 
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reported positively in 2000 about the opportunity of citizens to inﬂuence the decision-
making process. But a deﬁcit of civic assertiveness and organizational culture makes non-
Estonians much less eﬀective. Only 9% of non-Estonian respondents were optimistic 
about the impact of the citizens’ movement on local government aﬀairs, compared with 
32% of the Estonian respondents (Democracy 2001, 21). These and other observations 
testify to the signiﬁcant alienation of non-Estonians from local democracy. 
This kind of alienation also leads to social problems, such as the emergence of 
an “uncivilized civil society” (in the discourse of the majority) as a sub-community, 
consisting mainly of non-Estonians. As yet, there has been little or no research into 
these subcommunities; however, they are considered to have much higher crime rates, to 
foster networks of organized crime and illegal small businesses, etc. This situation is an 
indication of the devastating eﬀects of the deﬁcit of participatory democracy and civic 
culture in the north-eastern region, Maardu, and some subregions of Tallinn, which are 
populated mainly by non-Estonians.
The results of this study are supported by other ﬁndings that revealed a big gap 
between Estonians and non-Estonians in terms of their integration into civil society 
through membership in diﬀerent associations (Ruutsoo 2002) and their access to diﬀerent 
types of networks. That is, there are striking diﬀerences between two communities 
in terms of social capital (Heidmets and Lauristin 2000, 348–350). The studies also 
support the general observation made in various countries that the diminishment of 
social capital negatively aﬀects trust in local institutions and the belief that people are 
able to aﬀect their performance (Saarts 2000). 
4.3.3 Local Solidarity and Identity
In the sociological sense, citizenship also refers to social identity or social membership, a 
feeling of identiﬁcation with local groups, or the acknowledgement of being a member 
of a given community or even a member of a particular group (La Torre 1995, 113). As 
such, citizenship practices are a source of social, communal, and political identity. But 
the translation of these identities into a positive citizenship identity depends entirely 
on the context of activation. What has been called the “culture of diﬀerence” triggers 
a weaker solidarity everywhere. Within modern ideologies, social identity and social 
solidarity seem to conﬂict with each other on principle (Donati 1995, 299). If this is 
a general trend, then it raises issues about the new solidarities in the post-communist 
world. At the theoretical level there have been promising observations that a new societal 
semantics has taken a root. Donati explains:
In and through it, citizenship appears as a relational set of rights and duties of 
individuals and social groups, arranging civic life into a number of ‘universalistic societal 
autonomies’ capable of reconciling collective goals and self-management practices, 
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solidarity and identity issues. This is the challenge: to ﬁnd a way out towards a new 
balance between social solidarity and social identities. The name of this new game 
is ‘societal citizenship’ or citizenship of social autonomies, including regional ones 
(1995, 313).
The development of societal citizenship is both relevant and urgent for Estonia, i.e., 
progress towards creating the ties, networks, and identities that bind people within and 
to their society. But eﬀorts in this regard in Estonia must take into account its particular 
context, deﬁned by conﬂicts rooted in post-socialist and also postimperial realities. 
One of the most important constitutive layers of residents in the development of 
societal citizenship is the members of the local bodies. This group is not representative 
of the “average” Estonian. Their attitudes and identity structure are those of a local elite, 
which has the capacity to operate as patriots in their residential area and to produce 
subsidiary “links.” To some extent our study supports and in other respects challenges 
previous ﬁndings. Our results do not always reﬂect the linear and regular results that 
are usually observed in research on LG, e.g., that the smaller the group or territory, the 
bigger the share of oﬃcials identifying themselves as members of the group (Democracy 
2001). If we divide the attachment of the local government elite into three levels—strong, 
medium, and weak attachment—we can see that this division corresponds with levels in 
the spatial dimension of territory or area: local, regional-national, and supra-national. 
Table 3.81
Local Oﬃcials’ Level of Attachment to Diﬀerent Identities [%]
Attachment Level Strong and Very Strong Weak and Very Weak
Area of residence 74.2 0.5
Parish/hometown 61.8 1.8
Region 54.2 3.2
Estonia as a whole 58.4 1.8
Europe 10.6 19.9
World as a whole 12.7 27.0
Source: LGS 2002.
There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the attachment felt toward the regional, parish, 
or national level of community among the local oﬃcials. However, the attachment of 
oﬃcials to their area of primary residence is relatively higher and in the rural areas very 
high. Their attachment to the primary level of local government is not as important. 
This gives some indication of the devastating impact of the Soviet regime on the basic 
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elements of traditional community-building. People are attached to their residential 
area, their primary community (as Lebenswelt or life world), because of personal, life-
historical, and communal reasons. The larger units (parishes), which had a fundamental 
meaning in the identity-building of residents in the years of the First Republic, have not 
restored their role and their meaning (the success of individuals is not as strongly related 
to the progress made at this level of community). The parish or county has largely lost 
its value as an historical or economic entity and the oﬃcials’ plan for a fundamental 
shift that would create a new center of gravity of societal organization (the consolidation 
of LG) has in sociological terms not made any signiﬁcant progress. This is despite the 
fact that 84% of those involved in building the local bodies are long-time inhabitants 
who have resided ﬁfteen or more years in the parish or hometown and only 1.4% have 
resided there less than three years. 
The traditional identity structure—in which the smaller and more peripheral the 
place of residence, the stronger the attachment—is a more complex phenomenon than 
is normally expected. According to our ﬁndings, the inﬂuence of smaller residential 
areas or localities overlaps with other indicators, such as: a longer period of time 
members of oﬃcial bodies have spent in the place they were elected, a more limited 
competence in foreign languages, a less frequent use of the Internet (more limited 
access), and a lower economic status. It can be said that economic, informational, and 
cultural marginalization contribute to the creation of a substructure of local patriotism, 
sometimes with parochial tendencies (Ruutsoo 2002). 
 According to the LRS ﬁndings, the identity of Estonian oﬃcials residing in the small 
parishes is the most homogenous and solid. They are devoted patriots of their parish, 
(attachment over 90%), have a high attachment to the region (over 85%), and a strong 
identiﬁcation with their country (around 65%). Their attachment to Europe and world 
aﬀairs is weak (10%). The identity of local oﬃcials in Tallinn is more complex. Their 
attachment to Europe is the most developed, with about one-third of all respondents 
(both Estonians and non-Estonians) declaring their attachment to Europe. In the smaller 
towns, the “ensemble of identities” of the oﬃcials is more locally focused— they mainly 
display a locally, regionally, or nationally oriented set of identities. There is an observable 
regularity in identity related to the generations. The bigger the share of young members 
in the elected bodies of the towns (30 to 40 years of age), the more positive and more 
attached to Europe they are.
A speciﬁc dimension of identity-building of residents is ethnicity (non-Estonians 
citizens of the Estonian Republic). Along with the big changes in the identity structure of 
Estonians in the last ﬁfteen years, there has been an even bigger restructuring of identity 
among non-Estonians. Minor changes are visible in identity at the local/residential level, 
but at the regional and national levels identity is crucially intertwined with the political, 
military, and economic integration of Estonia into Europe and other transnational 
structures (Kirch 1998).
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Our study revealed that around 6% of elected oﬃcials is non-Estonian. This ﬁgure is 
ﬁve-six times lower than the percentage of non-Estonians among eligible voters. It appears 
that on the national level non-Estonians tend to vote for Estonians. One explanation for 
this is the fact that the non-Estonian postimperial elite is still very weak. The identity 
proﬁle of non-Estonian members of local governments is also much diﬀerent from the 
Estonians’ proﬁle. The attachment of non-Estonians (with Estonian citizenship) to 
the area where they reside is considerably lower than that of the ethnic Estonians. The 
majority of them have resided for a much shorter period of time on the territory of their 
respective municipalities (but this fact only partially explains the diﬀerence).
Our ﬁndings ﬁt well with results of data gathered in the framework of DLG projects, 
which also questioned the oﬃcials of local governments (Democracy 2001). Compared 
to the ethnic Estonians and Estonian citizens, non-Estonians and Estonian citizens 
perceived themselves twice as much to be citizens of the world (attached to the world). 
It should be noted that these data also speak to attachments to Russia as world, although 
Russia was not speciﬁed in the questionnaire. 
Table 3.82
Local Leaders’ Identiﬁcation with Diﬀerent Levels of Community [%]
Level of Community Total Estonians Non-Estonians
Locality or town where you live 78 82 63
Region of country where you live 46 53 21
Your country as a whole 55 59 42
Baltic group of countries 11 12 7
Europe as a whole 23 21 33
The world as a whole 24 21 37
Source: LGS 2002.
The high level of identiﬁcation that non-Estonians feel with Europe and the world 
is a reﬂection of the identity crisis and reorientation of the Russian-speaking population. 
The reestablishment of Estonian independence in 1991 meant a crucial change in status 
for non-Estonians: from the dominant group that represented an imperial nation to 
a minority in a small nation state. In addition, due to poor Estonian language skills, 
a higher unemployment rate, involuntary job shifts, etc., non-Estonians experienced 
greater disappointment and uncertainty. European institutions have long been advocates 
for the rights of non-Estonians. Thus, the reorientation from a Russian to a European 
or even to a world identity has an ideological basis more than anything else.
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4.3.4 Legitimacy of the Administrative and Political System
In formal terms, a democratic system of governance has basically been installed and is 
taking hold in Estonia. However, the basic elements that sustain the legitimacy of the 
political and administrative system—both the objective characteristics of the system 
(regime) and the subjective positioning of the individuals—are not yet supported with 
a new civil and political culture. The legitimacy of the established regime is derived 
from social acceptance and appropriateness as judged by reference to certain norms to 
which people more or less actively assent. A new system of social, political, and civic 
norms has developed, which will become more cohesive with the modernization of the 
whole society.
A paradox of the young Estonian democracy is that the legitimacy of the established 
political system is generally quite high, despite the critical attitude of many people 
towards politicians. At the same time, people’s trust in parliament is among the highest 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Vetik 2002, 108). This paradox is explained by fact that 
Estonians are intensely anti-communist and they overwhelmingly regard the more than 
four decades of Soviet colonization as a period when freedom was absent. Over the last 
decade, a stable two-thirds of Estonians have evaluated the new economic and political 
system positively. Russophones who reside in Estonia tend to evaluate the Soviet regime 
much more positively (two-thirds evaluate this period in positive terms). But they also 
believe that in Estonia today there is more democracy and that they are better oﬀ in 
Estonia than in contemporary Russia (Rose 1997). 
The comparison with the past is the main source of legitimacy for the ultra-liberal 
economic policy of the Estonian elite. The polarization of society in economic terms and 
the dismantling of the welfare state have had a negative impact on people’s attitudes, but 
only 4% think that Estonia should return to a Soviet-type system. The present economic 
system is positively evaluated by 79% and the political system by 70% of respondents. 
The share of people who are positive-minded about the regime has risen from 58% to 
70% during the last eight years (Vihalemm 2002, 278–279).
Ten years of national independence have produced signiﬁcant change in terms of 
the legitimation of the state and other public institutions. Trust towards “own” national 
power structures and institutions of justice—the police and the courts—has gone up. 
At the same time, trust in the media, which has become a part of business controlled by 
the international corporations, has gone down. The national government and parliament 
enjoy much less public trust than local government. Trade unions, despite their quite 
limited membership, are more trusted than political parties. But the low membership in 
unions suggests a kind of distrust, in that people do not believe unions have the ability 
to defend their interests. 
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Table 3.83
Citizens’ Trust in and Perception of Ability to Inﬂuence Institutions [%]
Trust in Institutions Capacity to Influence Institutions 
2002
1990 2002
Trust Trust Do Not 
Trust
Can Not 
Say 
Large 
Extent 
Small 
Extent 
Not at 
All
President 79 16 5 1 3 92
Local government 65 28 7 3 28 65
Government 51 43 6 1 6 90
Police 19 50 42 8
Courts 28 47 33 20
Parliament 68 45 48 7 1 5 90
Media 63 44 50 6
Parties 12 22 56 22 1 12 82
Trade unions 20 42 23 35
Source: Kivistik 2003. 
An ongoing challenge for power-holders during the last decade has been the deﬁcit 
of trust that people have in their government and national parliament. This does not 
imply a crisis of legitimacy, but indicates that people are not satisﬁed with the workings 
of democracy in the country and do not believe they can have an impact on these 
institutions. Their low estimation of their own social and intellectual competence 
limits their interest in participating. But other, more objective factors, such as the 
deﬁcit of appropriate social spaces and institutions, etc., play a role in discouraging 
people from contributing to the development of their local social environment 
(Kivirähk 1999, 15). In other words, eﬀorts to develop “civic citizenship” or “active 
citizenship” have not been accompanied by the development of people’s practical 
capacities and the social and legal instruments they require in order to contribute 
to societal progress. 
People’s trust in local government is comparatively much higher than their trust in 
the state. Some believe they can bring changes in local politics and, although this belief 
is not strong, it signals the existence of some element of participatory democracy. 
The results of the Democracy and Local Governance survey, in which local leaders 
were asked about citizens’ participation in local aﬀairs compared with ﬁve and ten years 
ago, indicated that the leaders were conditionally positive about improvements in the 
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situation. Approximately two-ﬁfths of the local leaders were of the opinion that people’s 
participation in the local aﬀairs of their community in 1999 was greater than it was ﬁve 
years before. Looking back over the past ten years, three-ﬁfths of the leaders indicated 
that people’s activities had increased (Vöörmann 2001). 
These observations did not correspond to ﬁndings about the retreat of civil society, 
the deprivation of large sections of the population, political alienation as evidenced by a 
decrease in participation in the elections, an increase in social polarization, etc. The key 
to community-building is “citizenship” in its sociological meaning—social, economic, 
cultural, linguistic, and political citizenship. But citizenship in these terms is most 
relevant to middle-class, educated people who have at their disposal such resources as 
free time and suﬃcient income. 
In post-communist Estonia, members of the old middle class (managers, appa-
ratchiks, and heads of collective farms) were able to transform their “capital” and main-
tain their economic advantage, but they have been more profoundly expelled from the 
public scene than in some other CEE post-socialist states. The modern middle class has 
emerged with a structural imbalance. According to our study, the initiatives of “private 
individuals” (largely representing business) have played a very signiﬁcant role in local 
aﬀairs and modern citizenship in its full, sociological sense has not taken hold. 
It is realistic to expect that as long as a genuine social dialogue has not developed on 
the national level in Estonia (Seeder 2003) and corporate initiatives of policymaking in 
the form of subsidiary institutions have not taken hold, then “associational democracy” 
will tend to push Estonia towards a closed society. For this reason, local government as a 
procedural and deliberative institution will have a pivotal role to play in the development 
of democracy.
4.3.5 Conclusion
At the present time, local government reforms are mainly administrative and are not 
designed to contribute to the development of participatory democracy. The ﬁndings of 
this study conﬁrm a general observation that to implement only a formal or minimal 
framework of democracy is obviously insuﬃcient for bringing about a functioning 
democracy. Elements of a deepening “elite democracy” are undermining the legitimacy 
of the regime. But the development of almost all of the basic institutional elements 
that are preconditions for such legitimacy—parties, civil associations, a democratic and 
pluralistic media, etc., depends on how local government itself develops. 
Self-government is not only the focus of a fundamental shift from elitist democracy 
to the next stage of democratic transformation, i.e., the centre of gravity of the self-
organization of a new society, but also contributes signiﬁcantly to the legitimacy of 
the national political system. For non-Estonians and those who are not citizens of the 
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Estonian Republic (around 23% of the total population), local government is the only 
institution to which they have access. From this perspective, local democracy has an 
extraordinary role to play in establishing the legitimacy of the Estonian state. At the end 
of the 1990s, the trust of non-Estonians in local government was considerably lower 
than that of Estonians (Lauristin et al. 1997, 336). 
The transformation of Estonian society requires the institutionalization of changes 
that secure democratic citizenship and establish a modern procedural society, e.g., training 
civil servants, creating transparent procedures, opening up institutions to civil initiatives, 
having mechanisms for the regular assessment of public institutions, fostering discursive 
democracy in the public sphere, etc. The legitimacy of the system rests on the presence of 
the essential elements of a functioning local democracy: modern citizenship, participatory 
bureaucracy, eﬀective associations, and civil society discourse. In this context, Dryzek 
(1996) notes that both institutional “hardware” and “software” must be developed, the 
“software” referring to social capital, civic culture, and political capital. 
Developing some kind of participatory bureaucracy may be most eﬀectively achieved 
on the local level, because it depends on the participation of and coexistence with semi-
autonomous local institutions and civil society. New relational practices—political, legal, 
and symbolic—must be generated that are based on tacit universal rules and networks of 
civil associations that operate in combination with the unique civic cultures of diﬀerent 
kinds of civil communities. Self-governmental citizenship (quasi-democratic citizenship) 
can emerge only in the context of particular practices—namely, those that support the 
popular public sphere. The active engagement of citizens and civil organizations in the 
public sphere is crucial. The public sphere must also mediate between civil society and 
the towering forces of the state and national markets.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
The problems encountered in the development of democracy in Estonia largely derive 
from the particular institutional conﬁguration of central–local relations, in which 
the processes of deconcentration and decentralization are very weakly coordinated. A 
model of “split hierarchy” (Leemans 1970; Bennett 1997) emerged in Estonia in 1993 
largely as a crisis solution, but soon became generally accepted. In this model, local 
autonomy is irreconcilably opposed to central authority and vice versa, i.e., an abstract 
dichotomy is built into the basic framework. This vision was ﬁrmly institutionalized by 
the mid-1990s and excluded any other solution but this negative sum game, in which 
the redistribution of resources between local and central government is constantly 
contested. This vision, compounded by particularistic political interests, has not enabled 
the main balancing institution—the second tier of local government—to be installed 
in the vertical power structure. On the other hand, the eﬀorts of central government 
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to develop intergovernmental relations, including the most recent in 2004, have been 
entirely targeted to reducing the powers of the county governor and administration.
Thus, unbalanced intergovernmental relations in the vertical dimension have 
hindered the development of local democracy and the application of principle of 
subsidiarity through further decentralization, especially in building capacity for self-
sustaining community development. As a result, we mainly observe centralizing trends 
that cannot contribute to the further enhancement of space for local democracy. But 
there does not yet seem to be a trend to develop control mechanisms, i.e., there have 
been no attempts by central authorities to introduce mechanisms of direct administrative 
control over the activities of local authorities. 
Hence, the critical link in sustaining democracy and democratic values is the 
availability of horizontal balances at the local level—above all, institutional (council–
mayor) and political balances. In this dimension, in which local communities have much 
discretion, the prospects for local democracy in Estonia look much more favorable and 
sustaining. 
Estonia has chosen a cabinet model of organization of the political executive, which 
has ensured a rather good mechanism of mutual checks and balances between the 
representative and executive branches, the political and administrative institutions at 
the local level. In addition, we see evidence of rather well institutionalized local politics 
in Estonia (in comparison with other CEE countries), which would provide favorable 
political control mechanisms in the absence of administrative ones. 
Local electoral contests are increasingly based on interparty competition. The 
electoral results have become similar to those at the national level. The development 
of local parties and factions at councils has been especially intensive in the last several 
years. Citizen electoral unions have been able to preserve their position mainly because 
of the formalization of decision-making behaviour at local councils. 
This institutional conﬁguration of the horizontal organization of authority has 
ensured rather eﬀective policymaking and implementation at the local level in sectors 
in which local authorities have powers and resources, e.g., culture and education, local 
community services, privatization, etc. We also see rather eﬀective decision-making at 
council because of the development of coalition politics, although the professionalism 
of individual councilors might be rather low. Another positive ﬁnding was the rather 
eﬀective planning and program implementation, although recent centralizing trends in 
investment policy would reverse those trends. 
But all these favorable variables and trends were observed most clearly in larger 
communities. We did not intend to search for a “perfect size” of local community, 
in which the proximity of residents to the authorities is balanced by eﬀectiveness in 
capacity-building. Our analyses of the activities of local political parties, decision-making 
at local councils, civil society organizations, and public engagement demonstrated that 
there is a democratic deﬁcit both in very small municipalities and in large cities. The 
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most favorable environment for a vital civil society and public sphere can be found in 
medium sized municipalities (2,000 to 5,000 residents). 
The comparatively consistent institutionalization of local politics in the framework of 
the cabinet model of local executive has resulted in a speciﬁc trend in the development of 
citizen participation. This trend has also been observed in the course of local government 
reforms in the UK in recent years, in which the cabinet model is optional at the local 
level (Chandler 1998). The cabinet model creates obstacles for local citizens in exerting 
an impact on the policy process via local councilors, because the decision-making power 
has shifted to partisan coalitions and political executives that are less accessible to citizens’ 
channels of input. Councilors end up processing and highlighting citizens’ individual 
problems and complaints that have weak links with major policy problems and solutions. 
Hence, the link between citizens and council becomes weaker. Under this system, citizens 
prefer to seek individual solutions to their particular problems instead of attempting to 
inﬂuence the policy process at council via organized civil society organizations.
This trend is also revealed in the pattern of behaviour of local councilors. Estonian 
councilors act primarily on the basis of an electoral mandate that was earned by being 
included on the electoral list of a political party. Thus, they tend to undervalue the 
importance of other channels of institutionalized political input. These trends are also 
reﬂected also in the controversial self-identiﬁcation of local councilors. They share basic 
democratic values and belief in the ideal of representative democracy, but they often 
identify with and act in correspondence to the opinion of local executive power. 
Presumably, this controversy of representative versus participatory democracy dates 
back to the ﬁrst stage of local government reform. In the period when the basic values 
of local democracy emerged, the participation of people in politics was so active that 
not enough attention was given to incorporating it organically into the development 
of local democratic institutions. 
Some parts of civil society have visibly contributed to the post-communist transition 
at the local level. But the broad possibilities for public political engagement that were 
granted by legislation in Estonia were not used by the rather well developed civil society 
organizations. Economic reforms in the countryside caused a major disintegration of 
society and an entrenched division of Estonian social space into the Tallinn central 
agglomerate and the deep periphery. A major civil deﬁcit can be observed in the latter 
areas, including those populated by non-Estonians. We also observed a big gap between 
the towns and the countryside in the development of local media as an institution of 
civil society. These social and economic deﬁcits seriously weaken the capacity for self-
governance, which becomes one more obstacle in the development of legitimacy and 
trust in local democratic institutions. 
One of main potential responses to this deﬁcit is the development of cooperation 
between smaller local communities, which would also facilitate the restructuring of local 
authorities into larger units. Progress in this respect would result in the development of 
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local institutions and units whose main task is building civil society and maintaining 
contact with the media and the public.
One ﬁnal conclusion is that, on the one hand, many issues of everyday life of concern 
to the local inhabitants—personal security, employment opportunities, vocational 
education—are beyond the reach of local authorities’ powers and capacities and have 
not received enough attention from other institutions and authorities. On the other 
hand, given that Estonian public policy has emerged from the remnants of a hollow 
managerial state, the level of devolution and/or privatization of services to independent 
organizations and private subjects is considerable. For this reason, the role of local 
authorities in service provision is negligible. As our survey revealed, the eﬃciency of 
service delivery has improved, but it has not ensured enough general satisfaction with 
such a strategy. Presumably, both trends would contribute to the weak image of local 
authorities in the eyes of local inhabitants. 
Hence, despite the existence of well-functioning horizontal balances and democratic 
institutions, the general level of power resources of local authorities and actors (the 
strength of their impact on decisions at the local level) and also their legitimacy were 
considerably lower than in other small CEE countries such as Hungary and especially 
Latvia (Sootla and Grau 2004). Does this suggest that the shift from communitarian-
corporatist values to libertarian values in the development of local government in Estonia 
has happened? The answer to this will require further research and analysis.
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NOTES
1  P. Aru was the mayor of Viljandi during several electoral periods. 
2 Term used by A. Leemans (Smith 1993).
3 Term used by F. Kjellberg (1993).
4 The survey was carried out among town oﬃcials by the Institute of Social and 
International studies and Euro University, Tallinn. A self-administering survey 
method similar to the current survey was used.
5 Data of the Estonian Statistics Agency http://gatekeeper.stat.ee:8000/px-web.2001/
Database/Majandus_regionaalne/Majandus_regionaalne.asp. The Ministry of 
Finance’s bureau of local budgets used a diﬀerent method of budget analysis that 
did not coincide with data from the Statistics Agency. As the information from the 
Statistics Agency is oﬃcial and more open, we rely on that source. The latest data 
from that source at the moment of ﬁnal preparation of this chapter is from 2002.
6 As the basis of estimation we take responses of representatives of opposite institutions, 
in that case members of council.
7 There are already some studies on local government cooperation (Strengthening 
Intermunicipal Cooperation 2000), which analyze the main forms of cooperation 
and set up frameworks for successful cooperation. In our study we were only able to 
analyze background variables that would foster or hinder this cooperation, because 
the latter was not a speciﬁc task of our study and our survey did not contain speciﬁc 
questions. For ﬁscal problems of cooperation, see Sootla et al. 2002. 
8 Citizens’ electoral unions (CEU) are enacted in the Local Government Council 
Election Act. This is a mechanism to empower individuals who are not willing to 
participate in the party lists. Citizens with the right to stand as a candidate can 
constitute a union and form a list of candidates. In the allocation of seats, CEU 
lists will be handled exactly the same way as party lists. 
9 According to the Local Government Council Elections Act, CEU will not be allowed 
in future elections.
10 For statistics about the Estonian civil service see: http://www.riigikantselei.ee/index.
php?id=1338,.
11 Because a DP is normally prepared for the electoral period of council and immediately 
after the new council and government come into oﬃce, it is usually in the process 
of revision. Therefore, we did not ask our respondents this question immediately 
after elections.
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1   INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Local Government System
1.1.1 The Slovak Republic: A Brief Overview
The Slovak Republic (SR) was established on January 1, 1993, immediately following 
the peaceful division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. It is a parliamentary 
republic and, by constitution, a sovereign, democratic, and juridical state, not bound 
by any ideology or religion. Its economy can be described as a socially and ecologically 
oriented market economy. The SR is currently in the process of post-socialist reform 
of its political, economic, and social systems, and is a candidate for membership in the 
European Union and NATO. 
The head of state is the President of the Republic, elected by the general population 
by direct ballot for a ﬁve-year term. The sole constitutional and legi slative body is 
the parliament (the National Council), consisting of 150 representatives elected 
by proportional representation for four years. The Government of the Slovak Republic 
is the highest executive organ, while the independent Constitutional Court watches 
over constitutional rights. The power of the judiciary is invested in independent and 
impartial courts of justice. The most basic unit of self-government in the SR is the 
community and the higher territorial entity is the region (province). These two levels 
are independent territorial and administrative units, organizing persons with permanent 
residency in their territories. 
The population of the Slovak Republic includes citizens of Slovak, Hungarian, 
Roma, Czech, Ruthene, Ukrainian, and German nationality, among others. The 
demographic survey of May 2001 reported a total of 5,379,445 inhabitants, of which 
85.8% were Slovak, 9.7% Hungarian, 1.7% Roma, 0.8% Czech, 0.4% Ruthene, and 
0.2% Ukrainian. Hungarians predominate in the southern part of Slovakia, while Roma 
are concentrated in the eastern region. The majority of Ruthenes and Ukrai nians also 
live in the eastern part.
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There are eight distinct regions (provinces) in the SR. The 2001 survey showed the 
smallest to be the Trnava region, inhabited by 10.2% of the total population (in 249 
communities). The Bratislava region contained 11.1% (in 72 commu nities), and the 
Prešov region was the largest with 17.7% (in 666 communities). 
In the survey, 4,521,549 persons (84.1% of the total population) declared themselves 
religious and 3,708,120 (68.9%) were Roman Catholic.
The survey also revealed that of 2,666,000 economically active citizens, 86,000 
(1.6%) were employers and 128,000 (2.4%) were self-employed per sons. Of the total 
working force, 561,000 (20.5%) were registered as unemployed (Survey of People, 
Houses, and Apartments 2001). 
According to sociologist Ján Bunčák, in 2001 the population could be classiﬁed as 
10.3% higher class, 17.6% middle class, 19.2% lower middle class, and 52.9% working 
class. Up to 19.7% belonged to an underclass outside the above classiﬁcation, or their class 
attribute could not be determined (2003, 135). The new stratiﬁcation of Slovak society 
is described by sociologists as a cone or pyramid, rather than a rugby ball; i.e., it is not 
dominated by the middle class, but rather by the smaller, but legally and economically 
most powerful, higher class. Thus far, the process of social trans formation has weakened 
the middle class in Slovakia, both in numbers and in inﬂuence, and a portion of it has 
become lower class.  A similar loss of social prestige has befallen the most numerous class, 
the working class, a part of which sank to the underclass (Sopóci 2000). At the time 
of the demographic survey, there were 862,000 permanently inhabited family houses 
and 1,880,000 apartments in Slovakia. On average, there were 3.21 persons dwelling 
in each apartment; 92.8% of households had a bathroom, 61% a washing machine, 
76.3% central heating, and 39.1% an automobile. Computers were found in 9.2% of 
households, and only 3.2% of households were connected to the Internet (Survey of 
People, Houses, and Apartments 2001). 
1.1.2 The History of Local Self-government in Slovakia
Local and regional self-government on the territory of Slovakia has a long historical 
tradition. Its roots were created after the revolution of 1848. Local and regional self-
government existed during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the ﬁrst Czechoslovak 
Republic (1918–1938), as well as during the war-time Slovak Republic of 1939–1945. 
From 1948 to 1989, under the totalitarian Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, local and 
regional self-government became part of the centralized state administration ruled by 
the communist party.
One of the consequences of the political change of 1989 in Czechoslovakia was the 
creation of a new system of public administration in 1990, which entailed separating 
the central and local governments. The introduction of this system went hand in hand 
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with the building of a new democratic state, the prime objective of the newly elected 
national governments of the Slovak and Czech Republics. Each republic created a distinct 
national system of public administration within the legal framework of the existing 
Czechoslovak Federal Republic (Sopóci 1992).
In addition to government-initiated eﬀorts to reform the system of public 
administration in Slovakia, clear signs of the reform endeavor also came from “below.” 
The initiative in these latter eﬀorts came partly from former employees of national 
committees and individuals who did research in the development of regional and local 
self-government in Slovakia. Through their joint eﬀorts, an organization called “The 
Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia” (ZMOS) was created in January 
1990. As a prospective partner to the government, ZMOS set as its main objective the 
transformation of towns and communities into self-governing entities. The founding 
conference took place on March 21, 1990 and the new organization soon became a 
prominent representative of self-governed towns and communities in Slovakia.
At ﬁrst, the Slovak government did not recognize ZMOS as a partner on equal 
footing. Even when it became well established, ZMOS failed to reach the status of 
equal partner to the government, or even that of a respected representative of the 
interests of Slovak towns and communities. Competing models for the building of 
state administration have been developed and promoted by the government, especially 
the Ministry of the Interior in charge of state administration, on the one hand, and 
by ZMOS on the other. The government and its ministry intend to implement a dual 
system dominated by the central administration, whereas ZMOS prefers a model 
dominated by local and regional government. These two concepts have competed since 
1990, represented by the two principal rivals and their associates. During the 1990s, the 
government, the Ministry of the Interior, and other organs of the state administration 
dominated the ﬁeld. The existing system thus embodies the objectives and interests of 
its creator—the central state administration; the suggestions (and hence objectives) of 
ZMOS as the representative of municipalities and communities have been taken into 
consideration only marginally (Sopóci 1992).
The National Council of the Slovak Republic passed the Act on Elections to Organs 
of Local Governments (No. 346) in August 1990 and the Municipality Act (No. 369) 
in September 1990. Consequently, elections to municipal self-government bodies took 
place on October 23–24, 1990. With the election of mayors and local representatives 
to local councils, local government in Slovakia was born. 
At that time, regional government had yet to be created. The abolished counties 
and national committees were supplanted by a two-tier state administration system, 
governing 38 districts and 121 local oﬃces. This system assumed responsibility for 
both general and special administrative tasks (the special state administration was in 
charge of local schools, the health care system, and environmental issues). In 1996, the 
system of local state administration went through another reform, which created eight 
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additional counties (Bratislava, Trnava, Trenčín, Nitra, Žilina, Banská Bystrica, Košice, 
and Prešov) and 79 districts (local oﬃces were abolished). County and district oﬃces 
were subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, and carried out general and special 
administrative tasks; some functions of the state administration were taken over by the 
local governments and military district oﬃces.
In 2001, the Regional Government Act, passed by the National Council of the Slovak 
Republic, established a system of regional government on the territory of Slovakia that 
consists of eight higher territorial entities (self-governing counties). Their names and 
territories coincide with those of preexisting counties. After the election of chairpersons 
and members of representative bodies of counties in December 2001, county authorities 
in Slovakia began their work. This entailed the gradual abolition of district oﬃces, which 
was completed by January 2004. Likewise, pursuant to provisions of the constitution 
on self-government, more authority was to be shifted from state administration to local 
and regional self-governments.
As can be seen, the system of public administration after 1989 became rather 
unstable. Years of posttotalitarian reform eﬀorts brought about signiﬁcant changes in 
the system of central and local state administration and both are still evolving. 
Slovak historians characterize the history of public administration in Slovakia as 
a constant struggle for supremacy between the state bureaucracy and representative 
democracy, represented by centralized state administration on the one hand, and regional 
and local self-governments on the other. The latter had already played a subordinate role 
in the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy and continued to do so in the ﬁrst Czechoslovak 
Republic, the tug-of-war culminating in total state domination during the socialist era. 
(Bianchi 1971; Lipscher 1966; Lipták 1998). 
The two-tier approach to public administration has been the root of all conﬂicts 
between the centralized state administration and local and regional self-government. It 
also attests to the conﬂict of interests. Both parties in the conﬂict strive to concentrate 
as much authority and resources in their hands as possible—in other words, as much 
power as possible. This short overview of the history of public administration on the 
territory of Slovakia shows clearly that this basic conﬂict and its outcome have, both 
in the distant and more recent past, substantially aﬀected the development of public 
administration systems. 
The main diﬃculty in the reform of public administration in Slovakia from 1990 
onward has been the shift of authority and the concomitant shift of resources from 
the state administration to regional and local self-governments. The main objective 
of the ongoing process of posttotalitarian decentralization and destatization of public 
administration is more democracy in public aﬀairs, the main idea being that the public 
interest is best served at the regional and local levels and, therefore, that this is where 
the authority belongs—in the hands of elected representatives of towns, communities 
and regions.
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1.1.3 Contemporary Local Self-government in Slovakia
In the Slovak Republic there are at present 2,883 municipalities, of which 138 have city 
status. Two of the cities—Bratislava and Košice—have special status. The 1990 Act on 
the Capital of the Slovak Republic recognizes Bratislava as well its seventeen subdivisions 
as legal municipalities and Bratislava itself as the capital city of the Slovak Republic. 
The second largest city, Košice, has been granted special status by the Act  on the City 
of Košice, as a municipality divided into four districts and 22 city subdivisions with 
their own self-governing bodies.
The system of local government in Slovakia is a highly decentralized structure, 
within which all settlements, even very small villages, possess municipal status. This 
has created serious impediments to the functioning of the system in terms of ﬁnances, 
human resources, and organization. In small communities, the lack of suitable candidates 
makes the establishment of local councils and the election of mayors quite diﬃcult. 
A number of communities (even large ones) cannot aﬀord to employ administrative 
staﬀ for lack of funds, leaving the mayor to carry the entire burden of responsibilities. 
Financially starved small communities often employ and remunerate their mayors as 
part-time public oﬃcials, since they cannot aﬀord the level of remuneration speciﬁed in 
the law. For similar reasons, the scope of services oﬀered to the residents is rather limited. 
All this contributes to the complications that accompany the transfer of authority from 
the state to local government.
This predicament is the result of historical developments and recent social and 
political trends. After 1989, as a consequence of the establishment of local self-
government, small communities reversed the earlier prevailing trend to amalgamate. 
Even communities that had been merged for some time strove to separate from the cities 
to which they were aﬃliated, under the illusion that self-government would better serve 
their interests and would be conducive to their further development. 
As shown in Table 4.1, 40.9% of Slovak communities have fewer than 500 residents, 
67.8% fewer than 1,000, and 92.2% fewer than 3,000. 
The Municipality Act deﬁnes a community as an independent self-governed 
municipality and an administrative unit of the Slovak Republic. The community acts 
as a legal entity, independent in managing its resources and revenues within the limits 
deﬁned by the law. The community is free to decide on and carry out all legal procedures 
concerning the administration of the municipality and its property as deﬁned by the 
law. Some tasks of the state administration, such as running the local registry oﬃce or 
organizing polls within its electoral district, can be reassigned to the local self-government 
by a lawful procedure. 
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Table 4.1
Communities in Slovakia Ranked by Number of Residents
Size Category Number of 
Communities and Cities 
Proportion 
of Residents [%]
Average 
per Community
Under 500 residents 1,178 6.1 275
501–1,000 777 10.2 709
1,001–3,000 703 21.1 1,617
3,001–20,000 185 22.5 6,529
20,001–50,000 29 15.8 29,281
50,001–100,000 9 12.0 71,735
Over 100,000 2 12.3 332,065
Source: Slovak Statistical Yearbook 2001.
Municipalities and municipal cities of the Slovak Republic can pursue joint activities, 
bound by speciﬁc contracts. Being corporate bodies, they can also found associations 
of municipalities, as well as both proﬁt and nonproﬁt organizations. 
Under the Act on Municipal Organization, municipalities can associate as legal 
entities for particular objectives: the delivery of social services, management of the 
environment, collection and disposal of communal solid and liquid waste, local 
transportation, the school system, the local cultural scene, tourism, and various other 
obligations of municipalities and municipal regions. 
The most representative association of this kind in Slovakia is the Association of 
Towns and Communities of Slovakia (ZMOS), which has existed since 1990 and whose 
membership includes about 95% of Slovak municipalities. ZMOS represents the most 
important interest group of Slovak municipalities speaking up for their interests against 
the government, the parliament, and other central authorities of the state administration. 
ZMOS has now reached the status of an equal partner with the government and the 
state administration. Another association of this type is the Union of Slovak Towns, 
representing 43 cities and eight communities, with a status commensurate with its 
membership. 
All together there are 57 regional associations of municipalities, the members of 
which are located in smaller regions deﬁned by natural territorial units (most often the 
territories of former counties) and aﬃliated by virtue of their location, historical tradition, 
or by common economic interests. These associations are legal entities with charters and 
with representative and executive bodies. Their activities are funded through member 
contributions and various donations. However, because of the modest scope of their 
activities, their contribution to the life of municipalities has been rather marginal. 
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Within the leeway deﬁned by the Act on Municipal Organization, municipalities 
can collaborate with other territorial or administrative bodies or with authorities of 
foreign states operating within the municipality. Slovak municipalities have the right to 
join international associations of territorial entities or territorial bodies. In spite of the 
gradual revival of joint activities of municipalities, their total volume is rather meager; 
only a small portion of Slovak municipalities has so far embraced them and they have 
barely penetrated into the sphere of activity of local self-governments. 
1.1.4 Territorial and Administrative Subdivisions of the Sloval Republic 
After the political transition of 1989, the existing system of public administration, 
based on tri-level national committees, was replaced by a new structure of public 
administration. A two-tier system of 38 district and 121 subdistrict oﬃces of general 
and special state administration was established by the Ministry of the Interior according 
to the direction outlined in the government resolution  of February 14, 1990. 
The National Council Act on the Territorial and Administrative Subdivision of 
the Slovak Republic together with the Act on the Organization of the Local State 
Administration (both from 1996) provided the legal framework for the establishment 
of eight regions and 79 districts, with eight regional and 79 district oﬃces as the basis 
of state administration. 
With the passage of the National Council Act on Municipal Regions in 2001, a 
second, higher level of self-government was created—namely, the self-go vern ing regions 
or territorial municipalities. The eight that were created (Bratislava, Trnava, Trenčín, 
Nitra, Žilina, Banská Bystrica, Košice, and Prešov self-governments) corresponded to 
the existing regions. The National Council also passed the Act on Elections to Municipal 
Regions. In December 2001, after regional governors and representatives were elected, 
the regional oﬃces came into power. The ﬁrst ballot of the regional elections attracted 
a very low voter turnout—a mere 26% of eligible voters. In seven regions the governors 
were elected by second ballot. Candidates for the post of regional representative were 
ﬁelded by various coalitions of political parties. In the Trenčín region, the clear winner 
was the coalition HZDS–ĽS, claiming all available mandates. Out of the total of 401 
mandates in the regional representative bodies, HZDS–ĽS won 191, SMK 84, and 
Smer 50 mandates.
The low voter turnout in the regional elections was interpreted as being the result 
of inadequate information on new positions and responsibilities in the newly created 
self-government regions, and on the prevailing skepticism about the beneﬁts to be gained 
from their existence.  Another reason for the disinterest of voters was the way the election 
campaign was run—purely on party principles. Voters had to cast their ballots by party 
preference and not by personal preference for individual candidates.
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1.2 Internal Structure of Local Government
1.2.1 Local Government Elections in Slovakia
The Act on Local Government Elections regulates elections to municipal self-government 
bodies. Local polls, based on general, equal, and direct franchise are carried out by secret 
ballot. They are held on a simple majority basis in the case of mayors and lord mayors; 
a proportional system is used for election to local and city representative bodies. For 
election purposes, the municipalities are divided into wards equipped with multiple 
mandates, with the number of mandates proportional to the number of residents, 
but with no more than twelve mandates per ward. For the election of the mayor, each 
community forms a one-mandate election ward. Election wards in communities and 
cities are structured so that each contains about 1,000 voters. 
For election to municipal self-government bodies, political parties and coalitions that 
are registered by the Ministry of the Interior may submit a list of candidates for each election 
ward.  Independent candidates may stand for election on their own nomination, provided 
they attach a petition signed by at least 100 eligible voters in communities with more than 
2,000 residents and by at least 50 in communities with fewer than 2,000 residents.
Political parties and independent candidates must bear the expenses incurred by 
their electoral campaign. The law mandates that candidates have equal access to the 
mass media during the electoral campaign and that all candidates have equal access to 
the local media. Municipalities are required to allocate space for campaign posters, so 
that each party and the independent candidates can access it on equal footing. Expenses 
incurred in the local representative elections and also those of mayor (lord mayor) are 
borne by the state budget of the Slovak Republic. 
All citizens who are at least eighteen years of age by the day of the election and 
who are citizens residing within the electoral boundary have the right to vote and to 
be elected to self-government bodies. A citizen with the right to vote may be elected 
to the municipal council. A member of the municipal council may not be a judge, a 
prosecutor, or an investigator in the prosecutor’s oﬃce, a member of police force or 
prison and justice guard, a staﬀ member of the municipal oﬃce for which the candidate 
is running or its chief auditor, or the mayor (lord mayor). A citizen with the right to vote 
who is twenty-ﬁve years of age by the day of the election may run for the position of 
mayor or lord mayor. The oﬃce of mayor (lord mayor) is incompatible with the oﬃces 
and positions listed above and, in addition, with the position of municipal employee, 
statutory representative of a community organization, governor of a self-government 
region (county), and high oﬃcial in the state administration. 
Local elections took place in October 1990, October 1994, December 1998, and 
December 2002. The turnout declined during that time from 63.75% to 49.51% of eligible 
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voters. Thus far, the local elections have shown that the majority of voters, at least in smaller 
communities, vote according to personal preference rather than by party aﬃliation. This 
ﬁnding has been corroborated by sociological research carried out in the 1990s, which 
revealed that the local political scene was shaped either by a party- or a civic-minded 
approach. Local politics is designated as “party-minded” when local party politicians receive 
direction from their party headquarters and engage in political in-ﬁghting with other locally 
represented parties (or party coalitions). However, when local politics are characterized by 
the search for solutions to local problems and are not dominated by issues of party politics 
and targets, then the local politics is considered to be “civic-minded.” Research into this 
problem showed that in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, party-minded local politics prevailed 
in most municipalities and cities of the Slovak Republic, whereas civic-minded politics 
dominated in the more numerous, smaller communities (Malíková 1997; Sopóci 1995).
1.2.2 Communal Services
The Municipality Act obliges municipalities to provide the following services:
 • Operation of public lighting; 
 • Cleaning and maintenance of public roads;
 • Maintenance of the public green and cemeteries; 
 • Collection, transport, and disposal of communal waste;
 • Management of cultural, sports, and other communal facilities; and
 • Consumer protection.
In fulﬁlling these responsibilities, communities and cities can a) perform the services 
directly by delegating them to their own subsidized and budgetary organizations, or b) 
hire companies for this purpose, often jointly owned joint stock and limited liability 
companies. Citizens pay for the services either directly in the form of fees or indirectly 
through taxes.
Public lighting is the sole responsibility of communities and cities, and is paid for 
from their budgets. Maintenance of lighting is usually in the hands of limited liability 
companies, co-owned by cities and communities.
The cleaning and maintenance of public roads are paid for indirectly by the road 
tax and partly from local taxes; further funds may be collected at local parking lots. 
The cleaning and maintenance of public roads is most often handled by commu nity- or 
city-owned budgetary or subsidized organizations, or by limited liability compa nies, 
with which cities and communities are business partners.
The Municipality Act also decrees that cities and communities take care of public 
transportation. Five cities assume this responsibility directly: Bratislava, Košice, Prešov, 
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Žilina, and Banská Bystrica. In 53 other cities, public transportation is provided by the 
Slovak bus transport company and in all other cities and communities there is no public 
transport. Public transport com panies are subsidized from the state budget. 
 The cost of maintenance of public greens and cemeteries is covered by the municipal 
budgets. Additional ﬁnancing for these services comes from grave and burial fees and 
from fees for renting public facilities. As in the case of public roads, the municipalities 
provide these services through community- or city-owned budgetary or subsidized 
organizations, or through limited liability companies, with which cities and communities 
are business partners.
The collection, transport, and disposal of communal waste is also carried out by 
community- or city-owned budgetary or subsidized organizations, or by limited liability 
companies, in which cities and communities are business partner. The waste disposal is 
ﬁnanced by fees and ﬁnes collected from waste producers and by state subsidies from 
the Recycling Fund. 
As a rule, cities and communities manage their cultural and sports facilities by means 
of their own budgetary or subsidized organizations. The ﬁnancing comes mainly from 
rental and admission fees, supplemented by contributions from the communal budgets. 
The educational and schooling facilities (nurseries, kindergartens, elemen tary schools, 
after-school centers, and elementary art schools) have been administered by communities 
since 2002. The management of health care facilities (outpatient clinics, polyclinics, and 
smaller hospitals) and social service facilities (retirement homes, nursing homes, and 
hospices, etc.), has been transferred over to communities and cities from the state. The 
process was completed by 2004; during the transition, the operation of these facilities 
was ﬁnanced from the state budget, via communities and cities. 
Communities and cities have also taken over responsibility for consumer protection 
by issuing binding regulations and setting business hours both in shops and service 
centers. Communities and cities oversee this area and can impose ﬁnes for misdemeanors, 
thus supplementing their budgets. The registration of births and deaths, along with the 
issuing of various certiﬁcates, permits, and documents are additional community services 
that were previously provided by the state administration. These services are ﬁnanced 
through both fees and community budgets. The local police force, which maintains 
public order, is also ﬁnanced by the municipality. 
1.2.3 The Main Players in Local Self-government 
Communities are administered by their citizens through elected councils and the 
village or city mayor or lord mayor. These representatives are chosen by direct public 
election. Public polling (referenda) and public meetings are additional means of citizen 
participation at the local level. 
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In the Slovak Republic a terminological distinction is made between community 
and city self-governments. The most numerous are community self-governments (in 
villages) consisting of a body of elected representatives (council) and the community 
leader (mayor), whereas the city government consists of a city board and the lord mayor. 
The two biggest cities, Bratislava and Košice, are legally municipalities and are governed 
by city boards headed by mayors. Their districts are also self-governing communities, 
administered by local councils and mayors. Bratislava consists of ﬁve districts (seats of 
district oﬃces) and 17 self-governed city sections; Košice has four districts and 22 city 
sections with their own municipal councils. 
The community or city council consists of deputies elected by local residents for a 
four-year term. The board meets as often as necessary, but at least once every two months. 
The meetings are organized and hosted by the mayor. The local board deliberates and 
makes decisions, as long as the quorum has been met (a simple majority for resolutions 
and three-ﬁfths for an ordinance). If the necessary quorum is not reached, the mayor 
must call another meeting within fourteen days. The deliberations of the local board are 
always public; however, a session may be declared closed if the matters to be discussed 
are classiﬁed information under the law. Resolutions and ordinances passed by the board 
must be signed by the mayor not later than ten days after approval. 
The boards oversee and make decisions on all the basic aspects of community or 
city life: the management of communal property; the budget and general ﬁnancial 
management; the development of the community (city) land; local taxes and tariﬀs; local 
ordinances; the organization of polls on important issues of community life (referenda); 
the calling of public meetings; agreements and contracts with other communities or 
cities; participation in domestic and international organizations; the founding or 
disbanding of local authorities required by local self-government (boards and com-
missions); the municipal structure; the mayor’s and chief auditor’s salaries; and the 
founding, controlling, and disbanding of budgetary and subsidized organizations.
City councils can call up and dissolve the community board at any time; the board 
is staﬀed by members of the council who have been nominated by the council. The 
community (city) board is an executive and supervisory body, expected to act in an 
enterprising manner. It carries out assignments decided on by the local councils and acts 
as a consulting body for the mayor, who hosts the board meetings. The board can set up 
either permanent or interim commissions as consulting, initiating, and control bodies, 
staﬀed by members of local council and other persons nominated by the board. 
The mayors and lord mayors are the representatives and the highest executive oﬃcials 
of their respective communities. The oﬃce of mayor is a public oﬃce with a four-year 
term, which ends with the swearing-in of the new mayor. The mayor summons the 
local council (board), chairs its meetings, signs the passed resolutions, carries out local 
administration tasks, represents the municipality in dealings with the state administration 
and other corporate and physical bodies, and decides on administrative matters other 
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than those assigned to local council by law or by community statute. The mayor acts 
as a statutory body in legal, property, and labor relations; the mayor’s oﬃce is a local 
administrative authority. 
When the mayor is absent or incapacitated, his or her duties are taken over by the 
deputy mayor, who is selected from the local council at the suggestion of the mayor 
and approved by ballot for the entire term of oﬃce. The local council can also recall the 
deputy mayor at any time. Following the mayor’s proposal, the local council determines 
and approves the scope of responsibilities of the deputy mayor. 
The municipal oﬃce, headed by the mayor, is the executive body of council in charge 
of organizational and administrative matters. In the more populated communities and 
cities, the oﬃces may be headed by a chief administrative oﬃcer. If such a position has 
been created, the chief oﬃcer is the highest executive oﬃcer, appointed and recalled 
by the mayor. 
The local representative body also appoints a chief auditor. Candidates for the job 
must not be members of the local board or community or city employees with other 
responsibilities. The auditor is elected or appointed and recalled by the local council 
for a six-year term, after which time the contract is terminated. As an employee, the 
auditor is accountable to the local council and oversees local ﬁnances, accounts, and 
the management of assets, including those of budgetary organizations founded by the 
community or city. He or she attends meetings of the local board in an advisory capacity. 
In matters concerning the management of resources allocated from the state budget, 
the auditor cooperates with the state administration.
To summarize, residents in Slovakia participate directly in local self-government. 
They can vote and be elected to representative bodies. They can also engage in the 
decision-making process by voting in local referenda, taking an active part in public 
meetings, attending meetings of the local council, and submitting suggestions and 
complaints. 
1.3 The Indicator Project in Slovakia
The survey in Slovakia took place between March 1 and May 30, 2003. Data gathering 
was realized shortly after the elections to local governments in December 6–7, 2002. 
Sampling Method
We have applied the method of sampling used by the Tocqueville Research Center in 
the framework of the ILDGP.
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The population of all 2,922 local governments in Slovak Republic, as well as the 
list of all local representatives was provided by ZMOS (Association of Towns and 
Communities of Slovakia).  
Based on the equation developed by Tamás Rudas (Soós, Tóka, and Wright 2002, 
448–449), we have selected a random sample of 700 municipalities as the initial  
sample for the LGS, representative with respect to size distribution and population of 
municipalities. (Following the suggested rules, all localities with a population larger 
than 3,000 inhabitants were included.)   
The subsample of 210 municipalities was drawn from the LGS sample for the LRS 
survey. All local representatives and mayors from these selected local governments were 
included in the sample of the LRS. The size of the initial sample for the LRS was 2,012 
respondents. 
Questionnaires
Two types of questionnaire were distributed:  one for the Chief Administrative Oﬃcer 
(CAO)  in each of the 700 selected municipalites in the Local Government Survey (LGS) 
and the other for the local representatives—the Local Representative Survey (LRS).
Survey Implementation
Four subsequent contacts with respondents were applied:
On March 7, 2003 a short pre-notice letter signed by the President of the 
Association of Towns and Communities of Slovakia was mailed to the mayors of all 
700 municipalities. 
About a week later (on March 12, 2003), packages containing a cover letter signed 
by Ján Sopóci as the country representative, questionnaire(s), and return envelope(s) 
were mailed to the municipalities. On April 30, 2003, a reminder letter was sent to all 
municipalities with a response rate below 50%. 
During the week from May 19 to May 23 telephone contacts was made with those 
from 413 municipalities where the LGS questionnaires were returned. The main purpose 
was to increase the number of LGS–LRS matched responses. In the necessary cases the 
replacement questionnaires were sent.
All local representatives and chief administrative oﬃcials were contacted by the 
municipality oﬃces. 
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Response Rate
After the last contact, 413 of 700 LGS questionnaires were received and 896 of 2,012 
LRS questionnaires. The number of municipalities from which we received both LGS 
and LRS questionnaires was 84. 
The ﬁnal response rate was 59% for the LGS and 44.8% for the LRS. 
Further Comments
The mailing method used in the survey provided a response rate of 51.9%, which 
is considered relatively high. In our view, one of the main reasons was the idea of 
cooperation with the local government association. The fact that the pre-notice letter 
was formulated and signed by the professional sponsor put more importance on it. 
Thanks to this, the survey was taken by respondents as a municipality organization 
matter instead as one of “some other investigation.”  
The response rates disaggregated by municipality size (0–999, 1,000–4,999, over 5,000) 
do not diﬀer in the LGS samples (60%, 57%, 60%). In the LRS sample, local represen-
tatives in the biggest villages and cities are less likely to respond (50%, 46%, 38%).
2.  AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT
2.1 Legal Autonomy
At present, the relationship between the state and municipalities is characterized by the 
following principles:
 • The scope of municipal activities is deﬁned by the state, on the basis of the 
consti tution, laws, and international agreements signed by the state;
 • The decentralization process continues to be implemented, through the transfer 
of competencies from the state to the municipal level of administration;
 • Deﬁned areas of municipal activities are under the supervision (control) of the 
pertinent state organs; and
 • The state administration and self-governed municipalities display mutual 
cooperation and engage in common activities.
According to the constitution, the municipality is the basis of territorial self-go-
vernment in Slovakia. Constitutional guarantees of municipal autonomy include the 
following:
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 • A municipality is an independent territorial self-governing unit of the SR;
 • As a a legal entity, a municipality manages its own property and ﬁnancial assets 
independently, under conditions deﬁned by law; 
 • A municipality carries out its self-governing functions within the scope deﬁned 
by law, without state interference, except where such state interference has been 
decreed by law or the need arises as a consequence of international agreements 
signed by the SR;
 • A municipality has the right to merge or associate with other municipalities, to 
subdivide into several munici palities, as well as  the right to abolish itself; and
 • It has the right, by law, to issue generally binding regulations in matters 
concerning self-government and the speciﬁc tasks of self-government.
Thus, municipalities have the constitutional right to make independent decisions 
within their scope of competence; other limitations and duties can be imposed only by 
way of a lawful procedure. 
The legal competencies of a municipality are of two sorts: parent (own) competencies 
and those that have been transferred to the municipal administration from the state. 
The self-government functions are mainly administrative, ﬁnancial, and founding 
functions. The National Council Act on the Organization of Local Self-government vests 
considerable executive powers in the municipal bodies, which have the full right to decide 
and execute all transactions concerning the administration of the communities/cities 
and their assets. The act lists the following legal functions of communities and cities:
 • To manage funds and properties of the community (city), as well as state property 
for which the state has transferred the right of use;  
 • To create and approve the budget and ﬁnal accounts of the municipality and 
to decide on and administer local taxes and tariﬀs;
 • To regulate economic activities in the municipality and to issue approvals and 
binding opinions on business and the activities of businesses, legal entities, 
and natural persons on the location of business premises on the territory of the 
municipality, and to issue building licenses and binding opinions concerning 
investments in the community (city);
 • To carry out construction and maintenance work and administer local roads, 
public areas, local (city) cemeteries, cultural, sports, and other communal 
facilities, monuments, landmarks, and memorials;
 • To provide public utilities, mainly the disposal of communal and petty 
construction waste, the cleaning of public places, the maintenance of public 
green places and lighting, and the management of the water supply, waste water, 
and public transportation;
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 • To create and preserve healthy living and working conditions for the residents 
and to protect the environment;
 • To create the underpinnings of a functioning health care system by founding 
ambulatory care and local health centers and hospitals; 
 • To manage local educational facilities (kindergartens, elementary schools, and 
their lunchrooms, elementary art schools, school clubs, free time centers, etc.), 
cultural and educational facilities (museums, galleries, theatres, and public 
libraries), and facilities for pursuing artistic and sports activities;
 • To participate in customer protection, to support the transport and distribution 
of supplies, to regulate business hours in shops and public services, and to 
manage market places;
 • To arrange and approve development plans for residential areas and zones, to 
draw up plans for the development of community facilities and housing deve-
lopment programs, and to facilitate the creation of healthy living conditions;
 • To pursue their own investment and business activity towards satisfying the 
needs of the residents, including support of public housing and communal 
development;
 • To found, establish, dissolve, and control their budgetary and semi-budgetary 
organizations, as well as other legal entities and institutions;
 • To organize local polls on important issues of communal life and 
development;
 • To take care of public order, public defence, and ﬁre protection of the residents; 
to issue ordinances, tolerating on a temporary basis activities otherwise forbidden 
or restricted in time or place;
 • To preserve and maintain cultural and natural assets;
 • To participate in the social care system (day care service, seniors’ homes, etc.) 
and to certify legal documents and signatures; and
 • To keep local historical records in vernacular and in minority languages.
In addition, municipalities carry out some tasks that the state administration has 
transferred to them, such as the registration of births, the organization of parliamentary 
elections, etc. The state allocates the necessary funds and other resources for such 
tasks.
Both the constitution and the Municipality Act allow municipalities to base their 
local economy on their own ﬁnancial resources and to use them freely within the scope 
of their competence. Municipalities acquire funding mainly from own revenue, state 
subsidies, and other alternative resources. When municipalities are lacking in own funds, 
state subsidies are made available for the funding of development programs and tasks 
prioritized by the state. State subsidies are purpose-bound and must be used under the 
conditions stipulated by the ministry in charge. Use of such funds is supervised by the 
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relevant state organs. Municipalities can also use funds jointly with other municipalities, 
self-governing regions, or natural persons. 
The constitution deﬁnes a municipality as a corporate entity with the right to hold 
property. The Municipal Property Act decrees the scope of municipal property and the 
manner of its management. In sorting out its management procedure, the local council is 
constrained by the scope of this act as well as other laws concerning property 
management.
The municipality independently operates its own budget, which is approved by 
the local council. Municipal budgets are an independent part of the state budget of the 
Slovak Republic. However, they constitute an integral part of the public funds of the 
SR; their preparation and approval are therefore a public matter, administered by the 
pertinent legislation of the SR (Budgetary Rules Act, Bookkeeping Act, Auditor Act) 
and are subject to control by an independent auditor or, in case of state subsidies, by 
the Supreme Control Council of the SR. The lawfulness of procedures in this area is 
generally monitored by the Oﬃce of the Attorney General of the SR. 
The constitution and the Municipality Act entitle municipalities to issue regulations 
concerning territorial self-government (generally binding regulations as well as their own 
legislation), which deﬁne the powers of municipalities in a more detailed manner. Both 
the constitution and the Municipality Act distinguish between two types of municipal 
regulation: 
 1. Generally binding municipal regulations concerning self-government (these 
must conform to the constitution, to legislation, and to international treaties 
signed by the SR); and
 2. Generally binding municipal regulations concerning state administration tasks 
that became the responsibility of municipality by law must conform to the 
constitution, to legislation, and to international treaties of the SR, as well as 
to government regulations, statutes of the ministries, and other central state 
administration oﬃces.
The local council approves such generally binding regulations by a three-ﬁfths 
majority vote of councilors present; the lawfulness of regulations may be examined 
and contested by the prosecutor. In cases where a law has been broken, the prosecutor 
lodges a protest with the municipality and proceeds pursuant to the Prosecution Act. 
The Constitutional Court of Justice of the Slovak Republic rules on the harmony of 
generally binding municipal regulations with the Constitution of the SR, other Slovak 
legislation, and international agreements, unless the matter was ruled on by another 
court.  Controversial regulations or their parts become invalid on the day the ruling of 
the Constitutional Court of Justice has been published in the Collection of laws. 
As has already been mentioned, strict adherence to laws and to generally binding 
legal regulations (mainly regulations pertaining to administrative procedures) by the 
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organs of local self-government has been ensured by the oﬃce of public prosecution. 
The prosecutor is entitled to examine whether the procedures or decisions of municipal 
organs have contravened the law and, if so, to demand correction by pointing out or 
lodging a protest against the unlawfulness of the binding regulations, council decision, 
or other acts. The district oﬃce is the ﬁrst instance appeal authority in the case of 
municipal decisions and the second is the regional oﬃce of the state administration. 
The communities and cities are supervised by the other state institutions, mainly central 
institutions such as the Supreme Control Oﬃce of the SR in the scope speciﬁed by 
particular laws and regulations.
Functions of the state administration that were transferred to local self-governments 
are controlled and administered by the government of the Slovak Republic. Should 
a community or city seriously (for at least six months) neglect its duties pertinent to 
functions turned over by the state, the regional (county) oﬃce tries to prod it into action 
by issuing a writ and setting a deadline. If no action is taken by the deadline, the local 
state administration is authorized to proceed according to speciﬁc regulations.
The state and local administration in the SR have been strictly separated by legislation 
enacted in 1990. As legal amendments gradually came into force during the second half of
 the 1990s, more and more competencies were transferred to local governments. The aim 
of the transfer—pursuant to the European Municipal Charter, approved by the Slovak 
parliament—was to put the responsibility for local matters into the hands of organs 
closest to the citizens. The principle of decentralization of power is also supported in 
the Slovak constitution, which enables (Art. 71) the transfer of tasks of the local state 
administration to local self-governments. Thus, while the transfer of competencies during 
the 1990s proceeded very slowly (mainly owing to the reluctance of both central and local 
state administration to relinquish their competencies and the power to control the funds 
for public administration), starting in 1998 and mainly after 2002, responsibilities over 
wide areas of public service came to be administered by local governments (elementary 
schools, pre-school facilities, and many other areas of public administration). 
The transfer of competencies proceeded gradually in Slovakia, in tandem with 
the actual reforms of the system of local state administration. The establishment of 
self-government regions and the abolition of district oﬃces of the state administration, 
completed in 2004, initiated another phase in the transfer of competencies over to 
the regional and local self-governments. Numerous units of local government, mainly 
in smaller municipalities, are at present ill-equipped in terms of personnel, as well as 
logistically and ﬁnancially, to assume responsibility for all of the compe tencies, especially 
for running social care institutions, elementary schools, smaller health care insti tutions, 
etc. In discussions about this during 2002-03, some representatives (mainly mayors, lord 
mayors, and representatives from the Association of Towns and Villages) vented their 
concerns about the impropriety of such a massive transfer of competencies (especially 
health care and the elementary education system) and the inability of municipalities to 
adequately secure these services.
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In the transfer process, local self-governments not only take over the relevant legis-
lation, but also the pertinent executive regulations. For instance, competencies in general 
public administration (e.g., construction, real estate cadastre, and the issuing of various 
permits and licenses) engender fees that form the municipal revenue, but the limits on 
how high they can be have been set by the state or the ministry of ﬁnance. Similarly, 
when local councils approve a system of pay scales for their employees, they must heed 
government-issued regulations on the remuneration of public service employees. 
Other important forms of cooperation have resulted from the existing legislation 
in the area of state and local administration. The state administration agencies are 
obliged to provide professional help to the local administrations on how to apply legal 
regulations and supply the  required data from their records. They must also assist them 
in matters of bookkeeping and contribute to the training of local administrative staﬀ and 
councilors. On the other hand, the agencies of the local administration must supply the 
central state administration with data required for record-keeping, assist them in ﬁnding 
premises for state agencies active on their territory, assist in criminal prosecutions, allow 
supervision over the management of funds provided to municipalities by the state, and 
inform on the result of the annual audit of municipal operations by an independent 
auditor (member of the Slovak Board of Auditors). A municipal region has the authority 
to point out any problems it discovers in the course of its supervisory activity, while 
municipalities furnish the regional oﬃce and the Slovak Statistical Oﬃce with all data 
pertinent to the management of the municipality.
Certain characteristics of local self-government in Slovakia derive from the way 
local autonomy has been created “from above,” i.e., by the highest oﬃces of the state 
administration in such a way as to leave as much power as possible in the hands of  the 
central administration, including the power to control local self-governments. In the 
course of the transfer of competencies, however, this tug of war has gradually shifted in 
favor of local admini strations, strengthening the legal autonomy of local self-go vernments 
and fostering cooperation and coordination between the state administration and the 
muni cipalities. 
2.2 Fiscal Autonomy
According to the views expressed by the representatives of the Association of Slovak 
Communities and Cities (Sýkora 2002, 2003) and also by the majority of mayors and city 
mayors (Malíková 1997; Sopóci 1995), the single biggest obstacle to municipal autonomy 
and the proper functioning of local governments in Slovakia is their insuﬃcient ﬁnancial 
autonomy. This has been the case from the beginning of self-government to the present 
day. Some of the obstacles that have interfered with strengthening the ﬁscal autonomy 
of municipalities are:
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 • Inadequate internal funding sources;
 • Excessive dependence on external sources, mainly transfers from the state budget, 
which do not seem to follow any clear and stable rules;
 • Speciﬁc, purpose-bound state subsidies that restrict the autonomy of 
self-government; and
 • Ongoing decentralization of inadequately funded responsibilities, especially 
those competencies that tax the ﬁnancial resources of local self-go vernments 
the most. 
The Municipal Act mandates that communities and cities fund their needs from:
 • Own revenue (from municipal property and property made available for 
communal use, local taxes and fees, tax-share taxes collected by the state, and 
ﬁnes and other income;
 • State subsidies (endowments and transfers from the state budget and state funds, 
purpose-bound donations, etc.); and
 • Other sources such as donations and yields of voluntary collections, grants, 
loans, subsidies from regional authorities, resources used jointly with other 
municipalities, and ﬁnancial funds coming from outside the budget.
These revenues form the basis of the ﬁnancial management of municipalities 
during a calendar year. The budget contains revenues and expenditures pertinent to 
self-government, ﬁnancial links to the state budget, to the budgets of relevant municipal 
regions, and to juridical and natural persons. The municipal budget is approved by the 
council, after the residents have been given an opportunity to make suggestions and 
comments. The same rules apply to the annual ﬁnancial statement, which must be 
veriﬁed by an auditor.
The reason why municipalities suﬀer a perpetual lack of funds lies in the fact 
that the standing legislation and particularly that regulating the funding of local 
self-government (the Municipal Property Act, the Accounting Rules Act, and tax laws) 
restrains municipalities in their eﬀorts to accrue the resources necessary to adequately 
cover all their expenses and costs. 
The income generated by own resources of Slovak communities and cities does 
not form the decisive part of their budget. This is because municipalities were stripped 
of their most lucrative property—local businesses— by the National Council Act on 
Community Assets of 1991; only the public utility establishments were left with the 
municipalities. Thus, the typical assets of Slovak municipalities are real estate consisting 
of administration and school buildings, social, health care, sports, and other public 
facilities, and sometimes the production premises of former business facilities of national 
committees. In other words, the municipalities lost the substance needed for business 
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activities pursued by municipalities prior to 1948. Their revenue has become limited to 
their share in local taxes and tariﬀs, which is why the current income of municipalities 
consists mainly of revenue collection. 
At present, taxes amount to about one-third of the total income of communities. 
The Munici pality Act deﬁnes these as revenue gained from own sources, which consist 
of the due share of state taxes and the revenue from local taxes and tariﬀs.
The amount of the tax share from the state administration is determined annually 
by the State Budget Act. The communities thus obtain a share from the taxes of physical 
and legal entities and from the road tax. The conditions and a legislative mechanism 
for calculating the proportion of taxes appropriated for municipalities has not yet been 
agreed on and remains the subject of annual bargaining between the government and 
the parliament during the passing of the state budget bill. Communities and cities take 
an active part in the bargaining, mainly through their representatives in the Association 
of Towns and Communities of Slovakia and other represen tatives, in an eﬀort to gain 
the biggest share of the state taxes.
During the last few years, the municipal share of state-collected taxes has been 
7%–10%. The share municipalities obtain from taxes collected from physical entities 
was 10%–15%. The lump sum thus obtained has been proportionately divided on the 
per capita principle. The tax share from taxes of legal entities was only 4%–6%, divided 
as follows: 60% according to the per capita principle and 40% according to the seat 
of the taxpayer. Road tax revenue has been divided as follows: 60% goes to the state 
budget and 40% to the municipal budget (with the exception of the cities of Bratislava 
and Košice, where the proportions are reversed).
The constitution also deﬁnes local taxes as community resources. Legally, however, 
these taxes have not yet been made part of the state tax system and are thus not a 
community resource. Legalization of local taxes would bring to the communities an 
important ﬁnancial source and would make them more independent from the external 
sources. 
The only legalized part of  local taxes is the real estate tax. The communities prescribe 
the real estate tax in accordance with the pertinent legislation (mainly the Act on 
Administration of Taxes and Fees and on Changes in the System of Territorial Financial 
Authorities), taking into account their own needs. The particular conditions of collection 
and administration of the real estate tax communities speciﬁes the annually approved 
general binding order. The collected real estate tax enters the community budget. Incomes 
from these taxes are 10%–12% of the municipal budgets (see Appendix 1). 
Local fees are legal payments that communities specify pursuant to the Local Fee 
Act in their general binding orders. The following local fees are collected: for the use 
of public places, for using apartments or parts of an apartment for purposes other than 
residence, for renting rooms, the recreation or health resort fee, the dog fee, entrance 
fees, the liquor and tobacco sales fee, a car entrance fee for the historical parts of cities, 
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an advertising fee, game machine fees, vending machine fees, a fee collected for placing 
nuclear equipment within the territory of the community (in case the community or part 
of it  ﬁnds itself in the danger zone), and fees for the collection, transport, and disposal 
of communal and petty building waste generated within the municipality’s territory. 
Income from these taxes is from 4% to 10% of municipalities’ budgets.
An important source of community revenue consists of subsidies and transfers from 
the state budget, from speciﬁc programs managed by the ministries and from state 
funds. The state budget appropriates (in a special chapter) funds for the administration 
of municipal functions of communities with up to 3,000 inhabitants, subsidies for 
local transportation, funds for ﬁnishing school buildings under construction, subsidies 
for individual needs arising from the self-government status, a decentralization subsidy 
for functions and duties taken over from the state administration, as well as subsidies 
for other purposes envisioned by the government policy. To the extent that the state 
budget can accommodate the expense, ministries and state funds can appropriate funds, 
both repayable and non-repayable, e.g., for environmental protection, for support of 
youth sports and educational activities, housing support etc. Subsidies from the state 
budget may be allocated to development programs and activities preferred by the state 
policies. Likewise, the government has allocated standard subsidies to municipalities 
that have insuﬃcient revenues to perform their functions properly. The distribution of 
these sources among the municipalities is decided by the ministries and the state funds. 
Transfers and subsidies are about 35% of the municipal budgets.
Of the other municipal revenues not related to the state budget, the most important 
are:
 • loans;
 • revenue from administrative fees collected for permits, certiﬁcates, and 
licenses; 
 • income earned by business activities including dividends, levies, and proﬁt-
sharing in trade companies with municipal participation;
 • income from state organizations,
 • income from loans and deposits, domestic and foreign grants;
 • revenue from ﬁnancial operations, sales of movable assets, and sales of shares; and
 • repayment of granted loans and credits.
In addition, municipalities can muster further resources such as those used jointly 
with other municipalities and other physical and legal entities, as well as funds obtained 
from non-budgetary sources; they can also make bids for pre-accession funds allocated 
by the European Union and funds distributed by international associations, provided 
they can draft adequate, competitive projects. So far, such projects have been drafted 
(and funds obtained) by only a few dozen Slovak municipalities. 
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Credits and municipal bonds are also sources of municipal funds. These can only 
be used to cover capital needs without causing a budget imbalance in the current ﬁscal 
year. The Act on Budgetary Rules forbids municipalities to guarantee loans from the 
proportional state taxes for subjects that are neither founders nor institutors.
In order to illustrate the ﬁnancing of municipalities more fully, we should add 
that municipal budgets, in total, comprise only 10%–15% of the state budget. This 
balance is continuously shifting as more competence is transferred from the state to 
the municipal administration. In spite of this, the SR is behind Hungary, Poland, and 
Denmark, where municipal budgets form 25%, 20%, and 40% of the state budgets 
respectively (Nižňanský, Kling 2001).    
Table 4.2
State and Municipal Budget Expenditures [Billions of Slovak Crowns]
Indicator 1991 1995 2000
State budget expenditures 127.1 171.4 240.8
Municipal expenditures 14.3 18.9 27.3
Source: Slovak Statistical Yearbook, 2001. 
The gradual transfer of ever more competence from the local state administration 
to municipalities pushes the idea of broad local government to its completion, the 
ﬁnal goal being a local self-government equipped with a wide scope of powers and 
duties, with which it should serve the citizen. The competence shift came about in a 
piecemeal manner, driven by reforms of the local state administration. One of the most 
signiﬁcant steps towards strengthening local government occurred in 2001 with the 
creation of the municipal regions, with the concomitant shift of powers from the local 
state administration to regional municipal oﬃces. The responsibilities taken over by the 
regional oﬃces require sound ﬁnancial and organizational background. The shifting of 
competence has brought elementary schools, social institutions, smaller health care, and 
some cultural institutions into the care of local governments, whereas high schools, larger 
health care, and some cultural institutions will be administrated by the municipal regions. 
Funding of these public institutions comes both from local (regional) governments and 
from the state administration. Thus, the wages of elementary school staﬀ and the school’s 
energy bills, for example, are covered by the state administration, while other expenses 
and expenditures are covered by the budget of the local government or (when the local 
government has run out of funds) by contributions from parents and sponsors.  
Ever since the revival of local self-government, adequate funding has been one of its 
most pressing problems. Partly, this has been generated by the wording of the pertinent 
laws, which forbade local government participation in privatization and allocated far 
too small a portion of collected revenue to the disposal of local government. Local 
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governments, starved for funds, inevitably became ﬁnancially dependent on the state 
administration and increasingly dependent on alternative ﬁnancial resources. Eﬀorts to 
provide adequate funding for local government were disrupted by frequent legislative 
changes, such as amendments to the taxation scheme, reforms of the system of public 
funding, and organizational changes within the state administration and local self-
government. The instability caused by the above changes, the inability of the state 
administration to eliminate large tax evasions, and the general trends in the Slovak 
economy, such as high inﬂation and other eﬀects—all have had a detrimental eﬀect on 
the performance of local self-government. 
In general, although the total expenditure of local government in the last twelve years 
grew nominally, when adjusted for inﬂation, it stagnated or even decreased somewhat. As 
a result, local government was unable to maintain the required level of performance.
The above trend does not mean that all local governments are necessarily in the 
same situation. Their results depended on variable factors, mainly size and place (in 
Slovakia there are regions that diﬀer markedly in their economic prosperity) and the 
capabi lities of their representatives. As a result, the income and expen ditures of Slovak 
municipalities vary widely.
The endeavor to improve the performance of local governments has so far been rather 
ineﬀective in mitigating the gaping diﬀerences among municipalities, as this was not the 
primary objective. State subsidies were mainly deployed to secure the basic functions of 
local governments in smaller communities or to alleviate pressing local problems. The 
redistribution of proportional tax shares was used to alleviate the diﬀerences in ﬁnancial 
standing of small municipalities.  Some cities tried to improve their ﬁnancial standing 
by issuing bonds and some communities and cities took loans, mainly from the First 
Communal Bank. The cumulative debt of municipalities reached 12,965 million Slovak 
crowns by the year 2000.
Table 4.3
Trends in Indebtedness of Local Self-governments [Billions of Slovak Crowns]
Year 1997 1998 1999        2000            2001
Amount of debt 6,949 9,240 10,589       12,261     12,727        
Source: Slovak Statistical Yearbook, 2001.
The ﬁnancial autonomy of Slovak municipalities thus remains one of the most 
important unresolved issues of municipal autonomy and of its operability. The core of 
the problem lies in the inability of municipalities to secure adequate income from their 
own resources and hence their overt dependence on external resources, mainly those 
provided by the state (through redistribution of state funds and loans). The current 
legal status of municipalities in Slovakia is partly to blame for this. The ongoing transfer 
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of competencies from the state to the municipalities further aggravates the ﬁnancial 
standing of municipalities.
2.3 Political Autonomy
Slovak political parties have yet to ﬁnish their process of crystallization and stabilization. 
The ongoing process of proﬁling and reproﬁling of parties, the various party mergers 
and splits into factions and even into new parties, and the continuing creation of new 
parties are some of the reasons why many authors do not consider the Slovak party 
system suﬃciently stable and expect further changes (Kubín 2002; Mesežnikov 2001; 
Szomolányi 1999).
Local party representatives often show little ﬂexibility in pursuing their party policies, 
adhering strictly to party ideology and central party directives and causing frequent 
conﬂicts in the local representative bodies. The parties with the highest proﬁles are the 
Christian-democratic Movement (KDH), the Slovak Communist Party (KSS), the 
Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO), the Slovak National Party (SNS), and the Party of 
Hungarian Coalition (SMK). Most conﬂicts both at the parliamentary and the local level 
arise among the representatives of these parties (Mesežnikov and Nižňanský 2002).
With their due share of local autonomy, the local branch oﬃces of political parties 
pursue the party program, operate according to party rules, and are directed or coor-
dinated by party central oﬃces. The parties diﬀer, of course, in the degree of autonomy 
they allow to their branch oﬃces. But generally, the branch oﬃces of political parties in 
Slovakia pursue the party program approved by their party conference, convention, or 
congress (Mesežnikov 1999, 2001). This explains why local politics, especially in larger 
communities and in cities where there are branches of several parties, are essentially the 
same as on the parliamentary and government levels. 
There is, however, a special feature of local politics in Slovakia that diﬀeren tiates 
it from parliamentary politics. At the local level, party coalitions often form among 
parties that oppose each other at the parliamentary level. Political analysts account for 
this phenomenon by assuming, on the one hand, that at the local level common local 
goals elicit joint eﬀorts even in diﬀerent political camps and, on the other hand, that it 
is the result of the lack of political maturity of Slovak political parties and their members 
(Krivý 1999; Mesežnikov and Nižňanský 2002). In municipalities with less than 500 
(or 1,000) inhabitants—proportionally 40% (or 68%) of all municipalities—the party 
local branch very often does not exist at all, or there are only one or two branches. The 
local representatives, therefore, tend to pay more attention to the needs and problems 
of their own municipalities.
During both terms of the Mečiar government, but mainly from 1994 to 1998, 
political clientelism and corruption strengthened and became widespread (Sopóci 
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2002b), also pervading other walks of life and surviving to this day. The funding of 
municipalities also became part of the game, as funding was inﬂuenced by party politics. 
Thus, municipalities having at their helm mayors, lord mayors, and councilors aﬃliated 
with the government coalition and allied parties were given precedence in the distribution 
of subsidies. (The Municipality Act stipulated that the positions of mayor or lord mayor 
were compatible with those of the deputy of the National Council or the Regional 
council.) Moreover, local councilors were allowed to hold concurrent positions in the 
state and public service, the positions of judge and attorney being the sole exceptions. 
The most notorious case demonstrating this point was the state subsidy allowed to the 
city of Žilina for the large-scale reconstruction of public transportation, solely because 
the lord mayor, Ján Slota, had also been the chairman of the coalition, the Slovak 
National Party. Another case concerned moving the seats of several national oﬃces and 
that of the Bank of Slovakia to Banská Bystrica, a city dominated by the ruling HZDS 
movement.  HZDS also used subsidies, loans, and various economic measures to favor 
another “center”—the city of Trenčín and several other cities. By the same token, cities 
dominated by representatives aﬃliated with the opposition parties were handicapped 
by the government (Mesežnikov and Ivantyšyn 1999).
As a consequence of such policies, in each election term there were some 20 to 
30 depu ties, oﬃcers of the state, and other top party representatives who succeeded 
in running concurrently for the oﬃce of mayor, lord mayor, or councilor of a local or 
city council. The most conspi cuous example was again the lord mayor of Žilina, Ján 
Slota, who was also chairman of the Slovak National Party and deputy of the Slovak 
National Council.
This practice has continued to this day, with many mayors or local representatives 
occupying concurrent positions in the highest legislative and executive organs of the 
SR. For example, the city mayor of Komárno, Tibor Bastrňák (SMK), also sits in the 
parliament, the National Council of the SR;  the mayor of the city district of Bratislava, 
Rača Pavol Bielik (SDKÚ–KDH–SZS), serves concurrently as the vice-chairman of the 
Bratislava self-government region; the mayor of the village of Čenkovce, József Kvarda 
(SMK), serves as state secretary of the Ministry of Culture of the SR; and  the city mayor 
of Trenčín, Juraj Liška (SDKÚ), is an MP.
Any mayor or city mayor who also occupies a position in the highest state organs 
is an asset to the community, since he or she can guarantee preferential treatment and 
more chances to get subsidies from the government, its ministries, or from other central 
institutions. Conversely, the overlap of central and local politics at the personal level 
can also aﬀect local politics, albeit its eﬀect should not be overestimated. In 1998, the 
governing coalition (HZDS–SNS–ZRS) was defeated in both the parliamentary and 
the municipal elections, even in communities that had been dominated from1994 to 
1998 by representatives with the same party aﬃliation and enjoying the perquisites of 
the above dual-position system.
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Hence, the political autonomy of local governments in larger communities and 
in cities has been limited by the fact that the local oﬃces of political parties carry out 
their party politics, transferring the plague of political clientelism to the municipal level 
and aﬀecting the ultimate success of municipalities in some of their self-government 
tasks. At the same time, parties that oppose each other in the National Council form 
successful new coalitions and alliances at the municipal level. In small municipalities, 
where political life has remained somewhat vestigial, there have been virtually no 
problems with political autonomy. 
2.4 Conclusion
The return of local self-government in 1990 unquestionably brought about the 
democratization of political and public life in Slovak communities and cities. Public 
administration reform, mainly involving decentralization, has yet to be completed. The 
reform process is currently in its last phase, in which the posttotalitarian rivalry between 
the state and local administration has become somewhat settled, giving the system of 
public administration in Slovakia some stability, albeit temporary.
The broad range of legally mandated powers of local self-governments has gradually 
come to life, at the same time narrowing the elbowroom of the state administration. 
This process, which began in 1990, has been slowed down by the tendency of state 
administration oﬃcials (and politicians, including political nominees in the central 
oﬃces of the state administration) to keep as much power and hold sway over as much of 
the ﬁnancial resources as possible. On the other side, the problem is exacerbated by the 
unpreparedness, unwillingness, and inability of the staﬀ of local self-government to cope 
with new tasks transferred to them. As a result, local self-government is often plagued 
by bad management, a growing indebtedness of municipalities, poor service to citizens, 
and complacency about their views and needs. Not surprisingly, there are cases where the 
local self-government serves its citizens worse than the former state administration. 
We have yet to reach the end of the road to legal and ﬁnancial autonomy of 
self-go verned communities and cities of the Slovak republic. On the positive side, 
decentralization of the state administration has progressed satisfactorily as far as its 
legal underpinnings are concerned (mainly laws, less so with respect to the operating 
regulations). However, the implementation of new legislation remains a problem area—a 
fact for which the representatives of the state administration take the greatest part of 
the blame, along with local representatives. 
Law enforcement remains a problem, leaving much to be desired both on the part 
of the state administration and the local self-government. Since it is still a feature of 
Slovak politics to have individuals occupying high positions in both the state and party 
administrations, and also positions in local representative bodies, it will be interesting 
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to see whether this will be conducive to strengthening the political, legal, and ﬁnancial 
autonomy of local self-governments. It has yet to be seen how the relevant political 
parties will redeﬁne their activities at the central and local levels of politics. It is diﬃcult 
to foresee a time when several political parties, e.g., the current government coalition 
parties, will be able to move along hand in hand towards completion of the reforms.
Having had so many new powers and responsibilities transferred to them, numerous 
Slovak municipalities must consider whether they are able to assume those tasks on their 
own, or should join their forces or even their communities with other municipalities 
to increase their capacity. 
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT
3.1 Civil and Political Rights
The Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees basic rights to all citizens, irrespective 
of their gender, race, skin color, mother tongue, religion, political aﬃliation or views, 
national or social origin, ethnicity, fortune, origin, or other status. No one may be 
singled out, handicapped, or promoted because of any of these factors. In conformity 
with the European standard, the constitution gives all Slovak citizens the basic human 
rights and liberties, including political, economic, social, and cultural rights, the right 
to protection by the court, and other legal protections. 
The constitution decrees that aﬃliation with any national or ethnic minority must 
not put anyone at a disadvantage. Slovak citizens belonging to such minorities have 
constitu tionally guaranteed rights to free development, mainly the right to join other 
minority members in developing their own culture, the right to accept instructions 
and disse minate information in their own mother tongue, to join national associa-
tions, and to found and operate educational and cultural institutions. In addition, 
under the conditions described in the law, members of minority groups have the 
right to learn the oﬃcial language, to be educated in their own language and to use it 
in oﬃcial proceedings, as well as the right to participate in dealing with matters 
concerning natio nal and ethnic minorities. The constitution further declares that 
these minority rights must not endanger the sove reignty and territorial integrity of the 
Slovak Republic or lead to discrimination against other citizens (Constitution of the 
SR 2003).
The Municipality Act does not make distinctions according to social background, 
origin, race, nationality, or ethnicity. The act deﬁnes a community inhabitant as a 
person with permanent residency in the community. According to the Act on Naming 
Communities in the Language of a Minority, communities in which more than 20% 
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of inhabitants are not of Slovak nationality may be named in a language other than the 
oﬃcial state language. Similarly, the Act on the Usage of Minority Languages allows 
the naming of streets and public places in mino rity languages. Such rights have been 
implemented and exer cised in Slovakia. 
As far as the coexistence of Slovak and Hungarian nationals in the communities and 
cities of southern Slovakia is concerned, problems have centered mainly on language 
issues, e.g., the possibility of educating children in their mother tongue; the equal 
opportunity to pursue and develop cultural activities; ques tions concerning the formation 
and manifestation of national awareness of Slovaks and Hungarians living in nationally 
mixed communities; and the resulting tendency to favor their own people in managing 
the public aﬀairs of communities (Dostál 2001; Sopóci 2002). Research shows that in 
the mixed communities of citizens of Hungarian and Slovak nationality, both groups 
contribute about equally to the admini stration of public aﬀairs. 
By contrast, the coexistence of Roma and non-Roma is a hot issue in Slovakia. 
In the overwhelming majority of mixed Roma communities, the Roma people live in 
segregated areas within the communities or cities or sometimes in settlements outside, 
especially in eastern Slovakia. 
Poverty, unemployment, a low level of education, and high crime rates are some of 
the profound social problems aﬄicting this community (Vašečka 2002), and which have 
led to the stigmatizing of this group by the majority. The history and causes of these 
social ills, such as the disappearance of industries in which the Roma were traditionally 
employed, are little understood in Slovak society. In the context of the deep malaise 
encountered during the transition from a communist to a free market system, the Roma 
became a convenient scapegoat for many non-Roma people, whose hostile attitudes 
toward the Roma are now pervasive in Slovakia. Roma face discrimination in social 
services, are underrepresented in local governments, and remain excluded from the 
developing sense of community in the new Slovakia.
 
3.2 The Rule of Law
Representatives of local self-government in Slovakia generally respect the standing laws 
and regulations. Cases where the law has been broken mostly concern the activities of 
mayors and city mayors, with some of the unlawful activities originating in the local 
bodies of representatives. The prominence of mayors and city mayors in this respect may 
have to do with their strong position in the communities, which, when unchecked by 
members of the local board and by engaged citizens, can easily get out of hand. Thus, it 
is not surprising that attempts to break or bend the laws and regulations or violations of 
human rights have been recorded more often in smaller communities with a politically 
uniform population (Nižňánsky 1999).
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Nevertheless, in the few cases of unlawful activities that were recorded by citizens 
who lodged a complaint with the authorities, these became public and were decided 
in the courts. There have certainly been other cases that were not known or reported 
to the authorities, mostly owing to the passivity of citizens. Therefore, the frequency 
of such activities can be assessed only on the basis of public opinion polls, sociological 
research, and the estimates of experts. A speciﬁc problem of Slovakia continues to be 
the underperformance of the police, the attorneys, and the courts—a circumstance that 
negatively aﬀects lawfulness in the Slovak munici palities. In all these organs that act as 
independent representatives of the state, of state power, and of lawfulness, corruption 
and clientelism have long been present in Slovakia. Numerous decisions have been 
subjected to domestic and foreign criticism (Ivantyšyn and Sičáková 1999; Sičáková 
and Zemanovičová 2001).
A few examples of cases of legal violations and even of constitutional, basic human 
and civil rights perpetrated by the representatives of the local self-government in Slovakia 
may be instructive. Quite often (several times a year) municipalities issue general binding 
orders that are in conﬂict with laws or the constitution. A case in point is the general 
binding order issued by the local self-government of the city district of Bratislava, 
Nové Mesto, which forbids begging and the consumption of alcohol in public places. 
The case was appealed and ended ultima tely before the Constitutional Court of the 
Slovak Republic. In its ﬁnding, the court stated that this binding order was in conﬂict 
with the Constitution of the SR, namely with the constitutional law cited also by the 
Charter of Basic Rights and Liberties, and also in conﬂict with the Municipality Act in 
the wording of later regulations.
Unfortunately, the ﬁndings and decisions of the courts and the Constitutional Court 
of the SR have often been ignored by other organs of state power and by municipal 
organs as well. One example is the ﬁnding of the Consti tutional Court that the village 
of Brunovce violated the constitutional right of its citizen, Juraj Kukla, to possess 
free access to elected and other positions in the community and to information. The 
community council refused to approve his assuming the position of member of the local 
council, although it was obliged to do so, and refused to provide information about the 
acti vities of the mayor and the council. Another example concerns the ﬁnding of the 
Constitutional Court on the violation of the citizens’ right to vote by the village council 
of Dolné Krškany. On the basis of an unfounded decision of the village council, the 
mayor refused to register the permanent residency of several citizens and she prevented 
them from taking part in the elections to the local self-government. Both mayors ignored 
the court decisions or failed to take measures to comply with the decisions.
The existing legal position of the mayors allows them, once supported by the 
local council, to dodge compliance with the decisions of courts and ﬁndings of the 
Consti tutional Court. If the law is eventually enforced, it is still to the detriment of 
the communities, since they have to pay the imposed ﬁnes and legal charges, even if it 
requires the seizure of public property.
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The position of the mayor or city mayor in local self-government has been very 
strong, not least because of his or her ability to temporarily stall council resolutions 
by not signing them within the prescribed period of time. This might happen if he 
or she is convin ced that a resolution is in conﬂict with the law, or that it is obviously 
unfavorable to the com munity. The decision to do so is  based entirely on the mayor’s 
subjective asses sment of the matter. A mayor can thus block the attempted proceedings 
of the repre sentatives in cases when the latter have uncovered a violation of the law or 
of re gulations by the mayor, and can counteract it by his or her own resolution. 
The unusual position of mayors and city mayors is not only due to the broad legal 
powers given to them by the law, but also because they frequently hold high political 
positions concurrently, e.g., members of parliament, vice-chairmen and deputies of 
self-governed regions, high oﬃcers of political parties, and high oﬃcers of the state 
admini stration, such as state secretaries and ministerial clerks. In such cases, the conﬂict 
of interest between those state administration positions and the position of mayor is 
all too obvious.
The institutional problems in this area are compounded by the fact that the chief 
auditors of  communities are not elected directly by the residents, but by the community 
representatives to whom they responsible (and who can also terminate their employment). 
In politically or otherwise homogeneous communities, this creates conditions conducive 
to non-transparent and uncontrolled decision-making and management of local 
aﬀairs—especially when the public is disengaged. In addition, there are currently only 
285 part-time or full-time chief auditors in Slovak communities. In other words, about 
90% of municipalities run their business without adequate control (Benkovský 2003).
Among the various unsuccessful attempts to curb the rights of citizens in local 
self-government was the Slovak government’s eﬀort in 1998 to push through an 
amendment of the Act on Elections to Local Self-governments. In this amendment 
the government tried to supplant the direct election of individuals with the election of 
political parties. The amendment also provided representation in the local council for 
every minority, which, in the survey of 1991, was at least 5% of the total population 
of the community. The nationality of each candidate was to be stated on the list of 
candidates, to be set up by political parties and civic associations. The Constitutional 
Court found that this demand was in conﬂict with the Consti tution of the SR and 
repudiated any attempt to create inequality among candidates based on their nationality 
or ethnicity, since such inequality violated the principle of free competition of political 
parties in the democratic system.
The majority of the citizens of the Slovak Republic respect the legislation concerning 
local self-government (Nižňanský and Kling 2001). The municipalities ensure compliance 
with the law mainly by establishing a local police force responsible for public order and by 
means of a community board responsible for the collection of taxes and fees. Additional 
problems are caused by members of the Roma ethnic group and by criminals. There 
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is also a fairly populous group of citizens (including non-Roma citizens) that indulges 
in violations of local regulations on collection and disposal of com munal waste, public 
transport, and payment discipline (Ivantyšyn and Sičáková 1999).
3.3 Conclusion
By and large, the legislation on local self-government in Slovakia is comparable to similar 
legislation in the developed democratic countries. In addition, there is a similar degree 
of compliance with that legislation as in other walks of life of  Slovak society. 
The Municipality Act has already been amended several times, most recently 
in 2002. Its remaining imperfections, along with new developments and ongoing 
reform in public administration, indicate that this piece of legislation will have to be 
continuously changed. However, no ground-breaking changes are expected, only the 
further reﬁnement and patching of its weak points (some of which were discussed 
previously). The accessibility of citizens to legal procedures by the Municipality Act is 
established—there were neither objections nor requirements for change.
Further legal developments in the area of local self-government will depend 
decisively on whether there is a change in the relationship of citizens of municipalities 
to their local representatives and to the community in general. A swing towards positive 
develop ment is mainly in the hands of citizens who decide on the compo sition of local 
governments. It also depends on how much citizens engage in checking the conduct of 
local self-government during the electoral term—an area, it must be said, where there is 
much room for improvement. Once citizens become less abeyant and more involved in 
managing their local aﬀairs, they will be able to exert more pressure on the police, the 
courts, and the state executive oﬃces, forcing them to better perform their functions 
regarding local self-government (including the prosecution of violations of law by the 
representatives of local self-government).
4. TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
4.1 Transparency
According to the provisions of the Act on Free Access to Information, Slovak citizens 
have the right to obtain information from “obliged persons,” i.e., state organs, the 
local self-government, legal and physical entities equipped with powers in the area of 
self-government, legal entities managing public funds or public and state property, or 
other subjects at their disposal. Knowledge important for keeping citizens informed 
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on the activities of local self-government includes the following information, to which 
citizens must have access:
 • The competencies of the local self-government and a copy of the organizational 
structure of the community board;
 • The place, time, and way information on local self-government can be 
accessed;
 • Information on how to lodge a petition, a complaint, a suggestion, an initiative, 
or any other method of contact with the local self-government;
 • Notices of meetings and agendas of the council board;
 • Notices of public assemblies and their agendas;
 • Notices of parliamentary and local government elections, of state-wide or local 
referenda, and of the published results of elections and of referenda;
 • Notice of any approved generally binding order (VZN) of the community (these 
VZNs must be accessible to local residents at the local authority);
 • The proposed community budget prior to its approval, giving the citizens the 
chance to comment and raise questions on it;
 • The ﬁnancial statements of the community; and
 • Proposals for voluntary collections. 
The municipalities are obliged by the Municipality Act to publish this information 
at the oﬃcial community board for at least ﬁfteen days, three days prior to the meeting 
of the local council or the public assembly, and three weeks prior to the approval of 
the community budget. In addition, this information should be made public in the 
customary way, which in Slovak communities is usually over the local PA system, less 
often by way of local periodicals, and even less frequently on a local television network or 
the Internet. Municipalities that are not cities are exempt from the obligation to publish 
information in the “mass media,” as is mandated by the act, i.e., by telecommunications 
(radio, television, and the Internet). The act thereby takes into account the technical 
equipment and possibilities available to the majority of Slovak communities. The Act 
on Free Access to Information gives citizens the right to demand access to facts and 
data concerning the management of communal property, the content and fulﬁllment 
of contracts, and the operations performed under contracts made by the community.
The research conducted so far has revealed that communities are often inconsequential 
in fulﬁlling the above obligations (Velšic 2002). Research based on the LGS found that 
not all Slovak municipalities even make public their proposed budgets prior to approval by 
the local representatives. According to the respondents involved in the research, in 2002 
only about 80% of the municipalities in the research sample fulﬁlled this obligation.
The publishing of facts and data pertaining to the conduct of local self-government 
is usually a responsibility of the administrative staﬀ of local boards, and in small 
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communities this duty is assumed by the mayor. Only larger cities can aﬀord the position 
of a spokesperson or public relations oﬃcer.
In spite of the available legislation, Slovak citizens cannot be considered very 
knowledgeable about local self-government. According to the LGS research, about 25% 
of municipalities organized no public hearings or forums in 2002, about 25% only one, 
and about 20% two. Three or more public hearings or forums were organized in one-
third of the municipalities. Only 37.8% of  municipalities have their own website and 
45.9% can inform their inhabitants by e-mail. The results of other research show that 
less than one-third of respondents was satisﬁed with the extent of their knowledge about 
local self-government, about 40% was dissatisﬁed, and the remaining third showed no 
interest in matters of local self-government (Velšic 2002).
4.2 Corruption in Local Government
Politicians, political analysts, and commentators all concur in their opinion that the 
high degree of corruption and clientelism is the most burning problem of the reformed 
state administration in the Slovak Republic. Though both of the previous govern ments 
(the Vladimír Mečiar government of 1994–98 and the Mikuláš Dzurinda government 
of 1998–02 and after) launched anti-corruption programs, in neither case was there 
any signiﬁcant success.
Local self-government, too, has been tainted with a high degree of corruption. 
However, just as in the case of corruption within the state administration,  allegations 
of corruption within local self-governments are largely unconﬁrmed or are based on 
public opinion polls in which respondents vented their views on corruption or their 
experiences with corruption at the diﬀerent oﬃces or with representatives of the state 
or local administration (Ivantyšyn and Sičáková 1999). A public opinion poll on local 
self-government carried out in 1999 in nine cities of Slovakia merely found that almost 
half of the respondents considered corruption to be a widely spread phenomenon 
(Bernátová, et al. 2001, 236). The LGS research in 2003 revealed that only two-thirds 
of respondents thought there is corruption in local government. Clientelism (in cities) 
and nepotism (in villages) were considered the most frequent forms of corruption 
(Zemanovičová and Sičáková-Beblavá 2003, 9). There can be no doubt about the lack 
of trust of Slovak citizens toward the represen tatives of local self-government. The survey 
of 2001 showed that up to 57% of respondents thought local representatives are more 
concerned about their own proﬁts than about the needs of their community or city 
(Velšic 2002, 156).
However, there are very few proven cases of corruption in the organs of local 
self-government in Slovakia—about 30 persons on average are prosecuted in a year and 
only one or two of these cases concern local government (http://www.government.gov.
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sk). But it must be stated that neither the standing legislation on municipalities nor 
other pertinent legislation has created enough deterrence or has involved preventive 
measures against the corrupt behavior of staﬀ members or representatives of the public 
administration. The Municipality Act, for example, puts no obstacles in the way of the 
conﬂict of interest that arises between the position of a local public servant, such as the 
mayor, city mayor, local representative, chief of the local board, or chief auditor and their 
private business activities and those of their spouses and other relatives. The act only 
mentions the incompatibility of the position of mayor with the following other positions: 
community (city) employee, statutory representative of a budgetary or subsidized 
organization founded by the community in which he serves, local representative, 
chairman of the self-governed region, the leading position in the state administration, 
as well as judge or district attorney. Similar ineﬀective rules apply to other positions in 
the local self-government. Thus, there is no legislation that would forbid the elected 
local representatives or their spouses either to pursue private business activities in their 
communities or to take part in public tenders of the community. Also, there is as yet 
no legislation that would force local representatives to regularly disclose their income 
or the origin of their newly acquired property. All attempts to pass such legislation have 
failed—not least because of lobbying of the representatives of the Association of Towns 
and Villages and the vote of those MPs sitting in local self-governments (Mesežnikov 
and Nižňanský 2002).
The single most important electoral rule capable of preventing local representatives 
from pursuing biased interests is the opportunity for every eligible voter to submit 
his or her own nomination for the position of mayor or councilor as an independent 
candidate. The nomina tion is valid on condition that a petition to this eﬀect has been 
signed by at least 50 local residents (in communities up to 2,000 inhabitants), or by 
at least 100 local residents in larger communities. Citizens who are not members of 
political parties can be included as indepen dent candidates on the candidate rosters of 
political parties or coalitions.
Another rule serving as a preventive measure against the partiality of local 
representatives is the right to equal access to the local media and to communal space 
allocated by communities and cities for the electioneering of candidates. The Municipal 
Election Act decrees that all candidates standing for election must cover the costs of 
their elec tion campaign. There are no legal limits on the funds that can be spent for this 
purpose (as was the case in the campaign preceding the assembly election). However, with 
the excep tion of large cities, the costs of electioneering have been reasonable, certainly 
within the reach even of independent candidates.
Since funding of the election campaign does not tax the resources of candidates, it also 
does not create any commitment of candidates towards either a political party or a coalition. 
Such commitments, however, arise in the case of candidates nominated by a political party 
or party coalition, but it is more of a moral, rather than a ﬁnancial commitment.
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The struggle against corruption in local self-government is most eﬀective where 
there is mutual control between the mayor and employees of the municipal oﬃce on 
the one hand and the local representatives (city deputies) on the other, or where local 
residents take an interest in the conduct of local self-government. Most breaches occur 
during public procurement, the awarding of licenses and permits, and the hiring of staﬀ 
in the municipal oﬃces. Preventing this is possible only where the local representatives 
create an adequate political and professional counterweight to the mayor and where a 
substantial number of informed local residents take an active part in the public aﬀairs 
of the community. But these conditions largely do not exist in Slovak communities. On 
the contrary, the social atmosphere is often propitious to corruption and is coupled with 
the sloppy performance of institutions meant to discover and ﬁght it (Sopóci 2002).
The Association of Towns and Villages and other representatives of local 
self-government have thus far successfully avoided discussion of this topic of corruption. 
Their success is partly due to the fact that in the eyes of the public and the media, 
self-government has not been connected with corruption. It has been assumed that 
corruption mainly aﬄicts the highest ranks of the political order (especially concerning 
the privatization of state property and obtaining state orders), the courts, the police, 
oﬃces of the state administration, healthcare institutions, educa tional institutions, etc. 
(Ivantyšyn and Sičáková 1999; Sičáková and Zemanovičová 2001; Sopóci 2002). That 
is why local self-governments have so far not been compelled to address the issue of 
corruption, even though the problem has become quite serious. In addition, the burden 
of new tasks and responsibilities taken over from the state administration, compounding 
the ﬁnancial plight of local self-governments, has caused further delay in taking intitatives 
to tackle the problem of corruption in self-government in Slovakia.
4.3 Horizontal Accountability in Local Government
The Municipality Act gives local self-governments a deﬁned legislative space for making 
local decisions concerning community life, such as:
 • Approving the communal budget and its amendments, checking expenditures, 
approving the annual ﬁnancial statement, the emission of municipal bonds, the 
assumption of debts and obligations by the community, and the setting up and 
controlling of the principles for dealing with the property of the community;
 • Approving and creating development plans for the community;
 • Deciding on municipal taxes and levies, their introduction or abolition, and 
making decisions on accepting loans and credits;
 • Announcing local referenda on the most important questions of community 
life and community development and calling citizens’ assemblies;
 • Deciding on municipal regulations;
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 • Approving agreements on international cooperation and membership of the 
municipality in international associations;
 • Determining the organization of the local board (city council) and the 
remuneration of the mayor and the chief auditor;
 • Approving the remuneration scheme for the community employees and other 
regulations (agenda, etc.);
 • Establishing, abolishing, and controlling municipal budgetary and subsidized 
organizations and, upon the motion of the mayor, appointing and recalling their 
heads, establishing and abolishing trade organizations and other legal entities, 
approving community representatives in their organs, as well as approving the 
participating interests of the community in a legal entity;
 • Establishing and abolishing organs required for self-government and determining 
their scope of employment;
 • Proposing the coat-of-arms, the ﬂag, the seal, and the signature tune of the 
community; and
 • Awarding municipal prizes, decorations, and certiﬁcates of merit.
Under the provisions of the Act on Budgetary Rules, the local board or city council 
approves the budget and any amendments to it, oversees expenditures, and approves 
the ﬁnal statements, all municipal loans, credits, the emission of municipal bonds, 
and the assumption of liabilities. The budget is established for one calendar year and 
contains revenues and expenditures pertinent to the management of the community, the 
relationship with the state budget and with the budget of the self-government region, 
and ﬁnancial agreements with physical and legal entities.
The board or council appoints a chief auditor for a six-year term, during which he 
or she is a municipal employee accountable to the board or council. The community 
may establish an audit department, headed by the chief auditor. The chief auditor 
oversees the municipal revenues and expenditures, management of the communal 
property, as well as business operations of the municipal budgetary and subsidized 
organizations, issues professional evaluations of the municipal budget and of the ﬁnal 
statements prior to their approval by the local board, submits a report at least once 
a year to the local board, and acts together with the state organs in the management 
of funds allocated from the state budget. The Municipality Act speciﬁes several ways 
for local boards to control the mayor and the administrative machinery of the local 
board. For instance, the local board determines the internal organization of the 
latter, as well as the remuneration of the mayor and the chief auditor. The board also 
approves the remuneration scheme, establishes, abolishes, and controls the municipal 
budgetary and subsidized organizations, and appoints and recalls (on the motion of 
the mayor) their heads. It also founds and abolishes trade companies and nominates 
community represent atives to manage them, and establishes and abolishes organs 
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(e.g., local council, commission) required for self-government and determines their 
scope of employment.
The local board can also initiate the recall of the mayor by a popular vote of local 
residents. The board can announce such a vote, if petitioned by at least 30% of eligible 
voters, or in cases of gross or repeated neglect of duties, a breach of the Constitution of 
the SR, of constitutional laws, and of other laws and generally binding legal regulations. 
(This legal tool of the local board has so far proved to be problematic, especially when 
the popular vote later conﬁrms the mayor in oﬃce.) The local board can also announce 
a popular vote on the recall of the mayor if he or she is absent or unable to perform 
duties for longer than six months.
The local board can remove the chief auditor in cases of felony, having other positions 
incompatible with that of auditor, gross or repeated neglect of duties, or if his or her 
compe tency for legal acts has been restricted or cleared.
The mutual control between the mayor and the local board takes place mainly at the 
meetings of the board. These are convened as needed (but not less than twice a month) 
and are chaired by the mayor. If at least a third of the local representatives (city deputies) 
request it, the mayor is obliged to call a meeting within ten days from the date a demand 
was made, unless the date has already been included in the formal request. The local 
board can meet even if not convened by the mayor; the board can be summoned by the 
deputy mayor (elected by local represen tatives from among themselves as a substitute 
during the mayor’s absence or incap acity, normally for the whole term of oﬃce), or by 
any local representative autho rized by the board. 
In Slovakia, the position of the mayor as the representative and highest executive 
oﬃcer of the community has been fairly independent from the local board and entails a 
high degree of responsibility towards the citizens as voters. The relationship between the 
mayor and the local board has been designed to achieve the necessary balance of power 
and sharing of responsibility in managing public aﬀairs. The position of the mayor has 
been strengthened by the fact that he or she represents the community in public, acts as 
the statutory representative of the community in property-related and business matters 
and also as the executive organ in administrative matters, has the power to convene and 
chair the meetings of the local board as the other municipal authority, and conﬁrms or 
suspends resolutions of the local board by signing or not signing them. 
The mayor has the right to suspend the execution of a local board resolution that 
he or she thinks it is unlawful or obviously disadvantageous for the community, by not 
signing it within the deadline set by law. A suspended resolution can be recon ﬁrmed 
by a three-ﬁfths majority vote of all local board representatives. If such a vote does not 
take place within two months of the suspension date, the resolution becomes invalid. 
Once the resolution is reconﬁrmed, the mayor can no longer stop it. The intention to 
suspend a resolution is usually associated with the required proof of it being unlawful or 
unfavorable to the community. Since the law does not envision any other proceedings, 
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it leaves much room for the subjectivity and volunta rism of the mayor, when his or her 
decisions are not corroborated by a lawyer or an attorney.
With respect to control over the staﬀ of the municipal authority, it is the mayor 
who appoints, directs, controls, and ﬁres the head of this authority and also directs 
and controls the performance of other staﬀers. Thus, the mayor’s position in this area 
is very strong indeed. 
Smaller municipalities save operating costs by hiring fewer administrative staﬀers 
and very small communities employ just a mayor. Only larger villages and cities can 
aﬀord an administrative staﬀ consisting of several tens of persons, organized in several 
departments. These staﬀs are professionals, usually without political aﬃliation (although 
often hired through social networks and clientelism). In their positions they act mostly 
along professional and not political lines, aﬀecting the operations of local boards by their 
professional activities rather than by their political orientation or aﬃliation.  They rarely 
play a signiﬁcant role in local politics, at most acting as silent allies of the mayors and 
city mayors and much more rarely as allies of the local representatives or city deputies 
(Malíková 1997; Sopóci 1995).
The LGS and LRS research allows us to verify the above conclusions based on the 
evaluation of elected representatives and administrative staﬀ. The results do indeed show 
that the observed division of power in local self-government harmonizes with what was 
envisaged and decreed by the law in the Slovak Republic. The decisive or most signiﬁcant 
actors in the power game taking place at the local level are the mayors and city mayors, 
closely followed by the local boards (city councils), with the least inﬂuential being the 
administrative staﬀ members of the local self-government.
The law envisions a division of power in which local boards and city councils have 
a controlling role. However, mayors and city mayors have proved  better informed 
and more skillful in handling problems and conﬂicts and in dealing with the local 
representatives and citizens, owing to their formal powers and their everyday contact 
with the community and its problems. The local representatives are less often involved 
in the problem-solving process and less knowledgeable in legal matters, leaving them 
not as well equipped to tackle various tasks and solve community problems. Thus, 
in most communities mayors and city mayors have gained a dominant position in 
local self-governments by virtue of their superior knowledge and experience, very 
often irrespective of their political colors. Owing to their professional inferiority, local 
representatives are rarely in a position to eﬀectively control the activities of mayors and 
city mayors (Malíková 1997; Sopóci 1995; Velšic 2002).
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Figure 4.1
Perceived Inﬂuence on Local Government (7-Point Scale)
Source: LRS and LGS 2003.
4.4 Conclusion
There is still much room for improvement in the way local self-governments keep 
their citizens informed. In part, this is because of the passive attitude of the citizens 
themselves and their lack of interest both in the conduct of local self-government and in 
the possibilities open to them for control ling their representatives. Expert opinion has 
linked this rather indiﬀerent attitude of citizens to the generally high degree of corruption 
in both state and local administrative organs in Slovakia. Corroborative evidence is still 
largely lacking, since the problem of corruption in local self-governments has not yet 
become the focus of suﬃcient attention. Existing loopholes in the legislation concerning 
local self-government and the absence of eﬀective control mechanisms by the citizens of 
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communities and cities have created conditions conducive to corrupt behavior. In the 
absence of eﬀective control by the public, the distribution of power, deﬁned on the one 
hand by the standing legislation and on the other by inherited behavioral patterns, does 
not provide the prerequisites for a transparent, responsible, and honest way of performing 
public service—either by the elected representatives or by the employees.
Expert opinion seems to be unanimous that no improvement is possible until citizens 
become more active and involved. Amendments to the legislation could improve the 
transparency and controllability of local self-governments and better control by courts 
and district attorneys could assist in uncovering some of the corruption. Nevertheless, 
deep changes in this area can only be achieved by people becoming more interested in 
how the local self-go vernment is run. 
5. EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
5.1 Resource Control
The existing laws do not make it easy for communities and cities to collect taxes. The taxes 
they actually collect are real estate and house taxes. In addition, the local governments 
receive tax revenue from liquor and tobacco sales,  game machines, vending machines, 
and advertisements;  ﬁnes for polluting public places; and fees for the use of public places, 
for collecting and disposal of communal waste and petty building waste, dog fees, fees 
for speciﬁc services, administrative fees, and fees for public services (mourning house, 
cemetery services, pre-school institutions, public toilets, cultural, and sports facilities). 
Another source of internal revenue (both from physical and legal entities) is the non-tax 
revenue, such as income from real estate and house rentals, various duties, and donations. 
Communities also have income from the business of legal entities that they co-own. 
Other municipal revenue comes from external sources—from the state, various domestic 
and foreign grant organizations, donations, transfers, etc. The proportion of funds 
gained from these sources diﬀers from community to community, depending mainly on 
the number of inhabitants, the number of legal entities, i.e., businesses, self-employed 
persons and businesspeople, and on their prosperity (See Table A4.2).  
The collection of local fees, duties, and taxes does not usually pose any technical or 
organizational problems and the tax discipline of Slovak citizens remains relative high, 
with the possible exception of members of the underclass and some legal entities (http://
www.government.gov.sk). Donations and sponsorship from residents of municipalities 
(both physical and legal persons) do not signiﬁcantly contribute to municipal revenues. 
Local boards (city councils) often attempt to collect money for speciﬁc purposes, e.g., 
for the purchase of diagnostic health care equipment, equipment for elemen tary schools, 
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etc., but the economic situation of most Slovak citizens rarely allows them to make 
substantial contributions. Similarly, civic organizations not only cannot contribute to 
the community budget, but they often ﬁnd themselves in the position of supplicant. 
Cooperation among munici palities has so far failed to contribute signiﬁcantly to the 
funding of local self-go vernments in the SR (Mrva 2003).
The ﬁnancial situation of a municipality is reﬂected, among other factors, in the 
number of its employees—in small villages the mayor is frequently the only municipal 
employee, with the possible exception of the registrar, whose salary is paid by the state. 
Larger communities have an administrative staﬀ of several persons, while cities may 
have up to several dozen staﬀers. The size of the staﬀ does not only depend on the 
available funding, but is also determined by the tasks they are supposed to perform 
and the range of services provided. However, these two factors are interconnected, 
since the availability of funding is what determines the extent of service provision. In 
the majority of local self-governments in Slovakia—mainly smaller and middle sized 
municipalities—adequate funding is a serious problem. For example, in the smallest 
communities the mayor’s salary alone consumes most of the municipal budget. In such 
a situation, it is diﬃcult to envision how any community development is possible. 
The quality and qualiﬁcations of local government employees are guaranteed by a 
selection procedure used to hire personnel for local authorities. The candidates for such 
jobs must fulﬁll the criteria established for public service employees in Slovakia. The 
results of the LRS research show that the elected representatives of local self-governments 
consider the professional qualiﬁ cations and competence of administrative staﬀ to be very 
good. The majority of administrative employees responded that their prime objective 
on the job is to comply with the valid laws, rules, and procedures. Client satisfaction 
and quick and eﬀective service are the second priority.
5.2 Decision-making Capability
The Municipality Act decrees that meetings of the local board should take place as 
needed, but not less than twice a month. The LGS research shows that this ruling has 
been followed by the majority of municipalities (only 8.7% of local authority employees 
admitted that there were fewer than six local board meetings in their community in 
2002). In 75% of municipalities there were from six to ten meetings annually, so that 
there were one to three unscheduled meetings of the local board. In performing their 
duties, the overwhelming majority of representatives were very disciplined—adjournment 
or interruption of a meeting because of failure to meet the quorum occurred in only 
13.5% of munici palities. The meetings of local boards in 2002 were fairly eﬀective in 
their procee dings: postponement of decisions was a rare phenomenon in more than 
half of municipalities, in about one-ﬁfth it occurred from time to time, and in almost 
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one-ﬁfth the decisions were never postponed. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences among 
the municipalities when disaggregated by population size or by region.
Table 4.4
Most Frequent Reason for Postponement of Decisions 
by Local Representatives [%]
Reason Population of Municipality
999 and Less 1,000–4,999 Over 5,000
Lack of information 19.2 19.2 28.6
Lack of time 4.2 2.5 1.3
Obstruction 4.2 6.7 3.9
No agreement 15.0 15.0 1.4
No ﬁrm opinion 50.8 51.7 46.8
Other reasons 6.7 5.0 9.1
Source: LGS 2003.
Decisions were most often postponed because of representatives not being adequately 
prepared for the discussion and decision-making (they needed more time or more 
information to form an opinion); less frequent reasons for postponement were badly 
prepared proposals and motions and inability to reach a compromise. 
The notion of inadequately informed and unpre pared representatives (contrasting 
with the usually well prepared and informed mayors) was conﬁrmed by other analyses of 
the functioning of local self-government in Slovakia (Malíková 1997; Sopóci 1995).
Development plans in small and middle sized municipalities are conspicuous by 
their absence in Slovakia, partly due to incompetence and partly because of the limited 
possibilities of local self-governments to create such plans. In addition, certain kinds of 
plans would be redundant in any case, since most Slovak communities would have no 
resources to ﬁnance them. Table 4.5 gives more detail on the nature of such plans.
Several aspects of cooperation between local boards and mayors or city mayors have 
already been characterized. The LGS research, based on the responses of members of 
the administrative staﬀ of local boards, revealed that in 31.8% of municipalities the 
board almost always supports the standpoint of the mayor, in 63.1% they are mostly 
guided by objective criteria, and in 5.1% the board rarely supports the mayor’s proposal. 
This demonstrates representatives’ preference for problem-oriented and constructive 
discussions of public issues in the local assembly meetings, rather than acting out of 
partial and personal interest.
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Table 4.5
Programs of Local Policy and Municipal Development in Slovakia
Program Exists Does Not Exist
Work schedule for the municipal council and its committees 70.5 29.5
Long-term economic development program 26.4 73.6
Long-term program for local government investments 41.9 58.1
Public sanitation or environmental protection program 31.5 68.5
Program on public education 24.8 75.2
Sports program 27.4 72.6
Cultural program 32.3 67.7 
Plan for the ﬁnancial supervision of local gov. institutions 45.5 54.5
Guidelines for CAO reports for the mayor and councilors 25.2 74.8
Public safety and crime prevention program* 55.6 44.4
Health protection program* 35.3 64.7
Housing program* 50.0 50.0
Program to develop mass transportation* 14.7 85.3
Communication strategy* 65.7 34.3
Municipal beautiﬁcation* 61.1 38.9
Local regulation on handling of citizens’ requests* 81.6 18.4
Public procurement regulation* 97.4 2.6
Note: * cities over 20,000 inhabitants. 
Source: LGS 2003.
5.3 Output Control
The goals set out by self-governing authorities for their munici palities were only partially 
met—at least as far as implementation of their budgets is concerned. The LGS research 
found that only 61.3% of municipalities spent as much as was planned for the projects. 
In other municipalities, the means envisioned by the plan could not be expended: in 
19.4% of municipalities half of the projects were adequately funded and in 19.4% 
this was true of only a handful of projects. A similar rate of success was found for the 
completion of projects at planned deadlines. In 63.3% of municipalities, the majority of 
projects was completed by the deadline, in 19.7% of cases about half were completed, 
and in 17.1% only some could be ﬁnished by the deadline. About one-third (30.8%) had 
major problems, about half had small problems (53.4%), and 15.8% had no problem 
in funding the projects. These ﬁgures reﬂect the lower competency and ability of some 
local governments to handle municipal issues. Thus, the problem of local government 
is not only lack of ﬁnancial resources, but also their eﬀective use.
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In their eﬀorts to enhance eﬃciency, numerous local boards tried to streamline 
operational costs (69.9%), the cost of services of municipal institutions (54.5%), and 
the cost of services rendered by the local board itself (72.3%). Attempts to reduce costs 
through privatization or outsourcing have so far been rare (13.3% of municipalities made 
such attempts). Privatization and the contracting out of some operations are seen as a 
step in the right direction by the majority self-government employees, but unfortunately 
this has not always allowed reduction of the staﬀ of local authorities.
5.4 Conclusion
Local self-government in Slovakia is currently in the second phase of the transfer of 
responsibilities from the state administration. The transfer of powers from the center 
should be followed by the transfer of the majority of ﬁnancial resources, obtained mainly 
from taxes. But this second transfer has been slow to occur. Thus, local self-governments 
do not have suﬃcient funds to sustain the numerous new services they have taken over 
from the state, and they remain very much dependent on transfers and subsidies from 
the central state administration.
In spite of existing diﬀerences among the municipalities in Slovakia, their repre-
sentatives unanimously claim that the lack of funds represents the single biggest obstacle 
to more development, even in those communities where local self-government is capable 
of managing funds eﬀectively. However, analyses of the situation have shown that 
lack of funds was not the only obstacle—in many cases, planning, decision-making, 
and execu ting the activities of the municipalities leaves much to be desired. Until the 
ongoing reform of public administration has been completed, we will not know for 
sure whether the unsatisfactory performance of local boards and city councils has been 
the result of chronic underfunding or the local representatives’ inability to eﬀectively 
manage the funds in order to accomplish their intended purpose—the development of 
commu nities and cities. 
6. REPRESENTATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
6.1 Local Elections and Referenda
6.1.1 The Electoral System
The Act on Elections to Organs of Local Self-governments stipulates that elections will 
be held by secret ballot on the basis of direct, equal, and universal suﬀrage. The mayors 
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and city mayors are elected by a majority system and the members of local boards 
and deputies of city councils are determined by proportional representation. Elections to 
local self-governments are carried out in several constituencies, each with several mandates 
in which the number of elected local representatives is proportional to the number of 
inhabitants (local residents). In cities, subdivided to city districts, the borders of voting 
districts coincide with those of city districts. For the election of the mayor or city mayor, 
the community (city) forms a single one-mandate constituency. In communities and cities, 
the ballot casting and counting of votes is done in voting districts, each with about one 
thousand voters.
The number of local representatives is calculated prior to the election, according to 
the number of local residents (see Table 4.6).
Table 4.6
Number of Local Representatives in Communities
Number of Residents Number of Representatives Total 
Less than 40 3 40 
 41 to 500 3–5 5,851
501–1,000 5–7 5,331
1,001–3,000 7–9 6,274 
3,001–5,000 9–11 1,132
5,001–10,000 10–13 675
10,001–20,000 13–19 653
 20,001–50,000 15–25 1,134
 50,001–100,000 19–31 313
 Over 100,000 23–48 40 
Source: Slovak Statistical Oﬃce 2003.
The Municipality Act originally envisioned a higher number of local representatives 
(deputies), but the number was lowered in an amendment in 2002 in the interest of 
enhancing the eﬀectiveness of the business of local self-governments and because of the 
frequent inability of smaller communities to nominate enough representatives. In 2002, 
21,443 local representatives were elected, whereas 35,616 were elected in 1998 (before 
the reform). 
The Act on Elections to Local Self-governments stipulates that political parties or 
their coalitions may supply lists of candidates for community (city) representation, 
separately for each constituency. Independent candidates may also seek nomination in 
the local elections on condition that they attach a nomination form with the signatures 
of at least 100 eligible voters in communities with over 2,000 residents and 50 signatures 
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in communities with less than 2,000 residents. Likewise, candidates for the position of 
mayor (city mayor) may be nominated either by political parties or party coalitions (each 
party or coalition can only put forward one candidate). Indepen dent candidates may 
also run for the oﬃce of mayor, with the same requirement for residents’ signatures as 
in the election for representatives. The law guarantees that candidates have equal access 
to the local media and all are allotted equal space for putting up their election posters. 
These rules have met with compliance so far.
The rules for nominating candidates for local elections have been accepted by both 
the political parties and the civic associations, none of which currently seeks to change 
them. Likewise, no objections have been raised regarding the electoral system for local 
elections; no political party has requested a change (some of them did seek changes in 
the election law for parliamentary elections). According to the data collected in 1996, 
the great majority of citizens supported the existing electoral system (Bačišin 1996). An 
attempt to amend the Act on Elections to Local Self-governments, led by the government 
coalition of HZDS, SNS, and ZRS, in power from 1994 to 1998, was rejected by the 
Constitutional Court because of numerous discrepancies with the Constitution of the 
Slovak Republic. There have been no further attempts since that time.
During the elections to local self-governments, the only reservations expressed 
concerned the violation of election rules. There was a suspicion of tampering with the 
results in some constituencies, but these were isolated cases—e.g., in the elections of 
2002 only a single case was recorded (in the village Špania Dolina).  
The municipal elections are often followed by by-elections in some constituencies, 
because of a lack of candidates for the local representative positions or because candidates for 
the position of mayor received the same number of votes. In 2002, for example, the election 
of mayor had to be repeated in eleven communities and by-elections for local representatives 
carried out in six communities or city districts, mainly in small municipalities. 
The validity of elections to the organs of local self-government has been accepted by 
all participants. There has been no instance of an eminent political party, a citizen, or a 
civic association contesting the regularity, organization, or outcome of the election.
6.2 The Electoral Process
The existing system of elections to local self-government provides the voters with 
a choice of candidates nominated by political parties, coalitions, and independent 
candidates for the positions of local representatives or that of the mayor (city mayor). 
The number of candidates and the political spectrum they cover depends mainly on 
the size of the community. The larger the community, the more numerous are the local 
party oﬃces and also the candidates standing for elections, as well as the number of 
independent candidates. In the elections carried out so far in small communities, there 
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were problems with the nomination of candidates, especially for the positions of local 
representatives (that was one of the reasons why the amendment of the election law 
had lowered their proportion to the number of inhabitants). In larger communities, 
people are interested in standing for election to the city council, and the voters have, 
as a rule, a much better choice.
In municipalities where there are several local party oﬃces, ad hoc party coalitions 
are made prior to elections, even of parties that oppose each other on the parliamentary 
level. Thus, in the preelection period, Slovak municipalities bring forth a plethora of 
party coalitions (for instance in 2002, 236 diﬀerent parties and coalitions nominated 
their candidates for mayor and 286 for local representatives), which sometimes eﬀectively 
makes it impossible for voters to orient themselves along political and ideological lines 
(copying the analogous situation in the SR during the parliamentary elections). Party 
politics and ideology often being poor guidelines, in the local elections voters have 
to decide by their knowledge of the personal qualities of candidates. The political 
scientists, therefore, characterize local elections as elections of personalities, not of the 
political parties (Mesežnikov 1999; Mesežnikov and Nižňánsky 2002; Sopóci 1995; 
Szomolányi 1999). The results from the research before the local elections of 2002 
showed that about two-thirds of respondents preferred the candidates’ personal qualities 
to their party aﬃliation. The party membership of candidates was preferred only in 
about one-ﬁfth of respondents (Velšic 2003, p.45). 
Thus far, the inhabitants of municipalities have only minimally participated in 
the organization of election campaigns, these being carried mostly by the candidates 
themselves and by a narrow group of party friends; in the case of independent candidates, 
friends and relatives also helped with election posters, distribution of leaﬂets and letters, 
local broadcasting, and meetings with citizens, etc. The elections in the largest cities 
were an exception, in that campaigning for mayors and lord mayors was ﬁnancially 
demanding and was carried out by whole teams. In spite of this, the preelection 
campaigns were neither very intensive nor did they elicit any signiﬁcant activity on 
the part of the inhabitants of Slovak communities and cities, apart from a short-term 
interest in the political life of the community or city (Malíková 1997; Mesežnikov and 
Nižňánsky 2002; Sopóci 1995). Neither the intensity of the municipal election campaign 
in Slovakia, nor the interest of the public, could match those of parliamentary elections 
or the presidential elections. 
The law guarantees equal access to local media for all candidates. During the election 
the local board (city council) must reserve an area where the election posters can be 
placed. Its use must conform to the principle of equality between party-nominated and 
independent candidates. Each party and each independent candidate bears the cost of the 
election campaign. (For instance, in 2002, SDKÚ spent 3 million SK, ANO  4 millions 
SK, and the leaders of KDH decided that each candidate will bear his own campaign 
costs.) The costs associated with the election of mayors and the local representatives are 
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covered by the state budget of the Slovak Republic. So far there have been no known 
cases of violation of the above rules. 
6.3 Electoral Results
The ﬁrst municipal elections took place on November 23–24, 1990, with 63.75% of 
eligible voters participating. The majority of elected mayors and city mayors came from 
parties such as KSS, KDH, VPN, or were independent candidates of NEKA. Similarly, 
most local representatives (city deputies) came from KDH, VPN, KSS, and NEKA. 
Second-round elections had to be carried out in 150 communities and even a third 
round was necessary in some of them in order to elect the mayor and the requisite 
number of repre sen tatives.
Second-round elections took place on November 18–19, 1994, with the participation 
of 52.42% of eligible voters. The majority of elected mayors and city mayors came 
from NEKA (28.8%), SDĽ, HZDS, and KDH. The majority of elected local (city) 
representatives came from HZDS, KDH, and SDĽ. Various coalitions of political parties 
were also on the roster, as well as independent candidates supported by parties and party 
coalitions. In these elections, 70% of mayors and 54% of lord mayors were reelected.
Third-round elections took place on December 18–19, 1998, with the participation 
of 53.95% of eligible voters. The majority of elected mayors and city mayors came 
from NEKA (28.2%), while the majority of elected local (city) representatives came 
from HZDS, SDĽ, and KDH. In addition, numerous candidates of party coalitions 
were elected, the coalitions being composed both of parliamentary coalition parties and 
opposition parties. Among mayors and city mayors, 76% were reelected.
Fourth-round elections to the organs of local self-government took place on 
December 6–7, 2002, with the participation of 49.51% of eligible voters. The majority 
of elected mayors and city mayors came from NEKA (32.7%), HZDS–ĽS (13.1%), 
and SMK (8.0%). The highest number of elected representatives came from HZDS 
(16.6%), KDH (13.5%), and NEKA (13.5%), in addition to the numerous elected 
represen tatives that were nominated by the various party coalitions.
It comes as no surprise that the outcomes in parliamentary and municipal elections 
diﬀer, since the elections are run by diﬀerent rules and election systems and the public’s 
attitude toward them diﬀers as well. Indeed, some authors claim they are incomparable 
(Krivý 1999; Mesežnikov 1999, 2001). If there is any comparability at all, it would 
only be in the largest towns and cities of Slovakia, in which both the local politics 
and the rivalry between political parties closely mirror the state-wide pattern and the 
situation in parliamentary elections. In smaller commu nities, however, the character of 
local politics and the outcome of local elections are determined by factors not found in 
national or parliamentary politics—the election of a personality and not necessarily of a 
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political party, the presence of independent candidates, a much less inﬂuential election 
campaign, and the formation of coalitions across political camps, etc. Party politics at 
the local level, especially at the level of smaller communities which form the majority 
of all settlements, is very speciﬁc and often diametrically diﬀerent from politics at the 
state and parliamentary level.
Table 4.7
The Role of Political Parties in Local Elections (2002)
Political Party Elected Mayors Elected Local Representatives
From the 
Party
From the 
Coalition
Total From the 
Party
From the 
Coalition
Total
NEKA — — 951 — — 2,904
HZDS 384 268 652 3,565 694 4,259 
KDH 206 184 390 2,904 1,488 4,392
SDKÚ 127 229 356 1,066 1,947 3,013
SDĽ 128 219 347 1,619 463 2,082
Smer 68 255 323 970 993 1,963
ANO 59 208 267 626 1,425 2,051
SMK 233 16 249  2,050 523 2,573
SNS 38 90 128 673 283 956
KSS 32 81 113 460 167 627
DS 18 84 102 273 1,047 1,320
HZD 17 43 60 212 146 358
SDA 8 51 59 141 226 367
PSNS 13 39 52 250 219  469
Source: Krivý 2003.
In the past, voters in municipal elections have returned to oﬃce a rather high 
proportion of incumbent mayors and city mayors: 70% in 1994, 73% in 1998, and 
69% in 2002. Thus, it is fair to say that the positions of mayor and city mayor carry the 
most continuity of power, legitimized by the direct vote of the citizens of communities 
and cities. A similarly high continuity exists in the nomination and successful election 
of candidates of political parties and party coalitions. The major political parties (up to 
ten of the hundreds that are registered) have relatively stable local party organizations 
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that manage—either alone or in coalitions with other parties—to nominate enough 
candidates. Such candidates repeatedly become elected members of local boards and city 
councils, thus ensuring a high degree of continuity here as well (Krivý 1999; Mesežnikov 
and Nižňánsky 2002). For instance, the most successful parties in last three local elections, 
HZDS, KDH, and SDĽ, reelected 10% to 20% of the representatives. The results of 
past municipal elections also show a permanent high presence of independent candidates 
for the positions of mayor (city mayor) and local representatives (deputies)—a fact that 
places independents ﬁrmly in the ranks of the local political elites.
6.4 Voter Turnout
The participation of Slovak voters in the local elections was signiﬁcantly lower than in 
the parliamentary elections. According to political scientists, there are several reasons: 
the local elections always took place shortly after the parliamentary elections, the 
political parties paid less attention to them, the local election campaign was weak, etc. 
(Mesežnikov 2003).
Table 4.8
Voter Turnout in Parliamentary and Local Elections [%]
Year 1990 1994 1998 2002
Parliamentary elections 95.39 75.65 84.24 71.13
Local elections 63.75 52.42 53.95 49.51   
Source: Slovak Statistical Yearbook 2002.
The turnout in the parliamentary and local elections has been declining since 1990, 
with the exception of 1998. The parliamentary elections in that year were elections 
for political change in SR; voters were anxious to oppose Vladimír Mečiar and the 
HZDS—the reason for the higher turnout. 
At the local level, elections in villages have a higher turnout than in cities (in 
2002 the average turnout in villages was 67% and in cities 36%), with the tenden cy 
to participate decreasing with the increasing number of inhabitants. The same trends 
have been noted in the parliamentary elections. The average turnout of citizens with 
Hungarian nationality was consistently higher than that of Slovak nationals. The turnout 
in local elections is greater in the higher age groups, a tendency that is also reﬂected in 
the parliamentary elections. 
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6.5 Local Referenda
The Municipality Act provides for local referenda, to be called by local boards, on the 
most important questions of community life and development. The act speciﬁes that 
such questions may include the following: the amalgamation, partition, or abolition of 
a community, a change of name, the recall of the mayor, the introduction or abolition 
of local taxes and duties, etc. A local referendum can be initiated by a petition signed 
by at least 30% of eligible voters in the community. The result of a re ferendum is valid 
if there has been at least 50% turnout of eligible voters and if the decision was made 
by a simple majority of valid votes.
There is no organization in the SR under legal obligation to collect statistical data 
on local referenda, and therefore there are no data available. But research conducted 
in 66 local self-governments in 2000 revealed that there was a refe rendum in one-ﬁfth 
of them in the last ten years.  In 44% of the assessed commu nities, the petition was 
organized by citizens (Bernáthová et al. 2001). Local referenda most often dealt with the 
partition of a community, with the change of a community’s name, with the building 
of a municipal waste station, with incorporation of the community into the newly 
formed self-government regions (in most of these cases the Slovak govern ment rejected 
the results), and with the recall of the mayor.
Local referenda, in spite of their frequent use by Slovak communities, have met 
with numerous diﬃculties and problems that have compromised their eﬀectiveness. 
Experience gained so far shows that most local referenda struggle with insuﬃcient turnout 
and, once they have been pushed through, with the state administration (e.g., the Slovak 
government) accepting their result. Suﬃcient mechanisms do not exist for implementing 
the law on referenda.  For instance, before new territorial and administrative divisions 
were introduced in Slovakia in 1996, several local referenda were held in municipalities 
where citizens wanted to express their opinion about which district or region they 
should belong to. Their decisions were not accepted. Another example occurred in 
Starý Smokovec in 1996, when the central government did not accept the result of a 
referendum on changing of the name of their municipality.
Another problem is that local referenda can only be called to decide on community 
problems. A successful  local referendum in Štúrovo in 1997 (after the national 
referendum was refused) concerning the direct election of the president of Slovakia was 
rejected by the Ministry of the Interior. This led to an amendment of the Municipality 
Act, stipulating that local referenda can now be held only on issues relating to self-
government (Bernáthová, Kukliš et al. 2001).
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6.6 Conclusion
Of the range of possible methods by which citizens can control or exert feedback on their 
representatives in local self-government, elections are the most often used. However, 
the general lack of interest in municipal aﬀairs also makes itself felt in low election 
turnout. Citizens’ ability to wield their election tool eﬀectively is limited, especially in 
the smaller and middle sized communities that still comprise the majority of settlements 
in Slovakia, because the persistent lack of suitable candidates for local representatives 
makes it diﬃcult to choose good ones. This is partly the reason that so many mayors, 
city mayors, and local representatives are reelected. Another reason may be that citizens 
are satisﬁed with their representatives.
Thus, the inhabitants of Slovak municipalities have only a rudimentary means of 
exerting any control over their elected representatives, given the little feed back available 
between the local elections. The local referendum as a possible lever of power allowing the 
participation of citizens in public aﬀairs has met with a similar assortment of problems 
as the local elections. Furthermore, the state administration often responds to the results 
of local referenda with scepticism or with outright rejection.
7. LOCAL PARTIES AND FACTIONS
7.1 Political Parties at the Local Level  
Political parties in the Slovak Republic do not usually have a large membership. According 
to the leaders of the political parties, the largest have fewer than 50,000 members and the 
average have 10,000, while the overwhelming majority of some 100 registered political 
parties has not more than a few dozen or a few hundred members. The number and 
size of the party branch oﬃces in the municipalities reﬂect this size pattern. The branch 
oﬃces of political parties play an important role not only in local but also in state-wide 
party politics. The principles and goals of state and local politics, which are only rarely 
in accord, confront each other in the branch oﬃces. Each political party endeavours to 
build a dense network of branch oﬃces as the basis of all its activities. Not all parties 
have been able to achieve this goal. The LGS research indicated that there was a branch 
of at least one political party in up to 40.1% of Slovakia’s numerous (mainly small) 
communities.
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Table 4.9
Presence of Political Party Branch Oﬃces by Size of Municipality [%]
Size of
Municipality
To 999 1,000–
1,999
2,000–
4,999
5,000–9,999  10,000–
14,999
Over 15,000
Party 
branch in 
municipality
39.0 52.0 73.8 93.8 97.6 100
Source: LGS 2003.
Nevertheless, the majority of the assessed municipalities had branch oﬃces of one or 
more political parties.The number of party oﬃces in a community is directly related to its 
size. The most dense networks of branch oﬃces belong to the Movement for Democratic 
Slovakia–National Party (HZDS–LS), the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the 
Slovak Democratic Left (SDL), the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), 
and also, in the nationally mixed regions of southern Slovakia, the Party of Hungarian 
Coalition (SMK). The results of the LGS research conﬁrmed this.
Table 4.10
Local Party Branches in Municipalities [%]
Party Name Percentage of Municipalities 
with a Local Branch
Proportion of Active* Local Branches 
[Percentage of Local Organizations of Party]
HZDS 40.0 61.8
KDH 29.3 60.3
SDL 25.2 68.3
SNS 17.7 57.5
SDKU 16.0 68.2
Smer 16.0 66.7
SMK 11.6 70.8
KSS 11.4 48.9  
ANO 11.1 60.7
Note: * organized a public event in the last year.
Source: LGS 2003.
The LGS research also found that 47.7% of mayors and city mayors in the assessed 
communities were aﬃliated with a political party, while 52.3% were not. This does 
not tally with the situation in Slovak cities and communities, where mayors and city 
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mayors not aﬃliated with a party amount only to about 40%. The largest portion of 
mayors and city mayors in the analyzed sample belonged to HZDS–ĽS (25.3%), SDĽ 
(16.7%), SMK (15.1%), SDKÚ (14.0%), KDH (13.4%), Smer (43%), ANO (3.6%), 
and DS (1.6%). In the municipal elections of 2002, the independent candidates for 
mayor and city mayor took the most seats in the whole of the SR (32.7%), while the 
candidates of HZDS–ĽS won 13.1% and SMK 8%. It should be pointed out that a 
number of candidates for the position of mayor and city mayor were nominated by 
various coalitions of political parties, this being a characteristic feature of the preelection 
activities of political parties in the municipalities.
Independent candidates for local self-government achieve good results in elections 
on a regular basis, especially when running for the position of the mayor—in the last 
three municipal elections they invariably took about one-third of available positions. 
Independent candidates have been most successful in smaller communities, where several 
slates of independent candidates always win, even in large communities and in cities. 
Quite often, political parties also put a small portion of independent candidates 
on their nomination lists for municipal elections also—usually not more than about 
10% of all candidates.
The local branch oﬃces of political parties rarely exert much activity. They become 
active mainly during the parliamentary, presidential, and municipal elections and during 
other politically signiﬁcant events (referenda, etc.), acting on directions from the party 
headquarters. For example, before the local elections in 2002, leaders of the majority of 
parties ordered or recommended the election campaign strategy, the coalition partners, 
and the manner of participation of the leaders (Mesežnikov 1999, 2001, 2003).
Nongovernmental organizations cannot nominate candidates for positions in the 
local self-government, but they can publicly support their preferred candidates. As they 
are not important opinion leaders in Slovak society, their role in the municipal elections, 
just as in local politics (mainly in small communities), has been fairly insigniﬁcant.
7.2 Party Activity
According to the leaders of political parties, the parliamentary political parties have 
very few members in Slovak villages. In cities their number is usually higher—i.e., tens 
or even hundreds of members. Other registered political parties have a much smaller 
membership and do not play a signiﬁcant role either at the state or local level. 
During the election campaign, the local party branches mainly organize meetings 
of party candidates with the voters. The local candidates are frequently supported by 
higher party oﬃcials at these meetings. Local branches also support their candidates by 
designing and distributing election posters, ﬂyers, and letters to citizens,  and making 
radio broadcasts in local radio and television stations. A similar scope of activities is 
undertaken prior to parliamentary and presidential elections. 
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During the legislative term of oﬃce, public activity of local political organizations 
in municipalities abates and the majority of them disappear from public life altogether 
(Mesežnikov 1999, 2001). The LGS research has also shown a low activity of local party 
oﬃces in Slovak municipalities. Only about 60% of local party branches organized at least 
one public event in 2002 (the local elections year). There were only ten municipalities 
where parties challenged a decision of the local government on a public issue. During this 
period, their activities are directed instead to political lobbying of the local authorities 
through their elected representatives.
Nor do the local party branches try to aﬀect public life in an overt, direct manner; 
rather they prefer a clandestine manner by manifold lobbying practices in the organs of 
local self-government oriented towards promoting either certain persons or groups of 
persons (mainly local, or other businessmen, and other citizens) in the communities. The 
promoting of such group interests often brings them into conﬂict with other political 
parties and party coalitions, and with mayors and city mayors, since their interests often 
come in conﬂict with the interests of the majority of citizens. These conﬂicts are arbitrated 
in the local boards or city councils, mainly in the meetings of local boards. The party 
branch oﬃces frequently come into conﬂict when they advance the politics of party 
headquarters (for example, the politics of KDH often generated resistance at the local 
level from nonreligious political parties) (Mesežnikov 2001; Sopóci 2002).
The local branches of parties usually have few resources: minimal or no tools or 
funds, no paid personnel or oﬃce premises, no technical equipment, and mostly no 
sponsors. Party branches in cities, particularly in industrial centers, beneﬁt from the 
presence of economically powerful interest groups, capable of and willing to support 
local organizations of political parties, deputies, or mayors (Mesežnikov 1999, 2001; 
Sopóci 2002) in order to further their own political interests.
7.3 Factions
The degree of fragmentation of the local representation depends mainly on the total 
number of political parties in the municipality and, as mentioned previously, this 
parameter is in direct relationship with the size of community. In small communities, 
where there are at most one or two local branches of political parties, there cannot be 
more than one coalition of political parties.
In larger communities, a plethora of coalitions form and design a common list of 
candidates for public positions in the local self-governments. Most of them survive 
throughout the whole election term (Mesežnikov 2001, 2003). 
According to the LGS research, the local boards had no political parties or coalitions, 
or just one, in almost one-third of communities. There were two or three in almost half 
of the communities and four or more in just 20% of the assessed communities.
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Table 4.11
Local Boards Containing Parties or Coalitions (Factions) [%]
Number of Parties or Factions Proportion of Boards
0 20.4
1 14.5
2 24.2
3 23.4
4 10.2
5 3.8
6 1.8
7 and more 1.8
Source: LGS 2003.
The LGS research further found that formal, public coalition agreements between the 
political parties or deputies on the creation of a larger coalition in the local board occurred 
only in 16.4% of the municipalities. Informal alliances of deputies with diﬀerent political 
aﬃliations for the purpose of creating a voting majority existed in 18.2% of municipalities. 
These temporary coalitions play an important role when the deputies want to enforce 
their own motion against that of the mayor, when there are two irreconcilable camps or 
views on the solution of a local problem, or when competing groups of deputies try to 
push through their own group interests (Malíková 1997; Sopóci 2002). These ﬁndings 
conﬁrm and reinforce the ﬁndings of earlier research on local self-government from the 
ﬁrst half of the 1990s dealing with the prevalence of party over civic (regardless of party) 
politics in the larger municipalities and cities of Slovakia (Sopóci 1995).
7.4 Conclusion
Local organizations of political parties are the basis for the formation of local authorities 
and for local politics in the Slovak Republic. Their only political partners are independent 
representatives (deputies), mayors, and city mayors. The nongovernmental organizations do 
not play an important role either in nominating candidates for positions in local authorities 
or in local politics in general. Local citizens, too, have no signiﬁcant role in politics between 
elections, because of their civic passivity. That is why politics in larger communities 
and cities has become more of a party dominated arena for enforcing various partial, 
group, and individual interests and less of a catalyst for advancing the general interests of 
municipalities—the interests of the majority of citizens or of whole local communities.
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The characteristics of Slovak political parties thus manifest themselves in activities on 
both the state and local levels. The prevalence of representative over direct (participatory) 
democracy in Slovak municipalities allows political parties to sustain the present form of 
local politics. There are no legal changes planned that would enforce direct democracy in 
local government; therefore, as long as citizens are willing to tolerate the current situation 
and do not become more actively engaged, there will be no signiﬁcant change. 
 
8. LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES
8.1 Social Background of Local Representatives
Being elected to the position of city mayor or deputy of the city council means a 
signiﬁcant advancement in the personal career of any local resident. Once candidates 
have obtained the necessary numbers of votes, they have entered the world of the local 
social elite. But two important  prerequisites are required: ambition and an eﬀective 
strategy. Looking at social advancement from this viewpoint, we must ask what type 
of person is likely to be interested in a career in local politics and which strategies have 
been most successful. 
Another approach is based on the observation that voters quite rationally promote 
the candidates most likely to further their interests and preferences. An analysis of the 
composition of the local political elite then amounts to analyzing the way of thinking, 
interests, and calculations of the voters in their choice of candidate. Although the 
two approaches (examining the viewpoint of elected candidates and of the voters) 
complement each other, our analysis must carefully distinguish between the two, so 
that we are well aware of exactly what is in question: the strategies and motivations of 
aspiring candidates or the motivations and preferences of the voters.
Women comprise 26% of local representatives in municipalities with fewer than 
5,000 inhabitants. In larger municipalities this proportion decreases dramatically. 
Women more often than men have no party aﬃliation and they represent the more 
independent element in the local political elites. Sixteen percent of the predominantly 
smaller municipalities have female mayors. Comparing the percentage of female mayors 
with the percentage of women in the entire population, we note that it is signiﬁcantly 
lower. If, however, we are to compare this ﬁgure with the percentage of women in the 
national political elites, it is signiﬁcantly higher. Thus, there is an important relationship 
between the size of the municipality, the political mechanism for creating political elites, 
and the participation of women in politics. Women start successful political careers 
mainly in small municipalities, where the position of elected public servant does not 
engender large privileges and where elections are not dominated by competition between 
political parties. 
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A similar trend can be noted in the relationship between membership in the local 
political elite and factors such as gender and age. There is a statistically signiﬁcant 
relationship between the age of elected representatives and the size of municipality; that is, 
young people under 30 years of age are more often elected in small municipalities, while 
candidates older than 50 prevail in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. 
The majority of elected representatives are between 40 and 59 years of age (67%). The 
average is 43.4 in municipalities of up to 500 inhabitants and 49.1 in those with over 
5,000 inhabitants. This age pattern is the result of the way political parties operate; in 
order to obtain a place on the list of candidates, one has to show a degree of political 
experience or certain credentials inside the party. Both of these conditions automatically 
disqualify young people. On the other hand, the local political arena is a playground 
where political parties can go scouting for aspiring young politicians and prepare them 
for a future political career.
Examining the ethnic background of local representatives, we ﬁnd that the proportion 
of Hungarians in local representative bodies exactly reﬂects their proportion in the whole 
population (9.9% according to the 2001 census). Local representatives with other than 
Slovak or Hungarian ethnicity amounted to 2.5%, while 0.7% declared a multiple or 
mixed ethnicity. Thus, while the Hungarian ethnic minority has achieved full parity in 
local political representation, the same cannot be said of the Roma minority. The root 
of this problem has to do with diﬃculties in deﬁning this minority. The census of 2001 
recorded mere a 1.7% of inhabitants as having Roma nationality, while estimates suggest 
there are some 8.5% of Roma in the Slovakian population. If the estimates were true, the 
number of Roma would approach that of the Hungarian minority and their representation 
on local bodies would be small compared to their proportion in the population. On the 
other hand, if we use the oﬃcial ﬁgures and ignore the possibility that there are problems 
with self-declaration on the census, then the representation of Roma is adequate.
With respect to level of education, the diﬀerence between the representatives 
and their electorate is large. About 58% of inhabitants have elementary or vocational 
education, 32% have secondary education (high school graduates), and about 10% 
have graduated from university. By comparison, only 21% of local representatives 
have just elementary education and almost 79% of them have secondary or university 
education. Thus, those citizens aspiring to political careers in local politics are the best 
educated ones, who are attracted by the prospect of belonging to the local social elite. 
Voters, on the other hand, prefer candidates with high professional qualities. The system 
of political parties also brings advantages to candidates with higher education. This can 
be demonstrated by the fact that in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants, 
where local politics is dominated by political parties, up to two-thirds of councilors (65%) 
are university graduates. In municipalities with between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants, 
up to 85% of local representatives are high school and university graduates.  In small 
municipalities with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, most local representatives only have 
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a vocational or secondary education. Closely linked with the level of education are a 
variety of cultural assets, such as speaking foreign languages, computer literacy, and use 
of the Internet for communication.  
Table 4.12
Level of Education of Representatives and the General Population [%]
Population Representatives Difference
Elementary 28.8 1.8 –27.0
Vocational 29.4 19.3 –10.1
Secondary 32.0 40.8 + 8.8
University 9.8 38.1 +28.3
100.0 100.0
Source: LRS 2002.
As Table 4.12 shows, the representatives of local authorities come from the more 
educated social layers. Classiﬁed according to socioeconomic status, 71% are employees, 
17% are owners or self-employed, and 12% are economically inactive (retired or 
unemployed people and students). The proportion of owners is twice as high as it is in 
the general population. Three-quarters of local representatives have full time jobs, and 
over 10% have part-time or other jobs. Only very few (3%) are professional politicians, 
mainly mayors.
When the members of local authorities compare their income with that of other 
people in the community or city, the result depends mainly on their education and their 
social position in the community. Those with high school and university education rate 
their income as above average, while those with only elementary or vocational training 
think their income is lower than average. Local representatives with employee status are 
less likely to think of their income as above average than those who own property.
Aspiring to and obtaining a public position requires certain human predilections 
that take a long time to accumulate in families. With the exception of the very youngest 
candidates (between 19 and 29 years of age), 30% of representatives of all age groups 
had parents who were active in social or civic organizations. This was equally true of 
men and women and across all ethnic and education groups. Up to 38% of all mayors 
had one parent active in a nongovernmental organization. Having politically active 
parents is a somewhat less important source of human capital in the family; 25% of all 
representatives have parents who were aﬃliated with a political party. This factor has a 
particular signiﬁcance for the youngest and the oldest groups of representatives (19–29 
years of age and over 60), because in both groups the political aﬃliation of their parents 
was not necessarily with the communist party.
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Thus, it appears that the most important means of transferring human capital 
from parents to children is improving the access of children to higher education. 
Representatives whose parents were also public servants are much more likely to possess a 
high school or university education. This applies to almost half of the youngest generation 
(19-29 years of age) of representatives, i.e., those whose parents were politically active 
only after 1989.  There is no such correlation in the case of mayors, because their average 
age was higher. In explaining the intergenerational continuity in public positions, all 
these facts seem to support the hypothesis of familial accumulation of human assets and 
predilections for public positions rather than the practice of nepotism. 
8.2 Political Background of Local Representatives
About 22% of representatives in the local authorities were already publicly and politically 
active prior to 1990. Of the local representatives elected in 2002, 11% had previously 
been a deputy in the national council or the federal parliament. Almost 13% were a 
member or a functionary of a political party prior to 1990 and almost 14% occupied a 
position in a  civic organization. It is interesting that the parameters of intragenerational 
and intergenerational continuity almost coincide.
The typical career route of mayors has involved keeping their position for several 
consecutive terms of oﬃce. In 2002, 64% of mayors were reelected and 9% advanced 
to the position of mayor from that of deputy mayor. A similar type of intragenerational 
continuity of public oﬃce was found in the case of the mayors as in the case of deputies 
of the city council; 18% of mayors were members of the local council even prior to 
1990.  After the last elections, 27% of deputy mayors kept their oﬃce. 
Local representatives showed somewhat less stability, with 53% being reelected. 
Party membership was an important factor in becoming a councilor, especially in 
municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. Another factor to play a role was the 
record of previous community work in  the position of non-elected member of any of 
the commissions. The phenomenon of holding a public oﬃce in local self-government 
along with other public oﬃces has been rare in Slovakia. Of 896 local representatives, 
only thirteen (1.5%) were deputies of higher territorial entities (regions) and 42 (4.7%) 
occupied other political positions, mainly in the local or regional organizations of 
political parties.
Local representatives who acknowledged previous political training amounted to 
26%, with mayors, deputies of regional councils, and party oﬃce holders declaring this 
twice as often as local councilors. The mayors usually work full time; sixteen (15%) 
declared themselves full-time politicians. There are no professional councilors, because 
the position of councilor is not considered a professional position.
The social position  of local representatives predisposes them to have membership in 
the local elite. Accordingly, more than two-thirds of local representatives intend to keep 
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their position in the future. This is corroborated by the high proportion of reelections 
that was noted in the description of dominant common features of political careers of 
local representatives. In the 2002 elections, 37% of local representatives were ﬁrst-time 
elected representatives, 27% were reelected, 20% reelected for the second time, and 12% 
reelected for the third time. In addition, almost 3% of representatives were reelected 
to their positions for the fourth time. The phenomenon of reelection does not depend 
on the municipality size. 
People cease to seek re-election only after reaching retirement age.  The majority of 
representatives under 60 years of age (90% of those in the 19–29 age group and 61% 
of those between 50 and 59) in our survey expressed the wish to be reelected, while 
only 28% of those over 60 had the same desire.
One-third of incumbent local representatives would like to stay in that position for 
as long as ten years, 15% aspire to a more important position at the local or regional 
level, and more than 5% have an ambition to enter national politics. About the same 
proportion of local representatives aspires to being a company manager or director. 
Ambitions concerning the future social position of local representatives do not depend 
on municipality size.  
8.3 Social Capital of Local Political Leaders
Two-thirds of mayors and councilors in Slovakia are life-long residents of the communities 
they represent and only 5% are short-term residents. Thus, most of them have had years 
to accumulate the social capital needed for a position in the local elite. If social circles 
are sorted according to the time spent in them, three prime groups appear. One group 
encompasses parents, relatives, and friends. The second includes co-workers, people active 
in civic organizations, and other public servants. A third circle is formed by members 
of the local religious community. Each of these three groups has a speciﬁc meaning for 
certain categories of local representatives. In terms of the amount of time representatives 
spend in diﬀerent social circles, the family circle is especially important for the youngest 
group of councilors, aged 29 or less. Friends are the most important group for those 
under 39, and more important for representatives from the Slovak-speaking majority 
than those from the Hungarian-speaking minority. 
Meeting with people from NGOs appears to be more important for male than for 
female representatives, while such meetings have less signiﬁcance for representatives 
over 50 years of age and those coming from the smallest municipalities. For university-
educated local representatives, co-workers are less important than for councilors with 
vocational and secondary education. Male councilors and those with lower education 
consider meetings with fellow councilors important; this is also considered crucial in 
smaller municipalities and applies more to Slovak representatives than to those with 
Hungarian nationality.
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Meeting with people from the local religious community was most important for 
the youngest representatives, for those with a lower education, and for village residents, 
mainly those living in communities of 500 to 2,000 residents; participation in the life of 
the religious community was more important for representatives of the Slovak majority 
than for those of the Hungarian minority. 
Local representatives considered that their network of social relationships mediated 
by the organizations of civil society was equally as important as their contacts made 
in the workplace and those made in local councils—a signiﬁcant ﬁnding, in our view. 
This means that, in the process of accumulating social capital, local representatives value 
voluntary organizations from the third sector as much as either business or political 
institutions. 
One-quarter (26%) of local representatives claim to hold a leading position in 
civic organizations, most often in one organization, but some (9%) in two or more 
organizations. Most of these are civic associations (52%), followed by foundations (35%); 
the Slovak labor unions are last, at 13%. Having a signiﬁcant or leading position in civic 
organizations enhances social capital and self-conﬁdence and, hence, the chance to be 
elected to a public oﬃce. There is even a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between 
reelection and the number of positions held in nongovernmental organizations. This 
phenomenon of holding of several types of public positions can be observed in democratic 
society in general, raising questions about the extent to which a personal disposition 
predisposes people to participate in social activities. 
According to the opinions of top administrative oﬃcers of local councils, the tie 
between having a post in an NGO and being on the local council is much stronger. 
They claim that more than 60% of councilors also hold oﬃce in an NGO. Since it is 
mainly the larger municipalities that can aﬀord to have administrative oﬃcers in the 
local government, this assessment appears to be realistic. The bigger the municipality, 
the more of its councilors hold positions in civic organizations, but only up to some 
5,000 inhabitants. In urban municipalities this relationship no longer holds, as political 
activities cease to overlap with civic ones and the leading positions in NGOs are held by 
people other than local councilors. In other words, large nongovernmental organizations 
with extensive local activities and those publishing their own journals show no personal 
ties with the local administration.  Small local NGOs, on the other hand, often form 
important interest groups that lobby for their interests via the local government. 
In the survey, councilors we were asked which civic organizations were most 
important to them. Those with 21-100 members (56%) were deemed most important, 
small organizations with fewer than twenty members (26%) were much less represented, 
and large organizations with more than 100 members were the least represented 
(18%). Councilors have mainly been active in organizations in their own municipality, 
where local problems are a frequent topic of discussion. Almost 25% of such NGOs 
are connected with the local council by a contract of cooperation and/or they receive 
support from the local government. 
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Elected representatives of the community have often been the founders (more than 
10%), leaders (6%), or activity organizers (6%) of such civic organizations. About 
10% of local representatives spend on average more than ten hours per week on civil 
society activities. A small percentage of candidates for councilor (6%) admitted entering 
an NGO just prior to elections, 4% supported an NGO in the elections, and 3% of 
those standing for election thought their chances to be elected would be enhanced 
by a membership in an NGO. Only 5% of councilors are members of an NGO in 
which there are other councilors with similar political views. Local representatives 
described their civic organizations as independent of political parties; the activities of 
representatives in NGOs do not correlate with either party membership or sympathy 
for any political party. 
8.4 Political Culture of Local Representatives
We examined the values and attitudes of local representatives by asking them to indicate 
the extent to which they personally agree or disagree with statements about the political 
and administrative system (see Table 4.13). Some statements were presented as a scale 
with aﬃrmative and negative poles. The values and attitudes of the local representatives 
fall into three groups: a) the dominant one, shared by at least 75% of representatives; 
b) majority attitudes, agreed upon by more than 50% and disagreed with by fewer than 
25% of representatives; and c) those toward which diﬀerent or opposite political views 
occur among the representatives. 
The topics on which there is the largest concurrence of views among local 
representatives are: a positive evaluation of competition, a positive attitude towards 
entering the European Union, and positive value given to public participation. Only 
7%‒14% of representatives disagree with these attitudes. The majority are convinced 
that democracy is the best possible form of government. They evaluate the new local 
governments better than the communist local administration, conﬁrm their support for 
freedom of the media, accept the right of individual opinion without relying on others, 
accept institutionalized civic conﬂict, and share the view that goals cannot be achieved 
without encountering conﬂicts along the way. Only 19%‒23% of representatives 
disagree with those statements. The high extent to which those values and attitudes are 
shared among local representatives provides a good base for recovering a democratic 
political consensus. It makes possible the cooperation of diﬀerent political parties and 
interest groups.
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Table 4.13
 Democratic Values and Attitudes of Representatives [%]
Agree Ambivalent Disagree
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard. 82.7 10.1 7.2
Our country should join the European Union as soon as 
possible.
76.1 9.8 14.1
If everyone participates, public decisions better reﬂect people’s 
needs and wants and are easier to implement.
75.7 11.2 13.0
In a democracy everyone should have exactly the same rights. 72.9 7.8 19.3
Democracy is not perfect, but it is still the best possible form of 
government for Slovakia.
68.3 12.7 19.0
The new local governments do a better job than the local 
administration did before 1990.
64.3 15.0 20.7
Local media should point out the problems they see, even if 
their coverage could hurt some community residents or the 
local government.
63.8 13.8 22.4
Even if life is complicated, everyone can understand it without 
relying on others.
59.4 22.0 18.5
Local leaders who are too much concerned with preventing 
conﬂicts in the community can never achieve anything.
59.2 17.8 23.0
The government should take more responsibility for ensuring 
that everyone is provided for.
54.9 17.6 27.5
Freedom of speech must not mean that political extremists can 
propagate their views without any constraint.
54.3 19.1 26.5
In general, the private sector is more eﬃcient than the public 
sector.
52.1 20.9 27.1
The public sector is too large compared to the private sector. 50.5 18.5 31.0
We need larger income diﬀerences as incentives for individual 
eﬀort.
46.7 14.8 38.4
Private ownership of business and industry should be increased. 45.3 20.6 34.0
It is dangerous to make deals with one’s political enemies as it 
will lead to conﬂicts in one’s own political camp.
44.1 23.0 32.9
National goals must always have a priority over solving local 
problems.
33.6 38.1 28.3
Source: LGS 2003.
We are also interested in knowing which particular groups of representatives 
are not a part of this consensual opinion. The attitude towards competition was 
found to be dependent on the size of the community and level of education of the 
representatives; the more educated the representatives and the larger the municipality, 
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the better the acceptance of free competition. Competition was valued negatively only 
by representatives coming from the ranks of the Communist Party. Negative attitudes 
towards entering the EU were found mostly among representatives from municipalities 
up to 2,000 inhabitants, as compared to the positive-oriented representatives from 
bigger municipalities, those with vocational education, members of the Communist 
Party and HZDS-LS, and councilors declaring a strong left political orientation. On 
the question of political participation, only a small group of representatives from 
the smallest communities agreed more frequently with the opinion that widespread 
public participation often leads to undesirable conﬂicts or wastes time. We can easily 
identify two factors connected with this minor value orientation: ﬁrstly, the strong left 
orientation of the Communist Party and one-third of HZDS-LS members in the case 
of competition and joining the EU, and secondly, a diﬀerent kind of civic culture in 
the smallest municipalities in the case of political participation.
At the lower level of the consensus are attitudes towards everyone’s equal rights 
in democracy and the attitude towards institutionalized conﬂicts. A problem in 
interpretation arises from the scale deﬁned by the statements: “In a democracy everyone 
should have exactly the same rights” and “In a democracy the majority should accept 
that the minority have some additional rights that allow them to protect their interests 
on some questions.” In fact, those statements come from two diﬀerent continua and 
are not exclusive; both are true and politically correct. One may rightfully understand 
“some additional rights of the minority” as an aﬃrmative action helping to reach “exactly 
the same rights for everyone.”
At this lower level of value and attitude consensus, our analysis again shows political 
and cultural factors in the diﬀerentiation. Representatives who declared themselves 
deﬁnitely left wing in political orientation were inclined to disagree with democracy as 
the best possible form of government, with an evaluation of the new local government 
as better than the Communist administration, and they rarely agreed with the right of 
local media to point out all problems they see. From the perspective of party membership, 
this minority opinion was more often shared by members of the Communist Party 
and a portion of HZDS-LS members. HZDS-LS members also disagreed more often 
with the possibility of understanding life without having it relayed by others and they 
preferred the opinions of leaders and experts who can be trusted. 
Another particular cultural group is the ethnic Hungarians and members of SMK-
MKP. Not surprisingly, they more often support the idea of some additional rights that 
allow them to protect their interests (but even there, the majority prefers equal rights 
for everyone). In this group we also ﬁnd more stress on the role of politicians and 
experts as opinion leaders, and stronger support for institutionalized conﬂict indicated 
by the statement that local leaders never achieve anything if they are too concerned 
with preventing conﬂicts in the community. As a summary of our observations on 
diﬀerences between the Slovak majority and Hungarian minority in local councils, we 
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can formulate a hypothesis. Slovak communities, particularly in small municipalities, 
display more signs of parochialism (higher importance of personal friendship, inﬂuence 
of religious community, and personal friendship with other councilors). By comparison, 
the Hungarian minority is more politically integrated and their representatives are more 
conscious of their political mandate as representatives of the minority. The SMK-MKP, a 
political party representing the Hungarian minority, was politically a part of the central 
government coalition after the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections. The loyalty of 
local representatives to their coalition partners can also be observed in the local political 
culture: members of coalition parties, namely KDH and SDKU, express support for the 
idea of some additional minority rights more often than independent representatives. 
Generally, the values and attitudes of local representatives at this level are also strongly 
inﬂuenced by the size of municipality and by the education and, to a smaller degree, 
the age of the councilor. Representatives from urban municipalities more often have 
favorable attitudes about democracy as the best form of government, the advantages of 
the new local governments, the importance of free media, and they more often accept the 
importance of institutionalized conﬂict in society. The positive correlation between size 
of community and education indicates the inclination of more educated representatives 
from urban municipalities to reﬂect a greater consensus about these attitudes. 
The third group of values and attitudes lacks a consensual character and is strongly 
diﬀerentiated politically. For example, councilors who are members of the Slovak 
National Party (SNS) are the most tolerant towards political extremism, while the least 
tolerant are the Christian Democrats (KDH). The strengthening of private ownership 
of businesses is more often supported by representatives who are members of right-wing 
liberal and conservative political parties and rejected by representatives aﬃliated with 
the populist HZDS and left-oriented political parties.   
The next element of political culture is the trust elected leaders have in each other 
and in other people. The political fractions within local councils are relatively integrated. 
More than 60% of fraction members trust each other, with common party membership 
being a powerful factor enhancing mutual trust. Independent councilors as a group 
consider themselves mutually least trustworthy, while the best collegial harmony is seen 
among the members of HZDS, KDH, and KSS. Half of the local councilors show no 
trust in colleagues from other political fractions. In municipalities with less than 500 
inhabitants, the percentage of councilors who trust those from other fractions is twice 
as high as in large municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants. The councilors 
representing the Smer party show the least trust in colleagues from other parties and 
thus belong to the most radical opposition group. 
An important factor in the building of trust is the role of the mayors, who themselves 
are trusted by two-thirds of councilors. Since the most numerous group in the council is 
usually the independents, who tend to be the most distrustful of their fellow councilors, 
mayors can have some success in integrating councils where several political fractions 
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operate by winning the trust of the independents. As a result, in most councils the 
mayors are least trusted by the ideologically strongly integrated KDH. 
Local representatives trust people from outside of their own community twice 
as often as the general population: the results of the European Value Study in 1999 
showed that only 15% of questioned respondents thought that most people can be 
trusted, while the ﬁgure for local councilors was 34%.  An even higher portion of 
them—43%— believed that given a fair chance most people would behave honestly. The 
generally higher optimism of local representatives probably stems from the fact that they 
gained their position by a public vote. This notion can be corroborated by the ﬁnding 
that those representatives who intend to seek reelection showed statistically signiﬁcant 
higher optimism concerning the honesty of other people. We uncovered signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences among councilors on the question of trust in other people, depending on the 
size of their municipality, their level of education, and their political party aﬃliation. 
Councilors with less education and those coming from small municipalities more often 
thought that one should approach strange people with caution than did the more 
educated councilors and those representing larger municipalities. Members of SDKU 
and SDĽ, political parties adhering to right or left liberalism, showed a fair degree of 
trust towards other people, while those aﬃliated with the nationalistic SNS were much 
more cautious in their relationships with other people. 
The ideological orientation of local representatives closely matches that of other 
residents. A particularly good match (in both cases 39%) was found in ideologically 
left-oriented councilors and local residents. Centrists are twice as numerous among 
residents as they are in the council, while those residents that are unable or unwilling to 
embrace the left‒right scheme outnumber by several times any such group within the 
council. Of course, councilors are more politically conscious than other local residents. 
One should also keep in mind the characteristic tendency of centrist voters to support 
right-of-center local politicians in the elections. Another noteworthy feature concerns 
the ﬁnding that the ideological orientation of local representatives bears no relation to 
their membership in NGOs; councilors of all ideological orientations participate in the 
activities of civic organizations.
In the sample of local representatives we ﬁnd 514 non-members and 382 members 
of ﬁfteen political parties—all seven parties represented in the national parliament and 
eight nonparliamentary parties. Four of the parliamentary parties are connected to the 
national government coalition (ANO, KDH, SDKU, SMK) and three to the opposition 
parties (KSS, HZDS-LS, Smer). In the survey we also asked local representatives to 
indicate their opinion of all seven parliamentary parties on a scale running from 1 (very 
unfavorable) to 7 (very favorable). Table 4.14 shows the average degree of sympathy 
expressed by local representatives for each party according to their own personal party 
membership. 
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Naturally, respondents expressed the highest degree of sympathy for their own parties. 
The fact that this sympathy is not at level 7 on the scale is caused by the inclination of 
some respondents to answer with a mid-point number, i.e., with the ambivalent degree 
of 4 on the scale. In each row of the table we can observe the same result: the sympathy 
of local representatives to other parties copies the national parliament’s distribution of 
parties in the coalition and opposition groups. To overlook the reciprocal sympathies 
of diﬀerent groups of parties in the local councils, we compare the average sympathies 
expressed by members of the group of coalition parties with the sympathies of the 
opposition parties’ members and with the sympathies of non-party members (see Figure 
4.3). Sympathies to the respondents’ own party are excluded.
As shown in Figure 4.3, only two parties are seen as favorable, on average, for one 
of the groups of local representatives: the SMK is most favorably regarded among the 
other members of the coalition group and the Smer Party is the most favorable within 
the opposition group. Both the SMK and Smer parties are the most favorable reciprocally 
in the coalition–opposition groups. Non-party representatives make practically no 
diﬀerence among coalition parties and only the Smer party is more favorable for them. 
The most isolated political party for local representatives is the HZDS-LS of the former 
prime minister, V. Mečiar. The HZDS received the same average evaluation of sympathy 
as the Communist Party from members of coalition parties as well as from independent 
representatives. At the local level of politics, two parties lead in terms of level of sympathy 
in the coalition group: SDKU and SMK. The leader among opposition parties is Smer. 
This tallies well with the ﬁnding that Slovak‒Hungarian relations at the local level work 
smoothly and that the SMK is generally well regarded. 
Table 4.14
Party Sympathy of Local Representatives According to Party Membership 
Member of Party Sympathy for the Political Parties (Mean*)
ANO HZDS-LS KSS KDH SDKU Smer SMK
ANO 6.3 1.9 2.6 2.3 2.9 3.1 4.4
HZDS-LS 2.2 5.5 4.1 2.5 1.8 4.7 2.1
KSS 1.8 2.7 6.5 1.5 1.4 4.7 2.4
KDH 2.7 1.6 1.1 6.4 4.9 1.9 4.8
SDKU 3.3 1.7 1.5 4.2 5.8 2.6 4.9
Smer 3.1 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.3 5.6 3.0
SMK 3.6 1.5 1.9 2.8 4.1 2.4 6.0
Other 2.6 2.6 3.3 2.9 2.9 4.3 3.0
No members 3.1 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.2
Note: * mean on scale from 1—very unfavorable; 7—very favorable.    
Source: LGS 2003.
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Figure 4.2
Reciprocal Sympathies of Three Political Groups in Local Councils
Another question related to political culture is the trust of local leaders in 
democratic institutions (seeTable 4.15). The local media occupy ﬁrst place on the scale 
of trustworthiness of local representatives (32%), regional governments are second 
(28%), and parliament and the government are third and fourth (each with 26%). At 
the other end of the scale, the least trustworthy were political parties (8%), judiciary 
organs (13%), and the president (18%). Opinion polls show some similar results, with 
the media in ﬁrst place for trustworthiness and many of the same institutions at the low 
end, as on the survey of local representatives. Particularly disturbing is the low conﬁdence 
in the judiciary, which might be connected to rumors about corruption in the legal 
system. In contrast to what opinion polls brought to light, local representatives show 
higher conﬁdence in the central government and the state administration. This opinion 
is usually expressed to a signiﬁciantly higher degree by those councilors who intend to 
stand for reelection. It should be noted that membership in NGOs was found to have 
no bearing on the degree of trust in democratic institutions. Judging by the attitudes of 
local representatives, NGOs are very much independent of state institutions. 
The trust of local representatives in regional government indicates their positive 
attachment to regional units in which they are politically active. This feeling is natural, 
but it also raises a question about the regional span in which local leaders locate their 
political images. For the general population, identiﬁcation with the municipality and 
with other geographic units has a three-tier structure, depending on physical proximity: 
people best identify themselves with the place they live and work in, then comes the 
region and the country, and ﬁnally Europe and the world. Local representatives, too, 
have the strongest ties with their municipality and place of residence and the weakest 
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with Europe and the world. In their case, the weak link also has a political dimension, 
since local representatives hold particular ideas as members of political parties. If they 
are members of coalition parties, they identify themselves much more strongly with 
Europe and the world than do independents or  members of the Communist Party 
(KSS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS). Exceptions to this are the integration of 
Slovakia into the EU and certain localisms they express. Just as a certain type of political 
orientation fosters or inhibits a connection with Europe and the world, activities in civic 
organizations strengthen positive ties with the region. Councilors active in NGOs most 
often identify themselves with the regions in which they live. 
Table 4.15
Trust of Local Representatives and General Population in Institutions [%]
Rank Local Representatives General Population
1 Media (31.8) Media (46.8)
2 Regional government (28) Police (42.3)
3 Parliament (26.0) Parliament (38.6)
4 Central government (25.9) Local state administration (35.8)
5 Police (23.8) Courts of law (32.4)
6 Local state administration (20.4) Central government (17.7)
7 President (18.2) —
8 Courts of law (13.4) —
9 Political parties (8.0) —
Source: European Value Study 1999. 
8.5 Local Representatives’ Attitudes toward Representation
How do the representatives perceive their responsibilities as elected delegates and to whom 
do they give special consideration? What can we discover about local representatives’ 
way of thinking and of making decisions in this respect? 
To analyze this, we asked local leaders to what degree they feel it is important to give 
special consideration to certain groups of people (see Table 4.16). Local representatives 
consider themselves delegates of all citizens of a community or city (87.6%), whereas 
representatives elected in large municipalities also emphasize city districts (86.8%) or 
their voters (72.6%). The party or or group to which they belong ranked lower on the 
scale (of great importance for 50.3%), and regional and central government authorities 
lower still (45.2% and 42.3% respectively). The lowest level of importance for local 
representatives was generally the consideration given to occupational (39.3%) and 
ethnic (30.3%) groups.
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The question is, what are the representation patterns? Which representatives want to 
represent their party very much and which favor certain groups (e.g., their district or the 
central government) more than others (e.g., the whole municipality)? In Table 4.17 we 
present a summary of the results of a relationship analysis between local representatives’ 
demographic characteristics and party membership, on the one hand, and the special 
consideration they give to particular social groups, on the other.
Table 4.16
Special Consideration of Representatives to Selected Groups of People
Group Mean* Percentage of Great Importance**
All inhabitants of the municipality 6.1 87.6
Citizens who voted for him/her 6.1 86.8
A particular area of the municipality 5.3 72.6
The party or group to which he/she belongs 4.3 50.3
Regional government authorities 4.2 45.2
Central government authorities 4.1 42.3
Certain occupational groups 4.0 39.3
Ethnic groups 3.5 30.3
Note: * 1—little importance; 7—very great importance; ** including degrees 5 to 7.
Source: LGS 2003.
The size of the councilors’ municipality is the factor having the strongest inﬂuence 
on whether  they represent all residents of a community or city, only those living in 
certain districts, or only those who gave them their vote. Small municipalities do not 
have districts that are typical in the big and urban municipalities. Representatives in 
politically diﬀerentiated big municipalities have a stronger tendency to distinguish their 
voters among all residents. 
By successively taking group after group, we have constructed a basic framework 
of the representation of these selected groups of people in local councils. The results 
show that voters as a particular social group are signiﬁcantly more important for older 
representatives (over age 60) and signiﬁcantly less important in small municipalities. 
The word “voters” has a political meaning connected with party politics in bigger 
municipalities and older representatives are more often regularly members of political 
parties.  
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Consideration to a particular area of the municipality is less important for 
representatives with elementary education. Such councilors are mostly elected in 
the small and smallest municipalities. Table 4.17 shows a systematic and signiﬁcant 
relation between consideration given to a particular area and education as well as the 
size of municipality—the group of people deﬁned in this way belongs to the bigger 
municipalities. This group of people is signiﬁcantly less important for representatives 
from HZDS, which generally has its political background in smaller municipalities.
The party or group the representative belongs to is signiﬁcantly less important for 
male than for female representatives. Generally speaking, women are rarely elected to 
public oﬃce and institutionalized support from political parties can be more important 
for them; thus, they might be members of strongly ideologically integrated parties. The 
party is also signiﬁcantly more important for the oldest group of representatives and for 
those with vocational education. Party membership is a phenomenon that is once again 
connected with the size of municipality: it is signiﬁcantly less important in the small and 
more important in the big municipalities. The party is more important for representatives 
of Hungarian ethnicity and for members of four political parties: HZDS-LS, KDH, KSS, 
and SMK. It is signiﬁcantly less important to independent representatives. In the cases 
of the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH), the Communist Party (KSS), and the 
Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK), the importance of parties for their members is a 
consequence of precisely deﬁned ideologies: in KDH the will to improve society through 
Christian values, in KSS the defense of the old communist regime, and in SMK a desire 
for the political integration and political autonomy of the Hungarian minority. In the 
case of HZDS-LS, the party of the former prime minister, V. Mečiar, the importance 
of the movement for their representatives seems to be caused by its political isolation 
more than anything else. 
With regard to occupational groups, special consideration is given signiﬁcantly 
more often by female (50% secondary and 36% university educated) than male (37% 
secondary and 39% university educated) representatives, those in the highest age category, 
and those with higher education. Occupational groups are also more important for 
representatives active in urban municipalities and less important for those from small 
ones. None of those from political parties and groups gives special consideration to the 
occupational groups.
Special consideration for ethnic groups is part of the agenda of SMK. It is less 
important for male than for female representatives and more important for the oldest 
representatives. Representatives who are ethnic Hungarians give special consideration 
to ethnic groups and they more rarely live in the smallest municipalities than others. 
Members of the Smer party, on the other hand, consider the use of the ethnic principle 
in politics to be inappropriate          
The consideration given to central or regional government authorities weakly 
diﬀerentiates local representatives. The importance of central government for female 
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representatives probably results from their higher level of education, connected with 
support to the pro-reform politics of the central government. The importance of regional 
governments for HZDS-LS members probably ﬂows from the success of HZDS-LS 
in elections to regional governments. Membership in NGOs shows no bearing on the 
local representatives’ attitude to representation. 
How far are representatives inﬂuenced by opinion existing among the groups of people 
for whom they have special consideration? To determine this we asked local leaders if 
they usually follow their own opinion or the opinion of identiﬁed groups of people (see 
Table 4.18) when they ﬁnd themselves in situations of conﬂict in decision-making.
Table 4.18
Opinion Usually Followed by Representatives in Conﬂict Situation 
by Age, Party Membership, and Desire to be Reelected 
Opinion Followed Total Age Member of Party Desire to be 
Reelected
60 and 
More
HZDS-LS KDH Yes No
Own opinion 22.9 33.8 27.3 13.8 22.4 27.1
Opinion of groups of people 10.9 16.2 2.6 16.3 9.4 15.0
Depends on situation 66.2 50.0 70.1 70.0 68.2 57.9
Source: LGS 2003.
Faced with diﬃculties in decision-making, only 11% of representatives relies on 
the opinion of trustworthy groups of people, while 23% relies on their own judgment. 
Two-thirds either make their own decisions or accept the opinion of other people, 
depending on the situation. There are some signiﬁcant odds: the oldest representatives 
(over 60) most stubbornly rely on their own views. With respect to party membership, 
members of HZDS-LS are exceptional in that they seem to not rely on anyone else’s 
view, while members of KDH, in comparison with others, very rarely follow their own 
opinion. The most ﬂexible in their judgment (adapting their decisions to the situation) 
are those representatives who intend to stand for reelection. As mentioned previously, 
local leaders cease to seek reelection only after reaching retirement age. This may lead 
to the conclusion that there is a basic relationship between the wish to be reelected and 
ﬂexibility in judgement, with age being the only intervening variable. If so, political 
opportunism would seem to be a serious factor in making decisions depending on the 
situation. The source of the problem lies in the weak identiﬁcation of representatives with 
speciﬁc social groups and their interests, while they mostly give special consideration 
to all citizens.  
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Representatives’ weak ties with represented groups enhances the inﬂuence of other 
people on the formation of their opinion on local government issues. In the survey we 
asked our respondents how inﬂuential the opinion of certain people was on the formation 
of his or her own opinion. The results are displayed in Table 4.19.  
Table 4.19
Inﬂuence of Diﬀerent People on Local Representatives’ Opinion (7-Point Scale)
Rank People with Influence on the Formation of His/Her Opinion Mean* Percentage** 
Indicating of Great 
Importance”
1 Local residents he/she meets 5.5 79.5
2 The mayor 4.7 59.7
3 Councilors in the same faction or voting the same way 4.6 59.8
4 Own party representatives 4.2 46.0
5 Other local councilors 4.1 39.5
6 The CAO 3.6 32.6
7 Civil servants in the local administration 3.6 29.7
8 Representatives of civic organizations 3.4 23.6
9 Local religious leaders 3.3 26.0
10 Local businesspeople 3.2 21.5
11 Representatives of other political parties 2.7 10.2
12 Journalists 2.3 7.6
Note: * 1—very little inﬂuence; 7—very great inﬂuence; ** including degrees 5 to 7.
Source: LGS 2003.
In Table 4.19 we again see the inﬂuence of local residents as a whole in ﬁrst place. 
Second place is occupied by the mayor and councilors who vote the same way, a power-
holding group in the council. Markedly below them are the representatives’ own party 
leaders and other councilors, followed by CAOs and local administrative workers. 
Beneath administrative workers are the civil society representatives: civic organizations, 
churches, and business. Among these last three, one can even discuss whether the 
president of a civic association or a clergyman would be in ﬁrst place. Representatives 
of other political parties and journalists are located lowest on the scale and receive the 
same ranking as that used for political enemies in the previous answer. Quite naturally, 
the inﬂuence of journalists is greater in large municipalities, i.e., in cities. 
Party-aﬃliated councilors exert the most inﬂuence on the oldest councilors, in 
small municipalities, and on other party members, particularly those of KDH. Other 
councilors exert an inﬂuence mainly on less educated colleagues in smaller municipalities. 
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Age is a factor in the relationship between the CAOs and councilors, with older councilors 
more readily accepting his or her inﬂuence, while the youngest councilors are most often 
in opposition. A similar relationship is found between municipal oﬃce employees and 
councilors, with the views of the former being less highly regarded by the youngest 
councilors. Generally speaking, church representatives have more inﬂuence with party-
aﬃliated councilors and especially with those of KDH. Of course, NGO representatives 
inﬂuence councilors coming from their own ranks. Surprisingly, no political groups 
active at the local level admitted being aﬀected in any way by local businesspeople. 
An important phase in the opinion formation of local decision-makers is the 
collection of information and feedback from within his or her own constituency. We 
asked our respondents how important selected sources of information in the municipality 
seem to them as mayor or councilor (see Table 4.20).
Table 4.20
Importance for Councilors of Information Sources 
about the Views of Citizens (7-Point Scale)
Rank Information Sources Mean* Percentage** Indicating 
“of Great Importance”
1 Personal contacts with individual citizens 6.2 92.5
2 Organized meetings 5.9 84.9
3 Open oﬃce hours 5.2 70.4
4 Family and friends 5.1 65.8
5 Information in local media 5.0 62.3
6 Letters from citizens 4.9 60.6
7 The municipal administration 4.6 53.5
8 Regular place of work 4.5 51.8
9 Own party branch 4.4 49.6
10 Representatives of civic organizations 4.2 44.0
Note: * scale from 1—little importance; 7—very great importance; ** including degrees 5 to 7.
Source: LGS 2003.
 
 Local representatives consider personal contacts with citizens to be their most 
valuable source of information (93%), followed by organized meetings of citizens (85%), 
and oﬃce hours for the public (70%). Representatives from political parties do not favor 
public gatherings, in contrast to those who seek reelection. Oﬃce hours for the public 
are more important to representatives with less education in small communities; they 
are not so important to party members. 
Other sources of information are family and friends (66%), local media (62%), 
letters from citizens (61%), employees of the local council (54%), and the representative’s 
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workplace (52%). Information from the local media, employees of the local council, 
and members of NGOs is more important for female representatives; these sources are 
more rarely used by younger representatives (under 39 years of age) and by councilors 
in large municipalities. Women learn more about public opinion in their workplaces 
than do men.  
Only half of the representatives get most of their information from political parties 
or from groups of representatives (50%); the least information comes from civic 
organizations (44%). In addition to their own members, political parties are an important 
source of information mainly for the oldest representatives, for those representing 
large communities, and for those with a lower level of education.  Information from 
representatives of civic organizations is naturally more important for members of the 
NGOs, but it is also the case for female representatives. 
To summarize, the same tendencies can be observed about the information sources 
of local representatives as were noted in the previous question about the diﬀerent 
sides of the decision-making process. The occupational groups of people, regular 
workplaces, businesspeople, representatives of civic organizations, journalists, and 
even the local branches of political parties are at the lowest end of all scales measuring 
their inﬂuence or importance for elected representatives. The decision-making process 
seems to be dominated by closed power-holding groups that are minimally interested in 
cooperation with civil society actors in the development of local societies. In the smaller 
municipalities, the spirit of social conservatism is amply evident.    
8.6 Conclusion
In assessing the political culture of elected local leaders and their attitude toward 
representation we note the decisive inﬂuence of their social background. The most 
frequently occurring features accounting for variance in value orientations and attitudes 
are the size of the municipality, the level of education attained, and family history, the 
latter being often connected with the person’s region, according to other sources (Krivý 
1999). This interconnection of personal history with the traditional political culture of 
the region and the degree of its modernization generates speciﬁc local combinations. 
Their meaning for Slovak politics has been substantial, as can be expected in a country 
with a high proportion of small municipalities. 
Small municipalities have the tendency to fence themselves oﬀ from external 
inﬂuence, largely because of misgivings about national or supranational political 
institutions, or about political institutions that do not embody the same values as local 
political leaders or other members of the local social elite. Thus, the creation of social 
and political mechanisms conducive to the integration of local elites within national 
ones and mechanisms of European integration must be considered a task for the future. 
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This will be the task facing every European country for many years ahead. Democracy is 
certainly an important value, but we would prefer democracy coupled with progress and 
a better quality of life. The basic impulse propelling the development of local democracy 
will be the ability of elites to prepare their own development programs. The prerequisite 
for this development is much better cooperation between elected local leaders, local 
businesses, and civic organizations. At the present time, cooperation between the local 
political elite and the local business community leaves much to be desired, both for 
economic and political reasons. Therefore, the projects we consider most promising are 
those that are based on newly created connections between local governments, civic 
organizations, and local businesses for the purpose of developing and enhancing the 
quality of life in municipalities.
9. RESPONSIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The needs and desires of a constituency are most often reﬂected in programs that 
are part of local representatives’ electoral platforms. Such programs are often based 
on the majority opinion of the residents and present various routes along which the 
municipality can develop. However, new issues also tend to surface during the term 
of oﬃce, either as a reaction to changed conditions or to new and as yet unknown 
opportunities. But this varies across the regions, since the process of post-communist 
transition regularly presents more opportunities to the capital city and to the central 
rather than to the peripheral regions. If we were to ask people to assess how successfully 
the local government satisﬁes their needs, the assessments would not be clear because of 
uncertainty about how to distinguish among the responsibilities of the local, regional, 
and central governments in a period of massive administrative changes. Thus, there is 
no direct source of information in Slovakia for determining how the electorate assesses 
its local authorities from the standpoint of its needs. The best available indicator is 
probably the number of reelections, particularly to the position of mayor. 
We may also try to evaluate the process of governance from the standpoint of the 
basic attributes of good governance: the involvement of citizens and civil organizations, 
the correspondence of politics to local needs, and transparency in governance. Our 
analysis of local governments’ responsiveness is based on the evaluative responses of 
chief administrative oﬃcers in the Local Government Survey. 
9.1 Inclusive Decision-making
To what degree do local governments attempt to involve citizens, NGOs, local businesses, 
and media in the decision-making process? A starting point in assessing this would be 
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to determine the relative status and/or prestige of diﬀerent persons, social groups, and 
their representatives in the picture of social reality held by local government actors. We 
can reasonably assume that those persons and groups endowed with more social status 
will tend to have more inﬂuence in the decision-making process. In the questionnaire, 
CAOs were asked to what degree certain persons and bodies have an inﬂuence on the 
decisions of their local government (see Table 4.21).
Table 4.21
Inﬂuence of Selected Persons and Bodies 
on the Decisions of Local Government (7-Point Scale) 
Rank Influence Mean* Percentage of Those 
with a Big Influence** 
1 Committees of the municipal council 6.4 94.3
2 Mayor 6.1 89.2
3 Individual councilors 4.7 51.4
4 Chief administrative oﬃcer 3.9 39.5
5 Central government authorities 3.3 30.7
6 Most interested local residents 3.5 25.3
7 Factions in the municipal council 3.0 24.4
8 Regional authorities 2.9 20.9
9 Civil servants in local administration 2.5 14.6
10 Local entrepreneurs, ﬁrms, and business associations 2.8 14.0
11 Civil organizations, e.g., associations and foundations 2.5 11.4
12 Churches 2.2 10.4
13 The local branches of political parties 2.2 8.8
14 Newspapers, radio, and cable television 2.0 7.2
15 Trade unions 1.7 5.0
Note: * 1—very small inﬂuence; 7—very big inﬂuence; ** including degrees 5 to 7.
Source: LGS 2003.
The most inﬂuential body in the local government’s decision-making is the council 
committees, whose inﬂuence is comparable only to the mayor’s. Equally important is 
the very low position of civil society bodies on the scale of importance. CAOs are not 
alone in oﬀering this assessment—local representatives gave a similarly low rating to 
civil society bodies (Table 4.20). When we consider the involvement of NGOs, local 
business, and the media in the decision-making process, we should note that these 
institutions that have a very small inﬂuence in the subjective assessment of the chief 
administrative oﬃcer. 
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According to data from the survey of CAOs, there were active (i.e., operative, not 
just registered) civil society organizations in 67.6% of all 413 municipalities surveyed. 
In 45.5% of all municipalities, the residents participate in the decision-making of local 
governments by means of civic organizations. The local councils cooperate with from 
one to three civic organizations in 33% of municipalities, while in 16% even more 
civic organizations take part in the decision-making. In 22% of municipalities there 
were from one to three instances of NGOs submitting their own proposals or written 
demands concerning solutions to local matters; in 13% of municipalities such instances 
were even more numerous. 
The participation of NGOs has a distinct regional pattern. To compare the 
involvement of NGOs in diﬀerent regions we used an index constructed as a summary 
of data on the frequency of NGO participation in the preparation of decisions (variable 
Civil01a) and the number of own submitted proposals from NGOs (variable Civil01b). 
Values of the index are: up to 4, 4–8, 8–16, and more than 16 (see Table 4.22).
Table 4.22
Intensity of NGOs’ Involvement in the Decision-making Process by Region
Region 4 4–8 8–16 16 and More Number of NGOs 
in Municipality
Bratislava region 10 4 3 2 0
Trnava region 8 5 8 1 4
Trencin region 12 8 4 3 3
Nitra region 13 10 2 2 8
Zilina region 13 9 2 2 8
B. Bystrica region 13 5 2 17
Presov region 14 9 2 19
Kosice region 9 5 2 19
Source: LGS 2003.
There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between western Slovakia (Bratislava, Trnava, Trencin, 
Nitra, and Zilina), where civic organizations have been very active, and middle and 
eastern Slovakia, where up to two-thirds of NGOs took no part in the decision-making. 
These regions also diﬀer in the number and activity of their civic organizations—a fact 
that reﬂects the lower level of local socioeconomic development in middle and eastern 
Slovakia. If we cross tabulate data from the CAO questionnaire about the number of 
new businesses in a municipality and the number of civic organizations, we can observe 
a signiﬁcant relationship. According to the survey, there is a direct relationship between 
the number of new businesses, the number of civic organizations, and the total budgetary 
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expenditures of the municipality. In municipalities where there are active NGOs, new 
businesses also appear and hence new resources for local budgets. 
There is a fundamental diﬀerence between the subjective opinions of local 
representatives and CAOs about the minor importance of civic organizations, on the 
one hand, and the actual data, on the other. Perhaps the best explanation is that local 
representatives and administrative oﬃcers are uninformed about the beneﬁts of the 
active participation of citizens and civic organizations in terms of social and economic 
development. The underestimation of own disposable assets can also be seen in the 
constant highlighting of the central government responsibility to ensure that everyone 
is provided for (see Table 4.13).  
According to the provisions of the Municipality Act, local governments are in 
charge of public and social services. The public services mainly include the collection 
and transport of communal waste, the provision of funeral services, the maintenance of 
public greens and local roads, and public illumination, while social services encompass 
nursing care for the elderly and the provision of services for the physically and mentally 
handicapped, homeless people, abandoned children, and single parents.  Public or social 
services may also be provided by civic associations as  nonproﬁt organizations, allowing 
low budget municipalities to participate in local services by sharing property or funds 
with nonproﬁt organizations and with other subjects, such as other municipalities, 
associations, or church organizations. In 2002, 13% of municipalities used this method 
to provide some of their services.
The Municipality Act also requires that the draft budget be published ﬁfteen days 
ahead of its approval. Some 12% of municipalities did not follow the rule, even though 
this procedure is essential for citizens to have any input into the local government’s 
budget. More than 85% of municipalities used only one method of presenting public 
information about the proposed budget, 23% used two, and 5% three diﬀerent 
methods. As mentioned previously, the most common method was publication (in 
79.5% of municipalities), second was discussions with civic organizations (17.2%), 
third was public hearings or forums on the budget (15.7%), and last was discussions 
with journalists (5.6%).
9.2 Institutional Responsiveness
The demands and expectations of citizens towards local governments are formed 
to a certain extent by factors such as their awareness of the legal powers of local 
governments and their acquired attitudes and habits based on everyday experience. A 
survey (Strussová-Kawasaki 2001) carried out in Banská Štiavnica, a small, traditional 
city in central Slovakia, showed that its citizens expected local government to solve the 
following problems: 
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 • Improving the looks of the city and housing, starting new housing projects;
 • Economic development of the city and creating more jobs;
 • Construction and maintenance of roads, public transportation; 
 • Improvement and maintenance of technical infrastructure (water supply, gas 
and electricity, sewers, and telecommunications); 
 • Revitalization of historic landmarks; 
 • More shopping and service facilities; 
 • Cultural life, sports, and recreation facilities; 
 • Social services, health care, public order, and safety; and
 • Healthy environment and clean city.
But the programs and action plans of local governments do not entirely reﬂect the 
same priorities as citizens’ expectations would suggest. The most visible discrepancy is 
on the issue of economic development and the creation of new jobs. Only some 26% of 
municipalities have a long-term economic development program. Local governments often 
do not consider their role in the economic development of cities (see Table 4.23).
Table 4.23
Local Government Programs and Action Plans (2003) [%]
Existing Program Percentage of Municipalities
Communication strategy 65.7
Plan to make the city more appealing 61.1
Public safety and crime prevention program 55.6
Housing program 50.0
Long-term program for local government investment 41.9
Health protection program 35.3
Cultural program 32.3
Public sanitation or environmental protection program 31.5
Sports program 27.4
Long-term economic development program 26.4
Program on public education 24.8
Program to develop mass transportation 14.7
Source: LGS 2003.
Another signiﬁcant ﬁnding concerns local governments’ view of the importance of 
local problems compared to problems connected with their relations with central and 
regional government. It is clear (see Table 4.24) that it is much more important for 
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them to solve administrative problems than to respond to pressure and demands from 
citizen and civic organizations. 
Citizens’ wide ranging needs and expectations far exceed a local government’s capacity 
to address them. As it is, rather than follow priorities, local governments tend at best to cope 
with critical situations. Problems arise concerning the inherited city property and existing 
infrastructure, in addition to all of the responsibilities shifted from central administration 
to local governments. Thus, all the areas where citizens expect a solution have become the 
responsibility of local government, leading to a critical state of aﬀairs.
Table 4.24
Challenges Facing Community Leaders/Mayors (7-Point Scale) 
Local Level Problems Mean* Percentage** 
Responding “Important”
Resident pressure to limit increases in user charges 4.5 51.1
Unrealistic service demands from residents 4.0 38.2
Pressure from local enterprises 3.2 23.2
Pressure from local civil organizations 2.9 19.5
Problems in relations with central and regional government 
Too many responsibilities 6.4 90.5
Assigned standards in responsibilities 5.7 79.5
Unclear division of responsibilities 5.7 77.8
Discretion in determining local income 4.9 58.1
Authority in local economic policy formulation 4.8 53.5
Restrictions on restructuring 4.7 50.8
Interference from district authorities 4.3 48.2
Note: * 1—no importance; 7—utmost importance; ** including degrees 5 to 7.
Source: LGS 2003.
9.3 Accessibility of Local Representatives
In their relationship to citizens, local representatives have two roles: that of mayor and 
that of councilor. According to the survey, people expect the mayor to meet with them, 
to consider their demands, and to maintain regular oﬃce hours. A councilor is expected 
to take part in the deliberations of the local council, to supervise the implementation 
of council decisions, and to represent a certain political point of view. The councilor’s 
role is more that of a supervisor than of a leader mobilizing people around a long-term 
project. The law has also decreed this division of roles by distinguishing two organs of 
local government—the mayor and the council with councilors. 
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The diﬀerence between the mayor’s oﬃce and the position of councilor manifests 
itself in the way they encounter citizens and in their oﬃce hours. While 78% of mayors 
open their oﬃces for citizens several times a month, 62% of councilors have no oﬃce 
hours at all and use other ways to meet citizens. Also, councilors may consider oﬃce 
hours to mean time spent in council meetings. The mayor’s oﬃce is expected to publish 
articles in the local press (54% of mayors), give media interviews (64% of mayors), and 
participate in public meetings (84% of mayors). The law requires no such activities of 
councilors: only 20% of councilors have ever published an article in the local press or 
given an interview (24%) and only 52% attend public meetings. 
Our research showed that 66% of mayors devoted more than 40 hours weekly to 
the activities connected with their public oﬃce (full-time jobs), 18% spent 20 to 40 
hours a week, and 8% only ﬁve to ten hours a week (half-time jobs or less). On the 
other hand, 43% of councilors devoted less than ﬁve hours to their public activities and 
40% between ﬁve and ten hours a week.  
There is no diﬀerence between mayors and councilors with respect to participation in 
protest actions. Of the diﬀerent forms of protest action, local representatives most often 
participated in petitions (26% of representatives) and only rarely in public demonstra-
tions (5%); an even smaller portion of local representatives (1%) organized them.
9.4 Conclusion
At the present stage of reform of the local administration, the question of responsiveness 
and in particular of institutional responsiveness is a diﬃcult one. The most common 
current issue for local governments in Slovakia has been the transition from crisis 
management to genuine activities, i.e., selecting and dealing with the development 
priorities of their municipalities. We expect the situation to be stabilized within ﬁve 
years following the completion of the shift of responsibilities from central administration 
to local governments. A positive harbinger of such stabilization has been the general 
acceptance of the primary signiﬁcance of the needs and demands of citizens.
10. LOCAL MEDIA
The role of the mass media in a democracy is well known. Genuine public opinion 
exists in a democracy only because individuals and groups can freely express their 
views by means of mass media. There are, however, information media that can hardly 
be designated as “mass” media.  People who consume this form of information come 
from a single municipality; at the same time, they also consume information supplied 
by other regional or national mass media, both print and electronic. Analyses of the 
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media landscape usually conﬁne themselves only to media that reach a broad section 
of the population (Mistríková, Kollár, and Bella 2003), while our knowledge of local 
media and of their importance for democracy at the local level has been very scarce. 
This gap must gradually be ﬁlled. Our survey has gathered some basic facts about this 
type of media, based on the responses of central administrative oﬃcers from a randomly 
selected sample of municipalities.
10.1 Availability of Local Media
According to the subjective estimates of CAOs, more than half of all municipalities 
(55%) have a newspaper that pays attention to local public life, at least from time 
to time (see Table 4.25). This means that the monitoring of public life in Slovakian 
municipalities has not been a rarity. As far as coverage by the print media is concerned, 
municipality size makes a marked diﬀerence. There is no newspaper covering community 
life in 69% of small municipalities with up to 2,000 inhabitants, while there are such 
newspapers in 88% of those with more than 2,000 inhabitants. In municipalities with 
over 5,000 residents there are often two newspapers monitoring public life. With the 
electronic media, the threshold starts at municipalities with 5,000 inhabitants; in 66% 
of municipalities of this size, radio and television stations devote time to local aﬀairs 
at least occasionally. Of course, on rare occasions the electronic media operate even in 
smaller municipalities. 
Table 4.25
Presence of Media Covering Local Aﬀairs by Size of Municipality [%]
Size of Municipality Municipalities with Newspapers Municipalities with Radio 
or Television Stations
None 1 2 3 + None 1 2 3 +
Up to 1,999 69 17 11 2 94 3 3 —
2,000–4,999 22 46 26 6 74 19 2 5
5,000 and more 1 33 40 26 33 41 20 5
Total 45 27 20 8 77 14 6 2
Source: LGS 2003. 
Issues and events in public life in municipalities are most often dealt with by the 
regional media, complemented by the genuine local media, with bulletins published 
by local governments. The national media handle public life in municipalities in a very 
selective manner—their attention is either focused on the biggest cities or they cover 
only extraordinary local events (see Table 4.26). In other words, an analysis of media 
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coverage of local events must concentrate on the activities of regional and local media 
and how they divide their attention among single aspects of public life. 
Table 4.26
Coverage of Local Aﬀairs in Municipalities by Type of Media
 Type of Media   Newspapers   Radio or Television Stations
Number of 
Municipalities
Percentage of 
Municipalities
Number of 
Municipalities
Percentage of 
Municipalities
None 184 45 316 77
Local media   126 31 41 10
Regional media 185 46 47 12
National media 26 6 32 8
Source: LGS 2003.
It seems quite natural that the largest audiences of all types of media can be found 
in larger municipalities, where events are covered by several media or by one with high 
periodicity (see Table 4.27). The size of the municipality can make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence: 
a newspaper dealing with public life is read by fewer than one in ten residents in 72% 
of municipalities with under 1,999 residents, while in municipalities with 5,000 and 
more residents such a newspaper rarely fails to reach them all. In this size category there 
are up to 62% of municipalities in which six out of ten residents follow local events by 
means of the media. Very similar diﬀerences among municipalities of diﬀerent sizes are 
to be observed in the listening and watching patterns of radio and television stations 
respectively. 
As a rule, the newspapers report on local events in municipalities once a week, while 
radio and television stations broadcast such news at most several times a year—testifying 
to the fact that the electronic media are dominated by large regional or national stations. 
We should also point out the statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the fairly well 
covered western region and the much less well covered eastern part of Slovakia (Košice 
and Prešov regions). This diﬀerence tallies well with the size of municipal budgets. Low 
budget municipalities are rarely able to publish their own newspapers (bulletins) or 
support local or regional publishers. It is worth noting municipal activity in ﬁnancing 
elementary media: local bulletins appear where local annual budgets exceed a threshold of 
2 million crowns (SK); where the local budgets exceed 50 million crowns, the ﬁnancing 
of some kind of public press (at least a bulletin) is the rule. The spread is exceedingly 
large, indicative of a deep division of opinion in local councils on the importance in 
public life of communication through media. 
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Table 4.27
Audience of Newspapers and Radio or Television Stations
 in Municipalities of Diﬀerent Sizes [%]
Size of 
Municipality
Readers of Newspapers Listeners of Radio 
or Television Stations
Less than
One in Ten 
One to Five
in Ten
Six and More
in Ten
Less than
one in Ten 
One to Five
in Ten
Six and More
in Ten
Up to 1,999 72 19 19 96 3 3
2,000–4,999 24 63 46 75 15 17
5,000 and more 4 96 62 39 48 33
Total 45 54 34 77 14 14
Source: LGS 2003.
10.2 Independence and Representativeness of the Local Media
The survey data show that according to the opinion of CAOs, 63% of local newspapers 
(i.e., newspapers distributed only in a given municipality or in several neighboring 
municipalities) are owned by local governments. Other important media owners are 
trading companies (17%) and natural persons (12%), with only 3% of local newspapers 
being owned by nonproﬁt organizations. Local radio and television stations are owned 
by local governments (49%), trading companies 40%), or natural persons (privately 
owned). This means that the majority of local media (considered local in this narrow 
sense of the word) lies in the hands of local governments. This state of aﬀairs contrasts 
starkly with the situation in the national and regional media, the majority of which 
are privately owned or owned by trading companies, the other owners being public 
institutions and nonproﬁt organizations. 
The newspapers owned by local governments are mostly monthlies or periodicals 
published several times a year. Only rarely are they dailies or weeklies, these being mostly 
in the hands of trading companies or private owners. Ownership engenders economic 
dependence. Thus, newspapers published by local governments are funded by the local 
governments; periodicals published by nonproﬁt organizations, trading companies, or 
natural persons do not depend on local government subsidies. In the electronic media 
landscape the situation is similar:  the ﬁnancial support of local governments is mainly 
important for media owned by local governments. 
A large proportion of local governments, then, have media at their disposal that 
are totally or to a large degree ﬁnancially dependent on them. This relationship puts 
local governments in a better position vis-à-vis information media than the central 
government. Thus, when assessing the role of the local media in municipal democracy 
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we cannot rely on an analogy with the role of the national media on the one hand 
and the local regional media on the other. Local media, being dependent on local 
governments, fulﬁll the latter’s wishes through the dissemination of information on 
prepared or approved decisions and by expressing the views and attitudes of the mayor 
and other elected representatives or, more broadly, of the local power elites. The results 
of the survey show that the independence of the media increases with the size of the 
municipality. In large municipalities the communication with citizens is usually carried 
out by several media—a pattern impossible in small ones. In smaller municipalities a 
natural monopoly of the media arises, a trend that is only broken when audiences above 
a certain size have to be addressed. 
The diﬀerence in the relationship of elected representatives and the media in small 
and large municipalities can be demonstrated by the number of complaints of media 
bias. Representatives of smaller municipalities voice such complaints much more 
rarely, since local representatives as oligarchies can dominate the local public sphere 
and they like this situation. Thus, the tensions between the media and local elites start 
to manifest themselves only in larger municipalities.  At the same time, the number 
of those representatives who consider news on local government activities trustworthy 
grows. In other words, the local elite in a large municipality ceases to be automatically 
homogeneous and its views become more diﬀerentiated. This creates room for the media 
to pursue their task of creating a more independent public opinion. Only after this has 
been achieved can we speak of local media being accessible to various groups of citizens. 
According to our survey, this mechanism for creating independent public opinion 
starts to become operative beyond the threshold of 2,000 inhabitants. Other factors 
that co-determine the independence of the media are the achieved level of education 
of elected representatives and the size of the municipal budget.
Currently there is no local newspaper in Slovakia that is ﬁnancially independent of 
the local government and at the same time serves as a vehicle for community views. It 
would be unrealistic to expect the existence of such a newspaper when several national 
and regional newspapers are already ﬁghting for survival and for readers’ loyalty. One of 
the methods used to enhance circulation is to publish supplementary local and regional 
issues. Filling such issues with meaningful content has apparently been a diﬃcult task, 
even for large professional newspapers; what is needed is a permanent position for a 
local correspondent or even a whole local editorial team. 
10.3 The Media in Local Political Life
 
The status of local media in the political life of municipalities can be aptly characterized 
by observing the content and the means by which they inform citizens (see Table 4.28). In 
local media the prime position has been reserved for information on political life mediated 
by interviews with representatives of local government or councilors, followed by news on 
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council decisions. This type of news ﬁlls more than twice the space allocated for information 
on the draft proposals submitted for public discussion before the council deals with them 
and for the related arguments and counterarguments. Space for public discussion exists in 
only half of the local newspapers and in one-third of local radio and television stations. 
Table 4.28
Political Topics Presented in the Local Media [%]
Type of News Newspapers Radio or 
Television Stations
Interviews with representatives of local 
government or councilors
91 87
Reports on decisions of local government 82 70
Information on proposals made to the councils 52 40
Information on arguments for and against 
proposals to be deliberated in councils
53 33
Source: LGS 2003.
It is immediately apparent that local representatives prefer to use media they control 
more than twice as often for publishing what has already been decided than they are 
apt to publish their bills submitted to the council. If we are speaking solely about 
local radio and TV stations, this is not simply a question of more commercial outlets 
restricting their interest only to scandals. The local media, especially those operating in 
small municipalities, have two main purposes: to announce facts and decisions made by 
local government and to present the views and attitudes of the representatives of local 
governments and councilors. In fact, the local media stay away from local political life, 
especially those that are distributed within a single municipality. Therefore, the degree 
to which the media stimulate the interest of citizens in municipal problems in large 
municipalities exceeds by a wide margin the inﬂuence exerted by the media in small 
municipalities. However, in large cities the role of the local media is subsumed by regional 
and in the largest cities by national media. It would more appropriate, then, to speak of 
the inﬂuence of the regional and local content of “large media.” This is especially true 
for investigative journalism specializing in the problems of local governments.
10.4 Conclusions
Our analysis shows that the inﬂuence of local media on public policy in Slovakia has 
been very small; indeed, in smaller municipalities it has been almost negligible.  The 
local media have failed to create a space in which discussion could take place, much less 
one where decisions regarding municipal issues and interests could be made. 
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In Slovakia just as in other Central European countries, the room to create local 
media was established at the beginning of the 1990s. By coincidence, this was the period 
when the Internet started to penetrate the media landscape. Young people began to 
lose interest in print media and an entirely new mode of communications started to 
develop. This has visibly weakened the position of the print media, since the people who 
could give them a new character disappeared from their sphere of operation. On the 
other hand, barriers to the expansion of new forms of electronic communication have 
proven to be substantial. The main one is economic, since electronic media remain more 
expensive than print media. In addition, new skills and knowledge must be acquired 
and prejudices overcome. The time was simply not ripe for the dynamic development 
of the media. 
Nonetheless, the results of our survey show that local governments have not been 
overly imaginative in exploring potential uses and content for the local media.  Local 
residents often complain about the insuﬃcient information they receive from local 
governments; local governments even lack an integrated vision or a concept of how 
to use the media they own. Generally speaking, the communication skills of local 
governments and their subordinate institutions leave much to be desired. Development 
in this area has been hampered not so much by the desire to limit opportunities for 
the free expression of public opinion, as by the lack of pertinent skills. Hence, there is 
a need for initiatives from nongovernmental institutions and structures in support of 
the development of local democracy.         
11. LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
11.1 The Legal Status of Civil Society Organizations
Civil society organizations in the Slovak Republic exist in one of the following legal 
forms:
 • Civic associations;
 • Foundations;
 • Non-investment funds;
 • Nonproﬁt organizations rendering public services; and
 • Churches or religious societies.
The law deﬁnes a civic association as a legal entity organizing citizens or juridical 
persons with the aim to represent their interests. A foundation represents a purposeful 
union of articles, monetary funds, bonds, and other property with monetary value 
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(foundation property), which the founder has dedicated for useful public purposes, 
e.g., for the protection of human rights or of the environment and for the development 
of cultural assets, etc. A non-investment fund represents a nonproﬁt juridical entity 
combining funds destined for public purposes such as the protection of human rights 
or of the environment, for the development of cultural assets, or in order to provide 
individual humanitarian assistance for individuals or groups whose lives are threatened, 
are in urgent need of help, or are in distress due to a natural calamity. A nonproﬁt 
organization as a juridical entity renders public services such as: the development and 
protection of spiritual and cultural assets, the protection of human rights, humanitarian 
care, supplementary education of children and youth, and the provision of social services. 
A church or a religious society is a legal entity associating people with common faiths; 
members can form spiritual communities, ecclesiastical orders, and similar denomi-
nations. 
Civil associations, foundations, non-investment funds, and nonproﬁt organizations 
aiming at providing public services are founded, entered in the register of the Ministry 
of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, and operate pursuant to the dedicated legislation 
(the Civil Association Act, the Foundation Act, the Act on Non-investment Funds, and 
the Nonproﬁt Organization Act). Similar rules apply to churches and religious societies 
(churches can be registered with the Ministry of the Interior, provided they have at 
least 20,000 members; smaller religious societies can be registered pursuant to the 
Civil Association Act).  International organizations can operate in Slovakia and can be 
registered ( as well as annulled) pursuant to the Acts on Foundations, Non-investment 
funds, and Public Utility Nonproﬁt Organizations respectively. According to the 
provisions of the above acts civil organizations institute their own management, i.e., 
their executive and control organs. Civil organizations have created associations, usually 
together with organizations of the same type (for instance the Youth Council of Slovakia, 
the Slovak Humanitarian Council, the Slovak Union for the Protection of Nature and 
Landscape), as well as associations of diﬀerent types of organizations, e.g., the Third 
Sector Panel. The civil organizations have also founded several associations providing 
specialized help in methodologies, logistics, consulting, and other professional assistance 
they may need; the “Third Sector Service Center” is a case in point.
In the management of their ﬁnancial assets, civil organizations must, just like 
all juridical entities, proceed pursuant to the Accounting Act and other regulations 
issued by the Ministry of Finance. Their annual ﬁnancial statements are inspected 
by independent auditors under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Supreme Control Oﬃce of the Slovak Republic and their activities are monitored by 
the Attorney General. 
Registered churches and religious societies are funded by the state via budgetary 
funds allocated to the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic from contri butions 
of their members and from endowments. Nonreligious civil organizations acquire the 
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necessary funds from a whole range of sources: own proﬁts combined with contributions 
from their members, donations from citizens and businesses, collections, contributions 
of local governments, grant agencies, and funds coming from domestic foundations. In 
addition to this (mostly insuﬃcient) revenue, nonreligious civil organizations can solicit 
funds from foreign sources (foreign benefactors and foundations and various EU or single 
state supporting programs). Certain subsidies are available through the government via 
ministerial budgets, such as contributions to the funding of organizations for children 
and youth, special interest organizations, allowances for social care organizations 
devoted to certain groups and categories of citizens, Red Cross funding, the funding of 
some environmental organizations, etc. The majority of civil organizations receives the 
necessary funding from several diﬀerent sources. 
11.2 Density of Local Civil Society Organizations
The Slovak Ministry of the Interior has so far registered more than 13,000 local civil 
organiza tions. The numerical majority of these nonreligious organizations form civil 
associations oriented toward sports, cultural and recreational activities, gardening, small 
animal breeding, environmentalism and the protection of natural areas (dominant 
by their large membership). A much less populous group includes foundations and 
non-investment funds; still less numerous are the various educational organizations and 
organizations protecting the rights of various groups and categories of citizens (youth, 
women, and minorities), organizations supporting health and social care, regional 
development, housing, and international organizations (see Table 4.29).
The number of registered civil organizations in the Slovak Republic has been far 
from stable. For instance, the census of 2001 recorded 20 churches, ﬁve fewer than in 
1991. The number of religious societies in Slovakia decreased mainly after 1997, when 
new legislation changed the conditions for their registration and operation; state and 
foreign assistance has also been reduced, especially recently. While in 1996 there were 
a total of 1,639 foundations, non-in vestment funds and nonproﬁt organizations, in 
2000 only 830 were left, of which 479 were foundations, 250 non-investment funds, 
and 101 nonproﬁt organizations (Sopóci 2002b).
The LGS research revealed an average of one or two active secular civil organizations 
in the surveyed cities and villages and none at all in more than one-ﬁfth of them. The 
number of active civil organizations increases along with the size of the municipality. 
According to data from the Ministry of the Interior and corroborated by LGS data, the 
majority of civil organizations are active in western Slovakia, more than twice as many 
as those in eastern Slovakia. 
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Table 4.29
Largest Civil Society Organizations (2000)
Civil Association Membership
Alliance of Organizations of Disabled People in Slovakia 200,000 (estimate)
Slovak Red Cross 149,287
Slovak Union of Gardeners 115,058
Society of Saint Adalbert 114,063
Slovak Fishing Union 108,927
Voluntary Fire Protection of the SR 93,297
Youth Council of Slovakia 80,539
Matica Slovenská 62,427
Union of Pensioners of Slovakia 9,650
Slovak Hunting Union 50,654
Association of Construction Entrepreneurs of Slovakia 41,900
Fighters against Fascism 37,567
Association of Slovak Scientiﬁc and Technological Societies 31,000 (estimate)
Slovak Association of Apiarists (Bee-keepers) 16,345
Union of Associations of Home Owners 15,538
Slovak Association of Breeders 7,500 (estimate)
Source: Slovak Statistical Yearbook 2002.
Table 4.30
Types and Intensity of Civil Society Organizations in the Municipalities [%]
None 1 2 3 4 5 6 and 
More
Number of CSOs in the municipality 21.8 11.2 14.3 11.5 9.5 9.0 22.4 
Number of non-local CSOs active 
locally
64.1 12.7 12.1 4.8 3.1 1.2 2.2 
Number of ethnic minority 
organizations
72.4 15.9 5.1 1.4 1.7 1.1 0.6
Source: LGS 2003.
Organizations of national minorities operate mostly or exclusively in southern 
Slovakian communities (the Nitra and Trnava region) along the southern border. The 
organizations of Hungarian natio nals are situated there, while those of the Roma, 
Ukrainians, and Ruthe nes operate in the regions of eastern Slovakia (Košice and Prešov 
region). The LGS research showed the existence of minority organizations in only 27.6% 
of the surveyed communities and cities.
448
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Table 4.31 
Average Number of Active Civil Society Organizations in the Regions
Region N Mean Standard Deviation
Banská Bystrica 56 3.07 4.33
Bratislava 23 7.04 6.91
Košice 47 2.55 3.57
Nitra 52 6.02 7.60
Prešov 69 2.58 4.36
Trenčin 29 7.90 10.73
Trenava 33 8.21 10.58
Žilina 48 3.75 3.69
Source: LGS 2003.
11.3 Civil Society Organizations in Local Public Life
Civil society organizations in Slovakia act mostly as nonpolitical organi zations, dependent 
on and collaborating with none of the political parties.  Political independence did not 
come easily, however. In the 1990s they had to ﬁght for it, since the HZDS, during the 
period of the Mečiar government from 1994–1998, tried to subdue and bring under 
its control the nongovernmental, nonproﬁt organizations (Sopóci 2002b). When this 
plan failed, HZDS and some other political parties founded some of their own civil 
organi zations, such as youth and women’s organizations that are still in existence. 
On the other hand, we should point out that some of the nongovernmental, 
nonproﬁt organi zations (mainly those associated with the Third Sector Panel) became 
important players in the election campaign of 1998 on behalf of the opposition parties 
and made a signiﬁcant contribution to the latter’s victory. Leading representatives of 
that portion of NGOs (some of them active politicians of early 1990s) tried other 
ways to politically reassert the interests of their organizations, mainly with the political 
right. Even though these eﬀorts met with little success, after 1998 a signiﬁcant part of 
Slovak citizens stopped thinking of these organizations as nonpolitical entities.  Not 
surprisingly, their political record put a dent in the prestige of civil organizations and 
diminished people’s trust in them. Opinion polls show that people most appreciate the 
activities of nonproﬁt NGOs that assist physically and  socially handicapped people, 
support education, and protect the environment and nature, especially when such eﬀorts 
produce visible results or results that have been reported by trustworthy sources (Velšic 
2003). (See Table 4.32.)
 These circumstances aﬀect the status and work of civil society organization in 
Slovak communities and cities. Their position in the political life of municipalities 
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has been deter mined mainly by the fact that the election law does not allow them to 
directly nominate a candidate for municipal elections; instead, they have to use candi-
date rosters of political parties. Another possibility would be to support independents 
aspiring for the positions of councilor, mayor, and lord mayor. The results of LGS 
research show that, especially in larger communities and cities, members of NGOs have 
fairly often been elected to positions in local governments (some 60% of municipalities 
have members of NGOs in their local go vern ments). The question remains, however, 
whether they owe their position more to their mem bership in an NGO, or to their 
reputation based on local activities, including those done for the sake of some of 
the NGOs.
Table 4.32
The Usefulness of NGOs According to Slovak Citizens
NGO´s Oriented Toward Average Evaluation*
1996 1998 2000
Health services 1.22 1.38 1.35
Social care 1.29 1.41 1.37
Education 1.94 1.77 1.72
Environmental protection 2.00 1.84 1.92
Municipal development 2.27 1.91 2.08
Helping immigrants 2.40 2.00 2.17
Helping drug addicts 2.42 2.12 2.22
Supporting culture 2.56 2.19 2.24
Supporting sports 2.62 2.20 2.29
Human rights protection 2.58 2.26 2.32 
Note: * 1—very useful; 5—not useful at all.
Source: Mesežnikov and Ivantyšin 1999, 2001.
In evaluating the participation of members of NGOs in the organs of local 
self-government, one has to take into account a simple fact of life, that local governments 
include people who are members of local sports and interest associations, gardeners, 
small animal breeders, hunters, ﬁshermen, and members of the local ﬁre brigade—in 
other words, members of organizations that in the overwhelming majority of cases play a 
positive role in community life and more often than not have no connections to political 
parties. Social life in smaller communities, especially, is supported not only by local 
governments, but to a large extent by these civil associations.  In the small communities 
where there are no such civil associations or the existing ones remain passive, there is 
usually no social life to speak of. 
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Active participation in the decision-making of local governments by local civil 
organizations is rather limited, according the LRS research. For example, there were only 
sixteen cases in which civil organizations demanded the revision of a decision of local 
council. In 2002, this was less than half of the cases where revision was demanded by 
ordinary citizens. On the other hand, according to the representatives surveyed in the 
study, local residents—both members and non-members of NGOs—do not see NGOs 
as a means by which they can participate eﬀectively in managing municipal matters or 
aﬀect the rulings of local governments.
11.4 Contacts between Local Governments 
  and Civil Society Organizations
Cooperation between civil society organizations and municipal self-governments 
has not yet reached any high degree of sophistication, as can be documented by the 
ﬁndings of the LGS research. In 2002, the municipal governments of two-thirds of the 
municipalities under scrutiny ﬁnancially supported civil organizations. On the contrary, 
in only one-third of investigated municipalities did the civil organi zations extend any 
ﬁnancial or other help to local self-governments. In about one in ten municipalities, local 
governments con tracted a public service from civil organizations. The latter participated 
through membership in commissions or by providing expert services in the preparatory 
phases of the decision-ma king of one-third of local councils. In 2002, however, civil 
organizations submitted their own proposals and made demands pertinent to the solution 
of local problems to mayors, lord mayors, or to local councils (city boards) in more than 
90% of investigated municipalities. 
As can be seen, the relationship between local self-governments and local civil 
organizations has been asymmetrical, with more dependence of the latter on the former. 
This is the result of the disparate nature, locality, and function of local self-governments 
on the one hand and civil society organizations on the other in the social life of Slovak 
communities and cities. The LGS research found more facts to corroborate this 
asymmetry—namely, that 40% of investigated municipalities have no representatives 
of civil society organizations in their local governments and one-third have no more 
than one or two. In spite of this, municipal mayors and councilors claimed that when 
it comes to voluntary help and participation, more could be had from civil society 
organizations than from individual citizens. It appears, then, that local self-governments 
have not yet been able to make the best of the potential harbored by local civil society 
organizations.
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Table 4.33
Civil Society Organizations and Local Government
Proportionality [%]
None 1 2 3 4 5 6 and 
More
Percentage of CSOs that obtained 
support from the local government
37.4 12.9 14.8 9.9 5.3 3.8 15.9
Percentage of CSOs that supported 
local government
66.8 13.0 7.8 4.4 2.2 1.9 3.9
Percentage of CSOs contractually 
providing public services
86.7 7.8 2.6 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.3
Percentage of councilors holding 
oﬃce in a CSO
38.2 15.4 18.5 11.2 5.6 3.1 7.9
Percentage of CSOs that have an 
oﬃce-holder who is councilor
40.6 22.0 20.0 10.1 4.2 0.6 2.5
Percentage of instances when a CSO  
submitted its own proposal
64.8 3.8 11.9 6.3 4.6 2.4 6.3
Percentage of CSOs that submitted 
proposals
7.1 19.0 36.5 15.2 10.3 2.4 9.5
Source: LGS 2003.
11.5 Conclusion
Slovak civil society organizations have thus far played a subor dinate role in local 
self-governments— certainly not the role they could and in fact are supposed to play. By 
virtue of their nature, their existing membership, and their incidence in communities and 
cities throughout Slovakia, they have a high potential to make local governments function 
more eﬃciently. This potential has gone largely unrecognized by local governments, 
not least because of the legal status of civil society organizations, which in the minds 
of many still bears the connotation of political bodies or bodies closely connected with 
party politics. Also, their partici pation in the organs of local self-government has so far 
been deemed insuﬃcient or ineﬀective.
It would be unrealistic to expect legislative changes in the near future that would 
increase or strengthen the role of civil society organizations both in local government 
and in local demo cracy. Therefore, their members must continue to improve the public 
image of civil society organizations and better utilize existing possibilities to participate 
in the activities of local governments both from “inside” and from “outside.” Civil society 
organizations usually bring together the most active people in communities. It is fair 
to expect, then, that if more of them participated in local governments and the latter 
better utilized their potential, local residents would begin to participate more eﬀectively 
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in the social life of municipalities, thus making local democracy more mature and local 
government more eﬃcient.
12. CITIZENS’ POLITICAL CULTURE
12.1 Political Interest and Knowledge
The participation of citizens in the management of public aﬀairs is a prerequisite for 
the existence and functioning of local self-government. To be eﬀective, however, people 
need to be both interested in and knowledgeable about public matters. To analyze the 
direct participation of citizens in public aﬀairs, therefore, we have to consider how 
knowledgeable people really are about how local governments operate and also about 
their own local self-government. 
According to the facts gathered so far, Slovak citizens have neither been interested 
in taking part in the management of public matters, nor have they been knowledgeable 
about them. A representative survey carried out in 2002 found that the functioning of 
local government and its organs was an interesting topic for about half of Slovak citizens. 
Older people, residents of small munici palities, and better educated people were among 
those who had an interest in local politics. In general, this interest has been overshadowed 
by the interest in politics, the economy, and culture at the national level, i.e., topics 
that interest two-thirds of population. But of those who proclaimed an interest in local 
matters, half felt insuﬃciently informed about them, according to the survey. A similar 
survey in 2001 revealed that less than a third of all citizens felt adequately informed 
about local matters, while about 40% felt inadequately informed; the remaining third 
of citizens showed no interest in the matter at all (Velšic 2002, 2003). 
According to the survey of local representatives in 2001, the majority (58%) of citizens 
obtained their information on local government from their immediate neighborhood, i.e., 
from relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Local and regional periodicals (42%) and radio 
stations (41%) also served as an important source of information for many residents. Local 
bulletin boards were somewhat less eﬀective as an information source—only a third of 
residents used them, about the same percentage (28%) as those who got their information 
from printed documents issued by local councils, e.g., information brochures, ﬂiers, and 
letters. Public meetings of citizens with local representatives (e.g., participation in meetings 
of local council and public gatherings) manage to keep about one-ﬁfth of residents 
informed, while local or regional television served as an information source for 19% and 
the municipality web page for a mere 1% of Slovak citizens (Velšic 2002,152).
The surveys showed that the majority of residents of Slovak municipalities knew (mostly 
per sonally) their local representatives and the mayor, as well as city mayors (mostly only by 
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name). Only about two-thirds of local residents are personally acquainted with one or more 
councilors. The majority of local residents consider the lord mayor (mayor) the strongest 
or most inﬂuential ﬁgure in the local self-government, followed by local councilors, local 
businesspeople, and oﬃcers of the local administration (Velšic 2003, 36–38).
The inhabitants of Slovak municipalities did not put much trust in the representatives 
of local self-governments. The 2001 survey, for example, found that up to 57% of 
respondents thought local representatives were more interested in their own proﬁt than 
in the needs of their municipality; half thought local representatives were not interested 
in the views of common citizens and 59% considered organs of local government 
too inﬂexible, ridden with red tape, and incapable of solving the problems facing 
communities and cities. Another ﬁnding of the survey concerned the relationship 
between the degree of information about and trust in local government—two-thirds 
of the informed group of resi dents trusted local governments, while only half of the 
uninformed group did so (Velšic 2002, 151, 156).
12.2 Local Political Participation
A representative survey of 2002 discovered a close relationship between how much 
interest people show in local matters, their degree of information about local aﬀairs, 
the functioning of local government, and the degree of participation in solving local 
problems. However, the ﬁndings of a series of representative surveys carried out in 
the second half of the 1990s showed a similar proportion (25%) of local residents 
participating in one way or another in the management of local aﬀairs. The largest 
proportion of people involved in local government was in small municipalities; 
participation was greater among elderly and middle aged people than young people 
and among those with a higher level of education; the most active were creative 
white-collar people—the self-employed, businesspeople, and managers (Velšic 2003).
Since local self-governments have assumed responsibility for managing local aﬀairs, 
the involvement of most people has been limited to taking part in municipal elections. 
Only about a quarter of citizens have made use of other available ways to participate 
in managing local aﬀairs (attending local gatherings or meetings of local council, 
meeting the mayor or councilors in an attempt to solve local problems, etc.). As much 
as three-quarters of Slovak citizens took no part in managing the public aﬀairs of their 
municipality or city (Sopóci 1993; 1995, Velšic 2002, 2003). 
The ﬁndings of the LGS research conﬁrm this. Public demonstrations were organized in 
only four communitites in 2002 in an eﬀort to solve local problems; petitions expressing 
support or protest concerning local matters were noted in only 16% of the investigated 
municipalities (with a slightly greater number of protests than supporting petitions); 
residents appealed the decisions of the local council in 8% of municipalities and appeals 
were lodged by civic organiza tions in  only 4% of investigated communities and cities.
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The LGS research conﬁrmed the results of other surveys on the participation 
of citizens in local self-government. In their eﬀorts to sway the decisions of local 
government, the inhabitants of Slovak communities and cities prefer to make personal 
appeals (lobbying) to the mayor (lord mayor) or to the local representatives. They 
consider getting the support of civil organizations or political parties as vehicles for 
their action much less frequently. The use of the mass media is an even rarer event and 
recruiting the help of fellow citizens (collecting signatures for petitions or organizing a 
public protest) is the method of last resort.
Figure 4.3
Number of Times Citizens Used Diﬀerent Means 
to Inﬂuence Local Government Decisions 
Source: LGS 2003. 
12.3 Political Efficacy
According to public opinion polls, Slovak citizens have a permanent feeling of 
powerlessness and helplessness. For instance,  80% of respondents in a survey in 1977 
believed they could not inﬂuence the functioning and development  of  Slovak society. 
Only 17% of respondents  had the opposite opinion. In the survey of 1988, 72% of 
respondents answered that they did not have the power to defend their own interests 
against the government or parliamentary decisions (Bútorová 1998, 202). The results of 
recent surveys show that the situation has not changed, as about 75% of citizens think 
they cannot inﬂuence matters in Slovak society (Gyarfášová, Krivý, and Velšic 2001).
The situation in local politics is about the same. Only 12% of respondents in the 
2003 public opinion poll think that local government decisions are inﬂuenced by 
municipal residents. One-third of them believe those decisions are inﬂuenced by local 
businesspeople, another third by local political parties, and rest think that decisions are 
Appeal to mayor
Appeal to representatives
Seek support 
from civil organizations
Seek support of political factions
Use of the media
Citizen petitions or public protests
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inﬂuenced by the family and relatives of the mayor and local administrators. The same 
survey revealed that about 40% of respondents did not have information about the 
problems their local government was dealing with or did not have an opinion on these 
problems (Zemanovičová and Sičáková–Beblavá 2003).
The ﬁndings of representative surveys on local self-government also show that the 
majority of Slovak citizens do have at least a basic knowledge of the ongoing reform 
of public admini stration and of the responsibilities being transferred from the state 
administration to local self-go vernments. The majority of survey respondents was capable 
of correctly identifying the main problems encountered by local governments in Slovakia 
generally, as well as those concerning their own municipality or city.
At the same time, the surveys demonstrated that a fairly large portion of citizens 
found it diﬃcult to separate out local and national issues and responsibilities, much less to 
distinguish which matters and problems can be solved by business people or other bodies 
or entities. Half of the survey respondents thought, for example, that local governments 
were responsible for problems of unemployment, inadequate housing plans for aﬀordable 
apartments, problems of criminality, etc. In this case, too, there is a connection between 
knowledgeability about local government and the ability to correctly assess which are 
the responsibilities of local self-governments (Velšic 2002, 2003).
When trying to learn how citizens rate their own chances to aﬀect the decisions of 
local govern ments and to help to solve problems of their communities, a relationship was 
found between the activity of citizens and their positive assessment of the possibilities 
open to them when trying to take part in the local decision-making process. Of those 
citizens who tried to contribute to solving local problems (60% were at least partly 
successful), one-third believed in the idea that local government is able to solve local 
problems and in their own chances to help in the process (Velšic 2003,160–161).
12.4 Local Solidarity and Identity
According to LGS research, citizens of Slovakia identify most strongly with their own 
community or city (and in the case of cities, also with the city district they live in), 
then with the region, and ﬁnally with Slovakia as their mother country. Two-thirds of 
citizens are proud of their own community or city, 60% are proud of their region, and 
more than half (52–56%) are proud to be Slovaks. Those living in municipalities with 
fewer than 5,000 inhabitants showed the strongest identiﬁcation with their place of 
residence, those living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants showed less strong 
identiﬁcation, and those from settlements with between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants 
identiﬁed least strongly with their place of residence (Velšic 2003).
Information gained by long-term monitoring of Slovak settlements and their 
inhabi tants (Falťan, Gajdoš, and Pašiak 1995), as well as what has been learned about 
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the development of Slovak communities and cities in the early 1990s (when local 
self-governments were introduced), indicates clearly that Slovak citizens feel strongly 
about their place of residence and about the self-government of their communities 
and cities. That is why communities that were forcibly amalgamated in 1990 started 
to split apart again, this process continuing throughout the 1990s with a total of some 
150 cases. This separation process took place mostly as the result of local referenda. 
Although there are numerous indicators showing the lack of interest of Slovak citizens 
in the management of public aﬀairs, experience from the 1990s (elections and referenda) 
nevertheless shows that when it comes to the basic or crucial question of the existence 
of their communities and cities, large numbers of them can be mobilized. 
Numerous sociological and ethnographic studies have come to the conclusion that 
the role of the neighborhood in Slovak communities and cities has been signiﬁ cantly 
weakened over the past couple of decades. Relationships with neighbors have become 
worse or have disappeared altogether and, apart from family members, people’s closest 
links are now with colleagues, friends, and peers from the same interest group (Sopóci 
and Búzik, 2003). In the light of such views, we are now better equipped to understand 
the ﬁndings of the LRS research showing that in the communities and cities there exists 
both an average degree of mutual trust between people (mean value = 3.89; s = 1.41) 
and an average degree of mutual hostility (mean value = 3.53; s = 1.26). The evaluation 
was on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely).
12.5 Legitimacy of the Political System
A whole series of representative surveys carried out in late 1990s showed that Slovak 
citizens had no unanimous opinion concerning the introduction and functioning of local 
self-governments. As time passed, the ratio of those optimistic about local governments 
even declined, as can be seen in Table 4.34.
As can be seen from the survey results, the majority of citizens did not show an 
interest in legal questions concerning local governments and state administration and 
the division of their respective responsibilities, nor could they understand them—they 
leave these questions to professionals and to their elected representatives in local 
self-governments. The same lack of interest was demonstrated towards the ongoing 
reform of public administration. What they did show an interest in, however, were 
the practical consequences the reform would have on their everyday lives or any other 
positive or negative consequences (Velšic 2002, 2003). They assess the reforms according 
to these consequences in everyday life. 
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Table 4.34
Citizens’ Views on the Eﬀectiveness of Local Self-government 
and the Former Communist Local Administration [%]
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Problems better solved now 21.3 19.8 18.2 17.0 16.2
Nothing has changed 33.9 31.8 33.6 32.5 35.8
Problem resolution now worse 24.6 24.8 22.5 25.7 26.7
Do not know, not interested
No change perceived, etc. 20.2 23.6 25.8 24.8 23.3
Source: Velšic 2003.
12.6 Conclusion
It seems that the political culture of the inhabitants of Slovak communities and cities 
has yet to rid itself of the heritage of the past totalitarian regime, including civil 
passivity, disinterest in public life and concentration on personal matters, a tendency 
to enclose themselves within the family circle or friends and acquaintances, etc. These 
characteristics assert themselves mainly in the degree of political participation in the 
local self-government.
The interest of citizens in local self-governments, their knowledgeability about it, 
and their involvement the management of public aﬀairs have so far been recognized as 
the weakest points of the system of local self-government in Slovakia. The knowledge 
gained from surveys indicates that civic participation during the 1990s even declined 
slightly. People were less and less convinced that self-governments are better equipped 
to solve local problems than the old state administration. Typically, however, the most 
dissatisﬁed citizens have been the most passive ones, while the active ones have shown 
more trust in the new system of self-government. Since the higher degree of participation 
is typical of successful people with a positive attitude toward life, and because this group 
of people is unlikely to grow in the near future, there is little hope for any more civil 
participation in Slovak communities and cities. Therefore, even in the near future, in 
the system of local self-government representative democracy will dominate over direct, 
participatory democracy—a state of aﬀairs unlikely to be changed by any attempts to 
arouse citizens to more action.
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13. CONCLUSION
Today, everyone in Slovakia would agree that the revival of the system of local 
self-government has increased the autonomy of communities and cities, has made 
public life more democratic, and has opened new space for citizens to participate in the 
management of their communities and cities. 
Slovak citizens mostly appreciate the revival, functioning, and perspectives of local 
self-government, but are ready to criticize its many shortcomings and problems. Quite 
naturally, the residents in municipalities have been much more critical of their local 
self-governments than the representatives themselves have been. When interviewed for the 
LRS, most of the mayors, lord mayors, and councilors were satisﬁed with the situation in 
their municipalities and expected a positive development in the future. Less than a third of all 
elected representatives were dissatisﬁed and only a quarter expected the situation to become 
worse in the future.  Nevertheless, the representatives were more satisﬁed with the situa tion 
in their municipalities than with the developments in the whole Slovak Republic. 
The majority of regular citizens also rated the functioning of local self-governments 
favorably. Thus, according to the representative survey of 2002 only a third of local 
residents were dissatisﬁed with the local government, while 40% claimed that during the 
last electoral term the situation improved (Velšic 2002, 2003). Opinion polls also seem 
to indicate that citizens have consistently felt more conﬁdence in their local government 
than in the central government of Slovakia.
Figure 4.4
Citizens’ Conﬁdence in Local Governments 
and the Central Government of the SR
 
Source: Statistical Oﬃce of the Slovak Republic 1995–2002.
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On the whole, the current situation and outlook for the future of local self-
government in Slovakia can be rated positively. In spite of persistent diﬃculties 
accompanying its operation and development, the ﬁrst thirteen years of existence of 
local self-government in Slovakia has shown that it is alive and kicking. In other words, 
self-governments proved to be able to manage the aﬀairs of their communities at least as 
well as the earlier state admini stration. This has taken some burden oﬀ the government 
and institutions of the central state admi nistration and has allowed for the gradual 
transfer of competencies to local governments. Thus, the process of post-communist 
transfor mation of public administration in the Slovak Republic has gradually been 
concluded. 
The model of local democracy and local politics in municipalities and cities has been 
created predominantly on the basis of representative rather than direct, participatory 
democracy. The vulnerable point of local democracy continues to be the low disposition 
of citizens, and partly of civil organizations, to participate in the management of the 
public aﬀairs of their communities and cities. Another weakness is the lack of pertinent 
skills on the part of elected representatives, skills needed to cope satisfac torily with all 
tasks associated with the management and development of their municipalities. The more 
demanding the tasks transferred to local self-governments, the more the inexperience 
and lack of managerial skills of elected representatives are bound to interfere with the 
satisfactory functioning of local self-go vernments. 
According to opinion surveys, Slovak citizens consider the single most serious 
shortcoming of local governments to be their inability to provi de adequate services for 
their residents. In particular, residents identiﬁed problems concerning the technical 
amenities of municipalities, such as water supply, gas networks, sewage tanks and plants, 
communal waste deposits, maintenance of local roads, clean and orderly public spaces, 
provisions for cultural and sports facilities in communities and cities, and assistance in 
individual housing  (Velšic 2002, 2003).
The local representatives, as well as representatives of the Association of Towns and 
Villages, have repeatedly counte red such claims by pointing out the perpetual lack of 
funds that has plagued municipalities, identifying this as the single most serious obstacle 
to the proper functioning of local governments, compounded by the ever changing and 
often inscrutable legislation, unﬁnished distribution of competencies between the state 
and local self-government administration and, ﬁnally, the exces sive meddling of state 
administration in the competence of local governments (Mrva 2003).
Many of these ﬁndings have been conﬁrmed by the LGS research. The administrative 
staﬀs of local self-governments consider one of the most serious problems to be their 
relationship with the state administration, in particular with regard to the inadequate 
funding of competencies transferred to the municipalities and the inﬂexible and often 
limiting regulations and frequent interference of the state administration in local 
aﬀairs. Among the less serious problems they identiﬁed were problems with political 
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background (abilities and skills of councilors, relationships within the council itself and 
with the staﬀ of the local council), and the perplexities of the local environment arising 
from the demands citizens make and how they respond to what the council does. The 
least serious issues, according to administrative staﬀ, were the administrative conditions 
within local self-governments, i.e., issues concerning their professional skills and the 
nature and organization of executive tasks in local councils and city boards. 
Thus, mayors, lord mayors, representatives of the Association of Towns and Villages, 
as well as the administrative staﬀs concur that local governments have been beseiged with 
problems not of their own making and they fail to acknowledge any serious problems 
or shortcomings in their own performance. The art of self-reﬂection and self-criticism, 
it seems, is not yet part of the culture of those involved in municipal administration in 
Slovakia. Regular citizens do not seem to have realized yet that municipal management 
works not solely via the elected representatives, but with their active participation as well.
 
13.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of Local Democracy 
  in the Slovak Republic
The following tables summarize the positive and negative features of local self-government 
in Slovakia that have been identiﬁed in the analysis of its various characteristics. 
Local Autonomy
Strengths
 • Local self-governments in Slovakia have a high degree of autonomy—each com-
munity is self-governed and independent of the central state administration;
 • There is substantial scope to the authority of local self-governments; 
 • Laws regulating the authority of local self-governments are being continually 
improved;
 • The central state administration has already transferred all signiﬁcant compe-
tencies to local self-governments; and
 • Regional self-government has been created (self-governed regions or higher 
territorial entities).
Weaknesses
 • The reorganization of public administration in Slovakia is still not ﬁnished;
 • Local self-governments are non-integrated—even the smallest communities are 
self-governed, in spite of their inability to carry out all required self-governing 
duties;
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 • Numerous powers of local self-government have yet to be put to into practice, 
partly due to lack of funds and partly due to the incompetence of local represen-
tatives;
 • Tax reform has not been completed, so local self-governments cannot collect 
all the local taxes and thus remain dependent on state subsidies;
 • Revenues of local self-governments are insuﬃcient and ridden with bad internal 
structure; and
 • The organs of local self-government are incapable of handling all the powers and 
responsibilities relegated to them by the state administration, neither ﬁnancially, 
technically, or logistically.
The Constitutional Character of Local Self-government
Strengths
 • Slovak legislation concerning human, civic, and political rights is on a par with 
the European standard; and
 • The same holds true for Slovak legislation on local self-government.
Weaknesses
 • The standing laws are not always put into practice and the enforceability of the 
laws has also been insuﬃcient;
 • Problems have arisen with the provisions of the Municipality Act that deﬁne 
the status, powers, and mutual relationship of community mayors and of 
councilors;
 • Municipalities and cities have failed to integrate Roma into the communities; 
and
 • There has been insuﬃcient participation of local residents in municipal public 
matters and hence not enough public pressure on local representatives to act 
lawfully. 
Transparency and Accountability of Local Self-government
Strengths
 • The laws requiring the representatives of local self-government to account for 
their activities to local inhabitants have been well designed;
 • Most of the local representatives abide by those laws; and
 • The Municipality Act deﬁnes rules for the mutual control of representatives of 
local self-government.
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Weaknesses
 • Local residents are insuﬃciently informed about the activities of their 
representatives, mainly because of their indiﬀerence to these matters;
 • Neither Slovak laws nor the performance of the state and local administration 
have thus far created suﬃcient deterrence against corruption or have been able 
to prevent conﬂicts of interest among the local representatives; and
 • The SR is considered a state with a high degree of corruption and clientelism, 
including corruption in the ranks of local representatives.
Eﬀectiveness of Local Self-government
Strengths
 • The majority of local self-governments in the SR are able to design and 
execute plans for further development and decide on matters concerning their 
municipalities fairly eﬀectively.
Weaknesses
 • Lack of funds prevents local self-governments in numerous municipalities from 
embarking on more diversiﬁed development plans; and
 • In many municipalities lack of funds causes prepared projects to be 
abandoned.
Representative Character of Local Self-government 
(Elections and Referenda)
Strengths
 • Past elections to local self-governments have taken place without major problems; 
and
 • Municipal elections in the SR are focussed on individuals rather than parties.
Weaknesses
 • The widespread indiﬀerence of residents of small communities toward public 
oﬃce often makes it hard to ﬁnd suitable candidates;
 • The turnout in municipal elections is lower than in parliamentary elections.
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Local Political Parties
Strengths
 • In larger municipalities and in cities there are branch oﬃces of political parties; 
and
 • In smaller municipalities the civil form of local politics prevails over the 
party-dominated form.
Weaknesses
 • As a rule in smaller municipalities there are no branch oﬃces of political parties, 
sometimes not even of a single party; and
 • In larger municipalities and cities the local political pattern is typically 
party-dominated, often leading to situations where party factions set their own 
partial interests over those of the whole community.
Local Representatives
Strengths
 • Minorities with an advanced political identity (mainly the Hungarian minority) 
have had their proportional share of representatives in local councils;
 • There has been a natural continuity in the occupation of positions of local 
representatives and twelve years after the change of political system only 11% 
of local representatives remain in their positions;
 • The level of education of local representatives has grown signiﬁcantly and now 
exceeds that of the general population by a high margin;
 • More than 60% of local representatives occupy a position in an NGO;
 • The representatives largely trust mayors, persons with a key position for creating 
mutual trust in local councils;
 • Political parties in larger municipalities fulﬁll an integrating role, creating a 
background for majority coalitions;
 • Local Slovak representatives believe in the supremacy of democracy, support 
a democratic political system and its institutions, and consider themselves 
representatives of all.
Weaknesses
 • Women have not been proportionately represented in elected positions; political 
parties do not adequately support women wanting to join politics;
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 • Minorities with a low political identity (mainly the Roma) have been under-
represented in local councils;
 • Representatives in the smallest of municipalities show the tendency to isolate 
themselves from the outside world, a dangerous tendency in a high proportion 
of small municipalities in Slovakia; and 
 • Local representatives show a disturbingly low level of trust in the courts and 
judiciary institutions.
Responsiveness of Local Governments
Strengths
 • In 78% of municipalities there is at least one active civil organization and in 
13% local government provides some services via a nonproﬁt organization;
 • In 50% of municipalities NGOs participate in decision-making;
 • Mainly in large municipalities, NGOs enjoy a high degree of independence, have 
an inﬂuence on local politics, and can gain the respect of local governments;
 • Public gatherings have been an important means of communication of local 
governments with citizens; 
 • Interaction between local governments and citizens has been borne by mayors 
who, generally speaking, have created enough room to sustain it; and
 • Local representatives are well acquainted with the needs of citizens and generally 
heed them.
Weaknesses
 • The Roma minority feels a sense of inequality and injustice;
 • The sense of inequality and injustice has been connected with the handling of 
subsidized housing;  
 • The needs and expectations of citizens go far beyond what local governments 
can provide; and
 • Local governments exhaust most of their potential in dealing with critical 
situations. 
Local Media
Strengths
 • The media provide information on public life from time to time in 55% of all 
municipalities; 
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 • Local, printed mass communication exists in all municipalities with over 5,000 
inhabitants and in 88% of those with more than 2,000 inhabitants; and 
 • The number of media owned by private companies has grown; these provide 
coverage on public life in considerable detail even in small municipalities.   
Weaknesses
 • In small municipalities, the media owned by local government merely make 
decisions public and have no detectable ambition to serve as a means of 
communication with citizens; and
 • Local markets are too poor to support the existence of independent local media 
that could act as means of public control.
Local Civil Society Organizations
Strengths
 • A fairly dense network of civil society organizations exists in Slovak communities 
and cities;
 • They have a large membership, usually consisting of the most active citizens, 
i.e., the core of the local human civil potential; and
 • Their members are experienced in municipal public activities and have a record 
of service in the organs of local self-government. 
Weaknesses
 • Civil society organizations have only a weak legal status in local politics;
 • The public image of (some) civil society organizations is not yet quite positive; 
and
 • Cooperation with local self-governments remains unsatisfactory.
Citizens’ Political Culture
Strengths
 • Signiﬁcant numbers of citizens are able to mobilize themselves in key situations 
for local self-government; and
 • The inhabitants of Slovak communities and cities continue to be active.
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Weaknesses
 • Citizens have little interest in matters concerning local self-government;
 • Local residents have insuﬃcient information about the local self-government; 
and
 • There is a low degree of citizen participation in the management of public 
aﬀairs.
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APPENDIX  I
Table A4.1
The Structure of the Municipal Budget in Slovakia (2000)
Budget Item Amount [Slovak crowns]
Total revenue 27,354,560,000
Tax revenue 12,799,230,000
Taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital gains 7,666,880,000
Salaries and compensation 6,440,160,000
Property tax 3,606,160,000
Domestic goods and services taxes 1,514,720,000
Non-tax revenue 10,691,600,000
Entrepreneurial activity and property income 704,390,000
Administrative and other fees 1,265,980,000
Domestic credits and deposit interest 246,970,000
Other non-tax revenues 5,931,490,000
Grants and transfers 3,739,380,000
Revenues from repayment of credits and the share of purchases 124,350,000
Source: Slovak Statistical Yearbook 2001. 
 
Table A4.2
Income of Local Budgets [Billions of Slovak crowns]
Year Total From Revenues From the State Budget
1991 16,175 8,214 7,961
1992 20,627 18,242 2,385
1993 20,966 19,445 1,521
1994 20,073 8,993 1,080
1995 22,236 21,046 1,190
1996 22,858 22,562 1,266
1997 26,685 24,900 1,785
1998 25,929 23,851 2,078
1999 24,181 21,945 2,235
2000 27,354 24,588 2,766
Source: Slovak Statistical Yearbook 1992–2001.
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Table A4.3
Political Parties
ANO   Alliance of New Citizens 
DS  Democratic Party  
DU  Democratic Union of Slovakia
HZD  Movement for Democracy
HZDS   Movement for a Democratic Skovakia
KSS   Communist Party of Slovakia
KDH  Christian Democratic Movement
OKS  Civil Conservative Party  
PSNS   True Slovak National Party  
ROI  Roma Civil Initiative in Slovkia
SDKU  Slovakian Democratic & Christian Union
SDK  Slovakian Democratic Coalition
SNS   Slovakian National Party
Smer  Smer Party
SDA   Social Democratic Alternative
SDSS   Social Democratic Party of Slovakia
SDL   Party of Democratic Left
SMK  MKP Party of Magyar Coalition
SOP  Party of Civil Understanding
SZS  Green Party of Slovakia
ZRS   Association of Slovak Workers  
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1. INTRODUCTION—ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The aim of this paper is comparative and descriptive. The paper compares the practical 
functioning of local democracy in ﬁve countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In 
addition to the three countries reported in this volume (Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovakia), 
the foregoing analysis will involve two other countries (Hungary and Poland), also covered 
by the Indicators of Local Democratic Government Project’s (ILDGP) extensive surveys 
of local government councilors and chief executive oﬃcers. We focus on the municipal tier 
of local governments, leaving aside structures on a county or regional level. For example, 
we do not analyze the functioning of kraj (regions) in Slovakia, or powiat (counties) 
or województwo (regions) in Poland. In CEE we need to remember, however, that the 
upper tiers of elected subnational governments are usually either very weak (especially 
in functional and ﬁnancial terms) or do not exist at all. 
In this paper we concentrate on a description of the current situation, placing 
minimal attention on the explanation of identiﬁed diﬀerences. Nevertheless, even a 
pure description requires an analytical framework that helps us to identify the main 
similarities and diﬀerences. It should be stressed that we are unable to utilize the whole 
richness of the material provided by IDLGP surveys. We concentrate on the areas that 
are directly related to the analytical framework described below. 
1.1 Democracy Requires Democratic Institutions
How can local democracy be compared in diﬀerent countries of the region? 
Democracy is a term that requires deﬁnition. The Indicators Project presented in 
this volume is based on Beetham’s (1994) conceptualization. He argues that democracy 
implies decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies. Decision-making 
is democratic to the degree that it is subject to the control of all members of the collectivity 
considered as equals (Beetham 1994, 28). Schmitter and Karl (1991), in their classic 
essay, deﬁne democracy as a system in which government is accountable to citizens, 
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who act through their elected representatives, and who are competing and cooperating 
with each other at the same time. Democracy requires procedures and following agreed 
principles. Such necessary procedures are summarized by Robert Dahl (1971, 34) in 
the following items:
 • Decisions of government are controlled by elected politicians;
 • Elections are regular, free, and fair;
 • Practically all adult citizens have a right to vote;
 • Practically all adult citizens have a right to be elected;
 • Citizens may present their opinions, not being punished for what they are 
saying;
 • Citizens have access to alternative sources of information;
 • Citizens may organize associations or organizations, including political parties 
and interest groups.
Schmitter and Karl (1991) add two more to this list:
 • Elected representatives can introduce their policies without opposition from 
appointed bureaucrats;
 • Decisions are made independently of other political systems. 
In discussing the evaluation of democracies in post-communist Europe, Morlino 
(2004) formulates (on the basis of his review of classic writings) the following minimal 
criteria of democracy:
 • More than one political party;
 • Free elections;
 • More than one source of information;
 • Decision-making not restricted by non-elected elites. 
Therefore, our starting point needs to be a description (and comparison) of formal 
government institutions. We analyze the broad electoral framework as well as the 
relationship between elected and non-elected local government bodies. 
1.2 Local Democracy Requires Local Autonomy
Since we are interested in LOCAL democracy we need to assess local autonomy. This 
condition is directly related to the last item on Schmitter and Karl’s as well as on Morlino’s 
lists of criteria. In the analysis of local democracy the strong inﬂuence of upper tiers 
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on local decision-making would be equivalent to the intervention of another political 
system and/or restriction of local decisions made by non-elected elites (in this case, 
central-level politicians or bureaucrats). 
To compare local autonomy we will apply Page and Goldsmith’s (1987; see 
also Goldsmith 1995 and 2002) framework of central–local relations.1 The model 
distinguishes between three dimensions of central–local relations:
 • Functions (how broad is the scope of functions allocated to local governments). 
The size of local government spending (compared to total public, or—easier to 
measure—to national GDP) is a suﬃcient, although a bit simplistic, measure 
of this dimension of autonomy;
 • Discretion of local governments over decision-making. The freedom of local 
governments may be limited in several ways, including
  – Regulation of revenues (list of local taxes available for local governments, 
but ﬂexible enough that local councils may decide upon local tax rates, 
ﬁnancing through state grants, including conditional grants, etc.);
  – Regulations on expenditure (including limits imposed on local government 
borrowing power);
  – Setting central norms and standards on delivery of services. In this case, 
not only central government but also EU regulations gain more and more 
importance;
 • Access of local governments to the formulation of central policies. 
In the case of discretion, Page and Goldsmith distinguish between “statutory regulation,” 
in which once the laws have been passed, local authorities can do as they please so long as it is 
within the law (1987, 159) and control which is exerted through individual, administrative 
decisions of state oﬃcials. Goldsmith (2002) notices that a shift from direct to indirect 
modes of control has been typical for Western Europe in recent years. According to Page 
and Goldsmith, there is also an important diﬀerence in the dominant mode of access to the 
formulation of central policies. In some countries the dominant way is through negotiations 
(with central government, trade unions representing local employees) conducted typically 
by local government associations; in others it is more through direct contacts of individual 
local governments (and inﬂuencing individual administrative decisions). 
1.3 Local Democracy Functioning May Be Assessed 
 through its Legitimization
The framework presented above will guide us in the description of the formal institutions 
of local democracy. But in order to understand better its performance we will refer to 
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the concept of legitimization of the system. We may start from a notion of institutional 
performance, which Putnam (1993) deﬁnes through: 
 • Responding to local community needs;
 • Goal-setting skills;
 • Eﬃcient decision-making;
 • Implementation of the adopted decisions/accomplishment of the adopted 
objectives.
    
The above dimensions of eﬃcient management formulated by Putnam can also be easily 
referred to as the conditions of legitimacy, as discussed by Haus and Heinelt (2005):
 • The condition of responding to needs is closely linked with a need for genuine 
public participation. This means an opportunity to express satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction concerning proposed solutions as well as to inﬂuence decision-
making. Thus, the voice of citizens becomes audible, and the voice of the 
electorate genuinely counts. All this signiﬁes “input legitimacy.”
 • Putnam’s processes of goal-setting and decision-making are linked with the 
transparency of the processes taking place in self-governmental institutions, 
as discussed by Haus and Heinelt. Accountability before the electorate and 
openness of the political process, both inextricably linked with each other, are 
prerequisites of “throughput legitimacy.” 
 • Putnam’s evaluation of institutional performance from the point of view of the 
outcomes of the conducted actions refers to the capability to solve the local 
community’s problems, which in turn constitutes a third type of legitimacy 
through eﬀectiveness (“output legitimacy”).
Haus and Heinelt notice that the crisis of local democracy in European countries 
(mentioned in chapter 1) is connected to all three types of legitimacy summarized in 
Table 5.1.
The quoted original division by Haus and Heinelt ignores an important aspect of 
the legitimacy of authorities’ actions and related to the legitimacy of objectives realized 
by politicians. Quite apart from the three dimensions discussed by Haus and Heinelt, it 
is indeed essential whether the authorities’ community partners actually accept the goals 
of the undertaken actions. This does not have to be connected to direct involvement in 
decision-making or transparency of procedures, or with the achievement of the adopted 
objectives. According to Haus and Heinelt, input legitimacy refers only to “legitimacy 
through involvement.” However, not all the parties interested in the realization of a goal 
had to vote in favor of a given initiative, not to mention that they did not necessarily 
take part in consultative procedures. In democratic praxis, the “legitimacy through 
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involvement” as deﬁned by Haus and Heinelt partially coincides with the theoretical 
notion of procedural democracy (Schumpeter 1995) and, to a certain degree, can also 
overlap with throughput legitimacy. 
Table 5.1
 Diﬀerent Forms of Democratic Legitimization
Principle Criteria Phenomena of Crisis
Input legitimization Participation Consent Decrease of voter 
turnout 
Throughput 
legitimization
Transparency Accountability Opaque institutions
Output legitimization Eﬀectiveness Problem-solving Policy failure
Source: Haus and Heinelt 2005. 
Due to these reasons, it seems justiﬁed to introduce a certain modiﬁcation—in 
talking about input legitimacy we will also take into consideration to what degree local 
government activities are supported by the community from the point of view of their 
purposefulness. Do the actors think that undertaking these activities is generally a good 
idea? An alternative term that we could use is legitimacy of purpose.2 
1.4 Analytical Framework—How to Apply It?
This chapter is ﬁrst of all a comparative summary of national reports presented earlier in 
this volume. The comparison of local electoral systems and other elements of democratic 
institutions very much relies on data in the national reports, although other sources of 
information are used too. 
The functional dimension of local autonomy will be measured mainly by the share 
of local government spending in GDP. Analyzing other dimensions of local autonomy, 
apart from descriptive information in national reports as well as in other literature, we 
also can refer to some of our survey data. For example, local discretion may be assessed 
through the opinions of councilors on the impact of regional and local governments on 
local decision-making as well as through the perceived impact of regional and central 
government’s opinions on decisions made by councilors. In assessing the mode of access, 
we will look at the existence and role played by local government associations, as well as 
at cumul des mandates (holding some positions in central government by local politicians) 
practices. 
As regards various dimensions of legitimacy of the local government system, we 
mostly refer to ILDGP survey data (also analyzed in the country chapters of this book). 
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Survey data provide an excellent and unique opportunity for comparisons, although 
it is not free of serious limitations. First of all, we rely on survey data, which means 
that we mostly analyze the opinions of our respondents, which—by deﬁnition—are 
their subjective feelings, and which might not be identical with “hard facts.” Secondly, 
we have at our disposal a one-sided picture, as we do not have direct data on citizens’ 
opinions, which are known only through the impressions of our respondents. We do not 
know to what extent councilors’ and oﬃcials’ perceptions of what typical residents think 
reﬂects the real picture. Luckily, in some national reports, survey data are supplemented 
by information on public opinion studies. Similar information is also available in some 
other publications (e.g., Swianiewicz 2001), but it is not fully comparable, and we need 
to remember this limitation while drawing ﬁnal conclusions from our comparisons. 
Nevertheless, ILDGP data include plentiful information allowing an assessment of 
all three dimensions of democratic legitimization. 
1.5 Input Legitimacy
We start with the simplest aspect of this dimension, looking at who the local 
representatives are. What is their gender, age, education, and nationality structure? 
Obviously, representation does not require exactly following the social structure of the 
electorate by elected councilors, but in practice we know that too large a discrepancy can 
make a problem. We also ask to what extent local government reform brought continuity 
or change in the local political elites? We can easily measure this by the proportion of 
councilors who played an important role in oﬃcial political institutions before 1990. 
Then we turn to other aspects of input legitimacy, i.e., to various opportunities 
local community members have to transmit (directly or indirectly) their preferences 
on local issues such as:
 • The ability of citizens to directly inﬂuence decision-making, with special 
attention placed on local referenda;
 • Citizens’ interest in local public issues, measured ﬁrst of all by the turnout in 
local elections;
 • Formal regulations on decision-making as well as the reputation of the 
community power structure; 
 • Consideration of diﬀerent interests by councilors; also councilors’ opinions on 
declarations in conﬂict situations;
 • The number of information sources declared to be used by local councilors;
 • The existence of civic society structures measured by NGOs—their number, 
activeness in local governance, and perceived impact on local decision-making;
 • The role of political parties in local politics.
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In order to present our ﬁndings in a concise form, instead of extensive presentation 
of each of the variables (items of questions) we concentrate on summary indices taking 
into account several items of the questionnaire. 
1.6 Throughput Legitimacy
The ILDGP survey includes few questions covering throughput legitimacy. Nevertheless, 
national reports include interesting information on rules and practices of access to 
information as well as on local corruption, which is one of the main barriers for 
transparent decision-making. The survey data itself includes questions allowing for 
indirect analysis of throughput legitimacy—a question asking about cases of clientelism in 
local decision-making and questions on citizen’s access to various sources of information 
on local governments’ activities as perceived by local government oﬃcials (including 
the existence and quality of local media).
1.7 Output Legitimacy
We do not learn much about the actual outputs of local government activities, but 
some questions do refer indirectly to output legitimacy. Moreover, we may (at least 
partially) measure output legitimacy through the assessment of local administration’s 
willingness and capacity to introduce management changes. In this section we take into 
consideration the following items:
 • Opinion on the performance of democratic local governments as compared to 
the pre-1990 local authorities;
 • The existence of various programs/policies that might support management 
change; 
 • The existence of some management reforms, such as partnership with NGOs 
in delivery of functions; 
 • Councilors’ and CEOs’ assessment of the quality of local government staﬀ;
 • The ability of local assemblies to make smooth decisions; 
 • The self-declared skills of elected representatives, such as their ability to use the 
Internet.
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2. INSTITUTIONS OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY
2.1 Territorial Organization
In the present paper we concentrate on the municipal tier of subnational government. 
Importantly, attention should be drawn to the absence or weakness of meso-level3 elected 
government in CEE countries as an after-eﬀect of the post-communist transition. 
Opposite to the tendency in many West European countries, where new tiers of 
government have been created or strengthened during the last twenty to thirty years 
(Sharpe 1993), the above-communal level of government was signiﬁcantly weakened 
in all CEE countries. 
There is a lack of an elected upper tier of local government in Estonia and in Bulgaria, 
despite the regional level clearly being mentioned in the Bulgarian constitution. In 
Hungary, the level of 19 counties (megye) (plus 22 cities with county rights) has been 
kept, but its functions and powers have been seriously weakened compared to the 
previous period. In Poland and Slovakia, the 1990 wave of reforms allowed for local 
self-government on a communal level only. The county or regional elected government 
needed to wait till 1999 (with the creation of powiats and wojewodztwo self-governments 
in Poland) or even 2002 (the establishment of kraj governments in Slovakia). Moreover, 
even after the establishment of meso governments, their functions are usually very 
narrow, their ﬁnancing is heavily dependent on transfers from the central budget, and 
they have either none or a very limited role in coordinating (or inﬂuencing) the lowest 
level governments’ activities. Most of the vital services as well as any revenue-raising 
powers have been largely reserved for a municipal (communal) level of self-government. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 (later in this chapter), which shows that the vast majority 
of subnational public spending goes through the city/communal level. 
The origins of the weakness of the meso level lay in pre-1990 history. Regions 
or counties exerted direct control over municipalities, and their strong position was 
synonymous with the oppression of local autonomy. Therefore, the unwillingness to 
give signiﬁcant powers to the meso level was dictated largely by the fear of reformers and 
local politicians that the upper tier would still try to control municipal governments. 
This in turn conﬁrms that a discussion of the municipal level is most crucial to 
understanding the present status of local democracy. Among the countries covered, 
there is also a wide variation of municipal-level territorial organization. 
During the communist period, the widespread belief in economy of scale, together 
with an authoritarian style of governance, led to massive reforms. Territorial consolidation 
was introduced without real consultation with local communities. Not surprisingly, a 
strong bottom-up pressure for fragmentation was a natural reaction for earlier reforms in 
many countries.4 This resulted in extreme fragmentation of local governments in Slovakia, 
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Hungary, and—to a lesser extent—Estonia. In Hungary the number of municipalities 
was reduced from 3,021 in 1962 to 1,364 in 1988, but then increased to 3,133 in 1992. 
Changes were similar in Slovakia, where presently almost every village has its own local 
government, and in the anecdotal case of Prikry Village it has just two residents. 
But the same pressure for fragmentation has not manifested itself with a similar 
strength everywhere. Polish communes were amalgamated in 1973, their number was 
reduced from more than 4,000 to about 2,400, and their number remained relatively 
stable until now (the present number of municipal governments is 2,491). In Bulgaria 
the number of municipalities was reduced from 2,178 in 1949 to 255 at the end of 
1980s, and is very similar at present. 
The variation in size distribution of municipal governments is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
 As illustrated in Table 5.1, the same variation is repeated in our surveys of chief 
executive oﬃcers and councilors, even if there is quite visible overrepresentation of local 
governments from larger sized cohorts. A slightly higher bias towards big municipalities 
in the case of the councilors sample is easy to explain, since councils in larger local 
government units usually have more deputies. Naturally, the nature of local democracy 
is diﬀerent between countries where most local governments have a constituency of less 
than 1,000 citizens (Hungary, Slovakia, or Estonia) and those where most municipalities 
are much larger, with several thousand residents (Bulgaria or Poland). In the former case, 
there is a much more favorable chance for direct, personal contacts between voters and 
elected representatives; in the latter, one may expect more focus on eﬃciency in delivery of 
variety of local services. In their analysis of Western Europe, Page and Goldsmith (1987) 
argue that the size of municipal governments also inﬂuences the nature of central–local 
relations. It should be stressed that many of the indices used in this chapter (as well 
as in national reports) signiﬁcantly depend on the size of municipality. Therefore, we 
can discover considerable diﬀerences between average scores for individual countries; 
however, they reﬂect diﬀerences in territorial organization rather than diﬀerences between 
two cities of similar size in two diﬀerent countries. We will be returning to this issue, 
when discussing individual indices. 
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Figure 5.1 
Distribution of Local Governments According to Population Size
Table 5.2
Size Distribution of Local Governments [%]
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
Below 1,000 Whole country 0.0 9.4 54.9 0.0 68.5
CEO sample 0.0 10.0 41.5 0.0 45.0
Repr. Sample 0.0 4.0 21.2 0.0 33.7
1,000–5,000 Whole country 10.6 76.8 36.3 23.6 27.3
CEO sample 7.5 69.7 33.9 17.1 34.4
Repr. sample 2.6 51.0 34.5 15.5 38.5
5,000–10,000 Whole country 27.0 7.9 4.4 42.3 1.8
CEO sample 24.3 13.7 7.7 30.6 8.3
Repr. Sample 21.2 29.0 9.0 23.6 10.6
Over 10,000 Whole country 62.4 5.9 4.3 34.1 2.5
CEO sample 68.1 6.5 16.8 52.3 12.1
Repr. sample 76.2 16.1 35.3 60.9 17.2
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2.2 Local Elections and the Formal Power Structure
In all ﬁve countries the most important representative body is the local council, which 
is elected for a four-year term (except in Estonia, where the term is three years; a four-
year system is under discussion). In most cases, the electoral system is proportional, 
and larger municipalities are usually divided into multi-mandate electoral wards. The 
following exceptions to the principle of proportionality of council elections are:
 • Poland—in local governments with less than 20,000 citizens, council is elected 
in simple majority systems;
 • Hungary—there is a majority system in local governments with less than 10,000 
citizens, and a mixed system in larger municipalities. 
Our sample of countries also reﬂects a widespread tendency to introduce the direct 
(popular) election of mayors. Estonia is the only country among our ﬁve in which 
the mayor is appointed by the council. In Slovakia and Bulgaria direct elections were 
introduced at the beginning of 1990s, in Hungary in 1994 (before this, Hungarian 
mayors were directly elected only in small local governments), and in Poland in 2002.5 
However, the position of mayors in CEE countries is relatively weak, compared to 
the position of their directly elected colleagues in several West European countries. 
For example, they do not have a guaranteed majority in the council. It may lead, and 
does often lead, to serious management problems when the mayor faces an opposition 
that holds the majority in the council. If we remember the low stability and high 
fragmentation of political parties in CEE countries, we can expect numerous cases in 
which eﬀective decision-making may be diﬃcult. Among forty-two Polish cities with 
a population over 100,000, only seven mayors have the clear support of the majority 
of councilors. In most of the remaining cases he/she needs to rely on more or less 
stable coalitions. In ﬁve cities the situation is even more complicated—the majority 
in the council is held by a group deﬁnitely in opposition to the mayor (Swianiewicz 
and Klimska 2003). The mayor usually submits a budget proposal to the council. But 
councilors may introduce preferred changes to the proposal, which in turn cannot be 
vetoed by the mayor (with some exceptions, such as in Poland, where the mayor can 
disagree with the suggestion to increase borrowing by the city).
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Table 5.3
Position of Directly Elected Mayors in the Analyzed Countries
Guaranteed 
Majority in the 
Council for 
Mayors’ Group?
Chief 
Executive 
Position
Discretion in 
Appointment Decisions, 
Organizational Structure 
of Administration
Budget 
Decisions
Bulgaria No Yes Moderate—mayor 
decides on most 
appointments, but 
organizational structure 
and deputy mayors 
have to be approved by 
the council.
Mayor submits 
a proposal, which can 
be changed by the 
council.
Hungary No, election of 
mayor does not 
need to be on 
the same day as 
for the council.
No, mayor 
acts through 
CAO who is 
appointed by 
the council.
Weak, CAO appoints 
oﬃcers.
Mayor submits 
a proposal, which can 
be changed by the 
council—in practice 
asymmetry between 
full-time mayor and 
“amateur” councilors.
Poland No Yes Moderate—mayor 
decides organizational 
details and 
appoints most key 
administrators, but 
appointment of the 
treasurer and city 
secretary requires 
approval of the council.
Mayor submits 
a proposal, which can 
be changed by the 
council. But council 
must not increase 
amount of borrowing. 
Slovakia No Yes Strong Mayor submits 
a proposal, which can 
be changed by the 
council.
2.3 Local Government after 1990—Continuity or Change?
Apart from the depth of the legal change in the institutional setting of local democracy, 
it is important to note to what extent the local government reform has been perceived as 
a “new opening” and to what extent as introducing new rules into the existing system. 
In some countries, 1990 brought a dramatic turnover among local elites. For example, 
in Poland all the mayors of the ﬁfty largest cities elected in 1990, and a large proportion 
of councilors, were recruited either from the democratic opposition of the 1980s or were 
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not involved in any public activity previously. For them, local self-government started 
in 1990, and what happened before happened in “another world.” Local elites in this 
group of countries usually think that we should not use the term “local self-government” 
to describe the old reality.
But in some other countries of the region, the situation is diﬀerent and the local 
government reform of the 1990s may be summarized as an attempt at reforming 
old, existing structures, but without breaking ties with the tradition of the old soviets 
(councils). In these countries, most local politicians treat the history of their city 
governments as a kind of continuity (so it is possible to talk, for example, about something 
which “has over twenty years of tradition in our council”). 
In our sample we do not have countries that would be the most typical for the 
latter model (Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia would perhaps be classical examples). We 
do not have the precise measure of feeling of continuity or discontinuity, either. But 
indirectly we can measure this by the proportion of councilors who either were members 
of political parties or had the experience of sitting in local people’s councils before 1990. 
Figure 5.2 provides such information.
There is no doubt that personal continuity is the largest in Bulgaria—it concerns 
both former party and local council’s members. Almost one-third of present Bulgarian 
councilors were party members before 1990 and one in six was also a deputy to a people’s 
council. The lowest proportion of former party members has been found in Estonia and 
then in Slovakia. However, the declarations of Estonian respondents should probably 
be interpreted in a slightly diﬀerent way than the rest. Estonia was not an independent 
country (even formally) before 1990, and in such circumstances membership in the 
communist party was much more strongly seen as identiﬁcation with the occupying 
forces. Consequently, declaring their old party membership today may be more diﬃcult 
for Estonian councilors than it is for respondents from other countries. 
There is much lower intercountry variation in the “old councilors” rate, but once 
again there is a clear distinction between Estonia and Slovakia, with the lowest, and 
Bulgaria with the highest proportion of continuity.
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Figure 5.2
 Proportion of Councilors Who Were Party Members or Councilors before 1990
3. LOCAL AUTONOMY—CENTRAL–LOCAL RELATIONS
3.1 Functions
Data provided in Figure 5.2, suggest that—in terms of allocation of functions—CEE 
countries remain more centralized than most countries in the northern part of Western 
Europe. The share of subnational governments’ spending in GDP varies from between 
below ﬁve percent in Slovakia to slightly over ten percent in Hungary and Poland. 
The same share in north-western Europe is often above ﬁfteen percent (Netherlands, 
Finland, and Norway) or even above twenty percent (Sweden and Denmark). We 
should mention that, especially in Slovakia, the situation has changed since 2001. 
After this date, the Slovak government implemented regional government reform and 
decentralized more functions to municipal governments, but we do not have newer, 
fully comparable data. 
As is clear from Figure 5.3, the municipal government is the main agent of sub-
national spending, while the upper tier plays either no role or a marginal role in this 
respect. Apart from spending measured as a proportion of GDP, we also use an alternative 
measure of functional decentralization—the share of municipal in total public spending. 
This measure seems to be more precise, but it creates several methodological and data 
problems due to the existence of various extrabudgetary public funds in several countries 
that are very diﬃcult to take into account in a fully comparable way. However, relying 
on Dexia estimates (Local Finance… 2000 and 2004) we may report that this share 
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varies from twenty-ﬁve percent in Estonia to less than ten percent in Slovakia. But 
these estimates are based on several controversial assumptions and should be treated 
with some caution. 
Figure 5.3
Indicators of Functional Decentralization
Note: *  Data from 1998.
Source: Local Finance in Eleven…, 2000; Local Finance in the Ten…, 2004. 
3.2 Discretion 
The second dimension of central–local relations is directly related to the notion of local 
autonomy, since it analyzes local discretion in decisions over the functions municipalities 
are responsible for. We start by looking at the subjective perceptions of the impact that 
upper tiers have on local decision-making. Figure 5.4 is based on a mean of answers 
to two questions: “What is your sense of how much the inﬂuence is of the following 
bodies on the decisions of your local government?” and “When making a decision as 
councilor, to what degree do you feel it is important to give special consideration to 
the following groups?”
0
Bulgaria*
30
10
15
25
5
20
Hungary Slovakia
All local government spending as % of GDP (2001)
Municipal spending as % of GDP (2001)
Estonia Poland
Municipal spending as % of public spending (2001)
490
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
Figure 5.4
Impact of Upper Tiers on Local Decision-making—Perception of Councilors
The answers of respondents in individual countries are very similar, and in general 
the impact of the upper tiers is perceived as moderate. It is felt slightly less in Poland 
and Estonia while it is perceived as a bit stronger in Hungary, but the diﬀerences are 
very small. We noted before that the regional tier is usually very weak in CEE countries 
and that a lot of eﬀort has been made to secure mutual independence of the tiers of 
sub-national government. Therefore, it is a bit surprising that the impact of the regional 
tier is seen as only slightly less important than the impact of central government (in 
Hungary and Slovakia), and even more signiﬁcant in Poland. But we should note 
that both in Hungary and Poland, there is a strong negative correlation between the 
perceived impact of regions and the population size of a municipality, so this relatively 
strong impact is mostly felt by small local governments. In Slovakia the survey was 
conducted just after the introduction of the upper tier, so results may be treated as a 
sign of fear rather than a rational assessment of the existing situation. The situation in 
Poland is especially interesting—it is the only country in which the perceived impact 
of the regions is seen as stronger than that of the central government. Indeed, while 
Polish regional governments are very weak in functional terms, they play an increasing 
role in the allocation of investment support funds to municipal governments. Small 
local governments (unable to generate their own development resources) most often 
require this external support, and this fact perhaps provides a rational explanation of 
the negative correlation between the size and the perceived impact of regions. 
One of the most important ways in which local discretion is limited is through the 
allocation of funds. The most severe control is exerted through conditional grants, which 
can be used only for the purpose indicated by the source (usually central government). 
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We have incomplete comparative data on conditional grants, but we know that this issue 
is important in most of the analyzed countries. The Estonian national report informs us 
that, although grants constitute a minority of municipal revenues, the trend over the last 
few years has been negative, i.e., there was a decreasing share of own and an increasing 
share of conditional grants in the overall budget revenues. In Poland in 2002, conditional 
grants constituted around ﬁfteen percent of municipal revenues, but in some ministries 
there has also been a visible tendency to develop this method of funding. The Slovak 
report provides evidence of using party or political loyalty principles in deciding upon 
the allocation of state transfers to local governments from 1994–98. We also know that 
other periods and other countries are not totally free of this form of informal control. 
On the other hand, the highest level of local discretion may be expected if local taxes 
and other own source revenues provide a big share of local budgets. The proportion of 
these revenues in municipal budgets is illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5
Structure of Municipal Government Revenues [%]
Note: *  Data from 1998.
Local taxes are the most important in Poland (where they provide over twenty percent 
of total budget revenues), then in Hungary and Slovakia, but much less signiﬁcant in 
Bulgaria and Estonia. It should be added that in CEE countries, local governments have 
only limited discretion to decide upon the rates of local taxes. In Poland, for example, 
there is a maximum (ceiling) that limits tax rates. In Hungary there is a list of a few 
local taxes that municipalities can choose from. Other own sources of revenues play the 
most important role in Slovak and Hungarian municipal budgets. They consist mainly 
0
60
Bulgaria*
50
20
40
10
30
Hungary Slovakia
Other revenues from own sources (2001) Local taxes (2001)
Estonia Poland
492
T H E  S T A T E  O F  L O C A L  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  C E N T R A L  E U R O P E
of fees and charges as well as revenues from municipal property. Also, in this case, the 
actual discretion of local governments diﬀers from one country to another and (in the 
case of fees for services) from one function to another. The scope of this paper does not 
allow more detailed discussion of this issue. 
Norms and standards are another form of limitation of local discretion. Until 
recently the main source of this limitation was central government and parliament. In 
some countries and in some functions those norms have been extremely rigid, leaving 
almost no space for local decisions. Recently, many standards have been introduced or 
reformulated, due to an EU requirement to comply with European directives related 
to various services local governments are responsible for. This issue is strongly stressed 
in the Estonian report. 
Our data allow us to describe—using Page and Goldsmith’s (1987) terminology—the 
statutory means of control, but we know that in the countries analyzed there are also 
numerous cases of control exerted through individual/administrative decisions. The 
Slovak case of political bias in the allocation of state funds to local governments is just 
one of several possible examples.
3.3 Access
How can local governments inﬂuence central level policies concerning their functions? 
First of all, we should stress that in all ﬁve countries there are national associations of 
local governments that play an important role in lobbying and in negotiations with 
central level authorities. In Slovakia and Bulgaria there is one such association (ZMOS 
and NAMRB, respectively), while in the remaining countries the oﬃcial municipal 
representation is more fragmented. In Estonia there are two national associations, and 
their oﬃcial forum for discussion with central-level authorities is the Cooperation 
Assembly of the Local Government Unions. However, the Estonian report notes that 
this body has not been too successful and that the Government has ignored most of the 
proposals submitted by the unions. One source of this weakness is the frequent inability 
of the two major unions to reach a common opinion. 
In Poland there are four major municipal government associations (ZGW—
Association of Rural Local Governments, UMP—Union of Small Towns, ZMP—
Association of Polish Cities, and UMP— Union of Polish Metropolies). Membership 
in these associations is not obligatory, and they unite from twelve (a dozen of the largest 
Polish cities in the Union of Polish Metropolises) to over 400 associations (in the case 
of the rural local governments). More than half of Polish municipal governments do 
not belong to any national organization. Nevertheless, they play an important role in 
shaping central-level policies—together with the representation from county and regional 
governments, they sit in the Joint Central-Local Government Committee, with a formal 
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and important role in legislation. None of the legislation concerning local government 
can be voted on by the Parliament before it is discussed by the Joint Committee. 
Although its opinion is not binding for the Parliament, and central government is not 
always very eager to follow this procedure, there are several instances when the voice of 
the local government association has been decisive. But, similarly as in Estonia, there 
are some instances when local associations cannot reach a common conclusion, and in 
such cases it is easier for central government ministries to pursue their goals. A recent 
conﬂict between cities and rural local governments on the method of allocating funds 
for education provides a good example. 
Apart from national associations, an important role is played by smaller, usually 
regional, organizations of local governments. For example, in Slovakia there are more 
than 50, and in Poland more than 200 such regional organizations, that help to deliver 
some services jointly and that also play a role in representing their members vis-à-vis 
central government. 
But negotiation through associations is probably not a dominant means of access. 
Individual contacts of local politicians play an important role as well. The Slovak 
report cites an example of the mayor of Zilina city, who is also a chairman of one of the 
national political parties and deputy chairman of the Slovak Parliament. Such a cumul 
des mandates gives numerous opportunities to lobby for “home city” interests. In Poland 
the possibility of holding parallel political positions in various tiers of government has 
been abolished only recently (in 2002). Previously, in the 1997 parliamentary election, 
about 100 mayors and councilors were elected to the Parliament (almost 25 percent of 
all MPs elected that year), and most of them kept their positions in local governments 
parallel to their new functions in the central legislature. But even after liquidating the 
cumul des mandats activity of local MPs, lobbying for individual decisions concerning 
their home local governments is almost a rule. There are sometimes exotic political 
coalitions of MPs from the same region who lobby together for a better position in the 
allocation of central funds for regional development. Needless to say, municipal mayors 
and councilors spend part of their energy on contacting and pressing these local MPs. 
Holding a mandate of a mayor and member of the parliament at the same time is still 
quite common in Hungary. These examples strengthen the impression that direct, 
unoﬃcial access to central policy formulation is still typical for the political culture of 
Central and Eastern Europe.
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4. LEGITIMACY OF LOCAL DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS
4.1 Input Legitimacy
4.1.1 Social Structure of Local Councils
Our consideration of the legitimacy of local political systems starts with an analysis of 
the social structure of elected representatives. Obviously, we do not expect that eﬀective 
representation requires that elected councilors strictly reﬂect the social structure of their 
local communities. As John Stuart Mill noticed, the idea of election originates in the 
willingness to elect “the best,” not “the most typical.” But Sartori (1987) suggests that 
too much attention placed on mirroring the social structure of voters by their elected 
representatives might be interpreted as one of the diseases of modern democracy. But, on 
the other hand, we know that too large a discrepancy between the structure of the elec-
torate and the elected council may produce legitimacy problems. And it is very unlikely 
that there are no well-qualiﬁed candidates among certain age groups or genders. 
Low representation of some groups (typically: women, young people, and national 
minorities) may be the result of self-selection, when people from underrepresented groups 
are not willing to stand for election; or selection, when political elites or voters themselves 
are not ready to give a mandate to these people (see also Oﬀerdal 1991). Regardless, 
we deal with the self-selection or selection process, assuming that underrepresentation 
often reﬂects the process of social exclusion of certain groups, which is very dangerous 
for the legitimacy of the political system. 
Figure 5.6 shows that councilors are usually male, educated, over 40 years old, 
and rarely from national minorities. The proportion of women councilors varies from 
just over thirty percent in Estonia to just over twenty percent in Bulgaria and Poland. 
This is less than during the communist period, where diﬀerent social groups had semi-
oﬃcial quotas in elected bodies. But we should stress that it does not mean the role of 
women in local politics is now lower than twenty years ago: then, councils did not play 
a signiﬁcant role and the presence of women or minority social groups resulting from 
quotas often had only a symbolic meaning. In some countries the proportion of women 
strongly decreases with the size of local governments (i.e., there are fewer women in 
councils of big cities than in small towns or villages). Maybe this explains why there 
are fewer women in Bulgarian and Polish local governments but not in the other three 
countries. But an interpretation like this is not always that simple—in Poland there are 
proportionally more women in cities, where the idea of a woman’s role is less traditional. 
At the same time almost ten percent of rural local governments exist with not a single 
woman in the local council. 
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It should be stressed that there is an even lower proportion of women among local 
mayors, with 16% in Slovakia and 10% in Bulgaria. The situation looks even more 
dramatic in Poland, where only 166 (less than 7% of all) female mayors were elected 
in 2002. In our report we are unable to discover what the factors are that decide the 
underrepresentation of female councilors. The Bulgarian report suggests it is more a 
result of party selection than voters’ decisions, but we do not have strong arguments 
to verify this claim.
Figure 5.6
Social Structure of Local Councilors
 
The domination of councilors with university degrees is the strongest in Bulgaria 
(almost 80%), and the weakest in Slovakia (just below 40%). This variation is not 
surprising, since more educated councilors are usually found in bigger municipalities, 
and thus the territorial fragmentation of the Slovak local government system pushes 
up the proportion of representatives with lower education. Taking the size factor into 
account, it may be a surprise that the proportion of councilors with higher education 
in Poland is very similar to that of Hungary and Estonia—two countries with much 
more fragmented territorial systems. 
Over 70% of councilors are above 40 years of age, and the average age of councilors 
varies from 46 in Slovakia to 50 in Bulgaria. Younger councilors are more often found in 
smaller municipalities, and that explains the diﬀerence between Slovakia and Bulgaria. 
But in general, the variation between countries in the age structure of local deputies is 
not very big. 
The diﬀerences in the proportion of councilors from national minorities are interesting. 
It varies from just two percent in Poland to almost ﬁfteen percent in Bulgaria and Slovakia. 
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The ﬁgure for Poland is not surprising, since from the point of view of national structure it 
is almost a homogenous country. The ﬁgures for other countries are more intriguing. The 
proportion of Hungarian councilors in Slovakia and of Turkish councilors in Bulgaria are in 
almost ideal proportion to their share in the total population. But the Roma group is very 
strongly underrepresented in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Nevertheless, the authors 
of the national reports notice that even a symbolic representation of the Roma national 
minority is often progress in comparison to the situation only a few years ago. Interpretation 
of Estonian data is the most diﬃcult. The proportion of councilors of Russian origin (just 
over 3%) is deﬁnitely lower than the proportion of the Russian-speaking population. To 
understand this phenomenon, one needs to remember that about 20% of Estonian residents 
do not have Estonian citizenship. However, since 1996 it has not been necessary to be an 
Estonian citizen to be a candidate in local elections. Before 2001 it was necessary to speak 
Estonian ﬂuently, but now this condition has been withdrawn. The poor representation of 
Russians in local government reﬂects diﬃculties in its relationship with the Russian-speaking 
population, described in detail in section three of the Estonian chapter.
4.1.2 Citizens’ Interest in Local Government
In our analysis citizens’ interest is measured by the turnout in local elections. As in many 
other countries, the local turnout is signiﬁcantly lower than in the national elections. 
The diﬀerence is usually especially big in big cities, while in small communities people 
are more inclined to participate in local rather than parliamentary elections (for more 
data, see Swianiewicz 2001, 2002). 
Figure 5.7 
Turnout in Local Government Elections
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Figure 5.7 suggests a gradual convergence of the electoral turnout between the 
countries in this study. At the beginning of the transformation there was quite a clear 
distinction between Hungary and Poland with a low level of participation, and Bulgaria, 
Estonia, and Slovakia with a much higher attendance. But we have noticed a gradual 
increase in the turnout in Hungary since then, and stabilization in Poland, while a 
decreasing trend remains in three countries. 
4.1.3 Actors in Local Decision-making
Whose opinion plays a role when local decisions are being made? We start with a 
“reputational” study of community power structure, presented in Figure 5.8. Typically, 
it is the mayor who is seen as the most inﬂuential actor, followed by the local council 
and Chief Executive Oﬃcer (CEO). Such a structure suggests that our respondents see 
actors with formal (electoral) legitimacy as the most inﬂuential in local decision-making. 
If such a perception is not distant from reality, it means that the formal institutions of 
local representative democracy work correctly. 
Figure 5.8 
Community Power Structure—Mean of Councilors’ and CEOs’ Opinions
There are interesting diﬀerences between countries. First of all, Estonia is the only 
country in which local residents do not directly elect the mayor. In such a situation the 
normal expectation is that the role of mayor vis-à-vis the local council should be lower, 
but this is not the case in Estonia. At the same time, the role of mayor is assessed as 
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marginally lower than of the council in Slovakia, i.e., in a country with a long tradition 
of direct mayoral election and commonly seen as a country with a strong mayoral 
system. Other ﬁndings are much less surprising. As one might expect from the formal 
institutional setting, the role of CEO is the most profound in Hungary, where his/her 
inﬂuence is perceived as only marginally lower than councilors’. 
The direct role of interested citizens, NGOs, and local businesses is seen as much 
less important than the role of actors with a formal position within the government 
structure. These community actors seem to be the least important in Bulgaria—this 
observation is true ﬁrst of all in the case of NGOs, but it applies to interested citizens 
as well. Bulgaria is also the only country in which the role of businesses is assessed as 
higher than that of interested residents. It is also the only one in which the role of 
NGOs is seen as negligible. 
Direct democracy via local referenda is theoretically available in the countries analyzed 
here, but in practice they are rarely used, although there is some variation between 
countries. The Bulgarian chapter sees the reason in the lack of a relevant tradition and 
stresses that the only cases of local referenda concerned change of municipal boundaries. 
In Estonia referenda can be initiated by residents in theory, but this opportunity has 
never been used in practice. Also in Estonia, most referenda concerned changes to local 
government boundaries. 
Cases of local referenda are more frequent in Slovakia—the Slovak report indicates 
one in ﬁve municipalities. Also in Slovakia most referenda concerned issues such as 
change of name or boundaries, but some of them also concerned issues such as location 
of a controversial investment. 
In Poland the dominant share of local referenda has been organized to order a 
vote on the recall of the council or the mayor before the end of term. But there are 
also examples of more issue-oriented referenda, such as the location of controversial 
investments or “self-taxation” of the local population in order to improve the quality 
of service delivery. 
Deciding on important issues in local referenda seems to be the most popular in Hungary, 
although it is by no means on a similar scale to Switzerland. Hajnal (2001, 152) provides data 
suggesting that there were thirty-two such referenda during two years only (1999 and 2000), 
including fourteen on large-scale public investments and eleven on high-risk environmental 
projects. Obviously, thirty-two referenda in over 3,000 local governments does not look 
extremely impressive, but it is still more than in any other country presented here. 
In a representative democracy system, local councilors have to choose between 
following their own opinion and making the decision that reﬂects the opinions of the 
majority of their electorate. Opinions on this classical dilemma, called mandate versus 
independence controversy by Pitkin (1967), are illustrated in Figure 5.9. The mandate 
paradigm does not dominate in any of the countries analyzed. In Poland, supporters of 
both opinions—making decisions on the basis of one’s own judgment and transmitting 
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opinions of the electorate—are in balance. In other countries a larger proportion of 
councilors think they should follow their own opinion, and such an attitude prevails 
most dominantly in Slovakia. 
Table 5.3 illustrates how councilors collect information on the preferences of 
their voters. In each country personal contacts are seen as more important than any 
other (indirect) form. There is an interesting diﬀerence between two countries with 
territorially consolidated systems (Poland and Bulgaria) and three with the domination 
of very small local governments. In the latter group, all three options that were most 
frequently mentioned have “personal character”—apart from personal contacts with 
citizens, meetings, family, friends, and open oﬃce hours are other mechanisms to garner 
opinions. In the former group of countries, more indirect sources—such as municipal 
administration and place of work—play an important role. 
Figure 5.9
 In Case of Conﬂict between What You Believe Is a Correct Decision 
and the Opinion of People in Your Municipality, 
Whose Opinion Do You Follow?
Figure 5.10 illustrates the strength of two particular actors in local politics: civic 
organizations and political parties. The role of voluntary organizations in local democracy 
has been stressed by numerous actors for a very long time—from Alexis de Tocqueville’s 
and Adam Smith’s classic studies to Putnam (1993 and 1997) and other contemporary 
political scientists. In our analysis the development of civic organizations is measured by a 
multiple index based on the survey questions on their number, activeness, and perceived 
role in local decision-making. The highest score of civic organizations’ development 
is found in Poland, followed by Hungary and Estonia, while Slovakia and especially 
Bulgaria are at the other extreme.
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Table 5.4
Signiﬁcance of Information Sources for Local Councilors
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Poland Slovakia
1st rank Personal 
contacts with 
citizens
Personal 
contacts with 
citizens
Personal 
contacts with 
citizens
Personal 
contacts with 
citizens
Personal 
contacts with 
citizens
2nd rank Place of work Municipal 
administration
Organized 
meetings
Organized 
meetings
Organized 
meetings
3rd rank Family and 
friends
Family and 
friends
Open oﬃce 
hours
Municipal 
administration
Open oﬃce 
hours
Note: Sources with average score over 5.25 in 1–7 scale of importance are indicated in bold.
The variation in the civic organizations’ development index seems to correspond 
closely with oﬃcial data (also quoted in national reports) on the number of registered 
NGOs.6 Poland has almost sixty thousand registered organizations, while Bulgaria and 
Slovakia have ﬁfteen and thirteen thousand respectively, and Estonia much fewer at 
eighteen thousand. 
A very strong regional variation in activeness of civic organizations, stressed in the 
Slovak report but also true in Poland, is a very interesting phenomenon itself, but it is 
beyond scope of analysis of this chapter. 
Figure 5.10
The Strength of Civic Organizations and Political Parties
Party signiﬁcance is also an index based on responses to several questions.7 The rank 
of countries according to this index is almost opposite to the previous one. The lowest 
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score was found for Hungary and Poland and the highest for Bulgaria. However, as more 
detailed study on the role of parties in local politics suggests, the variation presented 
is to some extent misleading. The signiﬁcance of parties is strongly correlated with the 
population size of local government. If we compare the role of parties in jurisdictions 
of similar sizes, Bulgarian local governments are still the most partisan, but Polish 
local governments become less party-steered than Hungarian local governments (see 
Swianiewicz and Mielczarek 2005).
4.2 Throughput Legitimacy
One of the most important threats for throughput democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe is corruption. Obviously, the survey of local councilors and CEOs is not a proper 
instrument to investigate this issue, so our information is rather limited in this respect. 
But we can refer to the Corruption Perception Index prepared every year by Transparency 
International. The countries analyzed here are rather low in rank on the index. According 
to the 2004 edition of the ranking, the situation was relatively good in Estonia (31st in 
the ranking) followed by Hungary (42nd) and Bulgaria (44th), with the worst in Slovakia 
(57th) and Poland (67th). Obviously, the general index does not tell us how much of this 
negative phenomenon pertains to either local or central government administration, or 
to other public institutions (police, courts, etc.). Moreover, the perception index may 
be sometimes misleading. For example, some analysts suggest that Poland has moved 
down in the ranking when campaigns to ﬁght corruption have exposed more cases of 
misconduct to the general public. 
We know from several national studies that local governments are not free of 
corruption. The Bulgarian chapter notes that Bulgaria has moved up in the Transparency 
International Index in the last few years, but also stresses that there are some areas in 
which local administration is prone to corruption. This includes public procurement, 
licensing, and privatization of municipal property. However, Bulgarian public opinion 
sees local governments, and especially local elected representatives, as much less corrupt 
than some other professional groups, such as customs oﬃcers. 
The Slovak chapter quotes research according to which almost half of the residents 
consider corruption in local government widespread and two-thirds claim that there are 
cases of corruption. In addition, more than half of the citizens are convinced that the 
majority of local representatives are more concerned about their own proﬁts than about 
the needs of their community. Perhaps the most disappointing is that the Association of 
Towns and Villages blocks this topic from entering discussion in public meetings. 
In Poland it is important to notice the shift in public opinion—in 1995 most 
residents thought that corruption was more frequent at the national level, but surveys 
conducted in 1999 and 2000 showed that people believed it to be as frequent in the 
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national administration as in local governments (Swianiewicz 2001). According to the 
survey conducted in 2000, ﬁfteen percent of citizens claimed to know someone who 
bribed a local bureaucrat or councilor at least once. Opinions from entrepreneurs were 
even more pessimistic—as many as 38% said they knew another businessman who 
oﬀered a bribe (Swianiewicz 2001b). 
The situation seems to be better in Estonia (as suggested by its position in the 
Transparency International index). An interesting regulation is that Estonian local 
governments have to publish decrees and orders before their oﬃcial enforcement. There is 
also a special Anti-corruption Law of 1999. But—as the Estonian report presents—local 
governments are perceived as the most corrupt (alongside the police, customs, and border 
guards) sector of the public service. 
Our survey information on the transparency of local politics is indirect. In Figure 5.11
we learn that a majority of councilors believes that “success depends on having good 
contacts,” which indirectly indicates clientelist elements of decision-making. The 
variation in answers to this question across countries is very low. 
The belief that local administration decisions are objective8 is more widespread in 
Estonia and Poland than in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. But these answers do not 
correlate with the councilors’ perception of citizens’ trust towards local governments, 
which seems to be the highest in Slovakia and Hungary, but the lowest in Poland and 
Bulgaria. 
Figure 5.11
Does Success Depend on Good Contacts?
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means of communication. Direct contacts with citizens are the most often declared in 
Hungary and Poland and the least often in Estonia and Bulgaria. Using local media 
is not signiﬁcantly diverse among countries, although Slovak local governments seem 
to lag behind. Using electronic communication is by far the most frequent in Estonia, 
followed by Poland and Bulgaria, and the least popular in Slovakia and Hungary. The 
territorial fragmentation of local governments in the two latter countries most probably 
contributes to this result—usage of the Internet as a tool of communication is less 
common in the smallest villages. 
The presence of local media is usually seen as another factor positively inﬂuencing 
transparency of local politics. In our survey we asked about the presence of media and 
about councilors’ assessment of their quality. As regards their availability (Figure 5.13), 
local media are most often available in Estonian and Polish local communities, while 
Hungary and Slovakia are at the other extreme. The low score of Slovakia and Hungary 
may be explained once again by the territorial fragmentation—local newspapers, radio 
broadcasts, or television stations are much less numerous in smaller communities. But 
in using this line of explanation we should stress that media are “overrepresented” in 
Estonia (with relatively small local governments) and “underrepresented” in Bulgaria 
(with the largest local governments in the sample). Perhaps a partial explanation might be 
that—as is stated in the Estonian report—most of the local media are in fact newspapers 
owned and published by local governments themselves. 
Figure 5.12
Availability of Information on Local Government Activities
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Figure 5.13
Average Number of Local Media in a Municipality
Councilors’ assessment of the quality of local media presents a somewhat diﬀerent 
pattern (Figure 5.14). The best assessments have been found in Poland, Hungary, and 
Estonia, with the lowest in Bulgaria. The overall situation from the point of view of local 
media as watchdogs of local democracy seems to be the best in Poland and Estonia—they 
are frequent and score highly in eyes of local councilors. 
Figure 5.14
Average Councilors’ Assessment of Local Media Quality
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and other publications,9 we know that the level of trust in local government in CEE 
countries is usually larger than in other public institutions and that satisfaction with 
the performance of local government administration is usually higher than with the 
national bureaucracy. 
In such circumstances it is surprising that data provided in the Slovak chapter 
suggest that opinions on whether present local governments function better than local 
authorities in the communist period are very much divided. Moreover, as time passes a 
growing proportion of citizens expresses its pessimism about the results of the change. 
For example, in 2001 as many as 27% said that “problem-solving is worse now” and 
only 16% agreed that “problem-solving is better now.” This is in sharp contrast with 
the opinions of councilors, 64% of whom agreed that “the new local governments do 
a better job than the local administration before 1990.”
The situation in Poland is less extreme, although here too the opinions of councilors 
are more optimistic than the opinions of regular citizens. According to our survey, 66% 
of Polish councilors agreed with the opinion asserting improved local government 
performance. According to a 1998 survey (Swianiewicz 2001), the same opinion was 
shared by 53% of citizens, while only 8% had an opposite opinion. 
Hungary rests in between Poland and Slovakia. In 2000 over 32% of citizens thought 
that the present local government system worked better than under the communist 
period, while 23% expressed the opposite opinion (Hajnal 2001). As we know from 
our survey, the opinions of Hungarian councilors are even more optimistic—with 77% 
expressing a positive self-assessment of the new local government system. 
We do not have similar data on citizens’ opinions from the two remaining countries, 
but as we see in Figure 5.15, councilors’ opinions are the most optimistic in Estonia (with 
77% of respondents giving a positive opinion), while the least positive are in Bulgaria 
(with only 54% of councilors believing in the improvement of the local government 
system). 
While Bulgarians are the least optimistic in assessing the present performance of 
local governments, Poles (followed by Bulgarians) are the most skeptical about the 
future of their communities (Figure 5.15).10 Only 40% of Polish and 46% of Bulgarian 
respondents believe that their communities will be better oﬀ ﬁve years from now, while 
in Estonia this proportion is 72% and in Hungary 62%. It is interesting to notice that 
in each of the countries analyzed, the predictions concerning councilors’ communities 
are much more optimistic than their assessment of the situation in the whole country.11 
A relevant comparison is presented in Table 5.5.
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Figure 5.15
Councilors’ Opinions on Whether Local Government Is Better 
or Worse Now Than under Communism
Table 5.5
Councilors’ Assessment of the Situation 
in Their Countries and in Their Communities
Satisfaction with Situation 
in the Country 
[%]
Satisfaction with Situation 
in the Municipality 
[%]
Prediction of Situation 
in Municipality 
after Five Years [%]
Dissatisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied Worse Better
Bulgaria 66 13 43 33 27 46
Estonia 36 28 24 49 9 72
Hungary 40 29 29 45 16 62
Poland 65 7 48 22 39 40
Slovakia 59 19 28 44 26 50
In all the countries, negative opinions on the situation in the country prevail. The 
dominance of dissatisﬁed is the strongest in Poland and Bulgaria. But when asked about 
satisfaction with the current situation in their municipalities, councilors from Estonia, 
Hungary, and Slovakia usually give positive answers, while Poles and Bulgarians remain 
pessimistic (although to a much lower extent than in respect to the situation of the whole 
country). If we turn to councilors’ predictions about the direction of future changes in 
their municipalities, optimistic answers prevail in all ﬁve countries, although in Poland the 
diﬀerence between those believing in a better and in a worse future is only marginal. 
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Hungarian and Slovak councilors are also the most optimistic in their assessment of 
the quality of local administrative staﬀ.12 Once again, Bulgarians are the most skeptical 
in their opinions. Competency is assessed as weak or rather weak by 17% of Hungarian 
councilors but by 37% of Bulgarian councilors. Similarly, the proportion of respondents 
assessing them as outstanding or nearly outstanding varies from 35% in Bulgaria to 
60% in Hungary. 
Figure 5.16 illustrates the variation in the application of diﬀerent modern techniques 
in the management of local governments. The modernization index is based on the 
percentage of councilors’ declarations on the use of e-mail and the Internet in their work. 
Partnership with NGOs is based on the average proportion of local governments declaring 
ﬁnancial support for NGOs or contracting various services to NGOs (as declared by 
CEOs). Finally, the strategic planning index is based on the proportion of CEOs declaring 
long-term strategic development plans or long-term investment programs. 
Indices here refer to contemporary theories describing modern trends in local 
government. Both building horizontal non-hierarchical partnerships with non-
governmental actors and using management techniques traditionally typical for the 
private sector are elements of the shift from traditional local government to local governance 
as described by Rhodes (1997) and John (2001). The latter index can also be identiﬁed 
with the wider trend called New Public Management. Obviously, our survey does not 
allow us to check the quality of strategic planning documents, nor the real readiness 
of local governments to implement them. But at least we are able to realize how often 
“labels” of new ideas have been absorbed by local politicians and administrators. 
In two of three indices presented in Figure 5.16, the lowest score has been found in 
the case of Bulgaria (councilors’ modernization and partnership with NGOs), and in 
two cases Polish local governments have the highest score (strategic planning and NGO 
partnership index). Slovak local governments are the least willing (or ready) to adopt 
strategic planning techniques and are second to last in two remaining indices. 
Last but not least, the performance of local governments also depends on the ability 
to make decisions. Figure 5.17 presents how often councils have diﬃculty with making 
decisions and how often council meetings are stopped because of the lack of quorum. 
The situation (as assessed by CEOs) is clearly the most diﬃcult in Bulgaria, while the 
remaining four countries have similar scores, with Poland (followed by Hungary) in 
the lead. 
The overall assessment of the performance of local governments seems to be the most 
pessimistic in Bulgaria. This country has the lowest value of ﬁve out of seven indices 
presented in this section and it is second-to-last in one other. Slovak results are also 
low— with one of the lowest, and four second-to-lowest values. Estonia (followed by 
Poland) seems to be at another extreme. Estonia has the highest value of three indices, 
and in none of them does it score close to the bottom of the rank. 
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Figure 5.16
Modernization Measures of Management in Local Government
Figure 5.17
 Councils’ Diﬃculties in Decision-making, 
Mean of “Frequency of Abolished Decisions” and “Meetings Stopped 
because of Lack of Quorum”*
Note: * 0–100 scale: 0—never; 100—very often.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Over a decade after decentralization reform, local governments seem to be well rooted 
in the political systems of all ﬁve countries analyzed in this chapter. While they are 
well established in the literature classiﬁcations (Page and Goldsmith 1987; Hesse and 
Sharpe 1991; Loughlin 2001) of local democracies in Western Europe (South-European, 
North-European, Anglo-Saxon, etc.) there seems to be no uniform model for post-
communist Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, there are a variety of institutional 
solutions concerning territorial organization, scope of local ﬁscal autonomy, allocation 
of functions, etc. 
Similarly, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the practical functioning of local 
democratic systems. There are some common problems, however, such as corruption 
or weakness of social partners, who might enter development coalitions with local 
governments. But even these common problems are present in individual countries to 
a very diﬀerent extent. 
Although local governments are struggling with limited public interest, expressed 
by relatively low or decreasing electoral turnout, there are also clear signs of the success 
of the reforms. One of the clearest is that local authorities enjoy much higher levels of 
trust and satisfaction with their activity than is the case with central powers (government, 
parliament) in all countries considered in this book. 
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NOTES
1 Referring to the relationship between central and local government includes a bit 
of simpliﬁcation, since in such a framework we disregard multilevel governance 
(including the impact of the European Union). But this simpliﬁcation seems to be 
still legitimate—central governments are still a decisive factor in the limitation of 
local autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe. 
2 For a more extensive discussion of modiﬁcations to Haus and Heinelt’s deﬁnition 
of legitimacy—see Swianiewicz, Mielczarek, and Klimska 2005. 
3 Following Sharpe’s (1993) terminology I use the term “meso level” to describe the 
intermediate level of government between the centre and the basic municipal or communal 
level (p.1). It may take the form of regional or county-type level of government. 
4 More about changes in territorial organization, current debates in CEE countries, 
as well as a review of theoretical arguments for and against various territorial 
arrangements may be found in Swianiewicz, 2002.
5 This means that in Poland the CEO survey was organized before and the councilors’ 
survey after the introduction of direct mayors’ election. 
6 However, direct comparison is diﬃcult because of the variety in size of the analysed 
countries. Constructing per 100,000 ratio is not a good solution either, since 
many of these organizations operate on a national scale, so one should not expect 
proportionality between size of the country and number of NGOs. 
7 Precise methodology of index calculation is described in Swianiewicz and Mielczarek, 
2005. 
8 Precise formulation of the relevant question refers to the political bias: To the best 
of your knowledge, are civil servants in local administration very biased or not biased 
at all in their dealings with individual representatives and factions?. 
9 For a summary of arguments and data see, for example, Swianiewicz 2001. 
10 Figure 5.15 illustrates answers to the question: In your estimation, how will things 
be going in your local community ﬁve years from now? 
11 Generally speaking, how much are you satisifed with the way things are going in your 
country?
12 How do you rate the competence of civil servants of the local administration on a scale 
of weak to outstanding? 
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